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JUSTICE SCALIA'S FOOTPRINTS ON THE PUBLIC LANDS
BRET C. BIRDSONGt
ABSTRACT
This article explores Justice Scalia's views ofjudicial review of adminis-
trative action, as revealed in his writings on public land law, as both a
scholar and a Supreme Court justice. It examines and explains why Pro-
fessor Scalia favoredjudicial review of public land administration while
Justice Scalia seems to abhor it. In a sweeping law review article pub-
lished in 1970, Professor Scalia argued that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity historically did not apply in public lands cases. On the Court
he has penned two of the most significant decisions addressing judicial
review of public lands administration, each of them imposing new re-
strictions (or reviving old ones) on the availability of judicial redress for
executive unlawfulness. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
("Lujan I"), Justice Scalia used the law of standing, injected with separa-
tion of powers principles, to foreclose programmatic judicial review of
public land classification. And last year, in Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance ("SUWA"), he used traditional mandamus princi-
ples to foreclose judicial review of officials' alleged failure to achieve a
plain congressional mandate to maintain the wilderness quality of public
lands. Justice Scalia's imprint on public land law was foretold by his
scholarly writings, including his public lands article, which place great
emphasis on protecting executive discretion. He favors judicial review
for the vindication of traditional private rights while disfavoring it as a
means of ensuring the implementation of statutory, public values in the
face of the contrary exercise of executive discretion.
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INTRODUCTION
It is bombastic, perhaps, but not inaccurate to say that before there
was administrative law there was public land law. During the first cen-
tury and a half of this nation's history, probably the federal government's
most daunting administrative task was the management and administra-
tion of vast holdings of public land.' Then, and possibly now, the public
lands are a harbinger of American administrative law.
This article will examine Justice Scalia's views of judicial review of
administrative action, as revealed in his writings on public land law, as
both a scholar and a Supreme Court justice. Well before he joined the
Supreme Court, Scalia had established his stature as an administrative
law scholar.2 During a hiatus from academia in the early 1970s, he
served as the chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United
States.3 Upon his return to the cloistered fold, he continued as a player in
Washington regulatory world as editor of the influential journal Regula-
tion.4 In 1982, President Reagan appointed him to the D.C. Circuit court
1. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 231,414-19, 439 (2d ed.
1985); see generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).
2. In addition to the article explored at length in Part I of this article, to further examine
Scalia's significant scholarship on administrative law see Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The
A.P.A., the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345; Antonin Scalia, The
Hearing Examiner Loan Program, 1971 DUKE L.J. 319; Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regula-
tory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 97 (1987); Judicial Deference to Ad-
ministrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; and Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman,
Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899 (1973).
3. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographies
current.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
4. About Regulation Magazine, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulationlabout.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2005).
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of appeals, where his influence and expertise in administrative law
grew.5 He has parlayed his expertise into influence on the Court as the
author of several important administrative law decisions.
6
Antonin Scalia is no tenderfoot, either, when it comes to public land
law; he is a sourdough indeed.7 As an assistant professor at the Univer-
sity of Virginia, Scalia authored a sweeping article-the most substantial
of his early writings-that analyzed the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in public lands cases.8 He argued that courts had traditionally not applied
sovereign immunity in public lands cases, creating a historical and cate-
gorical exception to the doctrine's insulation from judicial review of ad-
ministrative action.9 On the Court he has penned two of the most signifi-
cant decisions addressing judicial review of public lands administration,
each of them imposing new restrictions (or reviving old ones) on the
availability of judicial redress for executive unlawfulness. In Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation (Lujan I),1° Justice Scalia used the law of
standing, injected with separation of powers principles, to foreclose pro-
grammatic judicial review of public land classification." And last year,
in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA),12 he used tradi-
tional mandamus principles to foreclose judicial review of officials' al-
leged failure to achieve a plain congressional mandate to maintain the
wilderness quality of public lands.
13
A primary goal of this article is to examine and explain why, at a
level one step removed from doctrinal specifics, Professor Scalia favored
judicial review of public land administration while Justice Scalia seems
to abhor it. On first consideration, it might appear that Justice Scalia has
had a change of heart regarding the proper role of the judiciary. But this
is not necessarily so. What came between his pronouncements as a public
land scholar and those as a public land justice was a transformation not
just of public land law but of administrative law in general. 14 A system of
rules developed initially to govern administration of private rights in
5. Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 3.
6. E.g., American Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). See generally Bernard
Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
1(1995).
7. The term "tenderfoot," as used by late-nineteenth century settlers in the American west,
referred to a newly arrived emigrant, not yet hardened to the difficulties of frontier life. The term
"sourdough," as used in the mining towns of Alaska and the Yukon, referred to a seasoned, experi-
enced prospector. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2178, 2355 (Philip Bab-
cock Gove et al. eds., 1986).
8. Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970).
9. Scalia, supra note 8, at 885.
10. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
11. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 899.
12. 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004).
13. SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2379-80.
14. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667,1669 (1975).
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public lands evolved into a system of rules intended to ensure the ade-
quate representation of the public interest in the administration of public
law. In the public land context specifically, in the interval between
Scalia's academic and judicial writings, Congress drew the curtain on the
"age of disposition," during which federal policy promoted the privatiza-
tion of public lands, in favor of a policy of federal retention and man-
agement of public lands for public purposes established by statute. 15
Justice Scalia's apparent reformation more likely reveals a steady
bearing in the changing tide of the law. That bearing is one which favors
judicial review of the administration of public laws impacting traditional
private rights or creating their equivalent. But the same bearing disfa-
vors (or at least seeks to limit) judicial review of the administration of
public laws that benefit individuals or groups representing some broader
aspect of the public interest. Seen in this light, Justice Scalia's writings
on public land law are perhaps the clearest indication of the course he
would chart for the law of judicial review of administrative action.
This article will proceed in three parts. Part One will examine Pro-
fessor Scalia's article on sovereign immunity in the public land cases. It
traces the themes in Scalia's early thinking about public land law and
judicial review. One theme is his understanding of public land cases as a
distinct body of law with a tradition of nonstatutory judicial review that
persevered in the face of the expanding doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity. A countervailing theme, however, is his preference for pro-
tecting executive discretion from judicial interference by means of other
doctrines, specifically standing and mandamus.
Part Two follows these themes through Justice Scalia's public lands
jurisprudence, examining Lujan I and SUWA in detail. It shows that,
while predictable, Scalia's invigoration of standing and mandamus prin-
ciples in those cases represents his imposition of his own scholarly ab-
stractions on the development of the law of judicial review-something
he admonished scholars against early in his academic career.
Part Three seeks to make sense of the path Scalia has forged in the
context of modem administrative law. It explores the "reformation" of
public land law and administrative law during the interval between his
academic and his judicial writings. It recasts Scalia's proclaimed reli-
ance on standing and mandamus doctrine as an effort to effect a "coun-
terreformation" of administrative law and to diminish the role of courts
as vindicators of public interest values. It shows that these writings press
against the tides of "reformed" administrative law by seeking to limit
judicial review of administrative decisions adversely affecting public
interest litigants. In this light, Scalia's footprints on the public lands are
15. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW Part A, Ch. 2, §2:1 (2005).
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properly viewed as leading to the development of different standards for
the availability of judicial review for private interest litigants than for
public interest litigants-a theme that Justice Scalia likely portends for
administrative law in general.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PUBLIC-LANDS CASES
It is surprising, given the path he has forged, that chance probably
led Antonin Scalia to the public lands. In 1967, he joined the law faculty
of the University of Virginia, where his senior colleague Carl McFarland
chaired the Public Land Law Review Commission, a congressionally-
mandated effort to suggest how the unruly field of public land law might
be brought to order. 16 At the time, both sovereign immunity and "non-
statutory review" of federal administrative action were garnering consid-
erable attention from administrative law scholars. Almost universally,
scholars loathed sovereign immunity.17  Scalia's Conclusions from the
Public-Lands Cases, written with the "advice and encouragement" of
Professor McFarland, 18 made a significant contribution to that literature,
arguing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was never properly ap-
plied in public lands cases and urging a return to the historical norm.
Scalia framed his analysis of sovereign immunity in Conclusions
from the Public- Lands Cases with an inquiry into disparate outcomes in
two then-recent cases seeking specific relief against federal officers ad-
ministering the public lands.' 9 In Malone v. Bowdoin,20 the plaintiffs
brought an ejectment action against a Forest Service official who as-
serted title on behalf of the United States.2' The plaintiffs alleged that
the putative fee title on which the Forest Service defended its possession
had been granted by a person, since deceased, who had owned only a life
estate, with the remainder in the plaintiffs. 22 The Supreme Court held the
complaint was properly dismissed on grounds that sovereign immunity
barred a suit for specific relief against the Forest Service officer under
the circumstances alleged2 3 In so holding, the Court applied a rule set
16. Inventory of the Papers of Carl McFarland, http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/
lawweb2.nsf/0/4b6e9b7556a137cf8525675200553ab0?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
17. Scalia wrote:
If there is one legal development (or, perhaps more accurately, nondevelopment) found in
the pages of the United States reports during the present century which would cause the
credulous observer to doubt the truth of [the] axiom [that scholarly criticism is a restraint
against judicial arbitrariness], it is the continued good health of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 867. Scalia cited a string of commentary dating to 1884, including Kenneth
Culp Davis's classic treatise, which summarily stated, "nearly every commentator who considers the
subject vigorously asserts that the doctrine of sovereign immunity must go." Id. at 867 n. 1 (citing 3
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 435 (1st ed. 1958)).
18. Scalia, supra note 8, at 867 n.*.
19. Scalia, supra note 8, at 872-82.
20. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
21. Malone, 369 U.S. at 643.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 648.
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out in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation24 in an
earlier attempt to "cut[] through the tangle of previous decisions ' 25 and
"resolve the conflict in [sovereign immunity] doctrine. 26
In contrast, sovereign immunity posed no obstacle to the invocation
of federal judicial power against a federal land official in Udall v.
Tallman, 7 a mandamus action which sought to compel the Secretary of
the Interior to issue federal oil and gas leases to applicants he had earlier
denied.28 Not only did the Court not base its decision on sovereign im-
munity, but the doctrine was not even mentioned by the Supreme Court,
the court of appeals, the trial court, or any of the parties' pleadings or
briefs throughout the litigation.2 9  Scalia's curiosity was justly piqued.
Surely a deeper blow at the United States's sovereignty is struck by "de-
mand[ing] [the] transfer of [a] legal interest which could be effected only
by the United States" and which had been denied after extensive admin-
istrative proceedings pursuant to an act of Congress than by merely seek-
ing to enforce a right of possession through a chain-of-title analysis that
required no positive action by the government and which fell within the
accepted competency of courts.3 °
Scalia concluded that the Court's application of sovereign immunity
in Malone was wrong and disregard of it in Tallman was correct as a
historical, if not doctrinal, matter.3' In so concluding, Scalia reviewed
the history of public land litigation dating from the nineteenth century
during which sovereign immunity posed no bar, closely analyzed a hand-
24. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
25. Malone, 369 U.S. at 647.
26. Larson, 337 U.S. at 701. Larson's rule, supposedly distilled from the cases in Chief Jus-
tice Vinson's plurality opinion, was that sovereign immunity bars suits for specific relief against an
officer of the sovereign actions except when the officer's action "is not within the officer's statutory
powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are
constitutionally void." Id. at 702. Larson cast in doubt, but did not overrule, a celebrated case in-
volving the widow of General Robert E. Lee, whose Arlington, Virginia, estate had been seized by
federal officers for nonpayment of taxes. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). In Lee, the
Court had explicitly rejected sovereign immunity as an obstacle to Mrs. Lee's ejectment action. Lee,
106 U.S. at 251.
27. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
28. Udall, 380 U.S. at 3.
29. Scalia, supra note 8, at 877.
30. Id. at 876-77. Scalia carefully analyzed and dismissed the likely explanations why sover-
eign immunity might not have been decisive in Tallman. He dispatched with possible arguments
that the failure to issue the lease fell within the ultra-vires-or-otherwise-unconstitutiona exceptions
of Larson, that the Mineral Leasing Act governing the leases in Tallman waived sovereign immu-
nity, and that Court's failure to apply sovereign immunity was the result of it not having been so
urged by the Solicitor General. Id. at 877-80. With the same pointed wit he would later famously
direct at others, including his colleagues on the Court, Scalia suggested that his own sense of "sur-
prise" that the Solicitor General failed to raise sovereign immunity might, to a skeptic of Scalia's
view, be "akin to a child's astonishment at watching a tight-rope walker for the first time-how
marvelous that he should not only walk along such a narrow wire, but carry and balance a long stick
at the same time!" Id. at 879-80. Nonetheless, he parried the suggested infirmity by pointing out
that only Congress, not inaction by a federal officer, can waive sovereign immunity and that the
doctrine is jurisdictional and is properly raised sua sponte by a court. Id. at 880.
31. Id. at 909, 919.
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ful of public lands cases in which the Court-erroneously, in his view-
applied sovereign immunity in the early twentieth century, and argued
that Tallman's result was in historical repose notwithstanding its irrecon-
cilable inconsistency with Larson's putative unified theory of sovereign
immunity.32 Public lands cases, according to Scalia, simply represent a
historically distinct category of cases in which nonstatutory review of
federal administrative action was properly available in spite of sovereign
immunity.33 Whether as oracle or prophet, Scalia concludes:
[H]owever solid and permanent that unifying theory may be, it will
not be applied to the area of nonstatutory review of public-lands de-
terminations. The accumulated mass of decisional law in this area
contrary to Larson is too overwhelming; and in the conflict, it is the
general rather than the specific, the theoretical rather than the practi-
cal, the abstract thesis rather than the historical actuality, which will
yield.34
There are four strains of Scalia's thinking in Conclusions from the
Public-Lands Cases that merit further elaboration-the explicit recogni-
tion of public lands cases as an "existential" category of cases within
which doctrine might acceptably develop that is inconsistent with
broader theoretical justification or application; the recognition that judi-
cial review had been and should be available in public lands cases; his
favoritism for both standing and traditional mandamus standards as
means to protect executive discretion from judicial encroachment; and
his criticism of scholars-albeit gentle-for a tendency to impose theo-
retical, generalized principles on the common law rather than deriving
them from it.
A. Public Lands Cases as an "Existential" Category ofLaw
The first important strand of Scalia's analysis of sovereign immu-
nity and public lands cases is his emphatic claim that public lands cases
are an "existential" category of cases to which the unified doctrine of
sovereign immunity does not apply. After much careful analysis of how
the Court applied sovereign immunity doctrine to several public lands
cases in a series of missteps, mistakes, and results-orientated self-
protection,35 he comes to the shrugging conclusion that sovereign immu-
nity does not apply in public lands cases simply because public lands
32. Id. at 909-20.
33. Id. at 909.
34. Id. Scalia makes clear his normative belief in this historical dialectic. The "correct"
general conclusion to be drawn from his analysis of the public lands cases is that "[n]either Larson,
nor any other theory which purports to provide a universally valid standard for the applicability of
sovereign immunity to suits against federal officials, can or will be followed unless it either rejects
sovereign immunity entirely or contains an exclusionary factor based plainly and simply upon his-
torical prescription," Id. at 912-13.
35. See id. at 886-909.
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cases are a category of cases in which the doctrine does not apply.36 He
supports his view not by providing theoretical or doctrinal reasons why
public lands cases are different from others seeking relief against federal
executive officials but by pointing out that there are other "existential"
categories of cases in which the same is true, namely post office cases
and tax cases. 37 These categories are "well-defined and fully developed
'existential' categories of legal activity" outside the rubric of sovereign
immunity.3 8 In this view, public lands cases are not simply an indistinct
subset of the vast population of sovereign immunity cases posing
"unique or rarely recurring fact situations"; they "constitute what is
probably the oldest continuous body of federal case-law relating to the
validity and effect of a particular type of administrative activity."
39
To be sure, Scalia's recognition that public lands cases form a dis-
tinct category in which courts could justifiably depart from theoretical
doctrine is based on a pragmatic appreciation of attorney and judicial
practice rather than principle. Though the existence of a public lands
"category" of cases justifies departure from Larson's supposedly unify-
ing theory of sovereign immunity, that is solely due to the fact that "the
actual development of the law has to a large extent been compartmental-
ized-into, for example, public-lands cases, post-office cases, and tax
cases." 40 As a practical matter, lawyers and judges seek answers to legal
issues in those distinct compartments of factually similar, commonly
pedigreed cases.4 1 Scalia quips that a lawyer casually speaking with an-
other would likely describe the case on which "he" was working as "a
products liability case, an automobile accident case, or an eviction case,"
but probably not as a "sovereign immunity case," even though sovereign
immunity might be an important contested issue.42 The same, he main-
tains, is true of a public lands case. Scalia explicitly states that "there is
in principle nothing distinctive about the public-lands cases" in compari-
son to other lawsuits seeking relief against federal administrative offi-
cers. 43 Nonetheless, what remains important here is that Scalia's com-
partmentalization of public lands cases justifies, in his view, the depar-
ture from theoretical doctrine. His analysis exalts pragmatism at the ex-
pense of theory.
36. Id. at 909.
37. Id. at 913-15.
38. Id. at 882.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 919.
41. See id. at 918-19 (describing how federal appellate judges had disregarded Larson in
public lands cases because "working always within the context of a particular set of facts, the felt the
pull of factually similar precedent.").
42. Id. at 882.
43. Id. at 919.
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B. The Availability of Nonstatutory Review in Public Lands Cases
Another important strand of Scalia's thinking in Conclusions from
the Public-Lands Cases is his embrace of "nonstatutory" review as a
mechanism for judicial oversight of public lands determinations by ad-
ministrative officials. Nonstatutory review refers to judicial review of
administrative action that is not obtained under a specific statutory provi-
sion creating a right to judicial review. 44 Before the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act45 and other modem legislation 46 created generally applicable
rights of action for injunctive and other specific relief against govern-
ment officials, judicially-crafted "nonstatutory" review provided the only
means to challenge federal administrative action.47 It is generally con-
sidered to encompass actions for injunction, declaratory judgment, man-
damus and other specific relief.48 As Scalia himself described, it is:
[T]he type of review of administrative action which is available, not
by virtue of those explicit review provisions contained in most mod-
em statutes which create administrative agencies, but rather through
the use of traditional common-law remedies ... against the officer
who is allegedly misapplying his statutory authority or exceeding his
constitutional power.
49
As Professor Siegel has noted, today's lawyer versed in judicial review
under the APA might understandably be unfamiliar with nonstatutory
review.50 Yet nonstatutory review remains important for the insight it
provides on the legal theory of suing the government and, equally impor-
44. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The
Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matier Jurisdiction, and Parties Defen-
dant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 395 (1970). In focusing on nonstatutory review and sovereign immu-
nity, Scalia placed himself in the company of several administrative law luminaries examining the
same topics. Professor Cramton's study was published in the same volume of the Michigan Law
Review as Scalia's Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases. See also, Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing
the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1962); Louis L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 197-256 (1965); Clark Byse, Proposed
Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties,
Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479 (1962); Clark Byse & Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967).
45. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2005).
46. The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2005).
47. Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1612, 1625 (1997). Professor Siegel recounts many of the famous cases that proceeded by
means of nonstatutory review, including: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (the Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
48. See, Cramton, supra note 44, at 395 n.28.
49. Scalia, supra note 8, at 870.
50. Siegel, supra note 47, at 1625. In 1976, Congress amended the APA to waive sovereign
immunity in suits seeking relief "other than money damages" against the United States and its offi-
cers. Before 1976, there had been some disagreement as to whether the APA's provision of a right
to judicial review also amounted to a waiver of sovereign immunity, but the bulk of authority held
that it did not. Id. at 1623.
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tant here, the Justice Scalia's attitude regarding the role of the judiciary
in providing relief against governmental wrongdoing.
Nonstatutory review, and the inapplicability of sovereign immunity
it entailed, permitted an individual injured by a government official's
conduct to bring an action against the official, supposedly as a private,
rather than government, defendant. By ordering the official, in his indi-
vidual capacity, to act or refrain from acting so as to remain within the
bounds of the law, courts could thus pretend that they were affording no
relief against the "immune" sovereign government. The supposition, of
course, was a fiction; a suit nominally against an individual officer was
really against the sovereign government. Our "government of laws, and
not of men, 51 depends wholly on individual officials to act, and the very
motivation of the fiction was to provide for some relief against the "indi-
vidual" official to remedy the injustice at the hands of the sovereign-
what Professor Seigel calls the "remedial imperative. 52
Scalia's recognition of the tradition of nonstatutory review for pub-
lic lands cases is important, first, for the mere fact of it. It is a recogni-
tion by Scalia that public lands cases constitute a category of cases for
which there historically existed a judicial remedy for government illegal-
ity, based, in a sense, on the remedial imperative. Though Scalia did not
use the words himself, administrative determinations relating to the pub-
lic lands were subject to a "presumption of reviewability. 53 In this light,
Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases is more than an academic
statement-now moot because sovereign immunity has since been
waived-that sovereign immunity is not a bar to judicial review of public
lands cases. It is a statement that public lands administration historically
has been and ought to be subject to judicial review.
Second, Scalia's recognition of nonstatutory review for public lands
cases says something about his openness to judicial involvement in for-
mulating judicial remedies for administrative wrongdoing. Despite its
name, there is some minor disagreement among scholars whether non-
statutory review is, in fact, extra-statutory. Professor Siegel, for exam-
ple, characterizes nonstatutory review as a judge-made doctrine by
51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
52. Siegel, supra note 47, at 1627-28.
53. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 423 (1958).
Professor Jaffe coined the phrase "presumption of reviewability." Id This was rooted it in a post-
office case, American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). In that case,
the court stated: "The acts of all ... officers must be justified by some law, and in case an official
violates the law to the injury of an individual the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief"
Id. at 108 (emphasis added). Scalia, for his part, cited the same case as the earliest in a line of au-
thority that he said establishes "post-office cases" as a separate "existential" category of cases in
which private individuals could seek relief, by means of nonstatutory review and notwithstanding
sovereign immunity, for officials' incorrect interpretations of the mail statutes. Scalia, supra note 8,
at 913-14 n.215. Notably, Scalia pointed out that American School of Magnetic Healing "cited no
judicial precedent in support of its holding except public-lands cases." Id.
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means of which "courts could ensure the rule of law. 54 Professor Jaffe
famously reckoned that nonstatutory review was a facet of a "common
law of judicial review," and specifically noted that public lands was one
of several "important areas of administration . . . in which the federal
courts allow appropriate common-law proceedings to test the legality of
federal actions. 55 Scalia correctly points out that nonstatutory review
actions, like all others in federal court "are, strictly speaking, statutory,"
at least in the sense that federal court jurisdiction must derive from some
statute.56  In this view, "[s]o-called 'nonstatutory review' proceedings
are, more accurately, those which are brought under the statutes of gen-
eral applicability, as opposed to statutes specifically designed to enable
judicial review of the actions of a particular agency or agencies.,,5' But
such hair splitting amounts to no more than a semantic quibble given
Scalia's explicit embrace of Jaffe's coining of a "common law of judicial
review,, 58 and his recognition that the common law of judicial review
applies not only to nonstatutory review, but also to "fill the numerous
interstices which any statutory-review provision contains. '59  Thus,
Scalia acknowledges without serious criticism the judicial role in creat-
ing, or enhancing, a practice (if not a theory) of nonstatutory judicial
review in public lands cases.60
54. Siegel, supra note 47, at 1631.
55. Jaffe, supra note 53, at 411. Jaffe also included within his construction of a common law
of judicial review the "whole congeries of judicial theories and practices which condition not only
the use of common-law writs but the statutory provisions [for judicial review] as well." Id. These
included the political question doctrine, sovereign immunity, exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the requirement of proper parties. Id.
56. Scalia, supra note 8, at 870 n.12. Scalia explains: "For example, a common type of
nonstatutory proceeding is the suit for injunction, brought under the 'federal question' provision and
the 'all writs' provision of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1651 (1962)--provisions which
may support suit against an official of any federal agency or indeed against private citizens." Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 870 ("These remedies gave rise to what Professor Jaffe has aptly called the 'com-
mon law of judicial review."').
59. Id. at 870 n.13.
60. Professor Siegel has convincingly shown that the nonstututory review, in both its incep-
tion and perseverance through numerous theoretical and practical challenges over the years, is
largely a creature of judicial ingenuity, even if subject matter jurisdiction originates from a statutory
grant. Siegel, supra note 47, at 1632. Propelled by the remedial imperative, judges first created the
legal fiction that permitted nonstatutory review proceedings to avoid the problem of sovereign im-
munity, and then revived it when the other doctrines began to obscure the essence and motivation of
the fiction and threatened to thwart the remedial imperative:
The ... unfolding of nonstatutory review was really the great testing of the remedial im-
perative through the medium of judicial creativity .... Again and again, judges demon-
strated that the remedial imperative, operating through the mechanism of nonstatutory re-
view, overcomes the assertion of sovereign immunity. This is not to say that nonstatutory
review always overcame every possible barrier to judicial relief, but it is to say that
judges, faced on the one hand with the need to provide relief to injured plaintiffs, and on
the other with a doctrine of sovereign immunity that never rested on a solid and com-
monly accepted basis, regarded the need to provide relief as more important than the
claim of the govemment to be free from judicial process. Judges refused to leave remedi-
less those wronged by governmental action, even though sovereign immunity prevented a
straightforward suit against the government itself. The three themes noted above - a legal
doctrine that separates the government officer from the government, the motivations of
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Third, Scalia's discussion of the relationship between the right of
review under the APA and its nonstatutory review antecedents indicates
his belief in the vitality of nonstatutory review as a distinct theory of
judicial review which the courts are powerless to restrict. In a separate
appendix to his Conclusion from the Public-Lands Cases article,6' Scalia
analyzed whether the provisions of the APA providing for judicial re-
view, as originally enacted, waived sovereign immunity. He concluded
that, even though the APA was "jurisdictional" in the sense that it pro-
vided for subject matter jurisdiction, it was not "jurisdictional" in the
sense of waiving sovereign immunity. 62 He cited several cases, includ-
ing Larson and Malone, brought after the enactment of the APA in which
the Court nonetheless held that sovereign immunity barred actions
against federal officials.6 3 As for the "many" public lands decisions
which refer to the action having been brought "under the APA" without
any reference to sovereign immunity, Scalia offers an explanation that is
"more limited than the hypothesis that the APA constitutes a general
waiver [of sovereign immunity], and which would reconcile these cases
with what appears to be the overwhelming weight of judicial opinion in
other fields, namely ... that there must be acknowledged a separate rule
for traditional 'nonstatutory review' cases. ' 64
Further, in the text of his article, Scalia characterizes the APA as a
congressional "restatement of the existing law" on judicial review of
administrative action.65 The import of this view that the APA codified
the existing law is that it deprives courts of the authority to diminish
rights to challenge federal administrative action that courts had devel-
oped before 1946, including the right to judicial review of public lands
cases. Thus, though the APA did not waive sovereign immunity, it "took
providing relief to those injured by government action and keeping government within
the bounds of law, and judicial creativity in finding remedies in the absence of any statu-
tory remedies - continually recurred.
Id. One can only surmise whether Professor Scalia would have subscribed to this analysis. I suspect
that he would not have gone so far as to openly admit to such judicial activism. It is clearer that
Justice Scalia today would chafe at the notion that judges should openly exercise their creativity-
interstitially or not-to create or protect remedies against the government. Professor Siegel charac-
terizes Justice Scalia as exemplary of "an unfortunate, retrograde period in which courts often seek
to disclaim their role in righting governmental wrongs." Id. at 1705 ("The opinions of some judges,
like Justice Scalia, frequently suggest that courts should be perfectly content to see a wrong go
unremedied."); id. at 1614 ("Today, many judges - most notably Justice Scalia-apparently seek to
abnegate the judicial role in creating remedies against the government."). Professor Siegel cites
Scalia's opinions in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 823 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) and Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612-13 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), but the Justice's public lands opinions would suffice to support the same conclusion. See
infra Part II.
61. Scalia, supra note 8, app. at 920-24 (entitled, Appendix: Concerning the Question
Whether the Administrative Procedure Act is "Jurisdictional" in the Sense of Constituting a Waiver
of Sovereign Immunity).
62. Id. at 922.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 923-24.
65. Scalia, supra note 8, at 917.
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away the Supreme Court's power to deny relief ... through subsequent
judicial revision of the principles of sovereign immunity," and possibly
"prevent[ed] [them] from raising any new obstacles to suit in the tradi-
tional fields of nonstatutory review .... What the courts had granted
public lands plaintiffs before the APA, they could no longer taketh away
without further congressional action.67
C. Alternative Means to Sovereign Immunity for Protecting Executive
Discretion
Lest the reader begin to conclude that Scalia, in his early years,
sought to throw open the doors of federal courts for plaintiffs to chal-
lenge every exercise of public lands administration, there is a hitch. The
most telling of the important strands of thought in Scalia's Public-Lands
article is his view that courts should use alternative doctrines to sover-
eign immunity to preserve executive discretion. In particular, Scalia
highlights standing and mandamus principles.
The bulk of Conclusions from the Pubic-Lands Cases traces what
Scalia regarded as the Supreme Court's erroneous application of sover-
eign immunity in a few public lands cases during the early twentieth cen-
tury. According to Scalia, the Court's error was rooted in a mistaken
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as encompassing "domestic"
as well as "foreign" sovereign immunity.68 The error was magnified by
the Court's conflation of sovereign immunity for states, on the one hand,
and the federal government, on the other.69 The amenability of the fed-
eral government to suit in federal court, Scalia correctly argues, is a clas-
sic case of "domestic" sovereign immunity.7° Finally, the wrongful ap-
plication of sovereign immunity in the public lands cases, Scalia argues,
was compounded by the Court's own desire to protect its docket from a
feared onslaught of original jurisdiction cases.71
But the error of the Court's way is less significant, as a reflection of
Scalia's impact on public land law, than his analysis of its return to the
66. Id.
67. It is unclear whether Professor Scalia would also have argued that the APA's codification
of the existing law of judicial review would also prevent courts from exercising creativity to en-
hance, rather than diminish, the right to judicial review of cases in the "traditional fields of nonstatu-
tory review" such as public lands. His analysis could be read to assume that the APA incorporated
nonstatutory review, wholly eliminating the ability of courts to change preexisting law in any way.
Professor Siegel, however, has convincingly shown that the APA neither eliminated nor subsumed
nonstatutory review and that nonstatutory review is available when the APA does not provide a
remedy and even when the plaintiff prefers nonstatutory review to an APA remedy. Siegel, supra
note 47, at 1665-68 (arguing that nothing in the text or in the discernible congressional intent could
be read to limit or exclude nonstatutory review). If the APA codified nonstatutory review as "exist-
ing law" but did not subsume it as part of an exclusive scheme, then courts would presumably still
be free to enhance the right of review through judicial revision.
68. Scalia, supra note 8, at 887-88.
69. Id. at 887.
70. Id. at 887-88.
71. See id. at 888.
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true path. Shortly after first using sovereign immunity to bar a public
lands case,72 the Court began to retreat, first in ordinary mandamus
cases73 and eventually in cases within the Court's original jurisdiction.74
The Court, of course, did not always grant relief in these cases. In a
number of cases in which the Court omitted to mention sovereign immu-
nity or applied it as an alternative ground, it ruled against the plaintiff on
the basis of other doctrines that serve to protect federal officers' discre-
tion in public lands administration. These doctrines, Scalia noted, in-
cluded the by-then discredited "passage-of-title" theory75 and, more im-
portantly, the traditional elements of mandamus relief, particularly the
insistence that the writ can issue only to compel the exercise of "ministe-
rial," as opposed to "discretionary" duties.76
Scalia's preference for other theories to preserve executive discre-
tion is clearest in the final flourish of his sovereign immunity analysis.
Scalia cites Morrison v. Work77 as the last public lands case in which the
Supreme Court had sustained the defense of sovereign immunity.78 The
suit sought a mandatory injunction and other relief against various fed-
eral officials, including the Secretary of the Interior, regarding their du-
ties under a statute governing the management and disposition of lands
ceded by the Chippewa Indians of Minnesota. 79 The Court, Scalia points
out, could easily have disposed of the case in one fell swoop by invoking
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.8° Indeed, that might have been the
expectation, given that the suit closely resembled Naganab, the high wa-
ter mark for sovereign immunity in public lands cases.8'
But, rather than merely rely on the case's likeness to Naganab, Jus-
tice Brandeis parsed the case into three different categories of claims.
The first set of claims alleged that the Congressional act authorizing the
challenged administrative acts was unlawful for failure to obtain the con-
sent of the Chippewas. These claims, Brandeis wrote, were barred by
72. Scalia, supra note 8, at 895-96 (citing Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60, 70 (1906)
(noting that sovereign immunity was an alternative ground) and Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S.
473, 476 (1906), (noting that it was the only ground for the decision)).
73. Id. at 898 (citing Garfield v. United States, ex rel Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249 (1908)).
74. Id. at 901-02 (citing Minnesota v. Lane, 247 U.S. 243 (1918)).
75. The "passage-of-title" doctrine held that as long as legal title to public lands remained in
the United States--even if a claimant had established an equitable right to occupancy or the issuance
of a land patent-the Land Department (later the Department of the Interior) had sole jurisdiction to
the exclusion of courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473, 478 (1899). The doctrine,
though never explicitly overruled, was effectively repudiated by Land v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174, 182
(1917).
76. Scalia, supra note 8, at 898-902.
77. 266 U.S. 481 (1925).
78. Scalia, supra note 8, at 903.
79. Morrison, 266 U.S. at 483-84.
80. Scalia, supra note 8, at 906.
81. Morrison involved the same statute as Naganab and, like the earlier case, was brought by
a Chippewa Indian on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. See id., at 903-04.
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sovereign immunity. 82  By overtly applying sovereign immunity to the
claims challenging the act of Congress, Scalia notes, Brandeis grudg-
ingly followed Naganab, but only on the narrowest possible grounds.83
The importance of this limited application of sovereign immunity, ac-
cording to Scalia, was that the doctrine would retain vitality (at least in
public lands cases) only with respect to suits challenging legislative, not
executive, action.84 According to Scalia, Brandeis's disposition of the
other claims in Morrison shows a better way to protect executive discre-
tion.85
A second set of claims alleged that the officials sued had miscon-
strued or misapplied the statute. Brandeis's analysis of these claims had
two facets. The plaintiff could not maintain them because he "[wa]s not
in a position to litigate in this proceeding the legality of the acts com-
plained of," having asserted a right that "resembles the general right of
every citizen to have the government administered according to law and
the public moneys properly applied., 86 But Brandeis played the sover-
eign immunity card as well, concluding his discussion of those claims by
again referring to the courts' lack of power "to interfere with the per-
formance of the functions committed to an executive department... by a
suit to which the United States is not, and cannot be made, a party.,
87
Scalia construed Justice Brandeis's focus on the plaintiffs interest as an
attempt "to convert into 'lack of standing' much of what earlier cases
would have called 'sovereign immunity.',, 88  In Scalia's view, the refer-
ence to sovereign immunity was "Justice Brandeis' subtle way of imply-
ing that in the past the doctrine of sovereign immunity had often been
applied to secure ends which could be achieved more properly . . .
through the recently expanded principles of standing. 89
82. Morrison, 266 U.S. at 485-86. As Scalia points out, Justice Brandeis applied a variant of
sovereign immunity based on his characterization of the United States as an "indispensable party"
which could not be joined as a defendant without its consent. Scalia, supra note 8, at 904 n. 174. As
Professor Siegel explains, the "indispensable parties" form of sovereign immunity stemmed from
courts' loss of focus on the fiction that enabled nonstatutory review in the first place, i.e., that a suit
against an officer was not really a suit against the United States. Siegel, supra note 47, at 1653-55.
83. Scalia, supra note 8, at 906.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Morrison, 266 U.S. at 486, 488.
87. Id. at 488.
88. Scalia, supra note 8, at 905 n.179. Scalia unsatisfactorily minimizes Brandeis's reliance
on sovereign immunity, noting that Brandeis wrote that the United States could not be joined "under
the circumstances here presented." Id. (quoting Morrison, 266 U.S. at 488). He fails to offer any
reason why the plaintiff's lack of a sufficient interest would enhance the applicability of sovereign
immunity. Id. Further, as Scalia admits, any lack of standing applicable to this set of claims would
be equally applicable to the others. Id. Despite Brandeis's discussion of the plaintiff's interest in the
proper administration of the trust-which, in any event, would put Indian allottees on a different
footing than beneficiaries of a private trust-it cannot be said that he based his analysis on standing
rather than sovereign immunity. See id
89. Id. at 905 n.179 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477, 488 (1923)) (emphasis
added). Scalia accepts that his reading of Morrison and Brandeis's designs are not the only plausible
ones. Id. What is important here is that Scalia signals his own preference for the doctrine of standing
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The third set of claims sought a mandatory injunction to compel the
Secretary to dispose of lands in a particular way. The plaintiffs aim was
to enhance the value of the trust fund of which he and other Chippewa
Indians were beneficiaries. 90 As to these claims, Justice Brandeis, with-
out mentioning sovereign immunity, held that a mandatory injunction is
an "exercise of sound judicial discretion" and was not warranted because
of insufficient equity. 91 Even here, Scalia emphasizes what he regards as
Justice Brandeis's standing overture.92
The purpose of this detail is not to saddle the reader-though it
might-but to highlight Scalia's obvious admiration for what he re-
garded as Justice Brandeis's deft reliance on alternative theories to sov-
ereign immunity to protect the executive from judicial "interference."
Scalia regarded Morrison as more than an attempt to right the law by
limiting the applicability of sovereign immunity to public lands cases.
The opinion is better read
as an ambitious attempt to adjust the role of sovereign immunity in
all its applications so that it would be relied upon, when appropriate,
only to insulate the legislative branch from judicial interference. Un-
der that interpretation, the protection of the executive branch would
be achieved by other devices, such as (1) the well-established minis-
terial-discretionary dichotomy... ; (2) the principle of standing...
perhaps expanded to cover many cases formerly disposed of on the
ground of sovereign immunity; and (3) a greater emphasis upon the
"discretionary" character of mandamus and injunctive relief.
93
In this view, sovereign immunity was superfluous because other doc-
trines could insulate the executive from judicial meddling.
D. Scholars, Judges, and the Common Law
Before turning to Justice Scalia's implementation of these principles
in the public lands opinions he has authored, it is fitting to note his con-
cluding comment on "the difficult role of the scholar in the common-law
to protect executive discretion against judicial intrusions-an early reflection of his view of standing
as promoting separation of powers he would later more fully develop. See Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881
(1983) [hereinaftler Scalia, Doctrine of Standing].
90. Scalia, supra note 8, at 905.
91. Morrison, 266 U.S. at 490.
92. Scalia characterized this third holding as based, in part, on a finding that the plaintiff had
an "insufficient interest." Scalia, supra note 8, at 905. Justice Brandeis noted that Congress had
specifically provided for suits by Indians who vainly sought an allotment to which they were enti-
tled. Id. But his point was not that the plaintiff was not himself a disappointed allotee. Id. Rather,
as a matter of equity, "it is not necessary to seek redress indirectly by this proceeding." Morrison,
266 U.S. at 490.
93. Scalia, supra note 8, at 906-07. Scalia notes: "If that was the attempt, it certainly failed,
for Morrison has disappeared into the faceless crowd of inconsistent and irreconcilable cases on
sovereign immunity." Id.
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system., 94  If the common law system, he concludes, "is to make good
the boast that its legal rules are hammered out on the anvil of reality,
then the common-law scholar, unlike his civil-law counterpart, must de-
rive his unifying principles from the case law instead of imposing them
upon it."'95 As a foil for this theme, Scalia recounts the failure of Larson
to establish a lasting and truly universal theory of sovereign immunity-
as evidenced by the continuing tradition of judicial review in public
lands cases. Scholars, "approaching the problem from the top rather than
the bottom, and seeking to follow out a principle rather than to adjudicate
a dispute," had missed the distinctiveness of public lands cases.96
Rather, they had lumped them together with the undifferentiated throngs
of cases "which happen to fall within the broad conceptual category" of
cases against federal officers seeking specific relief.97  In contrast, fed-
eral appellate courts adjudicating public lands cases, working from the
bottom, were not "misled" by Larson's putative universality.98
Both Larson and Morrison, however, might be regarded as schol-
arly opinions in the sense that they approached the problem of sovereign
immunity from the top-down perspective that Scalia criticizes. Larson-
an opinion almost universally criticized by scholars, including Scalia-
sought to untangle and resolve conflict in the sovereign immunity doc-
trine by imposing a general rule that did not accord with the cases. 99 And
in Morrison Justice Brandeis, by Scalia's own reckoning, ambitiously
sought to adjust the law of sovereign immunity "in all its applications,"
limiting its applicability to challenges to legislative action while convert-
94. Id. at 918.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 919.
97. Id.
98. Id. Scalia writes:
In fact, the tradition of judicial review of public-lands determinations would have contin-
ued even if the APA had not fortuitously been passed before, rather than after, Larson...
. The day in which the broad abstraction of Larson, however frequently affirmed, can suf-
fice, APA or not, to destroy the vitality of a long line of cases, factually cohesive among
themselves and factually divergent from anything specifically considered in Larson it-
self-that day, surely, will be the morning after the twilight of the common-law. Until
then, it is not the historically consistent factual treatment, but rather the abstraction,
which will be twisted into compliance or, if necessary, ignored.
Id. at 918.
99. Larson, 337 U.S. at 705. Justice Frankfurter began his dissent in Larson-an exegesis of
sovereign immunity case law-with the following admonition, somewhat at odds with Scalia:
Case-by-case adjudication gives to the judicial process the impact of actuality and
thereby saves it from the hazards of generalizations insufficiently nourished by experi-
ence. There is, however, an attendant weakness to a system that purports to pass merely
on what are deemed to be the particular circumstances of a case. Consciously or uncon-
sciously the pronouncements in an opinion too often exceed the justification of the cir-
cumstances on which they re based, or, contrariwise, judicial preoccupation with the
claims of the immediate leads to a succession of ad hoc determinations making for even-
tual confusion and conflict. There comes a time when the general considerations under-
lying each specific situation must be exposed in order to bring the too unruly instances
into more fruitful harmony.
Id. at 705-06 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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ing the law of executive sovereign immunity into a law of standing. 00
Scalia intended his admonition to scholars to help buffer the pragmatic
development of the common law from the abstracting influence of schol-
ars. Yet, at the climax of his analysis, he praises Justice Brandeis's judi-
cial abstraction, his imposition of supposedly unifying principles of sov-
ereign immunity, standing and mandamus.
II. JUSTICE SCALIA'S PUBLIC LANDS OPINIONS
As a young professor, Scalia noted: "What scholars represent as the
law has a tendency to become such. .. ."'01 No doubt, he meant this as a
testament to the power the scholarly pulpit and the influence of scholarly
analysis on the courts. Unlike most scholars, however, Antonin Scalia
became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1986.102 Justice
Scalia has participated in numerous decisions that, in some way, address
the public lands. He has written the opinion for the Court in two: Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation10 3 and Norton v. Southern Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance. °4 In these opinions, Justice Scalia has done what appears
to be a double pirouette, twice. In both cases he retreated from his re-
spect, as a professor, for the tradition of judicial review in the existential
category of public lands cases. And in both cases he did so by imposing
his scholarly abstractions on the field of judicial review.
A. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Infusing Separation of Powers
Principles into Standing
1. The Opinion
In Lujan I, several national environmental groups brought suit under
the APA against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Secre-
tary of the Interior to challenge "rampant" illegality in the administration
of the BLM's statutory land management responsibilities regarding land
withdrawals.' 0 5 By passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA), 0 6 Congress directed the BLM to conduct various inven-
tory and management planning activities for the 180 million acres under
its administration.107 These activities include inventorying the resource
and other values and classifying the lands for future uses in order to
achieve "multiple use" management l8 Among FLPMA's authorized
management tools are the reclassification of lands which had earlier been
designated for particular uses (sometimes to the exclusion of others) and
100. Scalia, supra note 8, at, 905 n. 179, 906-07.
101. Scalia, supra note 8, at 919.
102. Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 3.
103. 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Lujan 1).
104. 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004).
105. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 891.
106. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1734a (1982).
107. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford (Burford]), 835 F.2d 305, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
108. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 877 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 171 l(a)); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a)).
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the power to "make, modify, extend or revoke" land withdrawals. 0 9 The
revocation of a withdrawal would typically have the effect of opening the
lands to potential mineral development." 0 The plaintiffs alleged that the
BLM's activities in relation to its "land withdrawal review program"
violated FLPMA, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
the APA. "'
Whether because of the tradition of nonstatutory review or the
APA's 1976 amendment, sovereign immunity no longer bars such an
action, and the issue before the Court was standing-or, more particu-
larly, the prudential aspect of standing. Specifically, the issue was
whether the plaintiffs were "adversely affected or aggrieved" by BLM's
actions as required by the APA's general provision for judicial review.12
In response to government motions to dismiss and for summary judg-
ment, the National Wildlife Federation provided the affidavits of two
members who attested to using lands "in the vicinity" of the Arizona
Strip in northern Arizona and the South Pass-Green Mountain area of
Wyoming." 3 The parties agreed that the BLM had already terminated at
least one land withdrawal on the Arizona Strip and another in the area
referred to in the Wyoming affidavit.' "4 Writing for five members of the
Court, Scalia found these affidavits insufficiently specific to withstand a
motion for summary judgment." 5
Had Scalia rested there, Lujan I might be regarded as little more
than a guide to the technical rules of standing, or even just summary
judgment." 6 But Scalia went on to address a bigger issue-one infused
109. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 877 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1712(d) (reclassification), § 1714(a) (with-
drawals)).
110. Burfordl, 835 F.2d at 329. The term "withdrawal" is an artifact of the pre-FLPMA era in
which myriad laws provided for the disposal of federal lands by transfer of title or lesser property
interests to private parties. See Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 875. It refers to the withdrawal, or removal, of
designated lands from the normal operation of these laws, which included the mineral laws. Burford
1, 835 F.2d at 308. FLPMA, which reflected a shift in federal policy from disposal to retention of
public lands, repealed most of the disposal laws, but left in place those providing for mineral devel-
opment. See Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 877 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1701).
111. Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 875.
112. Id. at 885. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
113. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 880, 886.
114. Id. at 885-86.
115. Id. at 889. Scalia wrote:
[W]here the fact in question is the one put in issue by the § 702 challenge here-whether
one of respondent's members has been, or is threatened to be, 'adversely affected or ag-
grieved' by Government action-Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by averments
which state only that one of respondent's members uses unspecified portions of an im-
mense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has occurred or
probably will occur by virtue of the governmental action. It will not do to 'presume' the
missing facts because without them the affidavits would not establish the injury that they
generally allege.
Id.
116. Justice Scalia circulated his first draft opinion to the members of the Court on June 5,
1990. In response, Justice Stevens, who voted against the majority in conference and eventually
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with concern for the separation of powers. The plaintiffs could not rely
on additional affidavits-presumably not hampered by their nonspecific-
ity-to establish standing because no affidavits could suffice to enable a
challenge to the "so-called 'land withdrawal review program."" 17 Scalia
characterized the problem as one of definition, but his concern was the
scope of judicial relief. The land withdrawal review program (to the
extent such a program existed), he said, comprised "1250 or so individ-
ual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations", 18 and was
"not an identifiable 'final agency action' for purposes of the APA." l 9
The real problem was that the plaintiffs had filed a "generic challenge to
all aspects" of the program and were thus inviting the courts to correct
"rampant" violations by public land administrators. 20
In language oozing with separation of powers concerns, Scalia
forcefully emphasized the limited role of the judiciary in reviewing and
remedying executive power. Even assuming the rampant illegality al-
leged, plaintiffs "cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by
court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of
Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made.'
2 1
Even when ripeness and standing would otherwise permit judicial inter-
vention with respect to some part of a program, diffuse claims of illegal-
ity that address "the flaws in the entire 'program' ... cannot be laid be-
fore the courts for wholesale correction under the APA.', 122 Though he
acknowledges that Congress can provide for judicial "correction of the
administrative process at a higher level of generality," under the APA's
general right of review "more sweeping actions are for the other
branches."'
123
joined the dissent, corresponded: "In this case I shall await further writing, particularly since, if I
understand your discussion in Parts III-C and V, this really is not a standing case any more." Memo-
randum from John Paul Stevens to Antonin Scalia (June 5, 1990), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress).
117. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 890.
118. Id. (quoting the district court's opinion, Nat'l Fed'n of Wildlife v. Burford (Burford 11),
699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.D.C. 1988)).
119. Id. at 890 n.2.
120. Id. at 890 n.2, 891.
121. Id. at 891.
122. Id. at 893.
123. Id. at 894. There is a hint in the papers of Justice Blackmun that Scalia began with a
broader conceptual view focusing on separation of powers rather than the APA. Following the
pronouncement that the plaintiffs should seek programmatic improvement "in the offices of the
Department or the halls of Congress," Scalia initially drafted the following sentence: "In this third
branch of government, respondent must direct its attack against some particular 'agency action' that
causes it harm." 1st Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 17 (June 5, 1990), in THE HARRY A.
BLACKMt PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress).
In the second draft, Justice Scalia subtly softened the separation of powers emphasis by changing the
words, "In this third branch of government" to "Under the terms of the APA." 2nd Draft, Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 17 (June 8, 1990), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court
File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress). This slight change could be read to
suggest that Scalia, though motivated by separation of powers concerns, gives expression to them
through his interpretation of the APA.
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As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, Scalia's discussion was
gratuitous.124  More important, it conflates jurisdiction and the scope of
relief. Scalia's discussion converts the issue of whether a court may is-
sue programmatic relief to whether a plaintiff has a right of action under
the APA.1 25 There is no basis for a rule that a court cannot entertain an
action otherwise within its jurisdiction simply because it cannot issue the
full scope of relief sought by the plaintiff.
As an historical aside, Justice Scalia nearly failed to garner a major-
ity of the Court for the portion of his opinion in which he voices these
separation of powers concerns. Justice O'Connor circulated to the Court
a draft concurrence joining in all parts of the opinion except Part IV-A.
Though she "agree[d] with the principles set forth in Part IV-A," she was
"less convinced than is the plurality that no 'land withdrawal review pro-
gram' exists independently of the particular classification terminations
and withdrawal revocations."' 26  Justice O'Connor withdrew her draft
and joined Scalia's opinion "[i]n light of your changes in part IVA,"
which moderated (albeit subtly) the categorical denial that a "land with-
drawal review program" existed. 27  It can be said that the desire to form
124. Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Since the majority concludes in
other portions of its opinion that the Federation lacks standing to challenge any of the land-use
decisions at issue here, it is not clear to me why the Court engages in the hypothetical inquiry con-
tained in Part IV-A.").
125. See id. at 914-15.
126. 1st Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 1 (June 22, 1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File,
1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress).
127. Memorandum from Sandra Day O'Connor to Antonin Scalia (June 25, 1990) , in THE
HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of
Congress). Justice Scalia had made two minute changes to Part IV-A in the draft he circulated to the
Court on June 25, the same day that O'Connor withdrew her concurrence. The first change was the
characterization that the District Court found the "'land withdrawal review program' extends to,
currently at least, [rather than "consists, currently at least, of'] '1250 or so individual classification
terminations and withdrawal revocations."' 4th Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 16-17 (June
25, 1990), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-
640 (Library of Congress). Compare 2d Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 16 (June 8, 1990), in
THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library
of Congress). The second change was the insertion of the word "principally" in the following sen-
tence:
But it is at least entirely certain that the flaws in the entire "program"--consisting princi-
pally of the many individual actions referenced in the complaint, and presumably actions
yet to be taken as well-cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale correction under
the APA, simply because one of them that is ripe for review adversely affects one of re-
spondent's members.
4th Draft, at 18-19. Compare 2d Draft, at 18-19.
Moreover, in the next draft, Scalia added footnote 2 in response to Justice Blackmun's
dissent. Footnote 2 addresses Justice O'Connor's concerns more fully:
Contrary to the apparent understanding of the dissent, we do not contend that no 'land
withdrawal review program' exists, any more than we would contend that no weapons
procurement program exists. We merely assert that it is not an identifiable 'final agency
action' for purposes of the APA. If there is in fact some specific order or regulation, ap-
plying some particular measure across-the- board to all individual classification termina-
tions and withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is final, and has become
ripe for review in the manner we discuss subsequently in text, it can of course be chal-
lenged under the APA by a person adversely affected-and the entire 'land withdrawal
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a majority, as well as to respond to Justice Blackmun's dissent, nudged
Justice Scalia to moderate his expression of the limits of judicial review
of programmatic agency action.
2. The Scholarly Antecedents
That separation of powers concerns would motivate Justice Scalia's
standing jurisprudence should not have surprised anyone. Discussed
above is his reverence for Justice Brandeis's oblique use of standing in
Morrison v. Work. 128 Moreover, while a sitting judge on the D.C. Cir-
cuit, Scalia published a much-discussed essay arguing that standing was
an "essential element" of separation of powers.129 Scalia noted that sepa-
ration of powers principles are found within the structure of the Constitu-
tion, and he directed much of his attention to constitutional aspects of
standing. 30 But he also criticized what he called "the Court's progres-
sive elimination of the so-called 'prudential limitations' upon stand-
ing,"' 131 in particular, "the interpretation of the [APA] to create liberalized
judicial review provisions where none existed before."
1 32
One front of attack was textual. The APA provides a right of judi-
cial review to any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency ac-
tion, or adversely affected or aggrieved by [such] action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute ....,33 According to Scalia, the "legal wrong"
criterion referred to "a wrong already cognizable in the courts-that is,
one as to which standing already existed pursuant to traditional princi-
ples."'134 By that he meant that the plaintiff had suffered some invasion
of a legal right, such as "one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortuous invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers a privilege."' 135 The "adversely affected or aggrieved within the
meaning of a relevant statute" criterion, Scalia argued, was meant only to
encompass a right of review already provided by other statutes. 136 Under
this view, the APA merely codified the rules for judicial review existing
in 1946. The "legal wrong" criterion provided for judicial review of
review program,' insofar as the content of that particular action is concerned, would
thereby be affected. But that is quite different from permitting a generic challenge to all
aspects of the 'land withdrawal review program,' as though that itself constituted a final
agency action.
5th Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 17 n.2 (June 26, 1990), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress). See Lujan I,
497 U.S. at 890 n.2.
128. 266 U.S. 481 (1925). See discussion supra Parts I.C, I.D.
129. Scalia, Doctrine of Standing, supra note 89.
130. See id. at 881, 890-93.
131. Id. at 890.
132. Id. at 887.
133. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
134. Scalia, Doctrine of Standing, supra note 89, at 887.
135. Id. at 887 n.28 (quoting Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137
(1939)).
136. Id. at 887-88.
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those cases for which "nontstatutory review" had been available; the
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action" criterion provided for
judicial review of cases for which "statutory" review had been avail-
able. 37 Scalia decried the broader view taken by the Court in the line of
cases interpreting the "adversely affected or aggrieved" criterion to re-
quire only that the plaintiff assert a harm within the "zone of interests"
Congress intended to protect in some substantive statute. 138
A second line of attack was functional. The judicial relaxation of
standing rules, according to Scalia, allowed courts "to address issues that
were previously considered beyond their ken," and to "address both new
and old issues promptly at the behest of almost anyone who has an inter-
est in the outcome."' 139 The effect, to Scalia's chagrin, was the "emer-
gence of the courts as an equal partner with the executive and legislative
branches in the formulation of public policy ... ,,140 The more appropri-
ate role for the courts--one that standing laws could work to restore-is,
in Scalia's view, "their traditional, undemocratic role of protecting indi-
viduals and minorities against impositions of the majority. ',14 1 Aggrieved
classes of individuals who resemble a majority, according to this view,
must seek redress in the political branches where democratic theory
holds their power should prevail. 1
42
Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan I is best seen as an initial attempt
to enshrine this view in law. It is clear that he wished to press his textual
arguments to limit APA review under the "adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action" prong but he was constrained by precedent.
43
The functional path, however, was open to him, particularly with Justice
O'Connor's joinder. Thus he was able to make a significant stride to-
137. Id. at 888 n.31 (citing Scalia, supra note 8, at 870).
138. Id. at 888-89 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)).
139. Id. at 892-93.
140. Id. at 893.
141. Id. at 894.
142. Scalia appears to realize that democratic theory might not bear out in practice. Yet he is
unmoved. In a provocative generalization that can be read to reflect animus toward the legislative
zeal to protect the environment, among other things. Scalia wrote:
Does what I have said mean that, so long as no minority interests are affected, 'important
legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the
vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy?' Of course it does-and a good thing, too.
Where no peculiar harm to particular individuals or minorities is in question, lots of once-
heralded programs ought to get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere....
The ability to lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime engines of social
change, and the prohibition against such carelessness is (believe it or not) profoundly
conservative. Sunday blue laws, for example, were widely unenforced long before they
were widely repealed-and had the first not been possible the second might never have
occurred.
Id. at 897 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
143. Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) ("We have long since rejected [the] interpretation ...
which would have made the judicial review provision of the APA no more than a restatement of pre-
existing law.").
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ward infusing standing doctrine-albeit only "prudential" standing-
with separation of powers concerns. The effect, of course, was to em-
bolden statutory standing as a means to insulate executive discretion
from judicial review.
B. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance: Reinvigorating Tradi-
tional Mandamus Restrictions
1. The Opinion
If Lujan I provided Scalia a vehicle for enhancing standing doctrine
as a means to protect executive discretion, Norton v. Southern Utah Wil-
derness Alliance (SUWA) 144 did the same with respect to traditional man-
damus restrictions on judicial review.1 45 As in Lujan I, environmental
groups sued under the APA to correct allegedly illegal administration of
the public lands by the BLM.146 The problem this time, rather than
"across the board" malfeasance challenged in Lujan I, was agency non-
feasance in the face of a plainly mandatory legislative command.
147
As already described, FLPMA-the organic statute at issue in Lulan
I--directed the BLM to inventory and classify lands under its administra-
tion. 148 Among the categories of lands FLPMA required the BLM to
identify was wilderness quality lands that would be suitable for protec-
tion under the Wilderness Act of 1964.149 Only Congress, however, can
designate lands for such wilderness protection. 150 Enlisting the work of
the BLM in the task of determining which lands to protect, Congress
directed the BLM to designate all lands with "wilderness characteristics"
as "Wilderness Study Areas" and, through further study, to determine
which of those would be "suitable" for designation as wilderness.' 5' Fur-
ther, in order to preserve the congressional prerogative to designate wil-
derness in the future, FLPMA establishes a stringent management stan-
dard for all wilderness study areas: "[T]he Secretary shall continue to
manage such lands ... in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of
such areas for preservation as wilderness."' 
52
SUWA brought suit to compel the BLM to comply with its nonim-
pairment mandate for WSAs and other requirements.1 53 It invoked the
APA's provision of a cause of action "to compel agency action unlaw-
fully withheld or unreasonably delayed."' 154 It asked the Court to compel
144. 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004).
145. See SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2380.
146. Id. at 2377-78.
147. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 890 n.2. Cf SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2380.
148. SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2376.
149. Id.
150. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(b) (2005).
151. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
152. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).
153. SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
154. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2005).
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the BLM to comply with the nonimpairment mandate, to implement pro-
visions in its land management plans relating to off-road vehicle (ORV)
use, and to prepare a supplemental EIS to analyze the effects of ORVs
where usage had surpassed what was contemplated by the applicable
land use plans.
1 55
Writing for a unanimous Court, Scalia rejected the claims. As he
had infused the APA's right of review of final agency action with separa-
tion of powers principles in Lujan I, Scalia applied traditional mandamus
principles to limit the reach of the APA's right to review agency inac-
tion. The first prong of his analysis concludes that only "discrete"
agency action is reviewable under the APA. 156 Though the APA includes
"failure to act" in its definition of "agency action, ' '1 57 the result is
achieved by the construction of "failure to act" as the mirror image of the
explicit exemplars of affirmative agency action, which Scalia reads as
"circumscribed, discrete agency actions."' 58 Thus, the "failure to act" is
reviewable only if it is "a failure to take one of the agency actions (in-
cluding their equivalents) earlier defined."'
' 59
Moreover, according to SUWA, even where the agency action at is-
sue is discrete, the APA empowers a court to compel it only if it is "le-
gally required.' 160  The limitation derives from Scalia's view that the
APA "carried forward the traditional practice prior to its passage, when
judicial review was achieved through use of the so-called prerogative
writs-principally the writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act."'
161
Thus, not only must the action sought to be compelled be a "specific,
unequivocal command,"'162 but it also must be one "about which [an offi-
cial] has no discretion whatever."'163 Courts may compel "ministerial"
duties if they are sufficiently clear, but not "discretionary" ones no mat-
ter how clear.
The extent to which Scalia's view rigidly and formally separates the
judicial and executive roles, particularly in the area of public land law, is
evident from his treatment of the specific mandates at issue in SUWA.
FLPMA's statutory nonimpairment standard is "mandatory as to the ob-
ject to be achieved," but courts may not remedy its violation, in the face
155. SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2378.
156. Id. at 2379.
157. The APA provides: "'Agency action' includes the whole or part of an agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)
(2005).
158. SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2378.
159. Id. at 2379.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 165 1(a) (2005)).
162. Id. (citing Interstate Commerce Comm'n. v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 287 U.S.
178, 204 (1932).).
163. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 46 (1888) (quoting Kendall
v. United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 613 (1838))).
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of agency nonfeasance, because the statute leaves the BLM "a great deal
of discretion in deciding how to achieve it."' 64 Scalia meets the claim
that ORVs should be eliminated entirely in WSAs by finding no clear
legal mandate to do so.' 65 To meet the argument that that FLPMA man-
dates some kind of regulation, even if not total exclusion, Scalia falls
back on the rigidly constructed "discrete agency action" prong. 166 He
rejects the notion that a court, upon finding that wilderness values are
being impaired, should order the BLM to do something, even if leaving
to the agency just what to do (presumably, for later review by the
court). 167 Rather, he concludes that "[g]eneral deficiencies in compliance
... lack the specificity requisite for agency action."
' 168
By this reckoning, the discretion how to achieve the object (i.e.,
nonimpairment) becomes discretion not to achieve it-at least, so far as a
court is concerned:
If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compli-
ance with broad statutory mandates, they would necessarily be em-
powered, as well, to determine whether compliance was achieved-
which would mean that it would ultimately become the task of the
supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out compliance
with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day
agency management. 1
69
Implicit in this view is that the evil of judicial oversight of executive
discretion outweighs the evil of Congress's delegate, the administrative
officer, failing to act toward accomplishing an admittedly mandatory
objective. The hyperbolic concern for executive discretion permits the
executive to subvert Congress's clear intent to maintain wilderness-
quality lands unimpaired in order to ensure the possibility of their per-
manent protection.
Scalia's treatment of the plaintiffs' claims based on BLM's own
land use plans show that, in his zeal to protect executive discretion from
judicial oversight, he would even shield it from the binding exercise of
executive discretion itself. FLPMA employs the two-tiered management
structure common to all federal land; it directs BLM to prepare compre-
hensive land and resources management plans and to implement them
largely through later, individualized management decisions. 70  Such
individual decisions must be made "in accordance with," and "conform
to," the terms of the land use plan.17' The plaintiffs sought to enforce
164. Id. at 2380.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2381.
167. Id. at 2380-82.
168. Id. at 2381.
169. Id.
170. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a), (e) (2005).
171. SUWA, 124 U.S. at 2381; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a) (2005).
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ostensible commitments in a BLM plan to monitor ORV use and ban it if
warranted.17 2 Rather than find this commitment too discretionary or un-
clear to be enforced-as he did FLPMA's nonimpairment mandate-
Scalia reasoned that the commitment was nonbinding because "a land
use plan is generally a statement of priorities" which "guides and con-
strains actions, but does not (at least in the usual case) prescribe them.'
73
According to Scalia's somewhat circular reasoning, judicial enforcement
of such an executive statement of priorities "would lead to pervasive
interference with BLM's own ordering of priorities"' 74 because all ex-
ecutive commitments are subject to competing budgetary demands and
appropriation of funds.
75
In sum, by relying on the traditional elements of mandamus as a
limit to the right to judicial review of agency nonfeasance under the
APA, SUWA adds a new face to Scalia's construction of the APA as pro-
tecting executive discretion, particularly from judicial oversight. Indeed,
Scalia views his interpretation as closing the backdoor to the kind of
"broad, programmatic challenge" he stopped at the front in Lujan I. The
Lujan I plaintiffs, he reasoned, would not have succeeded had they cast
the BLM's conduct of the "land withdrawal review program" as a "fail-
ure to revise land use plans in proper fashion" or "failure to consider
multiple use."' 176 Like the rule of statutory standing in Lujan I, the man-
damus-based view of the APA's right of review to compel agency action
serves "to protect agencies from undue judicial interference with their
lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy
disagreements which courts lack both expertise and information to re-
solve."'
177
2. The Anomalous Disappearance of the Equity Tradition in Man-
datory Relief
Justice Scalia's reinvigoration of mandamus principles as limits on
the APA cause of action to challenge agency inaction may have been
172. SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2382.
173. Id. at 2383. SUWA does not render nugatory FLPMA's provision that management must
be "in accordance with" and "conform to" land use plans, but it comes close. Scalia admits that final
agency actions implementing a plan may be set aside as "arbitrary and capricious" under the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) if they are inconsistent with a plan. Id. at 2380 n.2, 2382. He further acknowledges
courts may compel action promised in a land use plans if the plan merely reiterates "duties the
agency is already obligated to perform." Id. at 2384. By this, he must mean only nondiscretionary,
ministerial duties imposed by statute, for he stops short of endorsing a view that agency-promulgated
commitments may be enforced under § 706(1); see id. at 2384 ("Of course an action called for in a
plan may be compelled when the plan merely reiterates duties the agency is already obligated to
perform, or perhaps when language in the plan itself creates a commitment binding on the agency.")
(emphasis added); "We express no view as to whether a court could, under § 706(1), enforce a duty
to monitor ORV use imposed by a BLM regulation." Id. at 2384 n.5.
174. Id. at 2384.
175. Id. at 2383.
176. Id. at 2380.
177. Id. at 2381.
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foretold by his scholarly analysis of Justice Brandeis's opinion in Morri-
son v. Work. The so-called "well established ministerial-discretionary
dichotomy" is now an essential part of the analysis whether agency inac-
tion is subject to review under § 706(1).178 But, as "well established" as
Scalia regards it, the universal application of the ministerial-discretion
distinction to limit the availability of mandatory relief-the basis on
which he denied judicial review in SUWA-is an historical anomaly, and
an unworkable one to boot.179 Although his attack on sovereign immu-
nity was part of a chorus of administrative law scholars in the 1960s and
1970s, his reliance then and now on the "ministerial-discretionary di-
chotomy" is discordant and historically wrong. It reflects the unfortunate
swallowing of the equitable remedy of the mandatory injunction by the
hypertechnical law governing traditional writs of mandamus.
Like the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common law of man-
datory relief against government officials had become woefully muddled
by the mid-twentieth century. Scholarly criticism of legal developments
in this area' 80-like that of sovereign immunity-led to statutory re-
form' 81 and might understandably be overlooked by those who do not
bear history in mind. A review of that history and the scholarly criticism
shows the error of Scalia's reliance on the traditional law of mandamus.
The writ of mandamus, an ancient legal remedy, is one form of
mandatory relief. 82  According to scholarly critics, notably Professors
Davis and Byse, American mandamus law suffered from several crip-
pling technicalities. First, Supreme Court precedent held that courts of
the District of Columbia had jurisdiction to issue a writ, 183 but federal
178. Scalia, supra note 8, at 907.
179. Justice Scalia is a student of historical anomalies in the law. In a 1985 lecture to the
Supreme Court Historical Society, he unraveled two anomalous developments in administrative law.
See Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, SUP. CT. Y.B., 1985, at 103, avail-
able at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04 library/subsvolumes/04 c19_i.html. One anomaly,
discussed supra in Part I, was the creation of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity by means of
its equation with state sovereign immunity. Id. at 104-06. Scalia expressed regret about the result
of that anomaly, namely, that it amounted to "an irrational impediment to judicial review," though he
hastened to add that his objection was to the irrationality, not the impediment. Id. at 106.
180. E.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Mandatory Relief from Administrative Action in the Federal
Courts, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 585 (1955); Clark Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory"
Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479
(1962); Clark Byse & Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory " Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967).
181. Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 2, 76 Stat. 744 (1962) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e)(2005)).
182. Its history in the United States is no less venerable than Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), in which Marbury sought a writ of mandamus for Madison to deliver his com-
mission as a justice of the peace. The technicalities that eventually confounded the whole of man-
damus law were evident in that seminal case. Though Justice Marshall found that the delivery of the
commission was a ministerial, rather than executive, duty which could be a proper subject of the
writ, Madison's petition ultimately failed because it invoked the Court's original, rather than appel-
late, jurisdiction.
183. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 616-17 (1838).
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district courts outside the District of Columbia did not. 184 As a result,
courts issued a series of conflicting opinions about when mandamus re-
lief was available to compel a federal officer (often a resident of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, but sometimes not) to perform a mandatory duty, ren-
dering the strategy of pursuing the writ to correct government unlawful-
ness an uncertain one at best.
185
A second confounding technicality, according to the mandamus
scholarship-and a more important one for purposes here-was that the
traditional writ of mandamus could compel ministerial, but not discre-
tionary, duties. The core problem with the ministerial-discretionary dis-
tinction is that it is so fraught with definitional difficulties as to be essen-
tially unworkable; applying the distinction requires the judge to catego-
rize the duty as one type or the other when, in many instances, the dis-
tinction often is unclear or inapt. 186 As Byse and Fiocca noted, "the di-
chotomy is largely illusory because there are few federal administrative
determinations that do not involve an element of discretion and few that
are wholly discretionary."' 87 For example, some duties, like FLPMA's
nonimpairment duty, involve a categorical imperative to achieve an ob-
jective but also afford discretion as to the exact means to achieve it.'
88
Other statutory duties become "clear" or "ministerial" only after an act of
interpretation that itself involves the exercise of judgment and discre-
tion.189 In such cases, orthodox application of the distinction-i.e., one
that finds no mandamus jurisdiction whenever the duty involves a scin-
tilla of discretion-would lead courts to deny relief even when the result
would contravene plain statutory purposes. 90 Thus, the ministerial-
discretionary distinction encourages courts "to avoid the difficult task of
determining the scope of the delegated power or discretion .... [r]ather
than study[] the applicable statute, its legislative history, administrative
practice under the statute, and utiliz[e] all other relevant aids to deter-
mine the scope of the discretion."' 19' The unfortunate result is the unjust
denial of judicial review of some administrative actions that are plainly
outside the permissible scope of discretion.
184. M'Intyre v. Wood, 5 U.S. 504, 505 (1813).
185. Davis, supra note 180, at 585.
186. See Byse, supra note 180, at 1509; Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 333.
187. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 333.
188. SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2380.
189. See Davis, supra note 180, at 598-99; Jaffe, supra note 53, at 426-27.
190. Both Professors Davis and Jaffe argued that the Supreme Court did not so rigidly apply
the ministerial-discretionary distinction. In Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900), for ex-
ample, the Court allowed mandamus review notwithstanding a question of statutory interpretation,
leading Jaffe to conclude that "the alleged discretion of the officer ... will not protect him from
mandamus if the court is convinced that his ruling was erroneous as a matter of law." Jaffe, supra
note 53, at 427. Davis went even further, concluding that the Court overruled the ministerial-
discretionary distinction, sub silentio, by affording relief in Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37
(1951), a case brought "in the nature of mandamus" under the APA which involved "a difficult
problem of statutory interpretation of the kind that is about as far removed from the 'ministerial' as
any discretionary function may be." Davis, supra note 180, at 606.
191. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 334.
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Another problem with the ministerial-discretionary distinction, as
Professor Davis argued, is that it is founded on an anachronistic under-
standing of judicial review--one that views the choice as between de
novo judicial review and none at all.192 Such a distinction made some
sense in the most traditional, formal view of the writ, which was con-
ceived as an action by the sovereign, through a "relator,' 93 against its
officer to compel a duty the officer is legally obligated to perform. Judi-
cial compulsion of merely ministerial duties, about whose existence there
was no interpretive discretion, could not infringe on the discretion of the
sovereign. But, as Professor Davis argued, in the modem context the
distinction needlessly conflates the distinct and separate issues of
whether judicial review is available as a threshold matter and the scope
of review when it is.' 9 4 In the modem administrative state, where there
are a range of available scopes of judicial review, including the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard, the discretion of the sovereign can be protected
by applying a deferential scope of review.'
95
The alternative approach to mandatory relief was the mandatory in-
junction, which developed in the equity tradition. Unlike the writ of
mandamus, the mandatory injunction was not hampered by unworkable
and, in some cases, unjust technicalities. Rather, it was the affirmative
manifestation of the traditional writ of injunction, which Story summa-
rized in 1836 as "a judicial process, whereby a party is required to do a
particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to
the exigency of the writ."'196 Under the principles of equity, courts could
issue mandatory injunctions when "from the standpoint of doing justice it
was proper in the circumstances."' 97 Among the benefits of the equity
tradition of mandatory relief, according to Professor Davis, were its fo-
cus on the substantive merits of claims "without interruption from proce-
dural discord" and the fact that equity "does not make availability or
scope of review dependent upon an undesirable and unworkable distinc-
tion between ministerial and discretionary action."
198
Despite its superiority as a form of mandatory relief from adminis-
trative unlawfulness, the tradition of the mandatory injunction had fallen
into disuse long before SUWA. But the application of writ of mandamus
technicalities to all actions seeking mandatory relief against the govern-
ment is largely the result of a historical accident that has never been
192. Davis, supra note 180, at 601.
193. A "relator" is: "An informer. The person upon whose complaint, or at whose instance
certain [traditional] writs [were] issued .... BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (6th ed. 1990).
194. Id. at 597.
195. See id. at 601 ("Today we know that our choice is not limited to de novo review or no
review.").
196. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 861, at 154 (Cambridge
Press 1836), quoted in Davis, supra note 180, at 589.
197. Davis, supra note 180, at 591.
198. Id. at 608-09.
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properly rectified. Professor Davis traces the initial fading of the manda-
tory injunction tradition to the 1934 case of Miguel v. McCarl.199 In that
case, although the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction rather than a
writ of mandamus, the Court, without explanation or discussion equated
the forms of relief and applied mandamus technicalities.2 ° ° Professors
Byse and Fiocca urged that the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 be
interpreted to eliminate the ministerial-discretionary distinction but fore-
saw that a late-hour amendment to the legislation would allow its contin-
ued vitality,201 particularly if "a busy judge [was] ... misled by a super-
ficial reading of quotations ... from some of the older Supreme Court
opinions in mandamus cases. 20 2 They also argued that, even if the min-
isterial-discretionary distinction were not entirely purged, it could ac-
commodate equitable principles if judges applied it to curtail administra-
tive action beyond the permissible range of discretion, even if the official
action involved some level of discretion.2 3
Despite its disuse, the equitable approach to mandatory relief has
never been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court as a mode of judicial
review of federal administrative action. Until SUWA, the Court had been
silent as to the exact nature of actions for mandatory relief under the
APA. Professor Davis believed in 1955 that the Supreme Court was
heading toward an interpretation of the APA that would finally jettison
mandamus -technicalities in favor of the equity tradition of mandatory
injunctions. He urged the Supreme Court to "explain that the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act has abolished mandamus intricacies, that equity
tradition prevails, and that in the future nothing will hinge on the un-
workable and harmful distinction between ministerial and discretionary
199. 291 U.S. 442 (1934); see Davis, supra note 180, at 597.
200. Miguel, 291 U.S. at 452 (stating "[tihe mandatory injunction here prayed for is in effect
equivalent to a writ of mandamus, and governed by like considerations," citing Warner Valley Stock
Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28, 31, 33 (1897)).
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Professor Byse, an architect of the 1962
legislation, argued forcefully that equity, rather than traditional mandamus, principles should thence-
forth govern mandatory relief against government officials. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 331-
36. Nonetheless, he foresaw that the insertion of the words "in the nature of mandamus" at the
insistence of the Justice Department late in the legislative process-could lead a resurgence of the
ministerial-discretionary distinction and other mandamus technicalities. Id. at 353-54.
202. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 353.
203. See id. at 334-35. Byse & Fiocca preferred the mode of analysis sketched by Chief Jus-
tice Taft in Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1925):
Mandamus issues to compel an officer to perform a purely ministerial duty. It cannot be
used to compel or control a duty in the discharge of which by law he is given discretion.
The duty may be discretionary within limits. He cannot transgress those limits, and if he
does so, he may be controlled by injunction or mandamus to keep within them. The
power of the court to intervene, if at all, thus depends upon what statutory discretion he
has .... [The] extent [of the officer's discretion] and the scope ofjudicial action in limit-
ing it depend upon a proper interpretation of the particular statute and the congressional
purpose.
Id. at 335.
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action."2 °4 The 1951 decision in Robertson v. Chambers,2 °5 which arose
under the APA, had been "completely inconsistent with the mandamus
tradition and... [could] best be explained on the ground that all the in-
tricacies of mandamus are superceded by the APA-or by a mixture of
the APA and common sense. 20 6 Yet, with citations to a few older Su-
preme Court opinions in mandamus cases,20 7 Justice Scalia has done the
opposite. He has ensured the perpetuation of the anomaly and the ulti-
mate ascendance of the harmful and unwise ministerial-discretionary
distinction.
III. FOOTSTEPS AND REFORMATIONS
Justice Scalia's footprints on the public lands led in 1970 to the
door of the federal courthouse. Today they lead away from it. The dis-
cussion thus far has focused on the push and pull of doctrine on Scalia's
compass. But there is another view of the landscape on which he has
tread. That view is framed by the identities of the participants in the
administrative process and the ends toward which they invoke the third
branch. Bowdoin and Tallman, whose cases first piqued Scalia's interest
in sovereign immunity and the public lands, called upon the courts to
vindicate traditional private property rights or their statutorily-created
equivalent. 20 8 The National Wildlife Federation and the Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, whose cases he turned away from the courthouse
door, asked the courts to vindicate statutorily-enshrined public values.20 9
At the time Scalia wrote Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases,
the presence of groups like NWF and SUWA as plaintiffs in lawsuits
seeking to affect national or regional policy was a nascent phenome-
non. 2 1  Within a few years, however, Professor Richard Stewart recog-
nized that administrative law was in the midst of a "reformation.
' '21
1
That reformation sought to place the public beneficiaries of administra-
tive action on a more equal footing with traditional, private interests,
both within the administrative process and in judicial review.212 It its
broad contours, the reformation would be consistent with providing judi-
204. Davis, supra note 180, at 607-08.
205. 341 U.S. 37 (1951).
206. Davis, supra note 180, at 605.
207. See SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2379 (citing ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 287 U.S. 178,
204 (1932), ICC v. United States ex rel. Humbolt S. S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912), and United States
ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 46 (1888) (quoting Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37
U.S. 524 (1838))).
208. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
209. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n (Lujan I), 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Norton v. S. Utah
Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373, 2373-2385 (2004).
210. The Sierra Club filed its famous suit seeking to stop the development of a Disney ski area
in Mineral King Valley, California, in June 1969. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)
(establishing that aesthetic injury is a sufficient basis for standing in environmental cases); see
Oliver A. Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 867,909-21 (2002).
211. Stewart, supra note 14.
212. Id. at 1712, 1716.
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cial review for Bowdoin, Tallman, NWF and SUWA alike. Justice
Scalia's denial of judicial review in Lujan I and SUWA cuts across this
213grain.
A. The Judicial Reformation ofAdministrative Law
Professor Stewart described a reformation driven by a need to but-
tress the eroding theoretical foundations of administrative law. What
Stewart called the "traditional" model of administrative law developed in
the context of emerging regulatory agencies in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the first
time, exercised administrative control over private business conduct.2 14
As Stewart described, the doctrines of the traditional model sought to
"reconcile the new assertions of governmental power with a long-
standing solicitude for private liberties by means of controls that served
both to limit and to legitimate such power., 215 In the aggregate, the doc-
trines Stewart associated with the traditional model viewed the regula-
tory agency as "a mere transmission belt for implementing legislative
directives in particular cases. 2 16 The traditional model thus legitimated
"intrusions into private liberties by agency officials not subject to elec-
toral control by ensuring that such intrusions [were] commanded by a
legitimate source of authority - the legislature." 217 The courts' role in
such a model is one of formal containment of agencies within congres-
sional directives in order to protect private autonomy.
With the vast expansion of agency powers during the New Deal, the
faults with the traditional model became clear. The traditional model
worked to legitimize administrative power as long as Congress provided
directives were narrowly drawn, but it failed to justify the exercise of
power under schemes that broadly delegated discretion.218 Expertise
became the new legitimizing tenet. The agency's role was thus recon-
ceived as that of a "manager or planner with an ascertainable goal," and
discretion was seen as necessary to their successful discharge of their
broad and ambitious responsibilities. 219 The judicial role under the "ex-
pertise" model became one of imposing procedural safeguards and ap-
plying procedurally-oriented scope of review doctrines to ensure agency
fidelity to congressional goals.22 °
213. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Nature of Environmental Law and the U.S. Supreme Court,
35 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10503, 10515 (August 2005).
214. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 1671.
215. Id. at 1671-72.
216. Id. at 1675.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1676-77.
219. Id. at 1678.
220. See id. at 1679-81 (describing the emergence of the requirements of substantial evidence
to support agency factfinding, reasoned consistency in decisionmaking, and clear statement of legis-
lative intent to regulate fundamental individual liberties).
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As surely as the traditional model teetered, so did the expertise
model. Faith that agency expertise would yield decisions in the public
interest soon withered. As Stewart explains, "[t]o the extent that belief in
an objective "public interest" remains, the agencies are accused of sub-
verting it in favor of the private interests of regulated and client firMs."
22 l
In this view, agency decisions could be explained as a product not of
expertise, but of an "essentially legislative process of adjusting the com-
peting claims of various private interests affected by agency policy.
222
The victors of this "essentially legislative" game, predictably, were or-
ganized, well-funded interests-such as the regulated or client indus-
tries-and their policy victories came "at the expense of diffuse, com-
paratively unorganized interests such as consumers, environmentalists,
and the poor., 223 The result was systematic agency bias in favor of regu-
lated entities.224
The "reformation" of administrative law, as described by Stewart,
was a judicially-driven effort to ground the legitimacy of the "essentially
legislative" administrative state in the capability of its procedural law to
afford adequate representation for all affected interests.225 Rules govern-
ing judicial review contributed significantly to agency bias. Because
only entities subject to sanction by the agency traditionally had the
power to invoke formal procedures or seek judicial review, "these groups
[were] ensured a forum in which they can force the agency to respond to
their views.' 226 To counter this structural imbalance,
courts have changed the focus of judicial review (in the process ex-
panding and transforming traditional procedural devices) so that its
dominant purpose is no longer the prevention of unauthorized intru-
sions on private autonomy, but the assurance of fair representation
221. Id. at 1682-83. Stewart further explains:
[W]e have come not only to question the agencies' ability to protect the "public interest,"
but to doubt the very existence of an ascertainable "national welfare" as a meaningful
guide to administrative decision. Exposure on the one hand to the complexities of a man-
aged economy in a welfare state, and on the other to the corrosive seduction of welfare
economics and pluralist political analysis, has sapped faith in the existence of an objec-
tive basis for social choice.
Id. at 1683.
222. Id. at 1683.
223. Id. at 1684-85.
224. Stewart goads the public choice critics as speaking with a "dogmatic tone that reflects
settled opinion," but he does not quarrel fundamentally with their conclusion. Id. at 1684. He of-
fers, however, a more nuanced version of the reasons for unbalanced agency responsiveness to
regulated industries than simple agency capture. Contributing to the problem, he argued, were the
inherently weak position of agency regulators whose power is "essentially negative"; the entry-
limiting aspects of an entrenched regulatory system; the comparatively scarce resources of regula-
tory agencies compared with regulated industries; and agencies' dependence on information con-
trolled by regulated entities and other organized groups. Id. at 1685-86.
225. Id. at 1683.
226. ld. at 1713.
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for all affected interests in the exercise of the legislative power dele-
gated to agencies.
227
In short, the reformation sought to legitimize administrative law by plac-
ing the beneficiaries of administrative action, such as consumers of
products and users of the environment, on an equal footing with the regu-
lated industries, such as manufacturers and polluters. If all interest
groups were adequately represented in the administrative process, the
exercise of agency authority would be supported by democratic theory.
The judicial reformation thus expanded the rights of regulatory benefici-
aries in agency proceedings by expanding notions of due process and the
protections of formal procedures.2 28 On the judicial front, the reforma-
tion established "an increasingly strong presumption of judicial review of
agency action (or inaction)" and enlarged "the class of interests entitled
to obtain judicial review of agency action.
2 29
Professor Stewart, to be sure, was a skeptic of the reformation. His
fundamental critique of the "interest representation" model was that it
could not restore the shaken legitimacy of administrative law because the
judicial reforms would not actually ensure adequate representation of all
relevant interests. 230 But notwithstanding its theoretical flaws and rami-
fications, the reformation has certainly been a success from a pragmatic,
instrumental perspective. That is to say, it has spawned a generation of
administrative and judicial litigation by public beneficiaries of statutory
programs-as private attorneys general-that has forced agencies to be
accountable to a broader set of affected interests. 231 Even if this devel-
opment falls short of Stewart's theoretical goals, as Professor Shapiro
notes, "pragmatism... does not permit the perfect to become the enemy
of the good.,
23 2
227. Id. at 1712. Stewart also described the reformation as follows:
[A]dministrative law is no longer limited to the protection of a small class of private lib-
erty and property interests against unauthorized governmental intrusions, but has as-
sumed far more ambitious responsibilities. During the process of expansion the operation
of the traditional model has itself been transformed thereby creating a possible solution to
the problem of imbalance in representation in the exercise of agency discretion.
Id. at 1716.
228. ld. at 1716.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 1763; see Sidney Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP: THE REFORMATION OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Art. 1 at 10-18 (2005),
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/artl (summarizing what he terms the "counterreformation" spawned
by Stewart's critique) [hereinafter Shapiro, Pragmatic Admin. Law]; see also Sidney A. Shapiro,
Administrative Law after the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48
U. KAN. L. REV. 689 (2000) [hereinafter Shapiro, Counter-Reformation].
231. Shapiro, Pragmatic Admin. Law, supra note 229, at 6-7 (listing recent environmental
cases); Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits to Enforce Nondiscretion-
ary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353,392 (2004).
232. Shapiro, Pragmatic Admin. Law, supra note 229, at 7.
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B. The Nonreformation of Scalia
Justice Scalia is Catholic, 233 but he might well invoke a phrase from
a famous Shaker song: "To turn, turn will be our delight 'Till by turning,
turning we come round right., 234 There is no inconsistency in his open-
ing the courthouse to public lands plaintiffs in 1970 and shutting it to
public lands plaintiffs in the 1990s and beyond. His view of the judicial
role is consistent through the decades. He views courts as a proper venue
for vindicating private rights against intrusion by governmental authority
and an improper venue for the vindication of public values against gov-
ernmental neglect or mismanagement.
As discussed already,235 Scalia's belief in the limited function of
courts is grounded in the assumption that the democratic process func-
tions to effectuate the will of the majority through the political branches
and that courts are needed only to protect minority rights against intru-
sion by the majoritarian exercise of governmental authority.236 Tradi-
tional private rights and their equivalents are, by virtue of their private
nature, minority rights. The kinds of public values that drive many envi-
ronmental plaintiffs and other private attorneys general to seek judicial
review, by Scalia's reckoning, are expressions of a majoritarian politics,
and the failure of agencies to realize them a majoritarian harm.2 37 But
even Scalia recognized that democracy does not always run true to the
premises on which it is based; he admits that "[i]t may well be ... that
democracy simply does not permit the genuine desires of the people to be
given effect.,
238
Given his reliance on democratic theory and the separation of pow-
ers, it is debatable whether Scalia's view of the judicial role-as it has
played out in Lujan I and SUWA-is motivated by the desire to counter-
reform administrative law. But his interpretation of standing and man-
damus principles plainly has that effect.239  Scalia himself recognized
that his reconception of standing would always afford judicial review for
"an individual who is the very object of a law's requirement or prohibi-
tion. ,240 And he contrasted that with the "increasingly frequent adminis-
trative law cases in which the plaintiff is complaining of an agency's
233. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297
(1990) (analyzing how Justice Scalia's Catholicism affects his jurisprudence).
234. Edward D. Andrews, Simple Gifts, in THE GIFT TO BE SIMPLE: SONGS, DANCES AND
RITUALS OF THE AMERICAN SHAKERS 136 (1962).
235. See supra Part II.A.2.
236. Scalia, Doctrine of Standing, supra note 89, at 896 ("It is hard to believe that the democ-
ratic process, if it works at all, could not and should not [be] relied on to protect the interests of [an]
almost all-inclusive group.").
237. See id. at 894.
238. Id. at 897.
239. See Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 229, at 719 ("Thus, the effect, if not the
intent, is to roll back standing doctrine to its status before the reformation, when regulatory benefici-
aries generally were not able to sue.").
240. Scalia, Doctrine of Standing, supra note 89, at 894.
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unlawful failure to impose a requirement or prohibition on someone
else."241 The majoritarian harm in the latter case, in his view, deserves
no vindication in the courts. Bowdoin and Tallman, asserting that inter-
ference with their private property rights, may obtain review, while NWF
and SUWA must rely on the political branches, not the courts, to correct
the BLM's failure to effectuate public values.
C. The Congressional "Reformation" of Public Land Law
It is tempting to think of public land law as a shining example of the
reformation of administrative law. In the days before FLPMA and simi-
lar laws mandating the retention and management of public lands, the
typical plaintiff in a public lands case resembled the object of govern-
ment regulation, whose private autonomy the traditional model of admin-
istrative law sought to protect. The reason for that is that the disposition
of the public domain was a dominant goal of public land policy, and
Congress sought to accomplish that goal by privatizing public natural
resources.242 In many instances, fee title in public land was transferred to
private parties under the terms of statutory grants. In other instances,
less-than-fee private interests in public lands were authorized by statute.
The administration of public land statutes by the Secretary of the Interior
and the General Land Office involved the exercise of authority over pri-
vate claimants to ensure that the transfer or creation of property interests
conformed with statutory terms. In seeking judicial intervention, disap-
pointed or frustrated claimants thus asserted what looked like traditional
private property rights.
By the same token, many of today's public lands plaintiffs resemble
the traditional regulatory beneficiary whose interests are affected by the
agency regulation (or deregulation) of others. They seek judicial review
under the APA based on harm to interests within the zone of protection
of FLPMA and other modern public land management statutes that em-
body a range of values, including protection and preservation of public
natural resources. The realization of the conservation-oriented values
they assert, of course, depends on the limitation of the extractive use of
public land which, in turn, depends on the exercise of agency discretion
to that end. The emergence of these non-extractive values in public land
law coincided with an increase in public participation rights and oppor-
tunities at the agency level and more effective use of the APA's judicial
review provisions by public interest groups.
But there is a key difference between the reformation of public land
law in the 1960s and 1970s and the broader reformation of administrative
law which Professor Stewart analyzed. Stewart's reformation, as de-
241. Id.
242. E.g., Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-23, 26, 28; Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat.
392 (1862) (repealed 1976).
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scribed above, was a judicially-driven effort to counteract undue influ-
ence over agency discretion by regulated industries. Such influence was
the cause of agency failure to effectuate congressional goals, and the
very legitimacy of administrative law depended on redressing systemic
agency bias. The reformation of public land law, by contrast, was con-
gressionally-driven. It reflected a new ordering of public values in pub-
lic land management. The reordering was away from the public value of
natural resources development, effectuated by creation of private inter-
ests in public land, toward a set of public values of conservation that
were not reducible to traditional private interests or their equivalent. In
this perspective, the new public interest plaintiff is not in a meaningfully
different position than the traditional "private rights" plaintiff asserting
injury to statutorily-created property interests.
D. The Public Lands and the Counterreformation ofAdministrative Law
What, then, to make of Scalia's use of standing and mandamus doc-
trine to curtail judicial review rights of environmental advocates in the
public land cases? One conclusion would be that, if Scalia wanted to
lead a counterreformation of administrative law, public land law should
not be the place to start. That is because there is no valid traditional
model to which to roll back in the context of public land law. The notion
that the traditional public lands plaintiff for whom Scalia brushed aside
the doctrine of sovereign immunity was asserting a private interest that is
the proper subject of judicial intervention is illusory. The private interest
in such a case is only a proxy for the public interest in promoting natural
resources development through disposing of the public lands. There is
no valid basis for providing such proxy rights any greater judicial protec-
tion than modem environmental interests.
Another conclusion, however, is that the public lands provide some-
thing of a safe haven from which to launch a counter reformation of ad-
ministrative law. First, public lands management involves vast discre-
tion and among the broadest permissible legislative delegations of
power.243 The discretion is often the result of intentionally broad statu-
tory standards, such as multiple use.2 " Sometimes, as in SUWA, it is a
product of the many different ways a mandatory statutory standard might
be achieved.245 Second, as the constellation of public values in public
land management grew, so did the complexity of administrative process
through which those values are to be realized. Public land agencies now
must uniformly engage in comprehensive land use planning such as that
243. Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administra-
tive State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 1021-47 (2000) (discussing the delegation
doctrine and the public lands).
244. 16 U.S.C. § 531; see George C. Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources: A Sum-
mary Case Against Devolved Collaboration, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 602, 610 (1999).
245. See SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2381 (2004).
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mandated by FLPMA. And most decisions made in plans are not self-
effectuating but rather must be implemented through future, specific de-
cisions. The "considerable legal distance" between the exercise of dis-
cretion at the planning stage and the implementation of policy on the
ground conveniently provides cover for judicial efforts to buttress doc-
trines that protect executive discretion from judicial oversight.246
CONCLUSION
Which brings us back to the distinctiveness of the public land law
and its pedigree as an original field of American administrative law. In
Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, Professor Scalia recognized
that public land law was at once distinctive and broadly prophetic. Its
distinctiveness enabled the development of a doctrine, the inapplicability
of sovereign immunity, on a different path than administrative law gen-
erally. Its pedigree foretold the eventual application of the rule against
sovereign immunity to challenges to administrative action, even if by
means of legislative action. There is probably no better an indication of
the prophetic value of a law professor's ideas than whether that professor
becomes a Justice on the Supreme Court. True to prophesy, in the public
land cases, standing and the traditional ministerial-discretionary dichot-
omy have emerged from Justice Scalia's pen as potent doctrines to pro-
tect executive discretion. As a practical matter, Scalia has effectuated a
sort of counterreformation of judicial review in public land cases.
Whether this, too, is a prophecy for administrative law, we can only wait
to see.
246. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 730 (1998).

ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP EXPENSES: TAXING TIMES
FOR THE BLM AND MINERS
SERGIO PAREJAt
ABSTRACT
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In a cavern, in a canyon, excavating for a mine,
dwelt a miner forty-niner and his daughter Clementine.l
INTRODUCTION
Times have changed for miners since California's Gold Rush. In
1849, more than 80,000 "forty-niners" flooded into the western lands that
the United States had recently acquired from Mexico to mine for gold,
nearly tripling the population of that territory.2 It was not long after this
"Gold Rush" that Congress enacted the Lode Law of 1866, 3 the Placer
Act of 1870,4 and the General Mining Law of 1872;5 laws that essentially
codified what already was happening in California's gold fields: miners
were freely entering public lands to initiate mining activity.6 These laws
were followed by a long series of federal laws that would eventually
have a great impact on the way miners and mining companies do busi-
ness.7 Although the early laws gave miners great freedom to explore for
precious minerals with almost no environmental constraints, more recent
federal legislation in this area has focused on minimizing the environ-
mental impact of mining activities. 8
In addition to legislation by the United States Congress, rules issued
recently by federal agencies also have had a major impact on mining
activities.9 One of the most significant of these rules is found at 43 Code
1. Excerpt of lyrics from the song "Clementine." National Institute of Health, Department of
Health and Human Services, Clementine, http://www.niehs.nih.gov/kids/lyrics/clementine.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2005). Copyright information for the song is unknown. See id. The words and
music are generally attributed to Percy Montross, circa 1880. Id. The song is possibly based on
another song entitled "Down by the River Liv'd a Maiden" by H. S. Thompson (1863). Id.
2. Geoffrey C. Ward & Dayton Duncan, New Perspectives on the West,
http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/events/l840_1850.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
3. The Lode Law of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866) (repealed 1872).
4. Placer Act of 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (1870).
5. General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (2005)).
6. The Lode Law of 1866, 14 Stat. 251; Placer Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 217; General Mining
Law of 1872, 17 Stat. 91. These laws were intended to give miners broad rights over valuable min-
erals that they had discovered. See Roger Flynn, The 1872 Mining Law as an Impediment to Min-
eral Development on the Public Lands: A 19th Century Law Meets the Realities of Modern Mining,
34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 301, 302 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Building Stone Act of 1892, ch. 375, 27 Stat. 348 (1892); Saline Placer Act of
1901, ch. 186, 31 Stat. 745 (1901); Surface Resources Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-15 (1955);
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82
(1976). See also F. K. Allgaier, Environmental Effects of Mining, in MINING ENVIRONMENTAL
HANDBOOK: EFFECTS OF MINING ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROLS ON MINING 132 (Jerrold J. Marcus ed., 1997) (noting that early hardrock miners "usually
did not worry about land reclamation or the quality of surface and ground waters as a result of min-
ing").
9. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (2005) and 36 C.F.R. § 228a (2005). Regulations affecting
hardrock mining are predominantly issued by the Department of the Interior and the Department of
Agriculture. Virtually all of the public lands in the United States open to hardrock mining are ad-
ministered by the following two federal agencies that manage land: (1) the Bureau of Land Man-
agement (part of the Department of the Interior) and (2) the United States Forest Service (part of the
Department of Agriculture). John F. Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the Environment: Issues of
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of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.") Section 3809.10 These regulations
were originally promulgated by the United States Department of the Inte-
rior's Bureau of Land Management (the "BLM") in 1980 and later
amended in their entirety in 2001.1" Significantly, the amended version
of these regulations gave the BLM, for the first time, the power to re-
quire that mining companies establish a trust fund to provide for long-
term maintenance and water treatment (an "environmental clean-up
trust"). 12  Specifically, 43 C.F.R. Section 3809.552(c) provides as fol-
lows:
When [the] BLM identifies a need for it, [the mining company] must
establish a trust fund or other funding mechanism available to [the]
BLM to ensure the continuation of long-term treatment to achieve
water quality standards and for other long-term, post-mining mainte-
nance requirements. The funding must be adequate to provide for
construction, long-term operation, maintenance, or replacement of
any treatment facilities and infrastructure, for as long as the treatment
and facilities are needed after mine closure. [The] BLM may identify
the need for a trust fund or other funding mechanism during plan re-
view or later.'
3
43 C.F.R. Section 3809 does not mention taxes, and there is no evi-
dence in the legislative history of those regulations that the BLM ever
contemplated the income tax effect of utilizing a trust mechanism to pro-
vide for environmental clean-up after mining activities. In fact, the only
guidance that appears in those regulations regarding the structure of the
trust agreement and administration of the trust fund is the following pro-
vision: "[The] BLM will periodically review the estimated cost of rec-
lamation and the adequacy of any [trust fund] and require increased coV-
Federal Enforcement and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 813 (2004). Specifically, the Bureau of
Land Management manages about 260 million acres of land in the western United States (about one-
eighth of all land in the United States), of which approximately 90% is open to hardrock mining, and
the United States Forest Service manages about 160 million acres of land in the western United
States, of which approximately 80% is open to hardrock mining. Id. at 811, 813; Thomas F. Darin,
The Bureau of Land Management's Proposed Surface Management Regulations for Locatable
Mineral Operations: Preventing or Allowing Degradation of the Public Lands?, 35 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 309, 309 (2000).
10. 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (2005). These regulations are referred to as the "3809 Regulations" and
the "Bureau of Land Management's Surface Management Regulations for Locatable Mineral Opera-
tions."
11. 65 C.F.R. § 6998 (2005). See also Darin, supra note 9, at 310.
12. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552(c) (2005).
13. Id. Note that the BLM can require the use of a trust fund at any time, even after plan
review or after mining work has commenced. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.552(b), (c) (2005). In the author's
experience, however, the BLM intends to use this provision to require the creation of trust funds
before it will issue a permit to start digging. To the author's knowledge, the BLM has not mandated
the use of a trust by a mining company after issuing a permit to that mining company.
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erage, if necessary." 14 The tax effects of this provision are ambiguous
and vary widely, depending on how the provision is interpreted.' 5
Although a myriad of non-tax drafting issues arose while the author
worked on the first two environmental clean-up trusts ever required by
the BLM, this article focuses on the federal income tax issues related to
drafting and funding environmental clean-up trusts.1 6 Part I of this arti-
cle addresses miners' historical clean-up obligations and discusses the
history of federal legislation and agency rules regarding hardrock mining
(with an emphasis on environmental issues).' 7 Part II discusses federal
income tax issues related to environmental clean-up, in general and,
more specifically, focuses on federal income tax issues related to the use
of environmental clean-up trusts.' 8 This section concludes that the law is
currently unclear regarding the way that environmental clean-up trusts
are taxed, and the taxation of these trusts will depend heavily on the way
the trust is drafted.' 9 Part III proposes to change the tax law by establish-
ing a clear rule regarding how these trusts will be taxed.20 More specifi-
cally, this section proposes that mining companies should be allowed a
present federal income tax deduction for any funds put into an environ-
mental clean-up trust at the request of the BLM.21 Furthermore, Part III
proposes that such trusts should be tax-exempt entities if the mining
company agrees to forego any reversionary interest.22  Or, if the mining
company does not agree to forego its reversionary interest, the environ-
mental clean-up trusts should be taxed separate from the mining com-
pany. 3
The proposed change to the law discussed in this article would pro-
vide tax certainty and simplicity for mining companies and the BLM
when they are negotiating the terms of environmental clean-up trusts;
14. § 3809.552(b). "Reclamation" generally means the "process of improving disturbed land
(soil, vegetation, water) to achieve land capability equivalent to the predisturbed condition." Uni-
versity of Alberta, Land Reclamation, Remediation and Restoration,
http://www.rr.ualberta.ca/Research/Index.aspPage=LRRR (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). "Remedia-
tion" generally means the "process of removing, reducing or neutralizing industrial soil and sediment
contaminants that threaten human health and/or ecosystem productivity and integrity." Id For
convenience and because the differences in meaning do not have an impact on the tax issues dis-
cussed in this article, the author has used the words "clean-up," "remediation," and "reclamation"
interchangeably throughout this article.
15. See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text,
16. Other issues included such things as the effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the situs
of the trusts, the protection of trust assets from creditors in the event of bankruptcy of the mining
company, the use of an investment director in addition to a trustee, and the identities of the trust
grantor and beneficiary. In addition, state and local tax issues arose during negotiations. These
issues are not addressed in this article.
17. See infra Part 1.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See id.
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this certainty and simplicity, in turn, would greatly expedite the process
of negotiating and funding these trusts.24 Society as a whole would bene-
fit from this because these trusts are one of the most effective ways to
ensure that the environment will be cleaned up after mining activities.25
By providing certainty regarding the taxation of these trusts and by giv-
ing mining companies a tax incentive to forego any reversionary interest,
tax policy will expedite and encourage the adequate funding of trusts to
ensure that the environment will be kept clean for future generations of
Americans.26
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP OBLIGATIONS OF MINERS
Before analyzing the taxation of environmental clean-up trusts, it is
essential to understand the fascinating history of federal laws that regu-
late mining activity. These laws, which include both legislation by the
United States Congress and rules by federal agencies, demonstrate that
the government is increasingly responding to public pressure to ensure
that the environment will be cleaned up after mining activities. 27 Fur-
thermore, history demonstrates that trust funds are the latest in a long
line of efforts to ensure that mining companies provide adequate funds to
clean up the environment, and that those funds will be protected from the
creditors of the mining companies.28
A. The General Mining Law 0f187229
The General Mining Law of 1872 (the "1872 Law"), which was
signed into law by President Ulysses S. Grant on May 10, 1872, origi-
nally promoted westward expansion by allowing all U.S. citizens, as well
as those planning to become U.S. citizens, to keep for themselves any
valuable minerals that they might discover on federal land.3°
The 1872 Law made no provision for reclamation of mined lands,




27. See infra Part I.A-E. This section is not intended to list all mining laws. The purpose of
this section is to give an overview of a few of the major laws that have had an impact on hardrock
mining.
28. See id.
29. General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (2005)).
30. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 29 (2005). Specifically, the 1872 Law provides as follows:
All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both surveyed and
unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which
they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and those who
have declared their intention to become such ... it shall be assumed that the applicant is
entitled to a patent, upon the payment to the proper officer of $5 per acre ....
17 Stat. at 91.
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ernment oversight of mining operations. 3' Although the original law
applied to all "valuable mineral deposits" on government lands except
coal,32 subsequent changes to the law limited its application, especially
with respect to minerals that could be used for fuel, such as oil and natu-
ral gas.33
Currently, the 1872 Law authorizes and governs prospecting and
mining for hardrock or "locatable" minerals on public lands. 34 With re-
spect to locatable minerals, the 1872 Law has remained remarkably un-
changed since its enactment. 35 Generally, the two essential elements of a
valid mining claim under the 1872 Law are "discovery" and "location.
3 6
37 38*A patent, costing only $5.00 per acre, gives the prospector title to the
locatable minerals and the surface estate where the minerals are located
for placer and lode claims.39  The federal government does not collect
any royalties for the extracted minerals.
40
31. See Darin, supra note 9, at 310-12 (discussing the history of the BLM and the origin of 43
C.F.R. § 3809 (2005)).
32. Seeid. at 311.
33. See id. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (2005), removes oil, gas,
oil shale, phosphates, sodium, and other minerals from the claim/patent system of the 1872 Law. Id.
The Materials Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-04 (2000), provides for the sale or public giveaway of
certain minerals, such as sand or gravel. Id. The Multiple Mineral Development Act, 30 U.S.C. §§
521-31 (2005), provides for the development of multiple minerals on the same tracts of public land.
Id. The Multiple Surface Use Mining Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. §§ 601, 603, 611-15 (2005), removes
certain common varieties of minerals from the list of minerals to which the 1872 Law applies. Id.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2005), redefines claim
recording procedures and provides for abandonment if the procedures are not followed. Id.
34. See Darin, supra note 9, at 309-10. "Locatable mineral" is "[a] legal term that, for federal
lands in the United States, defines a mineral or mineral commodity that is acquired through the
[1872 Law]." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HARDROCK MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS 14 (1999)
(hereinafter NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL), available at http://books.nap.edu/html/hardrock fed
lands/index.html (follow "Introduction" hyperlink). These are the base and precious metal ores,
ferrous metal ores, and certain classes of industrial minerals. Id. Examples of locatable minerals
include but are not limited to, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, magnesium, nickel, tungsten,... [and]
uranium." Id. This term is often used interchangeably with "hardrock mineral." Id. at 12-13.
35. See generally Darin, supra note 9, at 311-12 (discussing history of the 1872 Law). This
long period of minimal change with respect to "locatable minerals" occurred notwithstanding the
fact that there have been many changes to land laws since the late nineteenth century. See generally
id.
36. See id. Specifically, after a prospector makes a "discovery" of a valuable mineral on
public land, a mining claim must then be "located." Id. A valid mining claim gives the locator the
exclusive right of possession to the mineral deposit. Id.
37. A patent is not needed to extract the minerals from a mining claim. Id.
38. Id. A patent may also cost $2.50 per acre, in certain circumstances. Id. However, this
difference is not relevant to the tax issues addressed in this article.
39. Id. "Placer claims" generally involve mineral-bearing gravels and sands. Id. "Lode
claims" are located on bedrock. Id.
40. Id.
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B. The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 197041
President Richard M. Nixon signed the Mining and Minerals Policy
Act of 197042 (the "1970 Act") into law on December 31, 1970.43 The
1970 Act expressly declared that it is the policy of the United States to
reduce the adverse impact of mining activities on the environment.
44
Although the stated goals of the 1970 Act were lofty, after its passage,
the federal government continued to refrain from overseeing and moni-
toring mining activities with respect to locatable minerals on public
lands; indeed, the federal government was not privy to information re-
garding most locatable mineral mining claims until the enactment of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1 976. 41
C. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 197646
On October 21, 1976, President Gerald R. Ford signed the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 197641 (the "FLPMA") into law.
This Act represented a drastic change to the law at that time.4 8 The
FLPMA gave the BLM its comprehensive mission to manage public
lands for a variety of uses in order to benefit present and future genera-
tions.49 The FLPMA also established numerous policies related to con-
servation, attempted to appease vastly different and competing con-
cerns,50 and declared that the Department of the Interior would manage
41. Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-631, 84 Stat. 1876 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 21a (2005)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Specifically, the 1970 Act declared that it is the policy of the United States to encour-
age:
[T]he study and development of methods for the disposal, control, and reclamation of
mineral waste products, and the reclamation of mined land, so as to lessen any adverse
impact of mineral extraction and processing upon the physical environment that may re-
sult from mining or mineral activities.
Id.
45. See Darin, supra note 9, at 312.
46. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (2005).
47. Id.
48. See generally Eleanor R. Schwartz, A Capsule Examination of the Legislative History of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (1979). Prior
to the enactment of the FLPMA in 1976, there were several congressional efforts to pass comprehen-
sive environmental legislation with respect to mining operations, but none of the bills that passed
were signed into law. See generally id. at 286-96. Each of these bills possessed increasing com-
plexity. See generally id
49. Darin, supra note 9, at 312. The BLM originally had been established by a 1946 Execu-
tive Order, but the FLPMA gave it enforcement authority, a larger budget, and more coherence as an
agency. Id.
50. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2005). Specifically relevant to mining activities, the FLPMA
declared that:
[I]t is the policy of the United States that ... the public lands be managed in a manner
that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will
preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food
and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor
recreation and human occupancy and use.
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the land for various uses into the future51 in a way that would prevent
unnecessary degradation of the land.52
Although the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
stated that requiring a bond or other security was one of the most impor-
tant provisions of the Senate version of the bill that ultimately became
the FLPMA,53 the House bill did not include this provision. 4 Indeed,
Congressional staff could not reconcile the House and Senate positions
on this issue in its report to the conference committee, 5 and no provision
requiring reclamation was included in the final legislation. 6
D. Regulation of the Mining of Locatable Minerals by the BLM
In 1980, the BLM promulgated its first regulations affecting mining
activities that disturb the land's surface (the "Original 3809 Regula-
tions").57 These regulations divided mining activities into the following
three levels: (1) casual use, (2) notice-level, and (3) plan of operations-
level.58  "Casual use" means use that generally does not disturb the
land. 59 "Notice-level" includes use that causes a cumulative surface dis-
turbance of no more than five acres during any calendar year.60 Finally,
"plan of operations-level ' 6' includes use that is greater than casual use
and notice-level.62
The Original 3809 Regulations required reclamation of all mining
operations, but bonding requirements for the various types of mining
Id.
51. See § 1732(a). Specifically, the FLPMA states that the Secretary of the Interior "shall
manage the public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield." Id.
52. § 1732(b). The FLPMA states that "In managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of
the lands." Id,
53. S. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE FED. LAND
POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 (PUB. LAW 94-579) 68-69, 74, 91, 107 (Comm. Print
1978). This requirement in the Senate bill corresponded to a recommendation by the Public Land
Law Review Commission that users of the land be held responsible for restoration when the use has
an adverse impact on the environment. Id.
54. Id. at 745.
55. Id. at 748, 796.
56. Id. at 930.
57. 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (2005). See Darin, supra note 9, at 313.
58. Id. § 3809.1-1, .1-9(a), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT., SURFACE MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS FOR LOCATABLE MINERAL OPERATIONS (43 C.F.R.
3809) FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. A (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter FINAL EIS],
available at http://www.blm.gov/nhp/Commercial/SolidMineral/3809-EIS/1-cover.htm. Appendix
A contains the version of 43 C.F.R. § 3809 that was in effect from 1980 until 2001. See id.
59. See id. § 3809.0-5(b), reprinted in FINAL EIS, supra note 58. Specifically, "casual use" is
defined to mean "activities ordinarily resulting in only negligible disturbance of the Federal lands
and resources." Id. The "casual use" level specifically does not include the use of earth-moving
equipment, explosives, and the use of motorized vehicles in certain designated areas. Id.
60. Id. § 3809.1-3(a).
61. Also referred to herein as "operations-level" use.
62. See § 3809.1-4, reprinted in FINAL EIS, supra note 58. Specifically, operations-level use
is use that (1) exceeds notice-level use, (2) is conducted in designated conservation, scenic, or wil-
derness areas, or (3) requires the use of motorized vehicles in certain designated areas. See id.
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operations differed.63 For example, no bonding was required to secure
the mining company's obligation to reclaim casual use or notice-level
mining activities. 6' Operations-level mining was left to the discretion of
an "authorized officer" whether to require a bond.65 In practice, bonding
was required only when the operator had a record of noncompliance.
66
In the 1990s, precious metal prices dropped significantly, and as a
result, many locatable mineral mine operators on federal lands in the
western Unites States abandoned their mines. 67 This experience demon-
strated that reclamation requirements and bonds were often inadequate,68
especially after a mine operator's bankruptcy, a bond issuer's default,
69
or when the bond expired long before the mining activity ceased.y In
addition, the combined effect of advances in mining techniques, poor
oversight on the part of the BLM, and mounting evidence of environ-
mental "disasters" related to mining began to prompt calls for mining
law and regulatory reform.7'
In several reports issued in the mid-1980s, the General Accounting
Office (the "GAO"), Congress' investigative arm, detailed many mining-
related concerns, including the following: (1) the BLM's failure to re-
quire the posting of a reclamation bond by most miners, 72 (2) the BLM's
failure to screen mining claims to ensure that those claims were not on
land withdrawn from mineral development,73 (3) the BLM's failure to
inspect most mining operations in the western United States,74 and
(4) the BLM's failure to take action with respect to numerous unre-
claimed mining sites.75 The GAO concluded that mandatory bonding
was necessary to help ensure proper reclamation.7 6 In an additional re-
63. See id. § 3809.1-9.
64. Id. § 3809.1-9(a).
65. Id. § 3809.1-9(b). An "authorized officer" is "any employee of the Bureau of Land
Management to whom authority has been delegated to perform the duties described." Id. § 3809.0-
5(a).
66. See FINAL EIS, supra note 58, at "Summary."
67. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. - FOREST SERV., TRAINING GUIDE FOR RECLAMATION BOND
ESTIMATION AND ADMINISTRATION: FOR MINERAL PLANS OF OPERATION AUTHORIZED AND
ADMINISTERED UNDER 36 C.F.R. § 228A 4 (2004) (hereinafter "TRAINING GUIDE"), available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/geology/bondguide-042004.pdf
68. Id.
69. For example, the operator of the Summitville Mine in south-central Colorado declared
bankruptcy in 1992, and the mine was added to the Superfund National Priorities List in 1994. U.S.
E.P.A., Region 8-Superfund, Summitville Mine, http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/co/
summitville/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). To date, the cleanup has cost an estimated $210
million, and reclamation still is not complete. Id.
70. Ronald W. Cattany, Remarks at the Colo. Dep't of Natural Res. Annual Membership
Meeting, http://www.coloradomining.org/cattanyl21202.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
71. See Darin, supra note 9, at 315-18 (detailing General Accounting Office reports of min-
ing's environmental impact and the lack of effective BLM oversight).
72. Id. at 316.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 317.
76. Id. at 335. This was already the practice with mining activities on lands administered by
the United States Forest Service. Id. at 337 n.42.
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port, the GAO also described the large amount of damage to public lands
that had resulted from mining activities.
77
In light of the BLM's experiences in administering the Original
3809 Regulations, as described above, and in light of the increasing dif-
ficulty in obtaining surety bonds, in 1991, the BLM published its intent
to revise the bonding requirements.78 The proposed changes would have
expanded the range of financial instruments acceptable as financial guar-
antees. 79 This would have allowed mine operators considerable flexibil-
ity in structuring financial guarantees.8 °
By 1992, it became apparent that Congress intended to reform the
1872 Law. 81 As a result, the BLM stopped its efforts to revise the Origi-
nal 3809 Regulations. 82 Unfortunately, although the House and the Sen-
ate each passed their own bill in 1993 that would have revised the 1872
Law, the House and Senate could not reach an agreement on either bill,
and neither was enacted.83
In 1997, several years after the House and Senate failed to reach an
agreement regarding changes to the 1872 Law, the BLM published an
amendment to the Original 3809 Regulations (the "1997 Amendment").
84
The 1997 Amendment required financial guarantees from all mining
activity exceeding "casual use" and expanded the scope of acceptable
financial instruments that would provide these guarantees.85 Despite the
general increase in forms of financial security that the BLM could seek,
the 1997 Amendment did not allow the BLM to require mortgages on
mining properties or liens on mining equipment.86 In addition, the 1997
77. Id. at 317-18. According to this report, this damage covered hundreds of thousands of
acres. Id.
78. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 56 Fed. Reg.
31,602, 31,602 (July 11, 1991) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809). This appears to have been, in
part, in response to a GAO report regarding the declining availability of surety bonds due to tight-
ened requirements in the surety industry in the 1980s. See id.; Darin, supra note 9, at 318.
79. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 56 Fed. Reg. at
31,602 (discussed in the BLM's Statement of Intent).
80. See id. at 31,603. Mine operators would be given flexibility to "structure financial guar-
antees in a fashion that would not [threaten] a firm's liquidity and [that would not] harm its ability to
continue exploration and development activities on Federal Lands or to reclaim disturbed land." Id.
81. Darin, supra note 9, at 318.
82. Id.
83. Id. The Senate bill would not have imposed any new standards for reclamation, but it
would have required a surety or bond in an amount sufficient to complete the reclamation of mined
lands. Id. at 318-19. The House bill would have established a payment of royalties to the Govern-
ment for reclamation projects and would have imposed strict standards for reclamation. See id. at
319-21.
84. Id.
85. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 62 Fed. Reg. 9093
(Feb. 28, 1997) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
86. Id. at 9095. There also was some concern expressed about the liquidity of various secu-
rity instruments and market fluctuations, but the BLM determined that the risk of inadequate security
due to these concerns was acceptable, in light of the financial guarantees being equal to reclamation
costs, the provision for periodic review of security instruments to ensure they equal reclamation
costs, and the potential for criminal penalties and civil enforcement. Id. at 9097.
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Amendment merely relied upon a "certification" from the operator of the
mine that a financial guarantee was in place prior to mining.
87
Shortly after the 1997 Amendment was adopted, the Northwest
Mining Association, a mining trade association, successfully challenged
it in the D.C. District Court. 88 The court remanded the 1997 Amend-
ment to the BLM for changes because it failed to comply with the terms
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
89 in its rulemaking process.
90
In light of the remand and changes in mining technology and proc-
esses,91 the BLM proposed to completely revise the Original 3809 Regu-
lations, rather than just to amend them.92 A "significant aspect" of this
decision was "to respond to the remand [from the D.C. District Court] by
re-promulgating strengthened financial guarantee provisions. 93  The
proposed new rule would address financial guarantees differently from
the way they were addressed in the 1997 Amendment in several ways.94
The proposed new rule would require financial guarantees to be "actual"
guarantees rather than just certifications, would require the guarantees be
posted in the actual amount of the estimated reclamation costs, and
would expand the permissible types of financial instruments. 95 Impor-
tantly, the proposed new rule would also allow the BLM to require "a
long-term funding mechanism for water treatment and other post-mining
maintenance requirements."
96
Much of the BLM's motivation for adopting this proposed change
to the Original 3809 Regulations resulted from its experiences with in-
solvent and bankrupt mine operators.97 As a result, the BLM took the
position that post-mining maintenance should be covered by these guar-
antees.98
87. Id. at 9096. The 1997 Amendment also imposed a requirement that the financial guaran-
tees cover one hundred percent of the reclamation costs and imposed a floor of $1,000 per acre and
$2,000 per acre for notice-level and operations-level activities, respectively. Id.
88. Nw. Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14-16 (D.D.C. 1998).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2005).
90. Nw. Mining Ass'n, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 14-16.
91. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed. Reg.
6422, 6424 (Feb. 9, 1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
92. Id. at 6423-24. The BLM's proposal to revise the Original 3809 Regulations was also
prompted by the various GAO reports on mining. Id. at 6423.
93. Id. at 6424.
94. Id. at 6441.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 6442. With this provision, the BLM sought to overcome the financial constraints of
mine operators without burdening the taxpayers, it expressed its view that reclamation obligations
continue past bankruptcy, and it expressed its view that this provision may help prevent damage to
the environment by allowing maintenance of a mining site when the operator has stopped operations.
Id.
98. See generally id. See also FINAL EIS, supra note 58, at VOL. 2, COMMENTS AND
RESPONSES § 14.
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The proposed new rule would, in certain circumstances, allow the
BLM to require the mine operator to fund a trust to provide funds to pro-
vide for future maintenance. 99 This provision was aimed at ensuring that
enough funds would be available for clean-up if it appeared that a fully-
reclaimed mine would continue to discharge pollutants well into the fore-
seeable future.100
In 1998, while the BLM was working on its new proposed rule,
Congress commissioned the National Academy of Sciences to study the
hardrock mining regulations of both the Department of the Interior and
the Department of Agriculture. 01 This study (the "1999 Study"), re-
leased by the National Research Council (the "NRC") in September of
1999, recommended numerous changes that would effectively bring the
Original 3809 Regulations into closer alignment with the analogous
United States Forest Service ("USFS") regulations.0 2 The 1999 Study
identified numerous problems with then-current practices. 0 3  The issue
of financial guarantees appeared in the context of necessary improve-
ments in the regulations," °4 differential treatment of smaller mining op-
erations (notice-level),10 5 and planning for future uses of the land and
monitoring.
06
The NRC's first formal recommendation relating to financial guar-
antees was that they should be required for any disturbance to the land
greater than "casual use."' 1 7  Justification for this recommendation in-
cluded the cumulative impact of a large number of smaller mining opera-
tions.'0 8
99. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed. Reg.
6422, 6442 (Feb. 9, 1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809). Specifically, the trust would be used
to ensure "the continuation of long-term water treatment to achieve water quality standards or [to
provide funds] for other long-term, post-mining maintenance requirements." Id.
100. Id. Specifically, the provision was "designed to deal with the situation where an other-
wise fully reclaimed mining operation will continue for the foreseeable future to discharge pollut-
ants, such as acid mine drainage, into surface waters" and required the operator to set aside sufficient
funds which, when invested, would generate "income sufficient to pay for the ongoing cost of what-
ever treatment is required to meet applicable water quality standards for as long as the treatment is
necessary." Id. See also 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552(c) (2005).
101. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 120, 112 Stat. 2681, 257-58 (1998).
102. Press Release, The National Academies, Action Needed to Improve Effectiveness of Laws
that Govern Mineral Mining on Federal Lands (Sept. 29, 1999) (on file with author), available at
http://www4.nationalacadeniies.org/news.nsf/isbn/0309065968?OpenDocument. See also NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34.
103. Press Release, supra note 102. Identified problems included, for example, the lack of any
time constraints on how long a mine could be shut down "temporarily" and go without reclamation
and the failure to require bonding of smaller mining operations on BLM lands. Id.
104. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 65.
105. Id. at 71.
106. Id. at 83-86.
107. Id. at 93. Specifically, the NRC recommended that "[f]inancial assurance should be
required for reclamation of disturbances to the environment caused by all mining activities beyond
those classified as casual use, even if the area disturbed is less than 5 acres." Id.
108. Id. at 93-94.
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
The NRC's second formal recommendation relating to financial
guarantees was that the government needed to plan for long-term man-
agement of mining sites after the mining was complete.'0 9 This was jus-
tified by a need for post-closure maintenance and management of mining
operations after the release of reclamation bonds."10 Thus, the NRC
deemed long-term financial assurances to be necessary to truly accom-
plish the missions of both the BLM and the [USFS] and to prevent the
financial burden of long-term and monitoring costs from falling on the
taxpayers.' 1
After the 1999 Study, the BLM published its new proposed rule on
November 21, 2000.112 The BLM expressed its agreement in principle
with the NRC's recommendations with respect to financial guarantees."
13
The fact that the BLM's new proposed rule was in line with the 1999
Study is not a coincidence; Congress had mandated that any changes to
the Original 3809 Regulations were to be "not inconsistent" with the
1999 Study.
114
The comment period occurred in late 2000 and early 2001.115 The
comments regarding the use of trusts for mining reclamation purposes
varied widely; environmental groups were often "supportive," while the
mining industry "strongly opposed" the proposed new rule." 6 With re-
spect to trust funds, the BLM stated that it would identify the "need" for
109. Id. at 118. Specifically, the NRC determined that the "BLM and the [USFS] should plan
for and assure the long-term post-closure management of mine sites on federal lands." Id.
110. Id. at 118-19.
Ill. Id. at 118-20.
112. See MARC HUMPHRIES, MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS 14 (2005),
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/05Feb/IB89130.pdf; Mining Claims Under the General
Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 69,998 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to be codified at
43 C.F.R. § 3809).
113. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
69,998-99. The BLM also used the NRC's second recommendation regarding financial guarantees
to bolster its case for adopting the trust fund mechanism and to reiterate its position that a "bond
release" does not release mine operators from their reclamation obligations. Mining Claims Under
the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,613, 57,617 (Oct. 26, 1999) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
114. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
69,998. See also Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 106-291, § 156, 114 Stat. 922, 962 (2000).
115. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
69,998. The new rule had an initial effective date of January 20, 2001. Id. The Bush Administra-
tion proposed suspending this in its entirety on March 23, 2001 to allow the BLM to address legal
and policy concerns that the Administration raised. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws;
Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,162, 16,162 (Mar. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. §
3809). After additional comments through May 7, 2001, as well as additional amendments, the final
rule was published on October 30, 2001; it had an effective date of December 31, 2001. Mining
Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834, 54,834 (Oct.
30, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
116. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
70,065-66.
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one on a case-by-case basis, 1 7 but that sometimes a trust would be nec-
essary.' 18
On October 30, 2001, after the comment period, the BLM adopted
the new rule." 9 Although the new rule had been suspended 20 and sub-
stantially revised 121 in the early days of the Bush Administration, the
provisions regarding financial guarantees were not. 22  In its current
form, the new rule (the "New 3809 Regulations") requires a financial
guarantee for any mining activity in excess of "casual use."'
123
E. Regulation of the Mining of Locatable Minerals by the USFS
Although this Article is intended to analyze trusts created under the
New 3809 Regulations, it is interesting to compare reclamation require-
ments on property under the control of USFS. As mentioned above, the
USFS and the BLM are the two federal agencies that administer nearly
all public land open to hardrock mining. 124 The USFS derives its author-
ity from the Organic Administration Act of 1897125 (the "Organic
Act"). 126 The Organic Act states that that the Department of Agriculture
will issue regulations to protect certain public lands from degradation,
27
but that those regulations will not prohibit mining on the certain public
lands.
128
117. Id. at 70,070.
118. Id. at 70,069. Specifically, the BLM stated that "In some circumstances, an important or
perhaps the only way an operator may protect water quality from unnecessary or undue degradation
is to provide for long-term water treatment. The trust fund or other funding mechanism is appropri-
ate to assure that long-term treatment and other maintenance will continue." Id. at 70,069.
119. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg.
54,834, 54,834 (Oct. 30, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
120. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg.
16,162, 16,162 (Mar. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
121. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. at
54,834.
122. Id. at 54,842.
123. Id. The New 3809 Regulations eliminated several of the more substantive provisions of
the rules promulgated in 2000 so as not to "disrupt" or "confuse" the mining industry and the various
state regulatory bodies. Id. at 54,835. See Roger Flynn & Jeffrey C. Parsons, The Right to Say No:
Federal Authority over Hardrock Mining on Public Lands, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 249, 326-29
(2001) (detailing many of the revisions to 43 C.F.R. § 3809 and the changes made thereto by the
BLM under the Bush Administration).
124. See supra text accompanying note 9.
125. Flynn & Parsons, supra note 123, at 260.
126. Id.
127. Id. Specifically, the Organic Act states:
The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the protection against destruction
by fire and depredations upon the public forests and national forests.., and he may make
such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the objects of such
reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
thereon from destruction.
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1994)).
128. Id. The Organic Act further states that "[n]othing in [the language in Note 127] shall be
construed as prohibiting.., any person from entering upon such national forests for all proper and
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The USFS promulgated its rules regarding hardrock mining in 1974
(the "USFS Regulations"). 129 Like the New 3809 Regulations, the USFS
Regulations are in accordance with the policies of the 1872 Law.
130
Unlike the New 3809 Regulations, the USFS Regulations require anyone
desiring to operate a mine in a National Forest to submit a notice and
plan of operations if there will be any "significant" disturbance of the
surface. 1
31
The USFS Regulations are somewhat more streamlined than the
New 3809 Regulations. 32 The USFS Regulations also specify what rec-
lamation work is required and when it must be performed. 33 Reclama-
tion must be started upon exhaustion of the mineral deposit or other ear-
liest practicable time, or within one year of ceasing operations, unless
otherwise allowed by the USFS.1 34 This work includes controlling ero-
sion, landslides, and water runoff; isolating, removing, or controlling
toxic materials; reshaping and revegetating disturbed areas; and rehabili-
tating fisheries and wildlife habitats. 
35
With respect to financial guarantees, any operator required to file a
plan of operations136 is required to furnish a bond on request of the
USFS. 137 However, the USFS has learned lessons from other land man-
agement agencies regarding operator bankruptcy and abandonment of
mining operations and has found that in many cases bond amounts were
inadequate to cover reclamation costs. 138 As with the BLM, the USFS
has changed its practices to include long-term maintenance and monitor-
ing in reclamation cost estimates, and is also in the process of defining
financial arrangements, such as trusts, which could be used to fund long-
term obligations. 139 If such an instrument is deemed necessary, coordina-
tion with the Office of General Counsel and regional and national staff is
required. 140
Factors considered in the decision of whether to require a long-term
funding mechanism to secure the reclamation obligation are complex,
and the USFS has expressed a general preference for avoiding the need
lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral resources
thereof." Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 478 (2005)).
129. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 41 (discussing 36 C.F.R. § 228A (2005).
130. See United States v. Weiss 642 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1981).
131. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 41-42. See also 36 C.F.R. § 228.4 (2005).
132. For example, there are express requirements for environmental protection in the USFS
Regulations that reference applicable standards in other federal environmental protection statutes,
such as the Clean Air Act. 36 C.F.R. § 228.8 (2005).
133. 36 C.F.R. § 228.8(g) (2005).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4 (2005). Any operator whose activity will significantly disturb the
surface must file a plan of operations. Id.
137. 36 C.F.R. § 228.13(a) (2005).
138. TRAINING GUIDE, supra note 67, at 4-5.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 24.
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for a long-term funding mechanism.'41 Such long-term costs are broken
down into two categories: (1) "actions with a finite life"' 142 and (2) ac-
tions with an open-ended or extended timeframe.143 Both of these types
of long-term costs should also account for replacement costs for capital
goods and equipment 14 as well as other assumed expenses.145
Bonds may be prohibitively expensive or impossible to acquire for
long-term, indefinite, or costly work as described above, and, by using a
present net value analysis to determine the initial deposit, a trust fund
could potentially be utilized to pay for these costs. 146 In this case, the
trustee would invest the trust corpus in "conservative instruments such as
federal securities.,'
147
II. INCOME TAx ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE OF TRUSTS TO FUND
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP OBLIGATIONS
With respect to environmental clean-up trusts, the following two re-
lated tax questions arise: (a) when may a mining company deduct ex-
penses for reclamation work paid out of trust funds, 148 and (b) who is the
taxpayer with respect to income and deductions of an environmental
clean-up trust?
149
A. Deduction or Capitalization
Before analyzing the deductibility of environmental clean-up ex-
penses when a trust is used, it is necessary to understand the general de-
ductibility of these expenses when a mining company makes a payment
for environmental clean-up directly, without the use of a trust. The broad
issue is whether a payment is deductible or whether it must be capital-
ized.' 50 A deduction, if available, would be likely to fall under Sections
141. Id. at 23. To do so, the USFS has built features into the plan of operations that will miti-
gate or eliminate the need for long-term operation, maintenance, and monitoring costs. Id.
142. Id. Actions with a finite life include, for example, "fencing, road closures, or other means
until such time as long-term stability, erosion control, and revegetation have been successfully
established." Id.
143. Id. Open-ended actions include "road maintenance,.... diversion ditches, dams, water
treatment plants, fencing, gates, and signs," with the assumption that the "engineered" items will
require periodic maintenance, monitoring, and testing. Id.
144. Id. at 32.
145. Id. at 38-39.
146. Id. at 24.
147. Id.
148. In the author's opinion, the potential reasonable answers are: (1) when the mining com-
pany pays the money to the trustee, (2) when the trustee pays money out of the trust to do reclama-
tion work, (3) ratably, as mining work is done, and the obligation to do clean-up work accrues re-
gardless of the time of payment, or (4) never.
149. In the author's opinion, the potential reasonable answers are: (1) the mining company, (2)
the trust, or (3) the BLM.
150. Steven G. Black, The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup Costs: Current Deduc-
tion Allowed Under the Restoration Principle of Plainfield-Union, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1321, 1321.
If it is deductible, the payment can potentially reduce that year's income; if it is capitalized, the
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162, 198, or 468151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.152 Capitaliza-
tion is covered by Section 263.1
53
In general, if the deduction is available under Section 162, the year
in which the deduction may be taken will be determined primarily by
whether the company is a cash or accrual method taxpayer. 154 If, on the
other hand, the deduction is available under Section 198 or 468, the de-
duction may be taken in the year that the expense accrues regardless of
the taxpayer's accounting method.
55
In summary, there are two steps to analyzing the deductibility of
environmental clean-up expenses. First, one must determine if a pay-
ment is deductible or if it must be capitalized. Second, assuming that the
payment is deductible, one must determine the appropriate year of the
deduction.
1. Section 162-Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses
The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") first addressed the de-
ductibility of environmental remediation expenses in Revenue Ruling 94-
38156 (the "1994 Revenue Ruling"). In the 1994 Revenue Ruling, the
Service declared that costs incurred to treat soil and groundwater con-
taminated by hazardous waste from the taxpayer's business could be
deducted presently as ordinary and necessary business expenses under
Section 162 rather than capitalized under Section 263. 157 The Service
specifically found that these remedial actions did not permanently im-
prove the property or otherwise provide significant future benefits which
would require capitalization. 158 Remediation and groundwater treatment
merely restored the property to the condition in which the owner held it
prior to contamination, more akin to a repair than to a capital improve-
ment; accordingly, the Service determined that this allowed a present
deduction under the restoration principal of Plainfield- Union Water Co.
payment may be added to the mining company's income tax basis in the mine, reducing gain upon a
subsequent sale. I.R.C. §§ 263, 446(b) (2005).
151. 1.R.C. §§ 162, 198, 468 (2005). Section 162 is the general section for deducting ordinary
and necessary business expenses. Id. Sections 198 and 468 are special deductions specifically
related to environmental clean-up. Id. Section 162 does not specify the year in which the deduction
may be taken, while Sections 198 and 468 do. Id.
152. All references to the "Code" are references to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended. All references to a "Section," unless otherwise specified, are to a Section of the Code.
153. I.R.C. § 263 (2005).
154. § 162. See also Black, supra note 150, at 1323.
155. §§ 198, 468.
156. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
157. Id. Under the facts of the 1994 Revenue Ruling, the taxpayer had decided to remediate
soil and groundwater contaminated by its manufacturing activities. Id. The taxpayer constructed
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v. Commissioner.1 59 With respect to expenses to construct a groundwater
treatment facility, however, the Service ruled that the taxpayer had to
capitalize those expenses. 1
60
One year later, in Technical Advice Memorandum 95-41-005 61 (the
"1995 TAM"), the Service determined that the 1994 Revenue Ruling did
not allow for the deduction of collateral costs associated with environ-
mental remediation 1 62 The Service also determined that the restoration
principle it had applied in the 1994 Revenue Ruling and the court had
applied in Plainfield- Union Water Co. did not apply in situations in
which the taxpayer acquired the property in a contaminated condition.
1 63
In United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States,'64 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio rejected the taxpayer's contention
that it was entitled to deduct under Section 162165 expenses incurred for
environmental remediation 1 66  The court emphasized the fact that the
two sites at issue had contaminated soil at the time of purchase by the
taxpayer. 167 Furthermore, the taxpayer's business activities did not pro-
duce the contamination.1 68 As a logical consequence, the taxpayer's
remediation efforts did not return the property to the condition it was in
when the taxpayer acquired it. 169 Therefore, the taxpayer had to capital-
ize those expenses.
1 70
After the 1995 TAM and United Dairy Farmers, the deductibility of
environmental remediation expenses appeared to turn entirely upon
whether the taxpayer's normal business activities produced the contami-
159. Id. See 39 T.C. 333, 333, 338 (1962), nonacq. on other grounds, 1964-2 C.B. 8 (holding
that certain expenses incurred in cleaning and lining water pipes were deductible repairs because
they did not materially add to the value of the property or prolong its useful life; instead, they re-
stored the pipeline to its condition before the damage). This is referred to hereinafter as the "restora-
tion principle."
160. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. The expenses had to be capitalized under Section
263(a) because their useful life extended beyond one year. Id.
161. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Sept. 27, 1995).
162. Id. "Collateral costs" include consulting contracts, costs of assessing contamination and
remediation alternatives, and legal fees for negotiating a consent decree with the Environmental
Protection Agency. Id.
163. Id. The Service noted that "the restoration principle envisions that the taxpayer acquired
the property in a clean condition, contaminated the property in the course of its everyday business
operations, and incurred costs to restore the property to its condition at the time the taxpayer ac-
quired the property." Id.
164. 107 F. Supp. 2d 937 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
165. Rather, the court concluded that the taxpayer was required to capitalize its expenses
incurred for environmental remediation. United Dairy Farmers, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
166. Id. at 937.
167. Id. at 942.
168. Id. at 942-43.
169. Id. at 943. The taxpayer argued that it was unaware of the properties' contaminated
condition when it purchased them and that restoration merely returned the properties to the value the
taxpayer initially believed they possessed. Id. The court noted that deductibility did not turn on
one's subjective beliefs as to the value of property. Id.
170. Id.
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nation. The subsequent enactment of Section 198 changed this in certain
situations, at least temporarily.
171
2. Section 198-Qualified Environmental Remediation Expenditures
Section 198 allows "qualified environmental remediation expendi-
tures" paid or incurred by a taxpayer to be deducted in the year actually
paid or incurred even if the taxpayer acquired the property in a contami-
nated state. 172  "'Qualified environmental remediation expenditure'
means any expenditure ... which is paid or incurred in connection with
the abatement or control of hazardous substances at 'qualified contami-
nation site."",173 "Qualified contamination sites" generally include busi-
ness or investment property. 174 In order to presently deduct the expense,
this Section also mandates that the taxpayers acquire from the appropri-
ate state agency a statement that there has been a release, threat of re-
lease, or disposal of a hazardous substance on the property.
175 Signifi-
cantly, Section 198 does "not apply to expenditures paid or incurred after
December 31, 2005. ' '176
3. Section 162-Revisited
In 2004, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 2004-18177 (the "2004
Revenue Ruling"), which addresses the extent to which environmental
remediation costs can be deducted under Section 162 if they cannot be
deducted under Section 198.178 The factual situation in the 2004 Reve-
nue Ruling is similar to the one found in the 1994 Revenue Ruling.
179
Unlike the 1994 Revenue Ruling which had allowed a deduction of these
costs, in this newer ruling, the Service reached the opposite result, find-
ing that the soil and groundwater remediation costs had to be capital-
171. See discussion infra Part III.B regarding the timing of the deduction. It is important to
remember that the above discussion of Section 162 does not address the issue of timing if a deduc-
tion (rather than capitalization) is allowed. See id.
172. I.R.C. § 198(a) (2005).
173. I.R.C. § 198(b)(2) (2005). This occurs provided that these expenditures are not otherwise
required to be capitalized. I.R.C. § 198(b)(1) (2005).
174. I.R.C. § 198(c)(1) (2005). Specifically, "[t]he term 'qualified contamination site' means
an area... at or on which there has been a release (or threat of release) or disposal of any hazardous
substance" and "which (1) is held for use in a trade or business or for the production of income or (2)
is property [that qualifies as a capital asset] in the hands of the taxpayer." Id.; I.R.C. § 122 1(a)(1)
(2005).
175. I.R.C. § 198(c)(3) (2005). The chief executive officer of each state is allowed "to desig-
nate the appropriate state environmental agency within sixty days of the enactment of' I.R.C. § 198.
I.R.C. § 198(c)(4) (2005). The Environmental Protection Agency possesses the authority to desig-
nate such an agency in the event that such a chief executive officer fails to do so. Id.
176. I.R.C. § 198(h) (2005).
177. Rev. Rul. 2004-18, 2004-1 C.B. 509.
178. Id.
179. Compare Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 with Rev. Rul. 2004-18, 2004-18 C.B. 509
9this is true even if the taxpayer has not yet unconditionally made the payment of the expenses).
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ized.180 After the 2004 Revenue Ruling and through December 31, 2005,
manufacturers generally cannot use Section 162 to deduct environmental
remediation expenses that are not otherwise deductible under Section
198.
4. Section 468-Qualified Reclamation Expenses
Section 468 permits mining companies to elect to deduct, currently,
certain future qualified reclamation expenses as those obligations are
incurred. 181 More specifically, Section 468 allows taxpayers to elect to
deduct an amount equal to the current estimated reclamation costs of
property disturbed during the taxable year in connection with coal min-
ing operations. 182 Current estimated reclamation costs equal the amount
that the taxpayer would be required to pay for qualified reclamation costs
if reclamation activities were performed currently.' 83
Qualified reclamation costs include expenses incurred in reclama-
tion activities conducted in accordance with a reclamation plan submitted
pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977184
(the "SMCRA") or which is submitted pursuant to any other state or fed-
eral law imposing surface mining reclamation and permit requirements
"substantially similar" to those imposed by the SMCRA.185 Because the
SMCRA applies strictly to coal mine reclamation 186 and because the New
3809 Regulations do not apply to mining operations that involve coal,
187
the availability of Section 468 in connection with environmental recla-
mation trusts required under C.F.R. Section 3809.552(c) will turn on the
ability of the taxpayer to qualify on these "substantially similar" grounds.
180. Rev. Rul. 2004-18, 2004-18 C.B. 509. The Service noted that these costs were "incurred
by reason of' production activities within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-I(e)(3)(i) (as
amended in 2005). Id. Because the costs were properly allocatable to properly produced by the
taxpayer that was inventory in the hands of the taxpayer, the Service took the position that the tax-
payer needed to capitalize the remediation costs. Id. These costs must be treated as the costs of
acquiring inventory under Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2005). Id.
181. I.R.C. § 468 (2005).
182. § 468(a)(1)(A).
183. § 468(d)(1). This section requires taxpayers to establish reserves for each property the
taxpayer desires to have governed by Section 468. Id. The reserve is treated as having an opening
balance of zero during the initial tax year. § 468(a)(2)(A). The reserve is increased each year by the
amount of interest that would have been paid on the balance of the reserve at the beginning of a
taxable year, had the federal short-term rates applied with semi-annual compounding. §
468(a)(2)(B). The reserve is decreased by amounts actually paid by the taxpayer for qualified rec-
lamation costs and increased by the deduction allowed under the section. § 468(a)(2)(C), (D).
184. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
185. I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(A) (2005). As a general matter, Section 468 has not produced much
case law or many administrative rulings, and the Service has not issued guidance as to what consti-
tutes "substantially similar."
186. 91 Stat. at 445.
187. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.2(e) (2005).
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B. Timing Issues
If it is determined that an expense may be deducted under Section
162, as opposed to capitalized under Section 263, it is necessary to de-
termine the year in which that deduction will be allowed.188 The timing
of the deduction under Section 162 is determined primarily by the tax-
payer's accounting method (cash or accrual). 1
89
1. Accounting Methods
In general, a cash basis taxpayer may deduct a payment when "ac-
tually" made but not when "constructively" made. 190 Absent a special
exception, this would mean that a cash basis mining company would be
able to deduct reclamation expenses only as that taxpayer actually pays
for reclamation work, not when the taxpayer puts money into a trust for
future reclamation work. The Treasury Regulations provide the follow-
ing special rule that is applicable in this situation: a "payment" occurs
when payment is made to a creditor, either by written agreement or pur-
suant to government, agency, or court order.'9' This, in effect, means
that a payment by a cash basis taxpayer to a trustee of a non-grantor trust
upon order by the BLM is treated as a deductible payment by that tax-
payer.1
92
While individual miners and small mining companies may be cash
method taxpayers, large publicly-traded mining companies generally are
accrual method taxpayers. 93 An accrual method taxpayer may deduct a
payment only when "all events" have occurred fixing the liability, except
for the passage of time, and if the amount can be determined with rea-
sonable accuracy. 194 In addition, no deduction is allowed until there has
188. Recall that the timing issues discussed herein relate only to Section 162 and not to Section
198 or 468. If the deduction is allowed under Section 198 or 468, the deduction is allowed in the
year the liability is incurred whether or not payment is made in that year. If the deduction is allowed
under Section 198 or 468, then it is an estimated amount determined as described above. See supra
Parts III.A.2, A.4.
189. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2005).
190. A payment is "constructively" made when it is made available but not actually paid to the
recipient. Vandel Poel, Francis & Co., Inc. v. Comm'r., 8 T.C. 407,411 (1947).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) (as amended in 2004).
192. See id This general rule does not appear to apply to payments by cash method taxpayers
to "grantor trusts." A "grantor trust" is treated as not separate from the taxpayer for federal income
tax purposes; accordingly, no payment is made for federal income tax purposes when money is
transferred by a grantor to a trust that is a grantor trust with respect to that grantor. See infra notes
257-58 and accompanying text. A "non-grantor trust" is a trust that is treated as separate from the
grantor for federal income tax purposes. See infra Parts III.D-E.
193. I.R.C. § 448 (2005). Corporations whose average annual gross receipts in the prior three
years exceeded $5 million must use the accrual method of accounting. Id. It is worth noting that,
regardless of the accounting method used, mining companies often are eligible for special tax bene-
fits. For example, rather than depreciating an investment in a mine, the "cost depletion" method
often may be used to recover basis of investments in natural resources. I.R.C. §§ 611-12 (2005).
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2003). This is known as the "all events"
test. Id.
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been "economic performance" by the taxpayer. 195 Economic perform-
ance generally does not occur when a taxpayer makes a contested pay-
ment to a third party, such as a trustee, for future payment to a credi-
tor. 1
96
2. Issues Unique to Utilizing Trusts for Remediation Costs
In general, the use of a trust to fund environmental clean-up obliga-
tions has no effect on whether an expense must be capitalized rather than
deducted. The use of a trust, however, can have a significant impact on
the year in which a deduction may be taken. This is primarily tied to
whether the trust is a "grantor trust" or a "non-grantor trust" for federal
income tax purposes. Accordingly, the discussion in this article regard-
ing grantor and non-grantor trust status1 97 is solely concerned with the
timing of deductions and assumes that the expenses are not the type that
must be capitalized.
When focusing on the timing of deductions, it is important to re-
member that any deduction that is allowed under Section 179 or 468 is
allowed in the year that the liability accrues regardless of the accounting
method used by the taxpayer. 98 Although this provides some conven-
ience and simplicity for the taxpayer's accountant, it also is important to
remember that Sections 179 and 468 only apply in limited situations'
99
and that Section 179 expires at the end of 2005 unless Congress extends
it.200
The timing of the deduction of "ordinary and necessary business
expenses" under Section 162 turns in large part on whether the trust is a
grantor trust and whether the taxpayer is an accrual or cash method tax-
payer. Accordingly, the remainder of this discussion will assume that the
taxpayer is seeking to deduct the environmental clean-up expenses under
Section 162.
195. I.R.C. § 46 1(h) (2005).
196. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(1)(i) (as amended in 1999). There are exceptions to this general
rule. Id. For example, economic performance occurs when money is paid to the trustee of a desig-
nated settlement fund or a qualified settlement fund. See infra Parts III.C.2-3 for detailed discus-
sion.
197. See infra Parts III.D-E.
198. I.R.C. §§ 179, 468 (2005). Under I.R.C. Sections 179 and 468, deductions are allowed
(i.e., they accrue) as liabilities are "incurred" even if no payment is made that year. Id. Although
there is no case law on this issue, it would appear that, with one exception, payment to a trust, in and
of itself, for "future" clean-up obligations, even upon order of the BLM, should not allow for a
present deduction under I.R.C. Sections 179 or 468 because the liability has not been incurred yet.
The one exception, of course, occurs when a cash method taxpayer makes a payment to a non-
grantor trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) (as amended in 2004). In that case, a deduction for the
full amount of the payment is allowed under Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1). Id. See supra note 180
and accompanying text.
199. See supra Parts II1.A.2, A.4.
200. I.R.C. § 198(h) (2005).
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C. Special Situations
Three special situations merit discussion at this point. More spe-
cifically, the following three relevant types of trusts or funds20 1 are spe-
cifically identified in either the Code or the Treasury Regulations:
(1) environmental remediation trusts, 20 2 (2) designated settlement
funds,20 3 and (3) qualified settlement funds.2° The Code or Treasury
Regulations specify how and when each of these trusts is taxed.20 5 Be-
cause the rules could potentially apply to trusts created under the New
3809 Regulations, each of the three types of trusts is specifically dis-
cussed below. In general, with a few exceptions that are discussed be-
low, trusts created under the New 3809 Regulations are not likely to be
environmental remediation trusts, designated settlement funds, or quali-
fied settlement funds.
1. Environmental Remediation Trusts
Treasury Regulations Section 301.7701-4(e) 20 6 (the "Environmental
Remediation Trust Regulations") specifically states that "environmental
remediation trusts" are considered trusts for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code.20 7 This Regulation also states that each grantor of the
trust shall be treated as the owner for federal income tax purposes of the
portion of the trust contributed by the grantor under Section 677.208 As
discussed in greater detail below,20 9 Section 677 treats the grantor of the
trust as the owner when he or she has the discretion to distribute trust
income to himself or herself.210 Treasury Regulations Section 301.7701-
7(e)(1) defines an environmental remediation trust as:
[A]n organization that is organized under state law as a trust; the
primary purpose of the trust is collecting and distributing amounts for
environmental remediation of an existing waste site to resolve, sat-
isfy, mitigate, address, or prevent the liability or potential liability of
persons imposed by federal, state, or local environmental laws; all
contributors to the trust have actual or potential liability or a reason-
able expectation of liability under federal, state, or local environ-
mental laws for environmental remediation of the waste site; and the
201. Both "funds" and "trusts" are referred to merely as "trusts" herein for convenience.
202. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(e) (as amended in 1996).
203. I.R.C. § 468B (2005).
204. Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1 (as amended in 1993).
205. Id.; § 468B.
206. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(e) (as amended in 1996).
207. Id.
208. § 301.7701-4(e)(2).
209. See infra Part III.D.
210. I.R.C. § 677 (2005).
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trust is not a qualified settlement fund within the meaning of
§ 1.468B-l(a).2 1'
The term "existing waste site," as used in the above text, is not de-
fined in the Treasury Regulations or elsewhere. Members of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Environmental Tax Committee had suggested that
the regulations define an "existing waste site" to mean a "site at which an
event (or related series of events) has occurred which has given or may
give rise to at least one claim asserting liability under federal, state, or
local environmental laws., 2 12  The Department of the Treasury (the
"Treasury") responded to this request by noting that the final regulations
would not adopt this definition because it is sufficiently clear that the
rule applies to sites currently needing environmental remediation.2 13
As mentioned above, the BLM intends to use the New 3809 Regula-
tions to require mining companies to establish a trust fund for environ-
mental clean-up in order to secure a permit to start digging.21 4 Because
such a permit is likely to be sought at a site at which there has been no
contamination or that does not "currently" requires remediation, the En-
vironmental Remediation Trust Regulations generally do not appear to
apply to trusts created under the New 3809 Regulations.215
2. Designated Settlement Funds
Code Section 468B 216 provides that "economic performance' 217 is
deemed to occur when qualified payments are made by a taxpayer to a
"designated settlement fund., 218 This rule means that, assuming there is
a qualified payment, an accrual method taxpayer can deduct in the year
of payment the full amount paid to a trustee of a trust that qualifies as a
designated settlement fund.
Section 468B specifically defines a "qualified payment," with some
exceptions, as "any money or property which is transferred to any desig-
211. § 301.7701-4(e)(1) (emphasis added).
212. See Jerold N. Cohen, ABA Members Suggest Clarification of Definitions in Regs on Envi-
ronmental Settlement Funds, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 290-44 (1995).
213. 26 C.F.R. Parts 1, 301, and 602, RIN 1545-AT02, at 13. Specifically, the Treasury stated
that "[t]he term existing waste site should be sufficiently specific to allow taxpayers to establish an
environmental remediation trust for any contaminated site that currently requires remediation under
environmental laws." Id. (emphasis added).
214. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Although the BLM may require a trust fund at
any time, from the author's experience, the trust will need to be funded before the BLM will issue a
permit to commence mining work.
215. This would not be the case, however, if the BLM were to require the creation of a trust
after mining work has commenced, assuming there is then contamination at the site.
216. I.R.C. § 468B (2005).
217. Id. The effect of this section is to modify the "economic performance" requirement of
I.R.C. § 461(h), applicable only to accrual method taxpayers, with respect to a specific situation.
I.R.C. § 461(h) (2005). Accordingly, this section only applies to accrual method taxpayers. § 468B.
218. § 468B(a).
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nated settlement fund pursuant to court order .... ,,219 Furthermore, that
section requires, among other things, that a designated settlement fund be
used for tort claims arising out of personal or property damage.22°
A designated settlement fund is taxed on all income earned by the
fund, and it is allowed to deduct certain administration expenses. 221 It is
allowed no other deductions, such as a deduction for distributions related
to tort claims.222 Thus, the basic idea is that a taxpayer is allowed a pre-
sent deduction for all money paid into the trust for tort liabilities, the
fund is taxed as a separate taxpayer on its income, and the trust cannot
deduct payments to satisfy tort liabilities.223
A trust fund established under the New 3809 Regulations is not es-
tablished pursuant to court order.2 24 Furthermore, the trust fund gener-
ally does not extinguish a mining company's tort liability with respect to
any future tort claims. 225 Therefore, a trust fund created under the New
3809 Regulations is not a designated settlement fund.
3. Qualified Settlement Funds
Treasury Regulations Section 1.468B-1 226 provides for the creation
of "qualified settlement funds," which are treated the same as designated
settlement funds for federal income tax purposes.2 7 The definition of
"qualified settlement funds" is much broader than the definition of "des-
ignated settlement funds" and specifically includes funds established or
approved by order of the United States, any state, or any agency or in-
strumentality of the United States or any state.228 These funds must be
"established to resolve or satisfy one or more contested or uncontested
claims that have resulted or may result from an event (or related series of
events) that has occurred and that has given rise to at least one claim
asserting liability ....,,229 under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980230 ("CERCLA"), arising
219. § 468B(d)(1).
220. § 468B(d)(I)(A). Specifically, a "designated settlement fund" must be "established pur-
suant to a court order and [it must be a fund] which extinguishes completely the taxpayer's tort
liability with respect to [certain future tort claims arising out of personal injury, death, or property
damage]." § 468B(d)(2)(A).
221. § 468B(b). The fund is taxable in its investment income at the rates found in I.R.C. § 1(e)
(2005).
222. I.R.C. § 468B(b)(2) (2005).
223. Id. In short, this is a provision that allows accrual method taxpayers to take a full deduc-
tion much earlier than otherwise would be allowed (because of the economic performance require-
ment), but the provision also ensures that the fund will pay taxes on its income. Id.
224. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552 (2005).
225. Id.
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1 (as amended in 1993).
227. Id.
228. § 1.468B-1(c)(1) (emphasis added).
229. § 1.468B-1 (c)(2) (emphasis added).
230. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601-75 (2005).
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out of a tort, breach of contract, or violation of law, or designated by the
Service in a revenue ruling or revenue procedure.231
Although a government agency (the BLM) is ordering the creation
of the trust under the New 3809 Regulations, the environmental claims
do not arise from CERCLA and, more importantly, generally do not arise
from any event "that has occurred., 232 Instead, the fund generally is re-
quired in anticipation of an event that may occur (i.e., environmental
contamination once mining operations commence).233 Thus, a trust fund
created under the New 3809 Regulations prior to the issuance of a permit
to start digging generally will not be a qualified settlement fund.234
D. Grantor Trusts
Depending on the terms of a trust, for federal income tax purposes,
its income and deductions may be treated as income and deductions of
(a) the trust as a separate taxable entity, (b) the grantor of the trust, or
(c) a third party.235 Section 671 generally provides that when treated as
the owner of the trust, income, deductions, and credits attributable to the
trust shall be considered in calculating the taxable income of the grantor
or the third party as if that grantor or third party, respectively, directly
engaged in the trust's activities and transactions.236
Sections 673 through 677 determine when a grantor will be treated
as the owner of a trust with a United States situs, Section 679 determines
when a grantor will be treated as the owner of a foreign trust, and Section
678 determines when a third party will be treated as the owner of a trust
in the United States.237 Under Section 673, a grantor shall be treated as
the owner of any portion of the trust when he or she retains a reversion-
ary interest in the corpus or income from that portion if, as of the incep-
tion of that portion of the trust, the value of such interest exceeds five
percent of the value of such portion.238
Under Section 674, the grantor shall be treated as the owner of the
trust where the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the income is sub-
ject to a power of disposition, exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse
231. § 1.468B- (c)(2).
232. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
233. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552 (2005).
234. Because the New 3809 Regulations also allow the BLM to require the creation of a trust
after work has begun, it is possible that the trust would be a qualified settlement fund under those
circumstances. See supra text accompanying note 13.
235. I.R.C. § 671 (2005). The term "grantor trust" is generally used even if the taxpayer with
respect to the trust is a third party rather than the grantor. Accordingly, for the sake of clarity, this
article will frequently distinguish a "grantor trust with respect to the grantor" from a "grantor trust
with respect to a third party."
236. Id.
237. I.R.C. §§ 673-79 (2005). The term "situs" as used in this context refers to the primary
place of administration of the trust.
238. § 673(a).
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party 239 without the approval or consent of an adverse party.240 Sec-
tion 675 provides that grantors with certain administrative powers shall
be treated as the owners of trusts for federal income tax purposes. 241 The
powers that cause the trust to be a grantor trust include the power to pur-
chase, exchange, or otherwise deal with the corpus or income of the trust
for less than adequate and full consideration, the power to borrow the
corpus or income of the trust without adequate interest or security, and
certain "general powers of administration., 242 This section also provides
that when a grantor has directly or indirectly borrowed the corpus or in-
come, and has not completely repaid the loan before the beginning of the
taxable year, he or she will be treated as the owner of the trust.
243
Under Section 676, a grantor shall be treated as the owner of a trust
when the power to revest title in the grantor is exercisable by the grantor
or a nonadverse party.2 " Section 677 states a grantor shall be treated as
the owner of any trust whose income in the discretion of the grantor, may
be distributed to the grantor or grantor's spouse, held or accumulated for
future distribution to the grantor or his or her spouse, or applied to the
payment of certain life insurance policies.245
Under Section 678, a person or entity other than a grantor246 shall be
treated as the owner of any portion of a trust with respect to which he or
she either (1) has a power exercisable alone to vest the income or corpus
in him or herself or (2) has previously partially released or modified such
a power and after the release or modification retains such control as
would cause a grantor to be treated as the owner.247 Lastly, Section 679
notes a resident of the United States who directly or indirectly transfers
property to a foreign trust is treated as the owner for the taxable year of
239. I.R.C. § 672(b) (2005). I.R.C. § 672(b) defines a nonadverse party simply as any person
who is not an adverse party. Id.
240. I.R.C. § 672(a) (2005). I.R.C. § 672(a) defines adverse party as "any person having a
substantial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or non-
exercise of the power he possesses respecting the trust." Id. A general power of appointment over
trust property is deemed to be a beneficial interest in the trust. Id. I.R.C. § 674(b) lists eight trust
powers to which I.R.C. § 674 does not apply. § 674(b).
241. I.R.C. § 675 (2005).
242. Id. 1.R.C. § 675(4) lists the following three specific powers that qualify as general powers
of administration: (1) the power to vote stock of a corporation in which the holdings of the grantor
and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control, (2) the power to control the in-
vestment of the trust funds, either by directing investments or reinvestments or by vetoing proposed
investments or reinvestments, and (3) the power to reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other
property of an equivalent value. § 675(4).
243. § 675(3).
244. I.R.C. § 676(a) (2005).
245. I.R.C. § 676(b) (2005), however, provides that Section 676(a) does not apply to a power
the exercise of which can only affect the beneficial enjoyment after the occurrence of an event.
I.R.C. § 676(b) (2005).
246. A person or entity other than a grantor is considered a third party.
247. I.R.C. § 678 (2005). This situation is referred to throughout this article as a "grantor trust
with respect to a third party."
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the portion attributable to that property if there is a United States benefi-
ciary of any portion of the trust.
248
A trust established to cover future environmental remediation ex-
penses may qualify (and, in fact, is likely to qualify) as a grantor trust
with respect to the grantor (i.e., the mining company) based on general
tax principles and the Treasury Regulations issued under Section 677.249
Treasury Regulations Section 1.677(a)-l(d) 250 provides "a grantor is, in
general, treated as an owner of a portion of a trust whose income is, or in
the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, may be ap-
plied in discharge of any legal obligation of the grantor .... 9Q1 ' This
regulation reflects general economic neutrality principles articulated in
Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner,252 namely that the discharge of a
legally enforceable obligation by a third party produces income to the
obligor. 3 Thus, a trust established to fund future environmental reme-
diation costs should be treated as a grantor trust if the income of the trust
is used to discharge the grantor of liability at the time of payment under
federal, state, or local environmental laws. Ultimately, however, the
terms of the trust agreement and the arrangement with the BLM regard-
ing the trust will determine if the trust is a grantor trust.254 This is dis
cussed in greater detail below. 55
1. Deductions
When discussing deductions with respect to trusts, it is essential to
remember that there are two relevant types of deductions. First, there is
the possibility of deducting payments made by the grantor256 to the trust
for environmental clean-up. Second, there is the possibility of deducting
amounts paid out of the trust, for administration expenses as well as en-
vironmental clean-up costs, over time.
With respect to a trust that is a grantor trust with respect to the gran-
tor, a payment by the grantor to that trust is treated as having not been
248. I.R.C. § 679(a)(1) (2005).
249. Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a) (as amended in 1971).
250. § 1.677(a)-I(d).
251. Id.
252. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
253. Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. at 729. In Old Colony Trust Co., the court found that
income taxes paid by an employer, on behalf of an employee, resulted in compensation to the em-
ployee. Id. The court found the arrangement economically equivalent to the employer paying the
employee additional cash compensation, and the employee using this additional compensation to pay
his own tax bill. Id. In the context of a trust established to cover future environmental remediation
costs, discharging a grantor's obligation with income from the trust is equivalent to paying that
income directly to the grantor, which would cause the trust to be treated as a grantor trust under
I.R.C. § 677 and the rule of Old Colony Trust.
254. I.R.C. § 676(a) (2005).
255. See infra Part lI.D.2.
256. In this situation, the grantor is the mining company.
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made for federal income tax purposes.2 57 Thus, a taxpayer cannot take a
deduction solely by virtue of making such a payment regardless of
258whether the taxpayer is a cash or accrual method taxpayer. 8 When
amounts are ultimately distributed out of the trust for environmental
clean-up, those amounts may be deducted by the grantor if the grantor
could deduct the payments if they had been made directly by the grantor
for that clean-up.259
With respect to a trust that is a grantor trust with respect to a third
party,260 the analysis is somewhat different. When a cash method grantor
makes a payment to that trust, it is as if the grantor paid the money di-
rectly to the third party.261 Assuming that this payment is being made
pursuant to an order of a government agency, such as the BLM, and as-
suming that the third party is a "creditor" of the grantor, then the pay-
ment should be deductible when made to the trust if a payment directly
to that third party, by the taxpayer, would be deductible.262 Subsequent
income earned by the trust after the contribution to the trust is taxable to
the third party.263 This may provide a planning opportunity if it is possi-
ble to make a tax-exempt entity such as the BLM the third party to whom
the trust income is taxable. This potentially can be accomplished with
careful planning.264
2. Qualifying the Trust as a Grantor Trust with Respect to the
Grantor
In general, it should not be very difficult to qualify the trust as a
grantor trust with respect to the grantor.265 First, if the grantor retains a
reversionary interest equal to at least five percent of the initial trust
value, then the trust will be a grantor trust under Section 676.266 Because
certain mining companies will want a reversionary interest if it turns out
that the funds are not needed for environmental clean-up, there is a dis-
tinct possibility that the trust will be a grantor trust.26 7  Other mining
companies may view the requirement that they fund a trust for environ-
mental clean-up as a cost of doing business; in this case they may be
257. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
258. For federal tax purposes, it is as if no transfer has been made. This does not prevent the
taxpayer from utilizing deductions that accrue regardless of payment. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 179, 468
(2005).
259. That is when a payment is occurring for federal income tax purposes.
260. I.R.C. § 678 addresses such trusts. I.R.C. § 678 (2005).
261. For federal income tax purposes, the trust does not exist, and the third party is the tax-
payer.
262. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) (as amended in 2004).
263. I.R.C. §§ 671, 678 (2005).
264. See discussion infra Part II.D.3.
265. 1.R.C. § 676 (2005). In fact, the author believes that environmental clean-up trusts will
more commonly be treated as grantor trusts with respect to the grantor for federal income tax pur-
poses.
266. Id.
267. This has been the author's personal experience.
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willing to forego any reversionary interest.268 The company could forego
a reversionary interest, for example, by directing that any funds left in
the trust upon its termination will be paid to charity.269 The company
may want to do this, among other reasons, if doing so will sever its ties
to the trust for federal income tax purposes.27°
A second basis for ensuring that the trust will be a grantor trust with
respect to the grantor, if this is desired, is to affirmatively establish that
all income from the trust will be used to satisfy an on-going obligation of
the grantor to clean-up the environment. This would appear to be the
case if the grantor has an on-going clean-up obligation and if the trust
funds are used to satisfy that obligation; it would not be the case if the
grantor has completely satisfied its obligations to the BLM upon funding
the trust.
271
3. Qualifying the Trust as a Grantor Trust with Respect to the BLM
Attempting to make the BLM the taxpayer with respect to the trust
is a novel idea, which, if it works, would have extremely favorable tax
consequences.272 The general idea is that the BLM could be given an
unrestricted power each year to withdraw all trust income each year for a
limited period of time.273 Assuming that the grantor of the trust, i.e., the
mining company, would not otherwise be treated as the owner of the
income of the trust, then the BLM would be treated as the owner of the
trust for federal income tax purposes.27  Because the BLM is exempt
268. This has been the author's personal experience.
269. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1 (as amended in 1974).
270. Specifically, a company should consider doing so if it will make the trust a non-grantor
trust.
271. See supra note 113. The BLM generally takes the position that a financial guarantee does
not release the mining company of its clean-up obligations. See supra text accompanying note 113.
That being said, it may be possible to negotiate an arrangement with the BLM under which the
mining company would put an extra-large amount into trust in complete satisfaction of its clean-up
obligations with respect to the permit that it is seeking to obtain.
272. The possibility of doing this was originally suggested by Bill Huff of HRO.
273. The withdrawal power should last at least 30 days each year. This type of withdrawal
power, used in other contexts, is commonly referred to as a "Crummey power" as a result of the case
of Crummey v. Comm'r., 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 772 (1966). See 5 BORIs 1. BITrKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 124.3.3 (2d ed. 1993) (using the
term "Crummey power" to describe the unrestricted ability to withdraw trust income for a limited
period of time). The holder of a Crummey power is the owner of the portion of the trust to which the
power applies under I.R.C. § 678, provided that the grantor of the trust is not the owner of that
portion by virtue of I.R.C. §§ 676, 677, or 679(a) (2005). See I.R.C. §§ 676-78, 679(a) (2005);
BIrTKER & LOKKEN, supra, 124.3.3; infra note 274.
274. I.R.C. § 678(b) (2005). It appears that if the BLM withdraws income earned by the Trust,
it may be required to deposit that income in the United States Treasury "as soon as practicable with-
out deduction for any charge or claim." If this is true, it would potentially mean that the BLM is not
the beneficiary of the trust for federal income tax purposes, and therefore the trust would not be a
grantor trust with respect to the BLM under I.R.C. § 678. The counter argument, brought to the
author's attention by Kelly Berg and Chuck Ramunno at HRO, is that the United States government
as a whole is the beneficiary, and the BLM is a part of the United States government. This means
that the United States government is in effect the beneficiary and the holder of the withdrawal
power. Note that if the neither the grantor of the trust nor any third party is treated as the owner for
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from tax by virtue of the fact that the Code does not impose tax on gov-
ernment agencies, no taxes would be owed on account of income earned
by the trust.275
The primary problems with this idea are: (1) it may be difficult to
ensure that the trust is not a grantor trust with respect to the grantor,276
and (2) the BLM may not be amenable to the idea due to concerns about
its fiduciary responsibility or changes to the tax law with respect to its
tax-exempt status.277 It may be worth considering the use of this type of
withdrawal power, however, in such a manner that they will become
effective if and when the grantor goes out of business.278 Assuming that
the BLM would like to keep the trust in existence after the grantor no
longer exists, then it would appear to be preferable to have the trust be
tax-exempt at that time, if possible. 79
E. Non-Grantor Trusts
A trust that is not a grantor trust will be a non-grantor trust. Al-
though it may be difficult to structure an environmental clean-up trust as
a non-grantor trust, it should not be impossible under the right circum-
stances. As mentioned above, two key elements are to ensure that the
grantor does not retain a reversionary interest greater than five percent of
the trust's initial value and to ensure that the trust income is not used to
satisfy an ongoing obligation of the grantor. 280
1. Deductibility of Payments to the Trust
If the trust is a non-grantor trust, payments to the trust upon order
by the BLM will be deductible by cash method taxpayers as a result of
Treasury Regulations Section 1.461-2(c)(1). 281  With respect to accrual
method taxpayers, because the rules regarding designated settlement
funds and qualified settlement funds generally will not apply to environ-
federal income tax purposes, then the trust is taxed as a separate entity (i.e., a non-grantor trust).
I.R.C. § 678 (2005).
275. It is interesting to note that, although I.R.C. § 170(c), allows for the deduction of contribu-
tions to government agencies, I.R.C. § 501, does not directly provide that government agencies are
tax-exempt. I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501 (2005). That would appear to be due to the fact that the Code
does not tax those agencies in the first place.
276. This is because the grantor may be satisfying an on-going obligation with trust income.
See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text. Recall that if both the grantor and a third party
could be treated as the owner of the trust for federal income tax purposes, then the grantor is treated
as the owner. § 678(b).
277. These problems arose during the author's negotiations with the BLM.
278. One could call this a "springing Crummey power," or one that appears when the grantor
disappears.
279. Remember that one of the primary reasons for creating these trusts in the first place is to
ensure that funds are available for environmental clean-up in the event that the mining company
declares bankruptcy or ceases to exist.
280. See supra Part II.D.2.
281. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1)(1996).
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mental clean-up trusts,282 the economic performance rule283 will prevent
the grantor from taking a deduction until the funds are actually distrib-
uted from the trust for environmental clean-up work.284
2. Taxation of Income Earned by the Trust
A non-grantor trust that may retain or distribute income is referred
to as a complex trust.285 Complex trusts are taxed on all trust income;
however, the trust is a allowed deduction for administrative expenses as
well as for income that has been distributed to a beneficiary.286
III. PROPOSAL FOR TAx LAW CHANGE
As is evident from the multitude of Code Sections and Treasury
Regulations that are potentially applicable to environmental clean-up
287trusts, Congress and the Treasury did not anticipate the creation of
trusts under the New 3809 Regulations. Accordingly, in the interest of
certainty for taxpayers and the BLM, Congress or the Treasury should
take action to make the law clear with respect to these trusts.
A. The Options
There are two logical options with respect to these trusts. First, the
Code could be amended to deem the trust to be a grantor trust with re-
spect to the grantor, fully taxable to the grantor as if the trust did not ex-
ist.288 In this case, no deduction would be allowed solely as a result of a
contribution to the trust.28 9 The grantor could take deductions as distri-
butions are made from the trust in the future or, if deductions can be ac-
crued earlier under Section 179 or 468, then they could be taken ear-
lier.290
There is a sub-issue in this case regarding what happens if and when
the grantor ceases to exist and if the trust is a grantor trust with respect to
the grantor. In that case, the Code could make it clear that the trust either
282. See discussion supra Part II.C.2-3.
283. I.R.C. § 461(h) (2005); discussion supra Part II.B.1.
284. It is only at this point that "economic performance" will occur. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-
4(g)(1)(i) (2005).
285. See Clark Trust v. Comm'r., 49 T.C. 456, 458-59 (1968).
286. Id. See also I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (2005).
287. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 198, 468, 468B (2005); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(e) (as amended
in 1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1 (as amended in 1993).
288. Absent careful planning, this is most likely how such a trust would be treated under I.R.C.
§ 671; however, the current state of the law imposes uncertainty on the Service and on mining com-
panies. See supra Part II.D. In the author's experience, this uncertainty has caused the BLM to
insist that the mining company obtain at least one Private Letter Ruling to determine the income tax
consequences under the New 3809 Regulations.
289. A downside of this approach is the possibility that grantor trust status could increase the
likelihood that a creditor could reach trust assets if the grantor declares bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
issues are beyond the scope of this article.
290. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2, A.4.
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becomes a fully-taxable independent entity or a tax-exempt entity. In the
author's experience, tax-exempt status at that point would be the prefer-
able option both from the standpoint of the BLM and from the standpoint
of mining companies because it would greatly simplify the initial compu-
tation of the amounts needed to ensure that environmental clean-up work
can be completed.291 It also would make more money available for that
purpose by not reducing the growth in the trust value by income taxes.
Second, Congress or the Treasury could deem these trusts to be
separate taxpayers like designated settlement funds or qualified settle-
ment funds. In this case, the mining company would be allowed a cur-
rent deduction, and the fund would be taxable on its income as a separate
entity. Alternatively, the fund could be deemed to be a separate entity
that is tax-exempt. While this would have an impact on government
revenue, it would maximize the growth of these funds for environmental
clean-up work. 92
B. Proposal
In the author's experience, mining companies and the BLM are
seeking simplicity and certainty with respect to the taxation of trusts un-
der the New 3809 Regulations. In addition, the BLM has a great interest
in ensuring that trust funds are not reachable by the mining companies'
creditors. 93 With this in mind, it seems that the most favorable approach
would be to grant mining companies a present deduction for amounts
contributed to environmental clean-up trusts whenever a trust is required
by the BLM under the New 3809 Regulations. In addition, these trusts
should be non-grantor trusts for income tax purposes. Allowing the de-
duction coupled with non-grantor trust status would help to disentangle
mining companies from these trusts, which in turn should make the trust
assets somewhat safer from the perspective of keeping them out of the
reach of creditors. Because the decision regarding whether a trust will be
required is entirely within the control of the BLM, there is also little
chance that these trusts would be used for tax evasion.
294
With respect to the non-grantor trust status of the trust once it is
funded, it seems that an additional tax benefit could be used to give min-
291. It is virtually impossible to accurately estimate how much is needed in a fund if: (1) the
mining company pays all taxes on the fund while the company is in existence, and (2) the trust has to
pay taxes out of the trust if and when the mining company ceases to exist.
292. It is axiomatic that a fund that grows tax-free will grow more quickly than a fund whose
growth is reduced by the payment of taxes each year. See Spartech Corp. v. Opper, 890 F.2d 949,
955 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing taxes as expenses).
293. During the author's negotiations with the BLM in conjunction with the preparation of
environmental clean-up trusts for his firm's clients, the concern that was most frequently conveyed
by the BLM was that the funds would not be available to the mining company's creditors in the
event that the mining company were to declare bankruptcy.
294. To further minimize the possibility of tax evasion, amounts that revert to the grantor upon
termination of the trust, if any, should be included in the grantor's income.
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ing companies an incentive to sever all potential reversionary interests in
the trust: the trust should be tax-exempt if the mining company retains no
reversionary interest in the trust whatsoever. For example, if the trust
terms provide that unused trust funds ultimately pass to charity,29 5 then
the trust should be tax-exempt. This would mean that less money would
be needed up-front to adequately fund the trust, giving mining companies
an incentive to agree to this approach. 296 If the company refuses, 297 the
trust would be a taxable entity. This would mean that the mining com-




The BLM enacted the New 3809 Regulations to ensure that trust
funds would be available for environmental clean-up. 299  Because taxa-
tion has a great impact on how quickly a long-term trust fund will grow,
this objective is not likely to be met as long as the Code does not provide
certainty to mining companies and to the BLM regarding how these
trusts will be taxed.3 ° °
Regardless of the ultimate approach used, Congress and the Treas-
ury should create a clear rule. Because the funds are being set aside for
long-term or indefinite periods of time, because the amounts put into
these trusts have been computed by a government agency, 30 and because
it is likely that the funds ultimately will be used in a way that will benefit
the general public, the mining company should be given a present deduc-
tion for the total amount put into the trust and, once the trust is funded,
the trust should be a tax-exempt entity if the mining company retains no
reversionary interest in the trust.30 2 Doing this will maximize the amount
295. For example, the trust funds could pass to the Nevada Division of Wildlife.
296. Less money would be needed up-front because the fund would grow faster if it is not
reduced by taxes each year. See supra note 292.
297. Refusing, in this situation, would occur if the mining company insists on keeping a rever-
sionary interest in the trust.
298. See supra note 292. It follows that more money would be needed up-front because the
trust would have a lower anticipated growth rate as a result of its status as a taxable entity.
299. See supra Part I.D.
300. For example, assume that the BLM and "Clementine's Mining Company" agree that a
trust will be set up as a grantor trust. In that case, they would project the growth of the trust under
the assumption that the fund's growth rate will not be reduced by taxes each year. If Clementine's
subsequently goes out of business and if the Service determines that the trust is not tax-exempt, then
the trust fund will suddenly begin to be reduced by taxes. In that case, the assets left in the trust
would probably be insufficient to fully fund the required environmental clean-up. Because it is
impossible to predict if and when Clementine's will go out of business, current law would require a
lot of speculation regarding whether the trust will ever be taxable. Clementine's would argue that it
will never go out of business. The BLM would argue that it is going to go out of business at any
moment. As the author can attest, this makes for some awkward negotiations.
301. In this situation, the computing agency would be the BLM.
302. As mentioned above, the tax exemption could be used to give mining companies an incen-
tive to forego any reversionary interest. If the mining company chooses to keep a reversionary
interest, the fund could be taxable, much like designated settlement funds and qualified settlement
funds. See supra Parts 1.C.2-3.
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available for environmental clean-up. It also will provide mining com-
panies and the BLM with certainty and clarity, and perhaps it will foster
greater support for the New 3809 Regulations in the mining industry.
EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE WAR ON TERROR
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ABSTRACT
Two important paradigm shifts have occurred in the war on terror.
First, the United States has treated terrorism as a military issue, not a
law enforcement problem. Second, the United States has centralized its
intelligence apparatus under the direction of the newly-created Director
of National Intelligence and lowered the wall that separated external
security or foreign intelligence activity from internal security or domes-
tic law enforcement. In tandem, these changes are of historic dimension.
They also occur against a backdrop in modern times in which the execu-
tive branch has steadily accumulated power. In pursuit of the war on
terror, we have begun to blur traditional lines meant to protect civil lib-
erty from the danger of excessive executive power: the line between the
military and domestic law enforcement on the one hand, and between
domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence on the other. This
blurring of lines already has led to difficult questions regarding the lim-
its of executive prerogative and will undoubtedly lead to more. The cu-
mulative effect of both paradigm shifts is to enlarge executive authority
and to increase the risk of civil liberty abuses.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TROD U CTION ..................................................................................... 335
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................ 339
II. GROWTH OF EXECUTIVE POWER .................................................... 343
III. Tw o PARADIGM SHIFTS ................................................................. 352
A. M ilitary Response to Terrorism ................................................. 353
B. Centralization of Intelligence Functions .................................... 371
C ON CLU SION ......................................................................................... 385
INTRODUCTION
An examination of post-9/11 governmental action inevitably raises
the question of how to balance civil liberty interests against national se-
curity concerns in times of crises. This question is not a new one, either
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for the United States or for any other nation. More than 2000 years ago,
Cicero, the Roman statesman, lawyer, and philosopher, coined the
maxim, "Inter arma silent leges."' (In time of war, the law is silent.)
Then, of course, there is the oft-quoted admonition attributed to Benja-
min Franklin, "Those, who would give up essential liberty to purchase a
little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.",2  Falling
somewhere between Cicero's observation and Franklin's admonition is a
more recent appraisal by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist:
It is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will
occupy as favored a position in wartime as it does in peacetime. But
it is both desirable and likely that more careful attention will be paid
by the courts to the basis for the government's claims of necessity as
a basis for curtailing civil liberty. The laws will thus not be silent in
time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.
3
Whether in time of war the law should have no voice, a somewhat
different voice, or the same voice, is a question that not only may pro-
foundly affect individual rights but the constitutional structure of gov-
ernment itself. In measuring the extent of the law's voice during times of
crisis, the focus is often on the impact of national security-related meas-
ures on individual rights. 4 But post-9/11 governmental action may also
1. Cicero, Pro Milone, quoted in QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 863 (1965) (citation
omitted). In recent times, this maxim has been widely cited. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
579 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224 (1998);
Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 16, 150 (2002); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REv.
767, 767 (2002).
There is, of course, a certain irony in its authorship. After Julius Caesar was murdered,
political turmoil ensued in Rome. See ANTHONY EVERITT, CICERO 272-319 (2001). Cicero sought
to restore the Roman Republic and opposed Marc Antony in a series of speeches in the Senate
known as the Philippics. Id. Antony later came to power with Octavian and Lepidus in the Second
Triumvirate and had Cicero killed, along with Cicero's brother and nephew. Id. At Antony's order,
Cicero's head and hands were cut off and nailed to the rostrum in the Senate. Id.
2. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759), reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 107
(Jared Sparks ed., Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1836). Different, if not corrupted, versions of this
quote appear on any number of websites. It is not clear if Franklin authored the quote, or if it was
published under his direction and with his approval. Sparks asserts that Franklin "was not in fact the
author [of AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA]
although it was written under his direction, and doubtless from copious materials furnished by him."
Id. at 108-09. See also Richard Minsky, Franklin Quoted by Minsky,
http://www.futureofthebook.com/stories/storyReader$605 (asserting that "Franklin may well have
composed this particular quote.").
3. REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224-25. Not surprisingly, 9/11 has stimulated a considerable
body of scholarship in this area. For a small sampling of recent scholarship, see Bruce Ackerman,
The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004) [hereinafter Ackerman, Emergency Con-
stitution]; David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113
YALE L.J. 1753 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitu-
tion, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004); Bruce Ackerman, Response, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J.
1871 (2004). See also Lee Epstein, et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only
Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism
at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2004).
4. A profusion of scholarship has already focused on the impact of post-9/l 1 governmental
action on individual rights. For a sampling of such literature, see THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS:
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003);
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affect the distribution of power among the three branches of the federal
government, as well as the distribution of power between the federal
government and the states. Those structural consequences implicate, in
the aggregate and over the long term, liberty concerns that may be more
subtle and difficult to discern, though no less important. Moreover, any
examination of separation of powers issues raised by post-9/11 govern-
mental action must be placed in its historical context, against a backdrop
in modem times of the steady accumulation of power in the executive
branch.
This article asserts that two paradigm shifts have occurred as a re-
sult of the government's war on terror6 and that each implicates structural
DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS (2003); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2002).
5. For an examination of this point, see Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Be-
tween Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Approach to Rights Dur-
ing Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 161
(Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); Lobel, supra note 1.
6. For purposes of this article, the term "war on terror" is used to describe the government's
post-9/l I efforts to combat terrorism. Left unexplored is whether the "war on terror" is a true war.
A number of scholars have argued that it is not. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC
CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247 (2004) ("It is debat-
able, of course, whether the war on terrorism is really a war at all."); PHILIP B. HEYMANN,
TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 21 (2003) (on policy grounds
rejecting the metaphor of "war" as "dangerous in the longer run"); Jordan J. Paust, Post 9/11 Over-
reactions and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treat-
ment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1335, 1340-43 (2004) (arguing that as a matter of international law, the U.S. cannot be at war
with al Qaeda); Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 326-28 (2003) (same); Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135, 140 (2004) ("Although using the language of war and de-
scribing the September 1 Ph attacks as war crimes may be a convenient rhetorical device to describe
the struggle to cripple international terrorist organizations, it is not consonant with existing and
well-established principles of international law.").
Other scholars have argued the contrary. See RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING
SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 186 (2005) ("In wartime the
interest in security soars and so civil liberties are diminished; and our current struggle with interna-
tional terrorism is, like the Cold War, plausibly described as war."); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2070
(2005) ("When, as here, both political branches have treated a conflict as a 'war,' and that charac-
terization is plausible, there is no basis for the courts to second-guess that determination based on
some metaphysical conception of the true meaning of war."); Eric A. Posner, Terrorism and the
Laws of War, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 423, 424 (2005) (arguing that "[t]he laws of war might sensibly be
applied to conflicts between states and international terrorist organizations, though most likely in a
highly modified form"); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
207, 213 (2003) (asserting that conflict with al Qaeda qualifies as war and that it does not make sense
to treat 9/11 "as a massive crime, rather than an act of war").
For a thoughtful and provocative critique of both positions, see Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks,
War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of
Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004). Professor Brooks argues that the law of armed conflict
provides "no clear guidance" for determining whether al Qaeda is a criminal enterprise or a belliger-
ent armed force. Id. at 718.
[T]he Bush administration's arguments for viewing the September 11 attacks as 'armed
conflict' are-from a legal perspective-at least as persuasive as the arguments for viewing
the September 11 attacks as crimes .... There is no longer any basis for asserting a
clearly discernable line between crime and conflict.
Id See also Ackerman, Emergency Constitution, supra note 3, at 1032 ("Our legal tradition pro-
vides us with two fundamental concepts-war and crime-to deal with our present predicament.
Neither fits.").
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constitutional issues. The first shift has been to militarize the United
States' response to terrorism. In general, prior to 9/11, the United States
dealt with terrorism through the criminal justice system. After 9/11, the
United States began to treat terrorism as a military issue. One manifesta-
tion of this paradigm shift has been the indefinite detention of citizens as
enemy combatants. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,7 the Supreme Court rejected
the broadest assertion of an unreviewable executive power to detain.8
There is now some guidance on the outer limits of executive power in the
war on terror, at least with respect to the detention of citizens by the mili-
tary. Nevertheless, Hamdi hardly represents a sweeping vindication of
civil rights, and, indeed, may be viewed as an affirmation of executive
branch power. Moreover, many questions remain unanswered in the
wake of Hamdi, and the military response to terrorism will continue to
pose difficult line drawing questions on the bounds of executive preroga-
tive in matters once primarily handled through the courts and by civilian
authorities.
The second paradigm shift has involved a centralization of foreign
and domestic intelligence activities under the newly created National
Intelligence Directorate. This centralization, which was authorized by
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,9 lowers
the proverbial wall between foreign intelligence gathering and domestic
law enforcement-a wall carefully erected and maintained for more than
half a century by the National Security Act of 1947.10 In addition, vari-
ous provisions of the Patriot Act dismantle the wall between foreign and
domestic intelligence. 1 Unlike the issue of citizen enemy combatants,
we have no guidance from the Supreme Court on the centralization of
intelligence functions, and, for reasons to be explained, are unlikely to
receive any. In both instances, however, post-9/11 governmental action
raises important structural constitutional issues. And in both instances, a
recurring theme is the accumulation of power in the executive branch.
In tandem, the paradigm shifts are of historic dimension, and should
not pass unobserved. Important and long-standing lines have been
blurred between the military and domestic law enforcement on the one
Some in the Bush administration, but not the President, appear to be questioning the use
of the phrase "war on terror." General Richard B. Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
recently said that he had "objected to the use of the term 'war on terrorism' before, because if you
call it a war, then you think of people in uniform as being the solution." Richard W. Stevenson,
President Makes It Clear; Phrase Is 'War on Terror', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at A12. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other officials had also used the phrase "global struggle against
violent extremism." Id. President Bush, however, rejected that formulation and has continued to
call the conflict a war. Id.
7. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
9. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1011,
118 Stat. 3638 (2004) [hereinafter IRTPA].
10. National Security Act of 1947 § 103(d)(1), 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(d)(1) (West 2003).
11. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
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hand, and between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence on
the other-lines that were drawn to protect civil liberty from the danger
of excessive executive power. While some scholarship has noted the
military response to terrorism, 2 and other scholarship has commented on
recent laws that have centralized intelligence functions and lowered the
wall between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement, 13 this
article comments on both changes, places them in a historical context,
and evaluates their cumulative impact and the way in which they enlarge
executive authority.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief explana-
tion of the theory underlying the separation of powers doctrine and a
framework for analyzing separation of powers claims involving the ex-
ecutive branch. Part II places an assessment of executive power in a
historical context and discusses its growth in modem times. Some pow-
ers are less obvious than others and were not contemplated by the Fram-
ers. Part III examines the paradigm shifts that have occurred as a result
of the government's war on terror: a militarized response to terrorism
and a centralization of intelligence functions. Not surprisingly, perhaps,
this article concludes that one result of the war on terror has been to ex-
pand the power of the executive branch, an expansion that is part of a
broader and problematic historical trend.
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Framers imposed structural limits on the power of government
in order to better secure liberty. Part of the limitation occurs on a verti-
cal plane; part occurs on a horizontal plane. On the vertical plane, the
Constitution establishes a political structure in which there is a federal
government and state governments. Within that structure, there are lim-
12. For examples of such scholarship, see HEYMANN, supra note 6, at 19-33, 91-98; Robert
M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 34-39 (2005); John S. Baker, Jr., Competing Paradigms of Constitutional
Power in "The War on Terrorism, " 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2005); Richard H.
Kohn, Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 165 (2003);
Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 307 (2003); Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1217 (2002).
13. For scholarship that discusses the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 and its creation of a Director of National Intelligence, see POSNER, supra note 6; Grant T.
Harris, Note, The CIA Mandate and the War on Terror, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 529 (2005). To
date, there has been far more scholarship on provisions of the Patriot Act that dismantle the wall
between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement, see COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 4, at
162-65; STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 43-48 (2002); Richard Henry
Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and
Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319 (2005); Lobel, supra note 1, at 787-90; Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal Privacy, in THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS, supra note 4, at 133-43; Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306 (2004); Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need
to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179 (2003); George P.
Varghese, Comment, A Sense of Purpose: The Role of Law Enforcement in Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 385 (2003).
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its on the power of each government. The federal government is a gov-
ernment of enumerated powers. 14 It can act only if the Constitution al-
lows it to do so. Moreover, under the Tenth Amendment, "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'
' 5
The States, then, serve as a counterweight to the federal government.
On the horizontal plane, the federal government is divided into three
branches: the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Implicit in
that division is a separation of powers among the three branches. The
purpose of the separation is to establish an internal system of checks and
balances that prevents any one branch from becoming overly powerful.
16
As James Madison explained in The Federalist, No. 51, "the great secu-
rity against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department consists in giving to those who administer each department
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist en-
croachment of the others.,
17
In combination, Madison wrote, the vertical and horizontal distribu-
tion of power was intended to check the exercise of arbitrary power and
to safeguard civil liberty:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the peo-
ple. The different governments will controul each other; at the same
time that each will be controulled by itself.
18
Thus, as Justice Brandeis later elaborated, the doctrine of separation of
powers was not intended to promote efficiency, "but to preclude the ex-
ercise of arbitrary power."' 9 "The purpose was not to avoid friction, but,
by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the gov-
14. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle,
that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent, to have re-
quired to be enforced by all those arguments, which its enlightened friends, while it was
depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that principle is now universally
admitted.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 706-07 (1974).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 318-19 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
18. Id. at 320. See also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 87 (15th ed. 2004) ("To the drafters of 1787, protection against excessive concentrations of
power lay less in explicit limits such as the 'shall nots' of the Bill of Rights than in diffusions of
power among a variety of governmental units.").
19. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ernmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy.
20
The branches of government, however, are not hermetically sealed
from each other. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dis-
persed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.' Con-
gress enacts legislation,22 for example, but the President wields the veto
23power. In the area of foreign affairs, the President has the power to
make treaties and to appoint ambassadors, subject to the advice and con-
sent of the Senate.24 With respect to military affairs, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief,25 but Congress has the power to declare war, to
raise and support the armed forces, and to make rules regulating the
armed forces.26
Whether one branch has overstepped its constitutional bounds and
violated the separation of powers doctrine raises difficult and nuanced
questions of constitutional law.27  For claims of executive branch over-
reaching, the most influential and widely cited test comes from Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.28 In
20. Myers, 272 U.S. at 293. For recent scholarship that questions the extent to which the
principle of separation of powers protects civil liberties, see Tushnet, supra note 5, at 2677.
21. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
23. Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
24. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
25. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
26. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11-14.
27. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore in greater detail the varying analytical
approaches to separation of powers questions. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court has relied on
two tests, one known as "formalism" and the other as "functionalism." See generally FALLON, supra
note 6, 174-77; Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 11 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functional-
ism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21 (1998); Burt Neubome, Formal-
ism, Functionalism, and the Separation of Powers, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45 (1998); Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions - A Foolish Incon-
sistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987).
28. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-60 (Jackson, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has noted
that Justice Jackson's analytical framework "brings together as much combination of analysis and
common sense as there is in this area." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981). See
also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 2050 (calling Justice Jackson's categorization of presi-
dential power "widely accepted"); Epstein, et al., supra note 3, at 110 (based on quantitative analysis
of Supreme Court precedent arguing that in war-related cases, the Court uses an "institutional proc-
ess" approach that "looks towards Congress"); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 5, at 194 (noting that
"where both legislature and executive endorse a particular tradeoff of liberty and security, the courts
have accepted that judgment"); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002) (describing Justice Jackson's ana-
lytical framework as creating "three now-canonical categories that guide modem analysis of separa-
tion of powers"); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 82 (noting that Justice Jackson's concurrence "explored
in some detail the central importance of a grant of authority from Congress"). An interesting cri-
tique of Justice Jackson's test is that "[b]y emphasizing fluid constitutional arrangements between
Congress and President instead of the fixed liberal dichotomies bounding executive power, the legal
realist approach to the Constitution and foreign affairs has effectively supported the extension of
executive emergency authority." Lobel, supra note 1, at 775.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Youngstown, President Truman seized the nation's steel mills to avert a
strike during the Korean War.29 In doing so, he relied upon his power
under Article II of the Constitution, including his authority as the Com-
mander-in-Chief.30 The steel companies challenged Truman's action,
alleging a violation of separation of powers. 3' The Supreme Court
agreed.32 In his concurrence, Justice Jackson explained that executive
action could be divided into three zones of analysis.33
In the first zone, the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization from Congress.34 In such a situation, the President's au-
thority is at a maximum for it includes all of his constitutional power
plus all that Congress can delegate. 35 "If his act is held unconstitutional
under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government
as an undivided whole lacks power., 36 Presidential action in this cate-
gory is "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest lati-
tude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it."
37
In the second zone, the President acts in the face of congressional
silence.38 Congress has neither granted nor denied authorization.39 In
this situation, Justice Jackson explained, the President can rely only upon
his own independent power.40 There is a "zone of twilight," however, in
which the President and Congress may have concurrent authority or in
which the distribution of authority is uncertain.41 "Therefore, congres-
sional inertia, indifference, or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presiden-
tial responsibility. ' 2 Evaluating the constitutionality of executive action
in such circumstances "is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law."
4 3
In the third zone, the President acts contrary to express or implied
congressional intent.44 In this situation, the President's "power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter., 45 To sus-
29. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 583-84.
32. Id. at 589.
33. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 636.
35. Id. at 636-37.
36. Id.
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tain executive action, courts must essentially reject Congress's authority
to act upon the subject. 46  This cannot be done lightly. "Presidential
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scruti-
nized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by
our constitutional system.A7
As a matter of constitutional theory, the excessive concentration of
power in one branch of government can have serious consequences.
First, on a horizontal plane, an undue concentration of power in one
branch of the federal government throws off the checks and balances
inherent in a system of separated powers. An imbalance of power may
occur. To paraphrase Madison, the ambition of one branch may no
longer be able to counteract the ambition of another. 48 Moreover, on a
vertical plane, to the extent that this growth of power in one branch of
government results in an enlarged federal authority, it may also affect the
distribution of power between the federal government and the states.49 In
other words, the theory underlying the constitutional structure-that the
horizontal and vertical distribution of power will result in a "double se-
curity"50 to safeguard the rights of the people-may be called into ques-
tion.
II. GROWTH OF EXECUTIVE POWER
An examination of separation of powers issues raised by post-9/11
governmental conduct cannot occur in a vacuum. It is widely accepted
that executive power enlarges in time of crisis, whether that crisis is
caused by civil war, economic collapse, or international armed conflict.5'
Beyond that, executive power must be viewed from a historical perspec-
tive. Madison believed that in a representative republic, Congress, not
46. Id. at 637-38.
47. Id.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 17, at 319.
49. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine federalism issues implicated by the war on
terror. Suffice it to say that some have already arisen and more are likely to come. As an example,
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Attorney General John Ashcroft asked local police to assist the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in interviewing 5000 young Middle Eastern men nationwide. Fox
Butterfield, A Nation Challenged- The Interviews; A Police Force Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying
Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7. The police in Portland, Oregon, refused to assist
federal agents based on racial profiling concerns. Id. Similarly, the REAL ID Act of 2005 estab-
lishes uniform standards for state driver's licenses and requires states to verify that a license appli-
cant is lawfully present in the U.S. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202, 119 Stat. 311,
312-15 (2005). The nation's governors have predicted that the law will impose an enormous burden
upon the states. Michael Janofsky, Governors Warn of High Costs Arising from New ID Law, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A18. See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invali-
dating federal law on 10th Amendment grounds that "commandeered" state officials, by requiring
them to perform background checks on prospective gun buyers).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 17, at 320.
51. See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224 ("Quite apart from the added authority that
the law itself may give the President in time of war, presidents may act in ways that push their legal
authority to its outer limits, if not beyond."); Gross, supra note 3, at 1029 ("When an extreme exi-
gency arises it almost invariably leads to the strengthening of the executive branch not only at the
expense of the other two branches, but also at the expense of individual rights, liberties, and free-
doms."); Lobel, supra note 1, at 770 ("[s]ince September 11, there has been a dramatic, and in some
respects unprecedented, expansion of Executive power").
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the Presidency, would be the most powerful branch: "it is against the
enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge
all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions. 52 Nevertheless, in
modem times, the Supreme Court, Congress, and scholars alike have
observed the steady accumulation of power in the executive branch since
the founding of the Republic.53
At the outset, one must acknowledge the President's formidable
powers under Article II of the Constitution. The executive power of the
United States is vested in the President.5 4  The President has the consti-
tutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.,
55
Among other powers, the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces,56 receives and appoints ambassadors,57 and makes treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate.58 The President is sworn to "pre-
serve, protect, and defend the Constitution., 59  Thus, the President is
vested with great power in the area of foreign affairs and national secu-
rity.
60
But, as Justice Jackson famously observed more than half a century
ago, the modem President has powers not apparent from the text of the
Constitution.61 A "gap ... exists between the President's paper powers
and his real powers. The Constitution does not disclose the measure of
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 306 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
53. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, Book 1, 10 (1976) [hereinafter 1 CHURCH FINAL REP.] ("[T]he executive
branch generally and the President in particular have become paramount within the federal system,
primarily through the retention of powers accrued during the emergency of World War ll.");
FALLON, supra note 6, at 173 ("Over the sweep of American history, power has almost steadily
flowed to the President."); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED,
PROMISE UNFULFILLED 1-7 (1985) (describing growth of executive power); Sunstein, supra note 3,
at 68-69 ("Undoubtedly the increasing power of the President is largely a product of functional
considerations having to do with the rise of the United States as an international power and the
growing need for energy and dispatch."); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the
Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 731 (2005) (noting "the radical expansion of presi-
dential power during the post-World War II era").
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
55. Id. § 3.
56. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
57. Id. § 2, cl. 2 & § 3.
58. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
59. Id. § 1, cl. 7.
60. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this vast
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 240 (7th ed. 2004) ("Thus, by constitutional exe-
gesis, practical experience, and Congressional acquiescence, the executive has usually predominated
the foreign affairs sphere, but this expansive international relations power is not plenary, nor may it
be exercised contrary to restrictions in the Constitution such as the Bill of Rights."); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 638 (3d ed. 2000) ("these constitutional provisions have
come to be regarded as explicit textual manifestations of the inherent presidential power to adminis-
ter, if not necessarily to formulate in any autonomous sense, the foreign policy of the United
States"); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 66, 69 (recognizing that the President has "considerable power"
with respect to national security, but calling it "tendentious to contend that when the nation is at risk,
the President must be in charge of the apparatus of government.").
61. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the actual controls wielded by the modem presidential office. 62 The
President commands the public's attention in a way no other political
figure can. Modem methods of communication, including radio and
television, have only served to expand the President's ability to shape
public opinion. Justice Jackson explained:
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head
in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of
public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his
decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the
public eye and ear. No other personality in public life can begin to
compete with him in access to the public mind through modem
methods of communications. By his prestige as head of state and his
influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who
are supposed to check and balance his power which often cancels
their effectiveness.
63
Moreover, the modem President is not only the head of government,
but the head of a political party as well. According to Justice Jackson,
the "rise of the party system has made a significant extraconstitutional
supplement to real executive power."64 The Framers associated political
parties with "factions" that often acted contrary to the public interest,
65
and no political parties were present at the Constitutional Convention in
1787.66 Yet, for the modem President, "[p]arty loyalties and interests,
sometimes more binding than law, extend his effective control into
branches of government other than his own and he often may win, as a
political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution., 67 The
President, for example, usually commands the loyalty of legislators from
his own party. This, of course, means that if his party controls Congress,
he will often be able to get his way, and, as a practical matter, Congress's
check on his power reduced.68
Furthermore, "[v]ast accretions of federal power, eroded from that
reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activ-
ity."'69 Modem American history has seen the rise of the regulatory state
and administrative agencies with delegated lawmaking powers.7y In the
62. Id.
63. Id. at 653-54.
64. Id. at 654.
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 71 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Among the
numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.").
66. FALLON, supra note 6, at 5.
67. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
68. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 2679 ("The separation-of-powers mechanism weakened with
the advent of political parties that linked national officials, especially the President, to the local
political coalitions that selected candidates for Congress.").
69. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. See Federal Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002)
("The Framers, who envisioned a limited Federal Government, could not have anticipated the vast
growth of the administrative state."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544
n. 10 (1985) ("Most of the Federal Government's current regulatory activity originated less than 50
345
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:2
last century, federal laws have created new departments and a myriad of
agencies.71 Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to those agen-
cies, which are often executive, not independent, in nature. The Presi-
dent has the appointment power with respect to executive agencies and
establishes their policy as well. Rules promulgated by the agencies ex-
tend the reach of executive power, and an agency's construction of stat-
utes within its jurisdiction to administer is given deference under the
Chevron doctrine. 72 "If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing
agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to
accept the agency's construction of the statute . . . . In combination,
administrative agencies reach into virtually every aspect of modem
American life.
More than the rise of the modem regulatory state, in the last few
decades the number of federal criminal laws has increased sharply.
74
Federal criminal laws now reach into areas once thought to be "local
crimes," which were the traditional province of the states. Examples in-
clude drug trafficking,75 loan sharking,76 domestic violence,77 and the
unlawful possession of firearms. 78 Under certain circumstances, the gov-
ernment can also detain individuals not charged with a crime. Material
witnesses in a criminal matter may be detained "if it is shown that it may
become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by sub-
years ago with the New Deal, and a good portion of it has developed within the past two decades.");
FALLON, supra note 6, at 178-79; LOWI, supra note 53, at 52-58.
71. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 30-35 (3d
ed. 1999).
72. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699
(2005).
73. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2699.
74. There were few federal crimes prior to the Civil War; today, there are more than 3,000.
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40-44 (1996). The American Bar Association's Task Force on the
Federalization of Criminal Law has reported that "of all federal criminal provisions enacted since the
Civil War [1865], over forty percent [were] created since 1970." ABA TASK FORCE ON
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998). Chief
Justice Rehnquist has warned that the trend to federalize crimes traditionally handled by the states
threatens to overwhelm the federal courts. The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, THE
THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1999, at 3,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov//ttb/jan99ttb/januaryl999.html. See also Kathleen F. Brickey,
Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1172
(1995) (noting that Congress has "placed federal criminal law on an evolutionary collision course
with state criminal law."); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized
Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1125 (1995) ("For all practical
purposes, most crime has been 'federalized' for some time, and the recent additions to the federal
criminal code are merely the latest in a long trend. Whether desirable or not, the federalization of
the substantive criminal law is largely an accomplished fact."); Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The
Folly Over Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 1248 (1995) ("[R]ecent years have witnessed a
considerable expansion of federal authority, particularly in the last decade, with the increasing effect
of turning traditional state offenses into federal ones, raising some serious cause for concern.").
75. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-971 (West 1999 & West
Supp. 2005).
76. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 891-96 (West 2000) (extortionate credit transactions).
77. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-66 (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (domestic violence and stalk-
ing).
78. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-30 (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (firearms); 26 U.S.C.A. §§
5801-72 (West 2002) (machine guns, destructive devices, and certain other firearms).
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poena.' '7 9 Similarly, under a provision of the Patriot Act, with reasonable
cause, the government can detain an alien suspected of being a terrorist
for up to seven days and then for renewable periods of up to six months
"if the release of the alien will threaten the national security of the
United States or the safety of the community or any person." 80  Under
Article II of the Constitution, it is the duty of the President to enforce
those laws.81 This, too, expands the scope of executive discretion.
That discretion, in turn, permeates each step of the criminal justice
process: from the interpretation of statutes, to the investigation and
prosecution of crimes, and the granting of pardons if a conviction ob-
tains. The Attorney General, for example, has the implicit power to
interpret federal criminal statutes in such a way so as to all but preclude
prosecution. First, his interpretation of statutes will be accorded conclu-
sive weight by federal prosecutors in the Department of Justice.82 More-
over, the interpretation, even if erroneous, will likely establish a mistake
of law defense by any individual who reasonably relies upon it.83 Simi-
79. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (West 2000). Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties
Union have criticized the Bush administration's use of this law to detain terror suspects not charged
with a crime. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WITNESS TO
ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11
(2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/; Eric Lichtblau, Two Groups Charge Abuse
of Witness Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A10. For an explanation of the material witness
statute, see Roberto lraolo, Terrorism, Grand Juries, and the Federal Material Witness Statute, 34
ST. MARY'S L.J. 401 (2003). For a critique of the government's use of the material witness statute to
detain individuals in the absence of criminal charges, see Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely,
Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/l 1 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims
in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609,
685-87 (2005) (critiquing government's use of material witness statute to detain an individual for
alleged terrorist ties); Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & the War on Terrorism,
35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (2002) ("The War on Terrorism also has made a fundamental
change in the use of material witness laws. Under the material witness laws, individuals who have
not committed any crime themselves may nonetheless be detained for extended periods of time.");
Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Pol-
icy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1211-13 (2004) (same). For scholarship that questions the utility of
material witness detention in cases involving "sleeper" terrorists, see Chesney, supra note 12, at 34-
38 (noting that detention under the material witness statute is "quite temporary" and "not a long-
term solution to the problem posed by potential sleepers").
80. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350-52 (2001). For scholarship
that critiques the effect of 9/11 on immigration law, see Raquel Aldana, The September 11 Immigra-
tion Detentions and Unconstitutional Executive Legislation, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 5, 5 (2005) ("[federal
immigration] agencies, in fact, replaced standard immigration procedures with a law enforcement
process intended to incapacitate those arrested for as long as possible while they are investigated
and interrogated, with immigration enforcement merely as a secondary goal."); Akram & Karmely,
supra note 79, at 645 (post-9/1 I government policies "have exacerbated a trend toward criminaliz-
ing immigration law, expanding the categories of mandatory detainees, reducing administrative
discretion in determining release, and curtailing the immigration and federal courts from review of
detention decisions."); Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside
Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 349, 351 (2005) (arguing that "the post-September 11th
immigration reforms .. .followed the radical Republican modus operandi of leveraging national
security and terrorism to implement an anti-immigrant agenda"); Tumlin, supra note 79, at 1177
("U.S. terrorism policy is profoundly reshaping our national immigration and immigrant policy.").
81. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
82. See, e.g., infra note 83.
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (mistake of law defense when an individual "acts in
reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or
erroneous, contained in ... an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law
with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the
offense."). A recent example of the President's power to define criminal statutes narrowly occurred
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larly, if investigators choose not to investigate an alleged criminal viola-
tion, or if prosecutors decline to bring charges, those decisions are all but
unreviewable on separation of powers grounds as an exercise of execu-
tive discretion.
84
Even if an individual is investigated, prosecuted, and convicted of a
federal crime, the President may issue a pardon. 85 There is ample prece-
dent for such pardons in cases involving national security. In 1988, the
Independent Counsel charged 14 individuals in the Iran-Contra Affair.
86
Eleven were convicted, but two convictions were overturned on appeal.87
One case was dismissed after the Attorney General refused to declassify
documents ruled relevant to the defense.88 On Christmas Eve, 1992,
shortly before leaving office, President George H. W. Bush pardoned the
former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and five other govern-
ment officials. 89  Two of the individuals, including Weinberger, were
awaiting trial at the time of the pardon.90 In pardoning those individuals,
President Bush characterized the prosecution as representing "the crimi-
nalization of policy differences," 9' a characterization rejected by the In-
dependent Counsel.92
when the Department of Justice advised that the federal torture statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A (2005),
required a showing of specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering - "the infliction of such pain
must be the defendant's precise objective" - and defined torture, in part, as pain "equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death." Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Regarding Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2340-2340A 1, 3, 13 (Aug. 1, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee
801021tr.html. As a practical matter, this interpretation made it difficult to establish the elements of
the offense by creating a high threshold for "torture" and a restrictive mens rea standard. Even if
allegedly torturous conduct were prosecuted, the wrongdoer would likely assert reasonable reliance
on an official interpretation of law. The Department of Justice subsequently retracted its August
2002 Memorandum. See Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice to James B. Comey,
Deputy Attorney General, Regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2340-
2340A 2 (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf.
84. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (recognizing broad prosecuto-
rial discretion because prosecutors "are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him
discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."')
(quoting U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("'[S]o long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by stat-
ute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion."') (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978)); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 837,
837-38 (2004) ("Few decisions prosecutors make are subject to legal restraints or judicial review.").
85. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. I (President has the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offenses against the United States").
86. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 1-3 (Aug. 4, 1993) [hereinafter 2 FINAL REP. OF THE INDEP.
COUNSEL].
87. Id. at 1-2.
88. Id. at 2-3.
89. Proclamation No. 6518, Grant of Executive Clemency, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (Dec. 24,
1992) [hereinafter Proclamation No. 6518].
90. 2 FINAL REP. OF THE INDEP. COUNSEL, supra note 86, at 2.
91. Proclamation No. 6518, supra note 89.
92. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS 82 (Feb. 8, 1993), re-
printed in 2 FINAL REP. OF THE INDEP. COUNSEL, supra note 86, at 666.
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As a historical matter, executive power also increased after World
War II. In response to the Cold War, the government, for the first time in
American history, founded a permanent and powerful peacetime military
establishment to which a substantial portion of the nation's budget was
devoted. 93 In 1940, the United States spent an amount equal to 1.7 per-
cent of its gross domestic product on national defense.94 Military spend-
ing rose dramatically during World War II and subsided in the demobili-
zation that followed. 95 With the start of the Cold War, however, defense
spending once again began to rise. From 1952 to 1959, it was at least ten
percent of gross domestic product each year.96 By 1961, three days be-
fore leaving office, President Eisenhower observed that "[o]ur military
organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my prede-
cessors in peacetime" and warned of the rise of "the military industrial
complex., 97  "This conjunction of an immense military establishment
and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. '98
Just as important as the development of a powerful peacetime mili-
tary establishment, the Cold War also witnessed the creation of standing
agencies devoted to the collection and analysis of intelligence.99 In this
regard, the work of the Church Committee is instructive. The Church
Committee, named after the Senator who chaired it, was asked in the
wake of Watergate to investigate allegations of wrongdoing committed
by U.S. intelligence agencies. 0 0 According to the Church Committee,
before World War II, the U.S. intelligence effort was ad hoc and spo-
radic.10' After World War II, however, Congress created agencies that
institutionalized the collection of intelligence.10 2  "The significant new
facets of the post-war system are the great size, technological capacity
and bureaucratic momentum of the intelligence apparatus, and, more
93. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 264 (1998) ("The nation had established a permanent peacetime mili-
tary establishment for the first time in its history and the armed forces enjoyed an unparalleled
degree of autonomy.").
94. 2005 PRESIDENT'S ECON. REP. 304, available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/
17fed20051700/www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2005/B79.xs. See also Robert Higgs, U.S. Military
Spending in the Cold War Era: Opportunity Costs, Foreign Crises, and Domestic Constraints,
CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 114 11 (Nov. 30, 1988), available at http://www.cato.org/cgi-
bin/scripts/printtech.cgi/pubs/pas/paI 14.html.
95. See 2005 PRESIDENT'S ECON. REP., supra note 94, at 304; Higgs, supra note 94, at 11.
96. Id.
97. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military-Industrial Complex Speech 3 (1961), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/speeches/eisenhowerOO .htm.
98. Id. From 1948 to 1986, military purchases averaged about $162 billion a year, or 7.6
percent of gross national product. Higgs, supra note 94, at 11. Prior to World War II and the Cold
War, peacetime spending on defense was generally no more than 1 percent of gross national product.
Id.
99. 1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 10.
100. Douglas Jehl, Judging Intelligence: The Report; Senators Assail C.I.A. 's Judgments on
Iraq's Arms as Deeply Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A 1.
101. Id.; AmY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC
163-84 (1999).
102. Themes Karalis, Foreign Policy and Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: Executive
Orders Regarding Export Administrative Act Extension of Times of Lapse as a Political Question, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109, 121 (2004).
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importantly, the public's acceptance of the necessity for a substantial
permanent intelligence system."'1 3 This development was "alien to the
previous American experience."' 04
The power, influence, and importance of the intelligence agencies,
in turn, enhance executive power. The intelligence community consists
of fifteen different agencies 10 5 with an estimated budget of $44 billion.
10 6
While the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is an independent agency,
its Director is appointed by the President subject to Senate confirma-
tion. 107 The remaining fourteen agencies are all located within the execu-
tive branch.10 8 The National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence
Agency, for example, are part of the Department of Defense; similarly,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a component of the Depart-
ment of Justice.' 0 9 The Church Committee concluded that "[t]he intelli-
gence agencies are generally responsible directly to the President and
because of their capabilities and because they have often operated out of
the spotlight, and often in secret, they have also contributed to the growth
of executive power."
'"10
Technological changes also occurred that amplified the agencies'
ability to gather information. As a result, they possessed greater power
to monitor the lives of citizens than in the past. According to the Church
Committee, in the decades following World War II, "unparalleled" tech-
nological advances had occurred."' Those advances "markedly in-
creased the agencies' intelligence collection capabilities, a circumstance
which has greatly enlarged the potential for abuses of personal liber-
ties. ' 12 In the decades since the Church Committee issued its report,
technological advances have only increased the government's ability to
watch over the lives of its citizens.' Those advances will likely con-
103. 1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 9-10.
104. Id. at 10.
105. COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 579 (2005) [hereinafter
WMD COMM'N REP.]. Appendix C to the Report contains a useful "primer" on the intelligence
community. Id. at 579-89. See also NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 86-87 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMM'N REP.]; POSNER,
supra note 6, at 43-44 (describing agencies within the intelligence community).
106. Scott Shane, Official Reveals Budget for US. Intelligence Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2005, at A24. Earlier estimates pegged the intelligence budget at $40 billion. See POSNER, supra
note 6, at 129; Douglas Jehl, Disclosing Intelligence Budgets Might Be Easiest of 9/11 Panel's
Recommendations, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2004, at A15.
107. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-4a(a) (West 2005).
108. WMD COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 580.
109. Id. For an overview of the NSA, see Michael V. Hayden, Balancing Security and Liberty:
The Challenge of Sharing Foreign Signals Intelligence, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
247 (2005).
110. 1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 10.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Justice Brandeis once warned that:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the Gov-
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tinue. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted the "power of technol-
ogy to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."
'1 14
The development of institutions devoted entirely to national security
also led to the need to classify their work. This, too, is an important
though subtle power that the President possesses. Under federal law, the
executive branch has broad latitude to decide if a document contains
classified material.' 15 Once classified, it is a federal crime to mishandle
or to disclose the information in an unauthorized fashion." 6 The classi-
fied status of a document renders it all but impervious to a request for
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, which explicitly ex-
cludes classified information from its ambit.' 17 Once classified, it is of-
ten a laborious process for information to be de-classified, and courts
will often defer to executive claims that national security requires the
non-disclosure of material.' 
8
eminent, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and
... expose... the most intimate occurrences of the home.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
different types of electronic surveillance, see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The
Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1350-56
(2002) (providing examples of "new technologies... likely to erode privacy even further"); Ronald
D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond the "War" on Terrorism: Towards the New Intelligence Net-
work, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1446, 1465-72 (2005) (discussing intelligence collection through data
mining); Peter G. Madrinan, Devil in the Details: Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Internet
Surveillance Provisions of the USA PATRIOTAct of 2001, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 783, 784-88 (2003)
(arguing that "[sleventy-four years after Justice Brandeis' premonition [in Olmstead], the ambigui-
ties latent in the terms of PATRIOT's pen register and trap devices ... make it possible for the
government to literally 'see' those pages of information an individual has viewed on the Internet
without physically inspecting the personal computer."); Ric Simmons, Technology-Enhanced Sur-
veillance by Law Enforcement Officials, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 711, 712-13 (2005) (describ-
ing technology that results in "virtual surveillance," "hyper-intrusive searches," and "high volume
collection."); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1264, 1293 (2004) ("Electronic surveillance law has not kept pace with the staggering growth of
technology.").
114. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). In Kyllo, the Court held that the police
use of a thermal imaging device requires a search warrant. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. The Court took
into account more sophisticated systems already in use or development and noted that "[t]he ability
to 'see' through walls and other opaque barriers is a clear, and scientifically feasible, goal of law
enforcement research and development." Id. at 36 n.3.
115. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, A Troubling Equation in Contracts for Government Funded
Scientific Research: "Sensitive But Unclassified" = Secret But Unconstitutional, I J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 113, 118-23 (2005). For a history of executive orders that established the
classification system, see NATHAN BROOKS, THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1-5 (2004), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21900.pdf, Christina E. Wells,
Information Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools of Repression, 30 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 451, 452-61
(2004).
116. 18 U.S.C.A. § 793(f) (West 2000) (criminalizing gross negligence in the handling of
information relating to the national defense); § 798 (felony to knowingly and willfully disclose
classified information to an unauthorized person).
117. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1996 and West Supp. 2005).
118. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) ("[l]t is the responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in
determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising
the Agency's intelligence-gathering process."); Center for Nat'l Security Studies v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (acknowl-
edging deference to executive branch with respect to claims that information must be protected on
national security grounds); Jacobs, supra note 115, at 119-20.
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Thus, the classification power, while essential to protecting national
security, is also susceptible to abuse. 19 In the hands of overly protective
officials, it can be used to shield the executive branch from outside scru-
tiny. It can also be used to stifle the flow of information so essential in a
democracy, for only an informed electorate is available to hold its leaders
politically accountable. Nor can Congress perform its oversight function
if it is unable to discern the activities of the executive branch. The ex-
ecutive branch itself may become less efficient as excessive secrecy and
the compartmentalization of information prevent agencies from sharing
information and cooperating. 120  Almost thirty years ago, the Church
Committee feared that "a series of secret practices ... have eroded the
processes of open democratic government. Secrecy, even what would be
agreed by reasonable men to be necessary secrecy, has, by a subtle and
barely perceptible accretive process, placed constraints upon the liberties
of the American people." 121
III. Two PARADIGM SHIFTS
The United States' war on terror has involved two paradigm shifts.
The first shift is the treatment of terrorism as a military issue, not as a
law enforcement problem. Following 9/11 and the invasion of Afghani-
stan, the Bush administration created a military detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and held two United States citizens without
criminal charges at naval brigs in the United States. One United States
citizen, Yaser Hamdi, was captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan; 122 the
other citizen, Jose Padilla, was seized after stepping off a plane at Chi-
cago's O'Hare Airport. 123 In the case of Hamdi, the Supreme Court has
spoken, and we now have some guidance on this issue. The Court re-
119. It has been reported that, by several measures, government secrecy has reached an all-
time high, "with federal departments classifying documents at the rate of 125 a minute as they create
new categories of semi-secrets bearing vague labels like 'sensitive security information."' Scott
Shane, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the Government, N.Y. TIMES, July
3, 2005, at § 1, 14. The record number of documents classified in 2004 - 15.6 million - was nearly
double the number in 2001. Id. For commentary and scholarship critical of the Bush administra-
tion's use of its power to restrict the flow of information, see John Podesta, Need to Know: Govern-
ing in Secret, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM, supra
note 4, at 226 ("what's troubling about this administration's approach to secrecy is its conversion of
the legitimate desire for operational security into an excuse for sweeping policies that deny public
access to information and public understanding of policymaking"); Jacobs, supra note 115, at 113-
16 (critique of government's post-9/l 1 decision to prevent disclosure of information described as
"sensitive but unclassified"); Wells, supra note 115, at 493 (concluding that "[t]he Bush administra-
tion's actions with respect to secrecy are of great concern."); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The
Freedom of Information Act Post-9/1 1: Balancing the Public's Right to Know, Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261, 266 (2003) ("FOIA developments
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 have created a climate of nondisclosure, and that the 'war
against terrorism' does not justify the magnitude of recent data restrictions imposed by the U.S.
government.").
120. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 417 ("Current security requirements nurture over-
classification and excessive compartmentation of information among agencies.").
121. 1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 9.
122. Thomas E. Ricks & Jerry Markon, U.S. Nears Deal to Free Enemy Combatant Hamdi;
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jected the broadest assertion of executive prerogative, but the case never-
theless can be viewed as an affirmation of executive power.
The second paradigm shift involves the wall between foreign intel-
ligence and domestic intelligence that had been carefully erected in 1947.
Post-9/1 1, that wall has been lowered through legislation that creates a
Director of National Intelligence and that encourages the sharing of for-
eign and domestic intelligence, as well as closer cooperation between the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI). One shift blurs the line between the military and domestic
law enforcement. The other blurs the line between domestic law en-
forcement and foreign intelligence. Both result in expanded executive
power.
A. Military Response to Terrorism
The phrase "war on terrorism" is not a new one and was used by
policymakers and Presidents prior to 9/11.124 In 1984, President Reagan
delivered a message to Congress in which he described a "war against
terrorism." 125  The following year, in addressing the American Bar As-
sociation, he characterized terrorism as "an act of war."' 126 In May 1995,
President Clinton used the phrase "war against terrorism" in a radio ad-
dress, and it appeared in the 1996 Democratic Party platform. 127 Simi-
larly, United States' policy has long recognized that terrorism posed a
threat to national security. In 1986, President Reagan signed National
Security Decision Directive 207, "The National Program for Combatting
Terrorism.' ' 128 This document recognized that in some cases terrorism
was a law enforcement issue; in others it called for a military response.
129
In 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 that
called terrorism both a matter of national security and a crime. 130 In this
directive, for the first time, policymakers recognized the threat to the
United States from terrorists who acquired weapons of mass destruc-
tion. 13'
Nevertheless, before 9/11, the United States largely dealt with ter-
rorists through the criminal justice system. 132 There were, of course,
124. Robert M. Chesney, Careful Thinking About Counterterrorism Policy, 1 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 169, 171-77 (2005) (describing history of phrase).
125. Id. at 173.
126. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 99.
127. Chesney, supra note 124, at 174-75.
128. STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN
LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001, 140 (2004).
129. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 113; COLL,supra note 128, at 141.
130. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 101.
131. COLL, supra note 128, at 318.
132. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 73 ("Legal processes were the primary method for
responding to these early manifestations of a new type of terrorism."); COLL, supra note 128, at 254
("Americans were still much more likely to die from bee stings than from terrorist strikes during the
early 1990s. In that respect it made more sense to treat terrorism as a law enforcement problem.");
Sievert, supra note 12, at 312 ("[W]ith rare exception, before September 11,2001, we had developed
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some notable exceptions. After the bombing of a German nightclub in
1986 that killed and wounded several U.S. soldiers, President Reagan
sent planes to bomb targets in Libya. 133  In 1993, President Clinton
launched a limited strike on Baghdad after learning of an Iraqi plot to kill
former President Bush.' 34 In 1998, in response to the al Qaeda bombings
of United States' embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States
launched cruise missiles against targets in the Sudan and Afghanistan
and sought indictments as well.1
35
In the past, the use of force in response to an international terrorist
attack was an exception, not the rule. For the most part, the United
States responded to such attacks by seeking indictments against the al-
leged perpetrators. This occurred after the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988,136 the shooting of five
CIA employees in their cars as they were stopped in traffic outside CIA
headquarters in Virginia in January 1993,137 the first World Trade Center
bombing in February 1993,138 the subsequent plot to bomb New York
City landmarks in the summer of 1993,139 the Manila air plot to place
bombs aboard a dozen trans-Pacific U.S. airliners in the winter of
1995,140 the bombing of Khobar Towers in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia in
the habit of classifying all attacks, regardless of target, as criminal acts of terrorism to be dealt with
by civilian courts under U.S. criminal law."); Note, Responding to Terrorism. Crime, Punishment,
and War, supra note 12, at 1224 ("[T]he United States has traditionally treated terrorism as a
crime.").
133. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1016 (2003); George C. Wilson & David
Hoffman, U.S. Warplanes Bomb Targets in Libya as "Self-Defense" Against Terrorism, WASH.
POST, Apr. 18, 1986, at Al. In 1996, German investigators arrested five suspects in the bombings.
Steven Erlanger, 4 Guilty in Fatal 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Linked to Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2001, at A7. Four were later convicted in Berlin. Id.
134. CARTER ET AL., supra note 133, at 997; David Von Drehle & R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S.
Strikes Iraqfor Plot to Kill Bush, WASH. POST, June 27, 1993, at Al.
135. CARTER ET AL., supra note 133, at 1022; Barton Gellman & Dana Priest, U.S. Strikes
Terrorist-Linked Sites in Afghanistan, Factory in Sudan, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at A1.
136. A Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands ultimately tried two Libyan defendants. Donald
G. McNeil Jr., The Lockerbie Verdict: The Overview; Libyan Convicted by Scottish Court in '88
Pan Am Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al. One was convicted, and the other acquitted. Id
137. Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 59 (Va. 1998). Two of the shooting victims died.
Kasi, 508 S.E.2d at 59. The gunman, later identified as Mir Aimal Kasi, fled to Pakistan, where he
was arrested nearly four-and-a-half years later. Id. He was tried in Virginia state court, convicted,
and sentenced to death. Id. at 59-60; Threats and Responses: An Earlier Killing; Virginia Executes
Pakistani Who Killed 2 at the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A20.
138. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 71-73; United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
933 (2003). The initial indictment in this case charged six individuals: Mohammed A. Salameh,
Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, and Bilal
Alkaisi. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 108. Yousef, Abouhalima, and Yasin fled the United States immedi-
ately after the bombing. Id. Abouhalima was caught in Egypt and returned to the U.S. to stand trial.
Id. The first four defendants to stand trial were convicted on a variety of charges and sentenced to
240 years imprisonment each. Id. Yousef was captured in Pakistan in 1995. Id at n.2. Another co-
conspirator, Eyad Ismoil, was indicted for his involvement in the bombing. Yousef 327 F.3d at 79.
Ismoil was arrested in Jordan two years after the attack. Id. Both were convicted at trial in the South-
ern District of New York. Id. at 79-80. Yasin remains a fugitive. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 108 n.2.
139. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 71-73; United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
140. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 73. Ramzi Yousef was the mastermind of this plot.
Yousef 327 F.3d at 78. He, Abdul Hakim Murad, and Wali Khan Amin Shah were charged with
various crimes for their conspiracy to bomb U.S. airliners and convicted at trial. Id. at 79-80.
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June 1996 in which 19 Americans died and 372 were wounded, 14 1 the
August 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania which killed 12
Americans and 212 others, mostly Kenyan, and which wounded thou-
sands, 142 the foiled January 1, 2000 millennium bomb plot, 143 and the
October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, Yemen, which killed 17
sailors and wounded at least 40.144
There were advantages and disadvantages to using the criminal jus-
tice system in response to terrorist attacks. 145  The advantages included
an affirmation of important process values. The accused were given the
full panoply of rights attendant to a criminal prosecution in federal court.
This includes the appointment of counsel, a public trial, and the right to
141. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 60. A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of
Virginia returned a 46-count indictment that charged 14 individuals for the bombing. David Johns-
ton, 14 Indicted by U.S. in '96 Saudi Blast; Iran Link Cited, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2001, at A1. No
individuals have been tried for the offense in the United States, but Saudi Arabia has apparently
prosecuted and punished some of them. Saudi Militants Are Sentenced in '96 Bombing, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2002, at § 1, 10.
142. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 68-70. Although more than a dozen individuals
including Usama bin Laden were charged for the bombings, only a few have stood trial to date.
Benjamin Weiser, A Nation Challenged: The Courts; 4 are Sentenced to Life in Prison in 1998 US.
Embassy Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al.
143. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 174-80. Ahned Ressam, who planned to bomb
Los Angeles International Airport, was convicted at trial. Eli Sanders, Judge Delays Terrorist's
Sentencing, Hopingfor Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, at A20.
144. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 190-97. An indictment was returned against two
Yemeni men in May 2003. Eric Lichtblau, Aftereffects: The Cole Bombing, U.S. Indicts 2 Men for
Attack on American Ship in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2003, at A17. Subsequently, a Yemeni
judge sentenced two men to death and four to long prison terms for their involvement in the bomb-
ing. Neil MacFarquhar & David Johnston, Death Sentences in Attack on Cole, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2004, at Al.
145. The debate over the use of force in response to terrorism is not a new one. For examples
of pre-9/l 1 scholarship on the subject, see Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-
Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 25, 48
(1987) ("Article 51 needs to be re-written, or its terms specifically defined so as to allow for the use
of self-defense in response to terrorism."); Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist
Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 539-41 (1999) (critique
of U.S. missile attack on Afghanistan and Sudan); Timothy F. Malloy, Reporter, Military Responses
to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 288-320 (1987) (debate on 1987 use of force
against Libya); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV.
89, 90 (1989) (critique of international and domestic law that impede the fight against terrorism).
Post-9/ 11, a renewed debate has emerged on the appropriate response to terrorism. In
general, scholars tend to fall into one of two camps. They either emphasize the use of the criminal
justice system or the use of force. For examples of scholars who advocate the use of domestic or
international criminal law, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A
Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 103 (2002) (calling for "an effective interna-
tional legal regime with enforcement capabilities"); Sadat, supra note 6, at 136 ("by characterizing
the September 11h attacks as acts of war rather than as terrorism or crimes against humanity, the
United States has lost what could have been an extraordinary opportunity to strengthen international
legal norms and combat international terrorism."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Rogue Regimes and the
Individualization of International Law, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 815, 819 (2002) ("Over the longer
term, however, the best strategy would bill itself not as a global war but as a global criminal justice
campaign. From this perspective, the 'war against terrorism' is an all-out fight against a particularly
frightening and deadly form of global organized crime.").
Other scholars argue that criminal law is insufficient to address the problem of terrorism
and that military force is necessary. See Sievert, supra note 12, at 352 ("It is now time, in the early
stages of this conflict, to reconsider the philosophy that dominated the last decade and to recognize
that we are not chasing domestic criminals but are fighting a war."); Abraham D. Sofaer, Playing
Games with Terrorists, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 903, 907 (2002) (critiquing use of criminal justice
system to respond to terrorists and arguing that "[w]hen all else fails, force is the essential method of
protection.").
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present a defense, to confront their accusers and to cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses, and to a presumption of innocence that could only be
overcome by a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. All of
those procedural and constitutional safeguards reduced the risk of error
and of an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The trials comported, in other
words, with principles of basic fairness and fundamental human rights.
146
There was no question that they upheld the rule of law. This, in turn,
helped preserve the moral legitimacy of the United States, encouraged
cooperation from other nations, and fostered the development of interna-
tional legal norms against terrorism. 47 More than that, the Department
of Justice's record in major terrorism cases was remarkably successful.
In case after case, the United States obtained convictions. 
148
But there were disadvantages to a criminal prosecution. The proc-
ess was costly and cumbersome. Assembling the evidence to present the
case in federal court and to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was
no small task. It involved the work of teams of FBI agents and federal
prosecutors. The process was resource intensive, and this imposed op-
portunity costs. 149 Law enforcement resources devoted to one matter
were unavailable for others. Treating the scene of a terrorist attack as a
crime scene meant that potential evidence had to be carefully collected
and handled. 150  In many cases, the perpetrators were not in the United
States but overseas. Trying to locate them could take years of painstak-
ing effort.' 51  Then they had to be apprehended and extradited to the
United States. Some perpetrators, including Usama bin Laden, hid in
146. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9 & 10, 999
U.N.T.S. 17 1; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 9 - 11, U.N. G.A. Res.
217.
147. See generally COLE, supra note 4, at 9-10 (noting critical importance of legitimacy at the
international level in order to gain cooperation from other nations); HEYMANN, supra note 6, at 95
(arguing that use of military commissions "deprives the United States of its historic claim of moral
leadership among the world's nations in matters of fairness to individuals charged with a crime,"
"makes even more difficult future efforts at military coalition-building and will deny us the benefits
of legal cooperation with our closest allies in the forms of extradition and mutual legal assistance,"
and "will leave lasting doubts about the honesty of convictions in the wake of secret trials with
secret evidence"); Bassiouni, supra note 145, at 103 ("If we want to put an end to the forms of
violence that we call terrorism, then we need an effective international legal regime with enforce-
ment capabilities that can, as Aristotle once said, apply the same law in Athens as in Rome."); Lobel,
supra note 145, at 555 (asserting that use of military force in response to terrorism is "suspect" and
that "[m]any experts note that these attacks do not deter terrorism, but result in an escalation of
terrorist violence and a spiraling cycle of retaliation."); Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War
on Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 4 (2004) ("Put simply, using war rules when law-enforcement rules
could reasonably be followed is dangerous."); Sadat, supra note 6, at 148 (contending that the "at-
tacks of September 1 th... presented the world with yet another opportunity to further strengthen
the enforcement of international criminal law norms, and fill the gap in enforcement that has plagued
efforts to control international terrorists.").
148. See supra notes 137-44. Each of the defendants who stood trial in the U.S. was con-
victed and sentenced to extremely long periods of incarceration.
149. Cf Harris, supra note 13, at 560 (discussing opportunity costs when intelligence agencies
respond to discovery requests in criminal cases).
150. Sievert, supra note 12, at 327-30.
151. See supra notes 137, 138.
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uncooperative states that refused to extradite. 152  Often times, only the
lower-level operatives were caught, not the masterminds. 
153
International terrorism cases also posed the risk that classified in-
formation, sources for classified information, and techniques for obtain-
ing classified information would have to be disclosed to the defense.
154
A defendant has the ability to seek access to other high-level terrorists
who have been captured and who allegedly possess exculpatory informa-
tion. 1 55 Such access, of course, could disrupt the government's on-going
efforts to question the captured terrorists. The trials themselves, given
the factual complexity of the cases and the number of charges and defen-
dants, often lasted months. 156 Justice was neither swift nor sure, two of
152. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 121-26; COLL, supra note 128 passim; Sofaer,
supra note 145, at 906.
153. Sofaer, supra note 145, at 906; Craig Whitlock, Terror Probes Find 'the Hands, but Not
the Brains': Attackers Often Caught as Masterminds Flee, WASH. POST, July 11, 2005, at A10.
154. See generally Stewart A. Baker, Should Spies Be Cops?, 97 FOREIGN POL'Y 36, 44-48
(1994) (describing security issues arising from disclosure); Harris, supra note 13, at 559 ("The ever-
closer relationship between intelligence and law enforcement poses problems in protecting sources
and methods of intelligence information. Specifically, close cooperation between intelligence and
law enforcement agencies can expose intelligence information to Brady requests in criminal trials.").
The Classified Information Protection Act (CIPA) can help prevent the disclosure of classified
information if the government devises a substitute for the information that "will provide the defen-
dant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific
classified information." 18 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 6(c)(1) (West 2000). "[Blut the substitute must be just
as good as the original for the defendant's purposes. If it is not, the government must reveal its
secrets or drop the prosecution." Baker, supra at 46. For commentary on CIPA, see A. John Rad-
san, The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1417, 1433-34
(2005) (discussing limits of CIPA); Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1962, 1964-66 (2005) (providing overview of CIPA); Rachel S. Holzer, Note, National Security
Versus Defense Counsel's "Need to Know": An Objective Standard for Resolving the Tension, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 1941, 1966 (2005) (arguing that "although CIPA was not originally intended to
favor prosecutors or defendants in any way, the government has gained substantial control over
proceedings involving classified information since its enactment.").
155. As an example, see United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. de-
nied, 125 S. Ct. 1670 (2005). Moussaoui sought access to three al Qaeda members captured by the
U.S. who possessed evidence material to his defense. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 456. The government
refused to produce the witnesses, arguing that doing so would interfere its efforts to combat terror-
ism. Id. at 470. The district court imposed sanctions on the government that the Fourth Circuit later
vacated. Id. at 482. For a critique of Moussaoui, see Roberto Iraolo, Compulsory Process, Separa-
tion of Powers, and the Prosecution ofZacarias Moussaoui, 35 U. MEM. L. REv. 15 (2004); Radsan,
supra note 154, at 1447-48; Keith S. Alexander, Note, In the Wake of September llth: The Use of
Military Tribunals to Try Terrorists, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 885, 913-14 (2003).
156. The trial in the first World Trade Center bombing case lasted six months and involved
over 1,000 exhibits and the testimony of more than 200 witnesses. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 108. The
trial in the "landmarks plot" case lasted almost ten months. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 111. The govern-
ment had to try the World Trade Center case a second time after Ramzi Yousef was arrested. This
trial lasted almost four months. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 80. Yousef's trial for the Manila airline bomb
plot lasted more than three months. Id. For the trial in the embassy bombings case the government
flew in more than 100 witnesses from six countries. Benjamin Weiser, Going on Trial: U.S. Accu-
sations of a Global Plot; in Embassy Bombings Case, the Specter of a Mastermind, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2001, at § 1, 27. The trial lasted five months. United States v. Bin Laden, No. S7R
98CR1O23KTD, 2005 WL 287404, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,2005).
Of course, complex criminal litigation is often time and resource intensive, whether the
charges involve securities fraud, organized crime, or other serious charges. The trial of John Gotti,
the "Teflon Don," for example, took ten weeks. Arnold H. Lubasch, Gotti Guilty of Murder and
Racketeering, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at Al. The more recent trial of Bernard Ebbers, the former
chief of WorldCom, on fraud charges, lasted eight weeks. Ken Belson, A Guilty Verdict: The Over-
view; Ex-Chief of WorldCom Is Found Guilty in $11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at
Al. The first trial of L. Dennis Kozlowski, the former chief executive of Tyco International, lasted
around six months and ended in a mistrial. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Chief and Aide Guilty of Loot-
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the hallmarks for criminal punishment to have the greatest deterrent ef-
fect.
157
More fundamentally, criminal prosecution is generally reactive, not
proactive, in nature. The prosecutor can act only after a crime has been
committed. Even then, once a crime has been committed, under Depart-
ment of Justice guidelines, the prosecutor should only seek an indictment
if there is sufficient admissible evidence for a jury to find the accused
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 58 If an indictment has been returned,
the prosecutor must focus on the task at hand--on preparing the case for
trial-not on trying to devise counter-terrorism strategies. Of necessity,
a prosecutor must proceed on a case-by-case, defendant-by-defendant
basis. While law enforcement can disrupt organized crime, it does so
with great difficulty even when the organizations are domestic in nature,
let alone when the organization involves foreign nationals located out-
side the United States.159 The 9/11 Commission concluded:
The law enforcement process is concerned with proving the guilt of
persons apprehended and charged .... The process was meant, by its
nature, to mark for the public the events as finished - case solved,
justice done. It was not designed to ask if the events might be har-
bingers of worse to come. Nor did it allow for aggregating and ana-
lyzing facts to see if they could provide clues to terrorist tactics more
generally - methods of entry and finance, and mode of operation in-
side the United States.
160
ing Millions at Tyco, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at Al. His retrial was almost as long. Id. Richard
Scrushy, the former chief executive of HealthSouth, was acquitted after a six-month trial. Simon
Romero & Kyle Whitmire, Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Former Chief of HealthSouth Ac-
quitted in $2.7 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A 1.
157. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 15 n.12 (3d ed. 2001) ("In
general,... an increase in the likelihood of punishment will deter more effectively than an increase
in the severity of punishment."); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 28-29 (4th ed. 2003) ("It does
seem fair to assume, however, that the deterrent efficacy of punishment varies considerably, depend-
ing upon a number of factors .... The magnitude of the threatened punishment is clearly a factor,
but perhaps not as important a consideration as the probability of discovery and punishment.").
158. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220 (Aug. 2002) ("both as a
matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prose-
cution should be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person proba-
bly will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.").
159. Despite more than half a century of law enforcement effort, organized crime is here to
stay. See Brian Goodwin, Note, Civil Versus Criminal Rico and the "Eradication" of La Cosa
Nostra, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279,326-33 (2002) (discussing difficulty of
eradicating La Cosa Nostra). Indeed, new groups have emerged in the United States, including
groups with ties to Russia, Asia, Mexico, and Latin and South America. Dorean Marguerite Koenig,
The Criminal Justice System Facing the Challenge of Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 1351,
1354 (1998). See also Joseph E. Ritch, Comment, They'll Make You an Offer You Can't Refuse: A
Comparative Analysis of International Organized Crime, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 569, 571
(2002).
160. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 73.
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Indeed, the 9/11 Commission theorized that the government's very suc-
cess in terrorism prosecutions "contributed to widespread underestima-
tion of the threat."''6
One can also question on policy grounds whether the criminal jus-
tice system provides an adequate response to terrorism on the magnitude
of that committed by al Qaeda against the United States. In February
1998, Usama bin Laden, declared war against the United States and is-
sued a fatwa in which he urged all Muslims to murder U.S. citizens
wherever they could be found. 162  "We do not have to differentiate be-
tween military or civilian," he declared.1 63 "As far as we are concerned,
they are all targets."' 64 His followers are dedicated jihadists, who are
willing to sacrifice their lives in furtherance of his cause.165 The threat of
criminal prosecution may hold little deterrent effect for such an individ-
ual. Unlike other criminal organizations, al Qaeda also has a political
agenda. 166 In pursuit of that agenda, al Qaeda has deliberately targeted
civilians and embassies. It has also tried to acquire or make weapons of
mass destruction for at least the past ten years.' 67  From that perspective,
a strict reliance on the criminal justice system appears to be inadequate-
incongruous even-given the demonstrated severity of the threat. 1
68
Perhaps for all those reasons and more, post-9/11 the Bush admini-
stration shifted from the criminal justice model to a military response to
terrorism.' 69  Al Qaeda was at war with the United States, 70 and the
161. Id. See also Sofaer, supra note 145, at 904 ("[T]he anti-terrorism policy of the Bush and
Clinton administrations, based principally on criminal prosecution, created the misleading impres-
sion that the U.S. government was providing the American people with meaningful protection.").
162. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 47.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Milt Bearden, The Nation: Twists of Terror; You Cut the Head, But the Body Still Moves,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, § 4, at 1.
166. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105 at 47.
167. WMD COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 267.
168. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 363-64 (finding that long-term success against
terrorism "demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert ac-
tion, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense");
William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 93 (2001) ("While arrest, prosecution, and incarceration serve well to help prevent
most crimes... , the risk of ... terrorist attacks forces us to consider other means of prevention.
Moreover, traditional Fourth Amendment requirements may thwart many investigations of terrorism,
which depend on stealth to prevent terrorist plans before they are carried out.").
169. To a remarkable extent, the issue of how to respond to terrorism has become politicized in
the United States. A recent controversy arose when Karl Rove, a senior White House adviser, stated,
"Conservatives saw the savagery of 9/11 in the attacks and prepared for war; liberals saw the sav-
agery of the 9/11 attacks and wanted to prepare indictments and offer therapy and understanding for
our attackers." Patrick D. Healy, Rove Criticizes Liberals on 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at
A13. See also Ackerman, Emergency Constitution, supra note 3, at 1032 ("The 'war on terrorism'
has paid enormous political dividends for President Bush, but that does not make it a compelling
legal concept."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances. Discarding Bedrock Constitu-
tional Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERORISM 75
(Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds. 2003) ("Predictably, [in the wake of 9/11] there has been
overreaction and political grandstanding.").
170. For scholarship that debates this issue, see supra note 6.
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United States was part of the battleground.171 "[T]ransnational terrorists
have blurred the traditional distinction between national security and
international law enforcement."'' 72 In a speech to the American Bar As-
sociation Standing Committee on Law and National Security, then-White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales argued:
[T]he brutal attacks of September 11 th - which killed nearly three
thousand people from more than ninety countries - were not only
crimes but acts of war. Since at least that day, the United States has
been at war with al Qaeda. While al Qaeda may not be the traditional
armed force of a single nation state, al Qaeda is clearly a foreign en-
emy force. It has central direction, training, and financing and has
members in dozens of countries around the world who are committed
to taking up arms against us. It has political goals in mind. Al Qaeda
has attacked not only one of our largest cities, killing thousands of
civilians, but also has attacked our embassies, our warships, and our
government buildings. While different in some respects from tradi-
tional conflicts with nation states, our conflict with al Qaeda is
clearly a war.173
Calling the conflict a war had important consequences. One was that "all
instruments of national power" would be used, including military
force. 74  A second involved the treatment of captured terrorists. "To
suggest that an al Qaeda member must be tried in a civilian court because
he happens to be an American citizen-or to suggest that hundreds of
individuals captured in battle in Afghanistan should be extradited, given
lawyers, and tried in civilian courts-is to apply the wrong legal para-
digm. The law applicable in this context is the law of war-those con-
ventions and customs that govern armed conflict."'
175
171. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT 1
(2005) [hereinafter STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE], available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d200O5630homeland.pdf ("Our adversaries consider US
territory an integral part of a global theater of combat."); Appellant's Opening Brief at 17, Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-6396) ("In the war against terrorists of global reach, as
the Nation learned all too well on Sept. 11, 2001, the territory of the United States is part of the
battlefield.").
172. STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 23.
173. Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Law and National Security 5 (Feb. 24, 2004),
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/20O4/02/gonzales.pdf. See also Chesney, supra note 12, at 22. Simi-
larly, Viet Dinh, a former Assistant Attorney General in the Bush Justice Department, has argued
that:
An enemy activity may be both a violation of the laws of war and of domestic law. The
president may choose to deal with it as law enforcement officer or as commander in
chief. The decision is his, and the commander in chief has a significant function even in
the United States, because AI-Qaeda has made the U.S. a target.
Anthony Lewis, Security and Liberty: Preserving the Values of Freedom, in THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS, supra note 4, at 65.
174. Gonzales, supra note 173, at 5. The administration's national security strategy states that,
given the danger of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. will, "if necessary, act preemptively" with
military force against both rogue states and terrorists, "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack." GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
175. Gonzales, supra note 173, at 5-6.
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Thus, the administration asserted the prerogative to detain both citi-
zens and non-citizens alike as enemy combatants, regardless of where
they were captured. In November 2001, President Bush issued an order
that directed the Secretary of Defense to establish military commissions
to try non-citizens believed to be terrorists or harborers of terrorists.
17 6
No similar order was issued with respect to citizens. Nevertheless, even
citizens captured in the United States as suspected terrorists could be
designated an enemy combatant. 177  Based on the "totality of circum-
stances," agencies in the executive branch would assess the potential for
criminal prosecution, material witness detention, or enemy combatant
detention. 7 8 This assessment would take into account a number of fac-
tors, including whether an individual posed a potential threat or had
value as an intelligence source, whether prosecution would compromise
an intelligence source, and whether the individual met the legal standard
for enemy combatant status. 1
79
Whether or not a result of its "totality of circumstances" test, the
administration has not been consistent in its treatment of suspected ter-
rorists or captured Taliban. Many have faced criminal charges in federal
court, rather than military detention. John Walker Lindh, a citizen cap-
tured in Afghanistan while fighting with the Taliban, 180 Zacariah Mous-
saoui, a conspirator in the 9/11 plot,' 8' and Richard Reid, the "shoe-icide
bomber," have all been prosecuted federally. 82 Other alleged terrorists
have as well. 183 Yet hundreds of non-citizens at Guantanamo Bay and
two citizens-Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla-were not. Hamdi was
176. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism §§
2, 4, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). For an analysis of the constitutionality of military com-
missions, compare Katyal & Tribe, supra note 28, at 1260 (arguing that "the President's Order
establishing military tribunals for the trial of terrorists is flatly unconstitutional."), with Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 2055 (contending that "Congress has authorized the use of military
commissions to try individuals covered by the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force]...
but.., such commissions cannot be used to try individuals who fall outside the scope of the AUMF
unless the President has independent constitutional authority to wage war against such individuals.").
A district court invalidated the commissions, but was then reversed on appeal. See Harndan v.
Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted 2005 WL 2922488 (Nov. 7, 2005).
177. Gonzales, supra note 173, at 13.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 13-14. See also Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 171, at 12 n.2 (further
describing the process by which a citizen is designated an enemy combatant as "the culmination of
an extensive deliberative process within the Executive Branch involving several layers of review.").
180. Neil A. Lewis, Traces of Terror: The Captive; Admitting He Fought in Taliban, Ameri-
can Agrees to 20-Year Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Al.
181. Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Tells Court He's Guilty of a Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2005, at Al.
182. Pam Belluck, Threats and Responses: The Bomb Plot; Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Is
Given a Life Sentence for Trying to Blow Up Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A 13.
183. Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism
Charges, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at AI (reporting that after 9/11 only 39 individuals have been
convicted of crimes related to terrorism or national security).
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captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan; 184 Padilla was detained as he
stepped off a plane at Chicago's O'Hare Airport.'
85
Hamdi and Padilla were held in military facilities, at first incommu-
nicado, without legal counsel. 186 No charges were filed against them,
and they faced the prospect of indefinite detention. 87 The government
opposed the appointment of counsel. 188 When counsel was allowed to
represent them and challenged their detention in separate federal district
court proceedings, the government asserted that the President, acting as
Commander-in-Chief, had the unreviewable constitutional power to de-
tain both individuals. 89 There was, in other words, no place for federal
court review of this executive action-the indefinite detention of citi-
zens-during a time of war. It was, perhaps, the boldest assertion of
executive authority since Truman's seizure of the steel mills more than
half a century earlier.' 90
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,191 the Court addressed two questions: (1)
whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who are enemy
combatants; 192 and (2) if so, what process is due a citizen who disputes
his enemy-combatant status. 93  On the first question, five Justices-
Thomas, plus the plurality of O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
Breyer-agreed that Hamdi could be detained as an enemy combatant.
194
Although the government argued that the executive branch possesses
inherent authority to detain enemy combatants under Article II of the
Constitution, neither the plurality nor Justice Thomas reached the ques-
tion because they found that Congress had authorized Hamdi's detention
through the Authorization for Use of Military Force Resolution
(AUMF). 195 This resolution, passed one week after September 11, 2001,
enabled the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, author-
ized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored such organi-
zations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
184. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002).
185. Neil A. Lewis, Court Gives Bush Right to Detain U.S. Combatant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2005, at Al.
186. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), motion to reconsider granted,
243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), motion to certify appeal granted, 256 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y.
2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated
by 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
187. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569; Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
188. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569; Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
189. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
190. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711.
191. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
192. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. For a clear and concise analysis of Hamdi, see Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Enemy Combatants and Separation of Powers, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 73, 76-78
(2005).
193. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542.
194. Id. at 509.
195. Id. at 510.
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terrorism against the United States."' 96  The plurality reasoned that
"[b]ecause detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a
fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary
and appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and unmistakably author-
ized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here."'
' 97
Four Justices, however, disagreed. For Justices Souter and Gins-
burg, the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), precluded Hamdi's
detention. 98 Section 4001 (a) bars detention of a citizen "except pursuant
to an Act of Congress."' 99 Justices Souter and Ginsburg read the law to
require a "clear statement of authorization to detain," and the AUMF, in
their view, failed to provide one.200 Justices Scalia and Stevens, on the
other hand, rested their analysis on the Suspension Clause of the Consti-
tution, which allows Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.01 In
their view, the Constitution required the government to charge Hamdi
with a crime or to release him.2°2 He could only be detained without
charges if the writ had been suspended. The AUMF was not such a sus-
pension. 203  Therefore, unless the Executive promptly filed charges or
Congress suspended the writ, Hamdi was entitled to be released.2 4
Having decided that the Executive had the authority to detain
Hamdi, the Court then addressed the second issue of how much process
was due Hamdi in challenging his enemy-combatant status.20 5 The gov-
ernment argued for extremely limited habeas review based on "' [r]espect
for separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of
courts in matters of military decision-making in connection with an on-
going conflict.' 20 6 The courts would be restricted to investigating only
whether legal authorization existed for the broader detention scheme.20 7
At most, courts should review an enemy-combatant designation under a
196. Id. at 510 (quoting 115 Stat. 224).
197. Id. at 519. Thus, under Justice Jackson's analytical framework, the President's authority
was coupled with that of Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1852) (Jackson, J., concurring). Under such circumstances, "his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 635. For a lively debate on the AUMF and the scope of presidential power, see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 6 at 2050-54; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2663, 2664-65 (2005); Mark Tushnet, supra note 5, at 2673-77; Ryan Goodman & Derek
Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2653, 2653-54 (2005); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Gold-
smith, Rejoinder: The War on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and
Constitutional Design, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2683,2683-84 (2005).
198. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 541 (Souter J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment)
199. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West 2005).
200. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment).
201. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 554.
203. Id. at 554.
204. Id. at 555.
205. Id. at 524.
206. Id. at 527 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 26, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020).
207. Id.
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highly deferential "some evidence" standard in which the court would
assume the accuracy of the government's articulated basis for the deten-
tion and assess only whether that basis was a legitimate one.2°8
The Court rejected the government's position based on a balancing
of interests under Mathews v. Eldridge.20 9 A citizen-detainee must re-
ceive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportu-
nity to rebut the government's factual assertions before a neutral deci-
sionmaker. 210  The "some evidence" standard was inadequate to satisfy
the requirements of due process.21' To alleviate the burden upon the
government in a time of war, however, the Court allowed the use of
hearsay evidence and a rebuttable presumption in favor of the govern-
ment's evidence,212 and acknowledged that a properly constituted mili-
tary tribunal might suffice.21 3 Separation of powers principles did not
mandate "a heavily circumscribed role" for the courts.214 "We have long
since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President
when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. 21 5
In practical terms, with the exception of Justice Thomas, eight of
the nine Justices rejected the broadest claim of executive power-i.e.,
that the President has the all but unreviewable discretion to detain a citi-
zen indefinitely as an enemy combatant.216 Four Justices (Souter, Gins-
burg, Scalia, and Stevens) said that the President lacks such authority.
21 7
Another four Justices (the plurality) concluded that the President could
detain an individual like Hamdi, but that he was entitled to a certain
amount of process-more than the government had been willing to pro-
vide-to challenge his enemy combatant designation. 218  Absent a sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus, the courts do have a say in review-
ing the detention of citizens.219
But Hamdi is hardly a sweeping vindication of civil rights, and
there are important limitations on its holding.220 First, on its facts, it ap-
208. Id.
209. Id. at 530 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
210. Id. at 533.
211. Id. at 537.
212. Id. at 533-34
213. Id. at 537.
214. Id. at 535-36.
215. Id. at 536.
216. Id. at 521 (majority opinon), 541 (Souter J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment), 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 540 (Souter J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judg-
ment), 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 519-20, 526 (majority opinion).
219. Id. at 526.
220. For critical commentary of Hamdi, see Chemerinsky, supra note 192, at 73, 80 (noting
that in Hamdi "the Supreme Court emphatically upheld the rule of law and the right of those being
detained as part of the war on terrorism to have access to the courts" but that the government also
scored a "significant victor[y]"); Frederic Block, Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: the
Interactions Between the Three Branches of Government in Coping with Past and Current Threats to
the Nation 's Security, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 459, 523 (2005) ("While preserving the
basic concept of judicial review.., the plurality accorded far-reaching deference ... to the Execu-
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plies only to citizens detained within the territorial jurisdiction of a
United States court.22 1 In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that the consti-
tutional requirements may differ for a citizen who is captured abroad and
held outside the United States,22 and Hamdi did not address that issue.
Moreover, at present, it is unclear if non-citizens detained as enemy
combatants are entitled to the same due process rights as citizens, even if
held within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court. In Rasul v.
Bush,223 decided the same day as Hamdi, the Supreme Court held that
non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are entitled to file ha-
beas claims in federal court.224  The Court stressed the special status of
Guantanamo Bay; it was "territory over which the United States exer-
cises exclusive jurisdiction and control.2 2 5 The question now being liti-
gated in federal court in the District of Columbia is whether non-citizen
detainees at Guantanamo Bay are protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.22 6 Two district courts in the District of Columbia
have reached opposite conclusions.2 27
Beyond its limitations, however, in important respects Hamdi repre-
sents a victory for the executive branch. The Supreme Court accepted
the President's authority to detain a citizen combatant captured on a for-
eign battlefield.228  The detention could be indefinite without a criminal
trial, subject only to the principle that detention last no longer than active
hostilities. 229 A citizen-detainee who wished to challenge his designation
tive Branch."); Brooks, supra note 6, at 701 (noting that the Supreme Court has left open the possi-
bility that "Hamdi might be entitled only to a sort of 'due process lite."'); David D. Coron & Jenny
S. Martinez, eds., International Decision: Availability of U.S. Courts to Review Decision to Hold
US. Citizens as Enemy Combatants - Executive Power in War on Terror, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 782,
785 (2004) (calling Hamdi "a sharp and much needed rebuke to the U.S. government's position" but
critical of the Court's "ambiguous mingling of domestic and international law"); Daniel Moeckli,
The US. Supreme Court's 'Enemy Combatant' Decisions: A 'Major Victory for the Rule of Law'?,
10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L., Spring, 2005, at 75, 76 ("The suggestion that the court has inflicted
a decisive defeat on the government that will forever change the legal parameters of the 'war on
terror' is, however, misleading."); John K. Setear, A Forest with No Trees. The Supreme Court and
International Law in the 2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REV. 579, 585 (2005) ("No Justice saw Hamdi as
raising an issue of international law that the Court needed to resolve."); Jared Perkins, Note and
Comment, Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Citizen Enemy
Combatants, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 437, 456-57 (2005) (critiquing Hamdi for not going far enough to
ensure separation of powers).
221. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
224. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481.
225. Id. at 476.
226. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 452 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal
docketed, No. 05-8003 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320 (D.D.C.
2005), appeal docketed sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-5062 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 2005).
227. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 281; Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at
323. Both cases are on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
228. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
229. Id. at 520.
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as an enemy combatant was given basic, but limited, process, and there
was fairly deferential judicial review of that designation.230
Other cases are being litigated that may provide additional guidance
on the separation of powers issues raised by the government's detention
of enemy combatants.23' In particular, the case of Jose Padilla raises
issues similar to those of Hamdi, with the exception that Padilla, unlike
Hamdi, was not captured on a distant battlefield, but on U.S. soil as he
stepped off an airplane.232 Much like Hamdi, the government has made
broad claims of executive power to detain even citizens as enemy com-
batants.233 And much like Hamdi, the courts have struggled to resolve
the issues. The district court denied Padilla's habeas petition and ac-
cepted the government's claim that the President has the authority to
detain citizens captured on U.S. soil as enemy combatants in a time of
war;234 the Second Circuit reversed. 235 The Supreme Court reversed the
Second Circuit on jurisdictional grounds, holding that under the habeas
statute the case was improperly filed against the Secretary of Defense in
the Southern District of New York.236 Padilla's claim was dismissed
without prejudice.237
Padilla then filed his habeas petition in the District of South Caro-
lina, where a district court granted the petition.238 First, the court held
that the AUMF did not authorize Padilla's detention and that detention
was contrary to the requirements of the Non-Detention Act, which "for-
bids any kind of detention of an United States citizen, except that which
is specifically allowed by Congress., 239 The critical distinction between
this case and Hamdi was that Padilla was not captured on a distant battle-
field, but in the United States. 240 No language in the AUMF explicitly or
implicitly gave the President the authority to hold Padilla as an enemy
combatant or that overcame the terms of the Non-Detention Act.
24 1
230. See David B. Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Bush's Good Day in Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 4,
2004, at A19. (arguing that Hamdi was a victory for the government); Chemerinksy, supra note 192,
at 80 (calling Hamdi "significant" victory for the government).
231. AI-Marri v. Hanfit raises the issue of whether a non-citizen may be detained as an enemy
combatant, when he is captured on U.S. soil. AI-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005).
AI-Marri was initially arrested in Peoria, Illinois, and charged with various federal crimes. Al-
Marri, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 674. A month before his scheduled trial date, the government designated
him an enemy combatant and transferred him to military custody. Id. A district court recently
upheld AI-Marri's detention as an enemy combatant. Id. at 675.
232. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2dCir. 2003).
233. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711.
234. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
235. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 695.
236. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
237. Id. at 451.
238. Padilla v. Hanfl, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005).
239. Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 688-89.
240. Id. at 688.
241. Id.
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Second, the court rejected the assertion that the President had the
inherent authority to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant.2 42  Citing
Youngstown, the court held that the President had taken steps inconsis-
tent with the will of Congress. 243 Thus, the President's authority was at
its lowest ebb. "'Congress, not the Executive, should control utilization
of the war power as an instrument of domestic policy.' 244 To accept the
President's claim of inherent authority "would not only offend the rule of
law and violate this country's constitutional tradition, but it would also
be a betrayal of this Nation's commitment to the separation of powers
that safeguards our democratic values and individual liberties."
245
A theme throughout the district court's opinion was its concern that
the executive have the power to order the indefinite and unreviewable
detention by the military of a citizen arrested on U.S. soil. 24 6 In the ab-
sence of, and indeed contrary to, congressional authorization, the Presi-
dent was handling through military means a situation that could be han-
dled through the courts. "Simply stated, this is a law enforcement mat-
ter, not a military matter., 247 Criminal laws also allowed for the prosecu-
tion and punishment of terrorists. Unlike the President's claim of inher-
ent authority, however, the criminal process allowed for accountability
and helped prevent arbitrary government action.248
On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court.249
The Fourth Circuit held that just as the AUMF authorized Hamdi's de-
tention, it authorized Padilla's detention as well. There was "no differ-
ence in principle between Hamdi and Padilla. 2 '0  The locus of capture
was irrelevant, as was the availability of criminal prosecution.25 1 Ac-
cording to the Fourth Circuit, the district court had been insufficiently
deferential to the President's determination that detention was necessary
and appropriate in the interest of national security.252
242. Id. at 689.
243. Id.




248. Id. at 691.
249. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
250. Padilla, 423 F.3d at 391.
251. Id. at 393-95.
252. Id. at 395. The United States recently indicted Padilla on criminal charges and moved to
transfer him to civilian custody. Neil A. Lewis, Terror Trial Hits Obstacles, Unexpectedly, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, A30. The Fourth Circuit has requested briefing on whether it should vacate its
opinion in the case. Id. If the Fourth Circuit opinion stands, absent a change of views, it is likely
that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari and reverse the Fourth Circuit. In Padilla, 542 U.S. at
465, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented from the dismissal
of the habeas petition on jurisdictional grounds. On the merits, the dissent argued "that the Non-
Detention Act ... prohibits - and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution ...
does not authorize - the protracted, incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the
United States." Id. at 464 n.8. If those Justices hold fast, the fifth vote would come from Justice
Scalia based on his view that the Executive cannot detain a citizen as an enemy combatant unless the
writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Handi, 542 U.S. at 553. The swing vote may be Justice
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Thus, some markers have begun to emerge with respect to the ex-
ecutive's power to detain citizens as enemy combatants. The Court has
rejected the broadest assertion of unreviewable executive prerogative to
detain enemy combatants.253 It is clear that the courts can review a de-
tention as long as the detainee is being held in an area subject to the ju-
risdiction of a federal court.254 It is also clear that the executive must
produce evidence, however modest, to establish the basis for the enemy
combatant designation. 55 In analyzing claims of executive authority,
courts will explicitly or implicitly rely upon Justice Jackson's analytical
framework to determine if the President is acting with congressional au-
thorization, in the absence of congressional authorization, or contrary to
256congressional authorization. Perhaps yet another theme to emerge
from the litigation is that the further events of September 11, 2001 recede
without an additional major terrorist attack on the United States, the eas-
ier it may be for courts to reject far reaching claims of executive author-
ity without apparent fear of compromising national security.
257
Yet many difficult questions remain, some of which are currently
being litigated in federal court, often times with disparate results. Non-
citizens held in a territory subject to the jurisdiction of federal court can
seek habeas review of their detention. But, do they have cognizable con-
stitutional rights? As for citizens, what is the scope of their rights if they
are captured and detained overseas? If an individual is acquitted in fed-
eral court on terrorism-related charges, can the President simply move to
detain the individual militarily as an enemy combatant in spite of the
acquittal? In the absence of the AUMF, what is the extent of the Presi-
dent's Article II power to detain individuals as enemy combatants? If
Congress explicitly overrides the provisions of the Non-Detention Act
and gives the President the authority to militarily detain alleged terror-
ists, both citizens and non-citizens alike wherever they are found, would
such a measure-a national security detention act-be upheld?
The upshot of this may ultimately be to expand, not contract, the pa-
rameters of executive power. From this perspective, the President asked
Breyer, as he joined the dissent in Padilla and the plurality in Hamdi. Perhaps, then, the critical
distinction for Justice Breyer may be that Padilla was arrested in the United States, and not on a
distant battlefield.
253. Id. at 553.
254. Id. at 693.
255. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
256. Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
257. Justice Davis expressed a similar sentiment in Ex parte Milligan, when he stated:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow that calmness in
deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial ques-
tion. Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise of power; and feel-
ings and interests prevailed which are happily terminated. Now that the public safety is
assured, this question, as well as others, can be discussed and decided without passion or
the admixture of any element not required to form a legal judgment.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 109 (1866) (emphasis added). See also REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 222 ("A
court may also decide an issue in favor of the government during a war, when it would not have
done so had the decision come after the war was over.").
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for a yard, and ended up with a foot or two. More than that, however, the
President shifted the parameters of the debate so that there is no longer
any question that, as long as the AUMF applies, the President can detain
a citizen captured abroad as an enemy combatant.258  The government
may also be able to proceed against the citizen detainee in a properly
constituted military tribunal, where it may rely upon hearsay evidence
and a rebuttable presumption in favor of its evidence.259
Most important, characterizing terrorism as a military issue, rather
than a law enforcement problem, has the inexorable consequence of ex-
panding the scope of executive discretion, unfettered from the judicial
oversight inherent in the criminal justice system and the need to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For reasons grounded in separation of
260powers and institutional competency, courts are apt to be more defer-
ential to the President when he acts as Commander-in-Chief, than when
he acts as a prosecutor.
Legitimizing a military response to terrorism will inevitably in-
crease the military's role at home, especially when the United States is
viewed as part of the battleground in the war on terror. Indeed, this has
already begun to happen. The Department of Defense has created an
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and a Northern Command
dedicated to homeland defense and civil support.261  "When directed by
the President, the Department will execute land-based military operations
to detect, deter, and defeat foreign terrorist attack within the United
States.262 It has also announced its plan to develop "a cadre" of special-
ized terrorism intelligence analysts and to deploy them to interagency
258. Chemerinsky, supra note 192, at 80 ("The Court ruled in Hamdi that American citizens
apprehended in foreign countries can be detained as enemy combatants.").
259. Id. at 78.
260. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) ("[Plolicies in regard to the
conduct of foreign relations [and] the war power ... are so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."). See also
Justice Jackson's opinion in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign af-
fairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not be published
to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should
review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. But
even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Con-
stitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance
or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, fa-
cilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of politi-
cal power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
261. STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 7-8; Kohn, supra note 12, at
176; Bradley Graham, War Plans Drafted To Counter Terror Attacks in U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 8,
2005, at AI (noting the Pentagon has drawn up classified plans for responding to terrorist attacks in
the United States).
262. STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 26.
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centers for homeland defense and counterterrorism. 263 As a policy mat-
ter, in certain circumstances, the military should provide support to civil
authorities, by, for example, sharing intelligence that may help prevent a
terrorist attack, responding to an on-going attack, or offering assistance
in the aftermath of an attack, especially one that is catastrophic.
Nevertheless, there is a tension here: an undue military involve-
ment in domestic matters flies in the face of American tradition. The
Framers had a general mistrust of military power permanently at the
President's disposal. 264 As Justice Scalia noted in Hamdi:
In the Founders' view, the "blessings of liberty" were threatened by
"those military establishments which must gradually poison its very
fountain." No fewer than 10 issues of the Federalist were devoted in
whole or in part to allaying fears of oppression from the proposed
Constitution's authorization of standing armies in peacetime.
265
266
The Constitution reflects the Framers' concerns. 2 6 The President is
the Commander-in-Chief, but Congress has the power to declare war
2 67
and "[t]o make Rules for the . . . Regulation of the land and naval
Forces. 268 Congress also has the power "[t]o raise and support Armies,
but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years. 2 69 More than the constitutional checks, there is a gen-
eral statutory prohibition on military involvement in domestic law en-
forcement. Despite important exceptions, the Posse Comitatus Act
makes it a crime to use the armed forces as "a posse comitatus or other-
wise to execute the laws.
270
Domestic military involvement in the war on terror raises serious
concerns. Some have argued that military resources will be depleted and
the military's effectiveness in fighting overseas impaired.271 Others
263. id. at 21.
264. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 568-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 569 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
266. Id.
267. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
268. Id. at cl. 14.
269. Id. at cl. 12.
270. Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1385 (West 2000). "[S]everal statutory
exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, especially the Insurrection statutes, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-335
(West 1998), give the President wide latitude to use troops for almost any purpose, including law
enforcement, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack." STEPHEN DYcus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 781 (3d ed. 2002). For an overview of the exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, see also
Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffgin for Posse Comitatus, 12 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 116 (2003) ("Especially since the end of World War II, the dramatic growth of
federal powers, and the extensive delegation of legislative authority to the President, has resulted in
a series of significant exceptions to the [Act]"); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus
Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 383, 398 (2003) (arguing
that "over the last 30 years, the protections offered by the [Posse Comitatus Act] have been signifi-
cantly eroded.").
271. See Kealy, supra note 270, at 430; Kohn, supra note 12, at 177.
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voice civil liberties concerns.27 2 There are important cultural differences
between the military and civilian law enforcement. A soldier, unlike a
peace officer, is not trained in the requirements of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.2 73 Due process is a concept that has little relevance on the
battlefield. The concern is that "mission creep" will result in which the
military becomes adjuncts of internal security agencies including law
enforcement, prosecutors, and domestic intelligence, that had been en-
tirely civilian in nature.2 74  "This has happened before--during almost
every war since the mid-19th century, with harm to American civil liber-
ties and to the relationship between the armed forces and the American
people.
2 7 5
Thus, as the executive continues to blur the line between a military
and law enforcement response to terrorism, difficult line drawing issues
will undoubtedly continue to emerge in which the courts will be asked to
determine the bounds of executive authority. Of necessity, such a deter-
mination will raise questions that go to the heart of separation of powers,
including an assessment of executive power and the limits on it in time
of war. In a sense, then, Hamdi and Padilla may be a harbinger of things
to come, as the courts struggle to reconcile conflicts between the de-
mands of national security and civil liberty.
B. Centralization of Intelligence Functions
Beyond a shift from the criminal justice system to a military re-
sponse to terrorism, a second paradigm shift has occurred as well: the
centralization of intelligence functions, both civilian and military, within
a single bureaucratic structure in the executive branch. This centraliza-
tion does not pose a conventional separation of powers issue, because,
with the exception of the CIA, which is statutorily designated an inde-
272. See Canestaro, supra note 270, at 100 ("The founding fathers feared the involvement of
the Army in the nation's affairs for good reason. History has demonstrated that employing soldiers
to enforce the law is inherently dangerous to the rights of people."); Kealy, supra note 270, at 430
(arguing that post-9/1 "[c]ongress should resist any call for greater domestic involvement of the
military," because "[s]uch operations have too great a capacity to lead to civil rights violations,
disproportionate uses of force, a depletion of military resources, and the militarization of the po-
lice."); Kohn, supra note 12, at 177:
The danger posed by the use of the regular military forces internally is dual: on the one
hand, impairing military effectiveness in the primary task of the regulars today, war-
fighting overseas; and on the other hand, undermining civil liberty (as has happened in
past wars) by using regular troops for law enforcement, to try or incarcerate American
citizens, to gather intelligence, or to suppress dissent or antiwar protest.
273. See Judge Arnold's opinion in Bissonette v. Haig:
Civilian rule is basic to our system of government. The use of military forces to seize ci-
vilians can expose civilian government to the threat of military rule and the suspension of
constitutional liberties. On a lesser scale, military enforcement of the civil law leaves the
protection of vital Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the hands of persons who are
not trained to uphold these rights. It may also chill the exercise of fundamental rights,
such as the rights to speak freely and to vote, and create the atmosphere of fear and hos-
tility which exists in territories occupied by enemy forces.
776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985); Canestaro, supra note 270, at 140-41.
274. Kohn, supra note 12, at 188.
275. Id.
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pendent agency, the other fourteen agencies that comprise the intelli-
gence community have always been situated within the executive branch.
Moreover, the centralization has occurred not by presidential fiat, but by
legislative enactment followed by executive implementation.
This unprecedented centralization lowers the wall that has separated
external and internal security or foreign and domestic intelligence for
more than half a century. 76 Other laws passed in the wake of 9/11, par-
ticularly the Patriot Act, further this centralization by fostering closer
cooperation between the foreign and domestic intelligence gathering
agencies.277 In the long run, this may help prevent a future catastrophic
terrorist attack on U.S. soil; certainly, that was the intent of the 9/11
Commission, which recommended the creation of a National Intelligence
Directorate, as well as the hope of Congress, which enacted the recom-
mendation into law in December 2004.278 It is important to recognize,
however, that this measure may have costs as well: much like the mili-
tary response to terrorism, the centralization of intelligence functions will
enhance the authority of the executive branch and increase the potential
for an abuse of power.
In the aftermath of World War II, the architects of our national se-
curity apparatus sought intentionally to diffuse power among different
intelligence agencies by creating a wall within the executive branch be-
tween foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. The National
Security Act of 1947, which chartered the CIA, specifically provided that
the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or
internal security functions., 279 The CIA, in other words, was intended to
combat the foreign enemies of the United States, not its domestic wrong-
doers. 280 That task fell upon the FBI, as well as other federal law en-
forcement agencies, which had statutory police powers and an internal
security function, even with respect to counter-espionage investigations.
276. For purposes of this article, "the wall" is used in a broad sense to refer to more than the
restrictions on sharing information gathered under the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act, but to
the historical separation of the CIA and FBI, and their respective functions. See Eleanor Hill's Joint
Inquiry Staff Statement:
The walls in question include those that separated foreign activities from domestic activi-
ties, foreign intelligence operations from law enforcement operations, the FBI from the
CIA, communications intelligence from other types of intelligence, Intelligence Com-
munity agencies from other federal agencies, classified national security information
from other forms of evidentiary information, and information derived from electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence or criminal purpose from those who are not directly
involved in its collection.
Joint Inquiry Staff Statement: Hearing on the Intelligence Community's Response to Past Terrorist
Attacks Against the United States from February 1993 to September 2001, 22 (Oct. 8, 2002) (state-
ment of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff) [hereinafter Joint Inquiry Staff Statement],
http://intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/
021008/hill.pdf.
277. See id. at 26
278. 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2005).
279. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(d)(1) (West 2005).
280. Baker, supra note 154, at 36.
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The legislative history of the National Security Act of 1947 shows
that one overriding concern was to avoid giving the CIA too much
power.28' Part of the objection was based on protecting bureaucratic turf,
particularly on the part of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI.282 Yet the framers of
the Act did not want the CIA to become a centralized national security
apparatus with control over both foreign and domestic intelligence func-
283tions. Truman emphasized that "this country wanted no Gestapo under
any guise or for any reason. ' '284 Stuart Baker, former General Counsel to
the NSA, has explained that "American intelligence agencies were
shaped by individuals who understood the mechanics of totalitarianism
and wanted none of it here. They knew that the Gestapo and Soviet
KGB had in common a sweeping authority to conduct internal and exter-
nal security and intelligence gathering. 285  Richard Posner notes that
"democratic nations, including the United States... , have shied away
from placing the same official in charge of both foreign and domestic
intelligence, lest the rough methods used by intelligence services on for-
eigners in foreign, often hostile countries be turned on its citizens. 286 In
effect, notwithstanding any potential costs to efficiency, the 1947 Act
established a decentralized intelligence apparatus with a separation of
powers between the CIA and FBI.
The separation between foreign intelligence or external security and
law enforcement or internal security was maintained for more than half a
century after the CIA's creation. During the Cold War, intelligence agen-
cies faced a threat that was almost entirely foreign; law enforcement
dealt with problems that were largely domestic.287 With the exception of
counterespionage matters, there was little overlap between the work of
the intelligence agencies and law enforcement.288  When such overlap
occurred, it was often on an ad hoc basis in specific cases. In limited
instances, personnel from one agency were detailed to the other. For
281. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 82.
282. Id. ("Lobbying by the FBI, combined with fears of creating a U.S. Gestapo, led to the
FBI's being assigned responsibility for internal security functions and counterespionage."); Joint
Inquiry Staff Statement, supra note 276, at 22 ("Two fundamental considerations shaped [the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947]: that the United States not enable a Gestapo-like organization that
coupled foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence functions; and that the domestic organization
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation be preserved."); ZEGART, supra note 101, at 163-84 (describ-
ing political maneuvering that led to creation of CIA).
283. 1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 136 n.31 ("It was frequently remarked that the
[Central Intelligence] Agency was not to be permitted to act as a domestic police or 'Gestapo."');
COLL, supra note 128, at 254-55 ("[In the aftermath of a catastrophic war against Nazism, Con-
gress also sought to protect the American people from the rise of anything like Hitler's Gestapo, a
secret force that combined spying and police methods.").
284. HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1 MEMOIRS: YEAR OF DECISIONS 117(1955). Truman repeats that he
was "very much against building up a Gestapo." Id. at 253. For Truman's recollections on the
intelligence reorganization following World War 1I, see HARRY S. TRUMAN, 2 MEMOIRS: YEARS OF
TRIAL AND HOPE 73-79 (1956).
285. Baker, supra note 154, at 36. Baker most recently served as General Counsel to the
WMD Commission. WMD COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 597-98.
286. POSNER, supra note 6, at 65.
287. Baker, supra note 154, at 37; STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 23.
288. Baker, supra note 154, at 37.
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example, in the mid-1980's, the Director of Central Intelligence created a
Counterterrorist Center within the CIA that included representatives from
the FBI and other agencies.2 9
The segregation of spies and cops began to change with the demise
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Intelligence resources
were used on other foreign targets, including international drug traffick-
ing and organized crime, terrorists, and alien smuggling.290 Those tar-
gets had both an international and a domestic element; they could also be
viewed as presenting a challenge to both national security and to law
enforcement. At the same time, globalization allowed terrorists and
other foreign wrongdoers to travel, gather and exchange information,
communicate, network, and transfer funds more easily.291 From a laptop
computer thousands of miles from the United States, a wrongdoer could
send an e-mail to followers around the world with instructions on launch-
ing an attack within the U.S. or on U.S. interests overseas. The potential
for overlap between foreign intelligence investigation and domestic law
292 thenforcement is particularly high in counterterrorism matters. In the
1990's, the intelligence community and domestic law enforcement began
to collaborate more often. Cooperation was institutionalized. Senior FBI
and CIA officials met regularly to plan joint operations, exchange per-
sonnel and technology, and coordinate activities on sensitive investiga-
tions.293
Nevertheless, pre-9/11 the intelligence community remained decen-
tralized. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was the Director of
the CIA as well as the head of the U.S. intelligence community. Despite
an impressive title, the DCI had limited authority over the intelligence
community. The DCI stated the community's priorities and coordinated
development of its budget, but lacked line authority over the heads of
other agencies, as well as the power to shift or allocate resources within
the community.294
289. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 85.
290. Baker, supra note 154, at 37.
291. Bassiouni, supra note 145, at 87-88. See also 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 88
("The emergence of the World Wide Web has given terrorists a much easier means of acquiring
information and exercising command and control over their operations."); Steve Coil & Susan B.
Glasser, Jihadists Turn the Web Into Base of Operations, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2005, at AI ("the
'global jihad movement,' sometimes led by al Qaeda fugitives but increasingly made up of diverse
'groups and ad hoe cells,' has become a 'Web-directed' phenomenon").
292. DYCUS ET AL., supra note 270, at 688. See also STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE,
supra note 166, at 23 ("[T]ransnational terrorists have blurred the traditional distinction between
national security and international law enforcement."); Chesney, supra note 12, at 2 (asking whether
terrorists are "criminals who should be incapacitated through the civilian law enforcement process"
or "enemy belligerents engaged in war crimes who should be incapacitated through military deten-
tion, even when operating within the United States"); Harris, supra note 13, at 554 ("it is conven-
tional wisdom that previous distinctions between 'foreign' and 'domestic' are archaic and counter-
productive when addressing modem national security threats.").
293. Benjamin Wittes, Blurring the Line Between Cops and Spies, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9,
1996, at 1.
294. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 79-80, 372.
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To remedy the failure to "connect the dots" that led to 9/11, the 9/11
Commission recommended the creation of a powerful Director of Na-
tional Intelligence (DNI) who would oversee and coordinate the efforts
of the intelligence community, both foreign and domestic. 95 Based on
that recommendation, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).296 This Act has several im-
portant features: (1) it creates a Senate-confirmed DNI, popularly known
as the "intelligence czar," who is the head of the intelligence community
and principal adviser to the President on intelligence matters related to
national security 297 (2) gives the DNI budgetary authority over the intel-
ligence community; 298 (3) allows the DNI to exercise authority over the
hiring of key officials in the intelligence community, including the Di-
rector of the CIA and the Director of the NSA;2 99 and (4) empowers the
DNI to establish personnel policies for the intelligence community.0 0
For the first time, the foreign and domestic intelligence communities are
united under the direction of an official who has actual authority over
them.
More changes, however, were to follow that consolidated the DNI's
authority over the FBI. On March 31, 2005, the Commission on the In-
telligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD Commission) issued its report.30 1 The WMD Com-
mission issued seventy-four recommendations to strengthen U.S. intelli-
gence capabilities. 30 2 Among other things, the Commission noted that
the DNI's authority over the FBI was "troublingly vague., 30 3 In response
to the WMD Commission's recommendations, on June 29, 2005, Presi-
dent Bush clarified and centralized the DNI's authority over the FBI's
intelligence program. 304 The President ordered the creation of a National
Security Service within the FBI that combines the FBI's counterterror-
ism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements.30 5 The DNI has au-
thority to approve the hiring of the head of the National Security Service,
295. Id. at373-74.
296. IRTPA, supra note 9. See generally SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 (2004),
http://www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/_files/ConferenceReportSummary.doc; POSNER, supra note 6, at
62-69.
297. IRTPA, supra note 9, at § 1011(a), 118 Stat. 3643-44.
298. Id. at § 1011(c) & (d), 118 Stat. 3644-47.
299. Id. at § 1014, 118 Stat. 3663-64.
300. Id. at § 101 I(f), 118 Stat. 3648-50.
301. WMD COMM'N REP., supra note 105.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 457.
304. Memorandum from George W. Bush to Vice President, Sec'y of State, Sec'y of Def.,
Attorney Gen., Sec'y of Homeland Sec., Dir. of OMB, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Assistant to the
President for Nat'l Sec. Affairs, and Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterror-
ism (June 29, 2005) [hereinafter Memorandum from George W. Bush],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050629-1.html. See also Dan Eggen &
Walter Pincus, Bush Approves Spy Agency Changes, WASH. POST, June 30, 2005, at AI; Douglas
Jehl, Bush to Create New Unit in F.B.I. for Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at Al.
305. Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 304.
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who will report to both the Director of the FBI and to the DNI. 3 °6 More-
over, the DNI was given authority over the FBI's three billion dollar
intelligence budget.3 °7
In and of itself, the creation of the DNI would be a significant step
in lowering the wall between foreign intelligence and domestic law en-
forcement. The provisions of IRTPA, however, cannot be viewed in
isolation. Congress has passed other laws, most notably in the Patriot
Act, that further dismantled the wall.3°8 Several provisions of the Patriot
Act make it easier for foreign intelligence to be used for domestic law
enforcement purposes.
This occurs, for example, in the area of electronic surveillance. To
obtain a domestic wiretap for criminal investigations, a federal agent
must meet the requirements of Title 111.309 A judge must find probable
cause to believe that "an individual is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit" an enumerated predicate offense and that "particular
communications concerning such offense will be obtained through...
interception."3 10 Thus, the essential inquiry focuses on the conduct of the
target of the surveillance and whether the surveillance will uncover evi-
dence of crime.
In contrast, under the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act (FISA),
to obtain an order for electronic surveillance or for a physical search, the
agent must establish probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a
"foreign power" or the "agent of a foreign power." 31 1 "Foreign power" is
defined to include, among other things, "a group engaged in international
terrorism.''312 "Agent of a foreign power" includes "any person who...
knowingly engages in... international terrorism... for or on behalf of a
foreign power., 313 When the target of surveillance is a citizen or resident
306. Id.
307. Id.; Eggen & Pincus, supra note 304.
308. This, too, has resulted in a profusion of scholarship. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra
note 13, at 43-48 (critique of Patriot Act amendments to FISA based on civil liberty concerns);
Sullivan, supra note 13, at 133-43 (same). A debate has also emerged on the extent to which the
wall has been torn down. See Seamon & Gardner, supra note 13, at 321-22 (disagreeing with asser-
tion that Patriot Act "tore down 'the wall"' and urging Congress to "truly tear down the wall");
Swire, supra note 13, at 1308 ("The Patriot Act made significant changes to FISA, notably by tear-
ing down the 'wall' that had largely separated foreign intelligence activities from the usual prosecu-
tion of domestic crimes."); Breglio, supra note 13, at 196 ("The wall has been torn down."); Harris,
supra note 13, at 554 ("The law enforcement prohibition in the National Security Act may make part
of the destruction of 'the wall' somewhat theoretical, despite the expansion of coordination and
information sharing between the FBI and CIA."). The key point is that the Patriot Act makes it
easier for the government to use foreign intelligence for domestic law enforcement purposes. Gen-
eral Michael V. Hayden, until recently the head of the NSA and now the Deputy Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, has noted that "[m]ore information is flowing between NSA and law enforcement
agencies." Hayden, supra note 109, at 259.
309. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (West 2005).
310. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3)(a)-(b) (West 2005).
311. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (West 2005).
312. Id. § 1801(a)(4).
313. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(C).
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alien, "agent of a foreign power" generally requires criminal activity.314
The inquiry under FISA focuses on a target's status as a "foreign power"
or "agent of a foreign power," and there need not be probable cause to
believe that the surveillance will uncover evidence of crime.3 5  FISA
surveillance, then, does not require a showing that comports with the
traditional criminal standard of probable cause.316
There are other significant advantages to the government in obtain-
ing a FISA order, instead of one under Title III. One advantage is dura-
tion. Surveillance of foreign agents under FISA may last ninety days for
U.S. persons;3 17 surveillance under Title III is limited to thirty. 318 Exten-
sions of surveillance are also easier to obtain under FISA, than under
Title I1.3 19 Another advantage is secrecy. Under Title III, the govern-
ment must provide notice to the target of the surveillance "[w]ithin a
reasonable time"; 320 under FISA, no notice is necessary unless evidence
derived from the surveillance is used in a criminal prosecution.3 21 Title
III also requires the government "to minimize the interception of com-
munications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter.,
322
In general, minimization must occur contemporaneously with the surveil-
lance.323 Under FISA, "in practice... surveillance devices are normally
left on continuously, and the minimization occurs in the process of in-
dexing and logging the pertinent communications. 324
To avoid the misuse of FISA surveillance or searches, and to pre-
vent agents from obtaining a FISA order when they would be unable to
obtain a warrant under Title III, prior to the Patriot Act, FISA required
314. Id. § 1801(b)(2); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 738 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); Lee &
Schwartz, supra note 113, at 1459 ("[lt should be noted that FISA's definition of an 'agent of for-
eign power' who is a United States person requires criminal acts"). But see Varghese, supra note 13,
at 421 (arguing that FISA investigations are not necessarily grounded in criminal activity).
315. SCHULHOFER, supra note 13, at 38.
316. See In re Sealed Case:
[W]hile Title III contains some protections that are not in FISA, in many significant re-
spects the two statutes are equivalent, and in some, FISA contains additional protections.
Still, to the extent the two statutes diverge in constitutionally relevant areas - in particu-
lar, in their probable cause and particularity showings - a FISA order may not be a 'war-
rant' contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.
310 F.3d at 741; Baker, supra note 154, at 42 (noting that FISA surveillance "saves [law enforce-
ment officials] much of the hassle of meeting Title III standards for the wiretap."); Schulhofer, supra
note 169, at 79 ("FISA surveillance is permitted after showing only a diluted form of suspicion not
equivalent to the traditional criminal standard of probable cause."); Sullivan, supra note 13, at 136
("Crucially, FISA warrants do not require a showing of probable cause of criminal activity.").
317. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e)(1) (West 2005).
318. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5).
319. SCHULHOFER, supra note 13, at 44.
320. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(8)(d).
321. See also Varghese, supra note 13, at 411 (comparing powers granted through FISA and
Title III). Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(8)(d) with 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(c) & 50 U.S.C.A. § 1825(b).
For a comparison of the differences between FISA and Title III, see the lower court opinion in In re
All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616-17
(FISA Ct. 2002), as well as the appellate decision that reversed it. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at
737-41.
322. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5).
323. Id.
324. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 740.
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that "the purpose" of the order be to obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion.325 Courts, in turn, construed "the purpose" test to require the gov-
ernment to establish that "the primary purpose" was to obtain foreign
intelligence information, and not to further a domestic criminal investiga-
tion.326 This issue arose in criminal cases in which the government
sought to introduce evidence at trial that had been collected pursuant to a
FISA order.
The Patriot Act relaxed the rules separating foreign intelligence in-
vestigations from criminal investigations, based on concern that the rules
had become overly restrictive. 327 One amendment to FISA, for example,
provides that the collection of foreign intelligence need only be "a sig-
nificant" purpose, and not "the purpose" of the investigation. 328 As a
result, the "primary purpose" test has been legislatively set aside.329 The
"significant purpose" test is not difficult to meet. The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court of Review has concluded that the government's
"sole objective" cannot be to gather evidence for prosecution purposes.33 °
Thus, the government may use FISA surveillance when its primary, but
not exclusive, purpose is to gather evidence to prosecute a foreign intel-
ligence crime or ordinary crime "inextricably intertwined" with foreign
intelligence crime, "[s]o long as . . . [it] entertains a realistic option of
dealing with the agent other than through criminal prosecution.',
331
Similarly, the Patriot Act facilitates the two-way flow of informa-
tion between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The
Act makes clear that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence ... information obtained as part of a criminal
investigation... [may] be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national
security official in order to assist the official receiving that informa-
tion in the performance of his official duties.
332
Grand jury information, which ordinarily must be kept confidential,
may be shared by criminal investigators with other government officials
for counterterrorism purposes.333 Information gathered under Title III
may also be shared "to the extent that such contents include foreign intel-
325. Id. at 723.
326. Id. at 725-27 (describing origin of "primary purpose" test).
327. Jeffrey Rosen, Security Check, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 2002, at 11.
328. Patriot Act, supra note 11, at § 218, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (West
2005).
329. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736.
330. Id. at 735.
331. Id. at 735-36.
332. The Homeland Security Act broadened the disclosures to state, local, and foreign govern-
ment officials. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 897, 50 U.S.C.A. 403-5d(l) (West 2005).
333. Patriot Act, supra note 11, at § 203(a)(1). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Act of 2004 also allows federal authorities to share grand jury information about terrorist threats
with state, local, tribal, and foreign government officials. IRTPA, supra note 9, at § 6501.
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ligence or counterintelligence., 334  Similarly, officials who collect for-
eign intelligence information are allowed "to consult with Federal law
enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect
against ... sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.,
335
The centralization of intelligence functions through the creation of
the DNI, as well as the dismantling of the wall between foreign intelli-
gence and domestic law enforcement, does not appear to raise a constitu-
tional objection on separation of powers grounds. Under Justice Jack-
son's analysis, the President's action would be afforded the greatest de-
gree of deference; when he appoints a DNI under IRTPA or implements
the provisions of the Patriot Act, he acts with the constitutional authority
of Congress as well as his own.336 The President's authority, then, would
be at its zenith, "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the wid-
est latitude of judicial interpretation.
' 337
Policy arguments can be made for and against the centralization of
intelligence functions. On the one hand, there are persuasive arguments
in favor of dismantling the wall between foreign intelligence and domes-
tic law enforcement. First, with respect to international terrorism di-
rected at the U.S., the distinction between foreign intelligence and do-
mestic law enforcement is largely illusory,3 38 and the law should take
into account that reality. Second, as the 9/11 Commission noted, "The
importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated.
Without it, it is not possible to 'connect the dots.' No one component
holds all the relevant information., 339 In other words, information should
be shared if it will help prevent a terrorist attack. Pre-Patriot Act, the
wall blocked the exchange of information between the intelligence com-
munity and law enforcement. 340  Worse yet, the pre-9/1 1 rules were
complex, often misinterpreted, and applied in an overly restrictive man-
ner.341 Indeed, a misunderstanding of the rules hindered the FBI's at-
334. Patriot Act, supra note 11, at § 203(b)(1).
335. Id. § 504(a)-(b).
336. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
337. Id. at 637. Kathleen Sullivan notes that "the Constitution may require separation of pow-
ers, but within the executive branch it is a voluntary decision to separate knowledge among the FBI,
INS, and CIA." Sullivan, supra note 13, at 142. Richard Posner suggests that a separation of pow-
ers issue could arise if the President tries to resist the centralization required by IRTPA. POSNER,
supra note 6, at 61-62.
338. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 726 (citing United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964
(9th Cir. 1988) with approval, which noted that under FISA "'[i]ntemational terrorism,' by defmi-
tion, requires the investigation of activities that constitute crimes."); Harris, supra note 13, at 549-
50, 554 (arguing that "the fight against terrorism blurs the border between law enforcement and
intelligence," a "strict bifurcation between law enforcement and intelligence activities ... no longer
exists," and "the foreign/domestic divide is oftentimes a distinction without a difference in the fight
against terrorism and other transboundary threats.").
339. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 408.
340. Id. at 79.
341. Id. at 79-80; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722-28 (criticizing development of "primary
purpose" test under pre-Patriot Act FISA).
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tempt to locate one of the participants in the 9/11 plot. 342  As a policy
matter, the executive branch ought to be able to use the information it
has, however collected, to prevent terrorist attacks. This is especially so
given the magnitude of the threat.
Moreover, one can argue that IRTPA and the Patriot Act include
structural checks that will help prevent civil rights abuses. IRTPA pro-
vides that the DNI is not located within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent.343 The Act creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
within the Executive Office of the President that is required to provide
advice and oversight on privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by
"the implementation of laws, regulations, and executive branch policies
related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. ' '344  The DNI
must appoint a civil liberties protection officer.345 The DNI and the
DNI's Principal Deputy cannot both be active military officers.346
IRTPA also reiterates the mantra that the CIA is to have "no police, sub-
poena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. 347
Similarly, under the Patriot Act, the CIA Director is to "have no author-
ity to direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or physical
search operations pursuant to [FISA] unless otherwise authorized by
statute or executive order.,
348
On the other hand, there may be considerable costs associated with
centralizing intelligence functions. Some have questioned whether creat-
ing a DNI will prove to be effective. Richard Posner has argued force-
fully that it will not.349  But, more important, dismantling the wall that
342. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 269-71.
343. IRTPA, supra note 9, at § 101 (a).
344. Id. § 1061(c)(3). This Board is advisory and reports to the President. Martha Neil, Mem-
bers of Privacy and Civil Liberties Board Named, 4 NO. 24 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 4 (2005). President
Bush appointed members to the panel in June 2005. Id. Richard Ben-Veniste, a member of the 9/11
Commission, has criticized it as "a very watered-down board without the kinds of powers which I
believe are necessary to provide credibility and authority, such as independent subpoena power...
and a bipartisan selection process." Caroline Drees, Civil Liberties Panel Is Off to a Sluggish Start,
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2005, at A13.
345. IRTPA, supra note 9, at § 101 l(a), 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3d(a)(1) (West 2005).
346. Id. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3a(c)(1)-(2).
347. Id. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-4a(d)(1).
348. Patriot Act, supra note 11, at § 901. The Patriot Act also has a sunset provision. Id. §
224.
349. See POSNER, supra note 6. Among other things, Posner argues that the intelligence reform
may be inefficient and costly. First, the reform proposed a structural solution to a management
problem. Id. at 127. "A reorganization is a questionable response to a problem that is not a problem
of organization." Id. Second, reorganization imposes substantial transition costs, as the agencies in
the intelligence community adapt to the new management structure. This can lead to "transition-
induced dysfunction." Id. at 129. "[A]doption of the proposals was bound to usher in a protracted
period of increased vulnerability to attack by dislocating the intelligence system." Id. at 130. Third,
greater centralization of intelligence activities may result in diseconomies of scale. Id. at 141. Added
layers of bureaucracy may result in delay and prevent information from reaching key policymakers.
Id. "[C]entralizing intelligence ... given the sheer size of the U.S. intelligence system . . . over-
load[s] the top of the intelligence hierarchy." Id. at 150. Centralization may also stifle diversity of
views and competition among the intelligence agencies. Diversity or pluralism, unlike centraliza-
tion, may result in "more and better information." Id. at 153-54. In sum, the intelligence reform
resulted in "a bureaucratic reorganization that is more likely to be a recipe for bureaucratic infight-
ing, impacted communication, diminished performance, tangled lines of command, and lowered
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was erected so carefully almost 60 years ago may give rise to one of the
very problems that the framers of the 1947 National Security Act sought
to avoid: civil rights abuses caused by the excessive concentration of
power within a centralized intelligence apparatus.
350
First, centralization creates a greater risk that intelligence will be
politicized to suit a President's agenda.35' The decentralized system that
existed prior to IRTPA made it more difficult for the President to pres-
sure or manipulate the entire intelligence community; the voice of the
CIA Director, for example, was one among many.352 Whatever its faults,
decentralization encouraged a diversity of views, competition in the
gathering and analysis of intelligence, and independent thinking.353 As
an institutional matter, this may be particularly important for agencies
largely shielded from public scrutiny that serve top officials in the execu-
tive branch. Even without centralization, "[n]o other part of the govern-
ment has so narrow an audience--or responds so enthusiastically to
guidance from above. 354 Centralization and the creation of a DNI who
oversees the intelligence community means that "the President will have
only one mind in the intelligence community to bend to his will. '355 This
is so, even if as a technical matter, the DNI is not located within Execu-
tive Office of the President.356 The reality is that the DNI is appointed by
the President and reports to the President.
Second, lowering the wall between foreign and domestic intelli-
gence creates the risk that foreign intelligence and methods used to ac-
quire foreign intelligence will be used for domestic law enforcement
purposes in an effort to circumvent legal safeguards that would otherwise
apply, even in cases unrelated to international terrorism. Baker observes
that "[i]ntelligence- gathering tolerates a degree of intrusiveness, harsh-
ness, and deceit that Americans do not want applied against them-
selves., 357 Very different legal regimes apply to government action with
morale than an improvement on the previous system." Id. at 207-08. Worse yet, it may "induce
complacenc[y] about our 'reformed' intelligence system and by doing so deflect attention from
graver threats than a repetition of 9/11." Id. at 208. More fundamentally, Posner argues that "the
prevention of surprise attacks may pose problems that even the best intelligence system could not
overcome. Recognition of this fact is the beginning of realism in the redesign of the system." Id. at
204.
350. For that reason, the American Civil Liberties Union opposed giving the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence certain powers. See Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Analysis of the 9-11 Commission's Recommendations for Intelligence
Reform (July 30, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=16181&c=1 11; Civil Liber-
ties and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, Aug. 23, 2004 (testimony of Gregory T. Nojeim, Associ-
ate Director & Chief Legislative Counsel for the ACLU),
http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID= 16280&c=206.
351. POSNER, supra note 6, at 116.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 7, 43. See id. at 84. See generally id. at 99-162 (discussing principles of intelli-
gence and organization).
354. Baker, supra note 154, at 40.
355. POSNER, supra note 6, at 116.
356. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403(a)(2) (West 2005).
357. Baker, supra note 154, at 40.
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respect to internal or external security. As a matter of constitutional
criminal procedure, for example, the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to extraterritorial searches of non-resident aliens absent a substantial
connection between the alien and the United States.358 Nor are aliens
entitled to Fifth Amendment due process rights outside the sovereign
territory of the United States.359 As previously noted, different statutory
regimes apply to electronic surveillance and physical searches that relate
to foreign intelligence or to domestic law enforcement. Prior to the Pa-
triot Act, agents may have been tempted to use a FISA order or informa-
tion derived from a FISA order when they were unable to meet the re-
quirements of Title III. That temptation, however, was checked by the
"primary purpose" test then in place. 360 The new test--one that requires
only "a significant purpose" -will have the opposite effect. 36 1 It creates
an incentive to seek a FISA order instead of one under the more onerous
requirements of Title III. The information sharing provisions of the Pa-
triot Act create a similar risk that an agent will be able to access informa-
tion otherwise inaccessible under the laws that constrain domestic law
enforcement activity.
Third, there are important cultural differences between the worlds
of cops and spies, and they approach their work differently. According
to Admiral Stansfield Turner, a former Director of the CIA, "The FBI
agent's first reaction when given a job is, 'How do I do this within the
law?' The CIA agent's first reaction when given a job is, 'How do I do
this regardless of the law of the country in which I am operating?'
' 362
Similarly, Stewart Baker has noted that "[c]ombining domestic and for-
eign intelligence functions creates the possibility that domestic law en-
forcement will be infected by the secrecy, deception, and ruthlessness
that international espionage requires. 363 Or, as Richard Posner adds,
"The idea that the CIA would engage in domestic intelligence gives even
conservatives the creeps; yet the Intelligence Reform Act takes a step in
that direction by placing the Director of National Intelligence over both
the CIA and the domestic intelligence activity of the FBI.
'364
This is not to impugn the integrity, idealism, or good faith of the
many dedicated members of the intelligence and law enforcement com-
365munities.  Almost thirty years ago, the Church Committee sought to
358. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990). See generally
FALLON, supra note 6, at 249 ("The Constitution affords few if any rights that extend outside the
territory of the United States to citizens of other countries.").
359. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784
(1950)).
360. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723.
361. See id.
362. Wittes, supra note 293, at 20.
363. Baker, supra note 154, at 36-37.
364. POSNER, supra note 6, at 57.
365. See Baker, supra note 154, at 40 (noting "the depth of the ... [NSA's] commitment to
obeying the legal limits on gathering intelligence relating to American citizens."); Hayden, supra
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understand how officials in intelligence agencies had committed unlaw-
ful acts in the mistaken pursuit of the public good. Quoting Justice
Brandeis, the Committee observed:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to free-
dom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understand-
ing.
366
Furthermore, for institutional reasons, the executive branch and its
members may not be well situated to analyze any trade-off between civil
liberty and national security. The executive branch's foremost concern
will not necessarily be civil liberty; rather, it will be preservation of the
state itself. In Hamdi, Justice Souter explained:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a
reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or
some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive
Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain
security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of
Government asked to counter serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance be-
tween the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the
responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that secu-
rity legitimately raises. A reasonable balance is more likely to be
367reached on the judgment of a different branch ....
From that perspective, it is possible to see how officials within the
executive branch may become the well meaning but misguided individu-
note 109, at 260 ("The process of reporting to legislative, executive, and judicial bodies has created a
culture at NSA that respects the law and the need to protect U.S. privacy rights.").
366. 1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 2 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 479 (1928)).
367. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Douglas
made a similar point in Katz v. United States:
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they be-
lieve national security may be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral
as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitu-
tion, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested. Rather it
should vigorously investigate and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute
those who violate the pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are
properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national security cases .... I
cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth
Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the
position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.
389 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 52-53:
[U]nder many circumstances the executive branch is most unlikely to strike the right bal-
ance between security and liberty. A primary task of the President is to keep the citizenry
safe, and any error on that count is likely to produce extremely high political sanctions.
For this reason, the President has a strong incentive to take precautions even if they are
excessive and even unconstitutional.
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als against whom Justice Brandeis once warned. Even pre-9/1 1, the CIA
and FBI were occasionally involved in serious violations of civil rights
and illegal activity.368 Those violations occurred despite the diffusion of
power between them. The question that arises is whether the possibility
for such violations will increase now that the walls separating foreign
intelligence and domestic law enforcement have been dismantled and are
unlikely ever to be rebuilt. This may be especially so since neither the
threat of WMDs nor the "war on terror" is likely to end anytime soon.
Indeed, in Hamdi the government conceded that "'given its unconven-
tional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-
fire agreement.' 369 In other litigation, the government has allowed that
"the war could last several generations." 370 According to the Department
of Defense, "the United States has become a nation at war, a war whose
length and scope may be unprecedented.,
371
Hamilton once warned that "[t]he violent destruction of life and
property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a
state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty
to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to
destroy their civil and political rights. 372 Will the intelligence reforms
of today give rise to the civil rights abuses of tomorrow? Are we wit-
nessing the build up of a national security state that relies upon founda-
tions laid during the Cold War?373  As an institutional matter, great
power coupled with secrecy, little public accountability, limited or defer-
ential judicial review, "dysfunctional" congressional oversight,374 and a
mandate to act for the imperatives of national security in a never ending
war on terror, would seem to create the preconditions for the next Church
Committee Report.
368. See generally SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS, Book 11 (1976) (describing abuses committed by FBI and intelligence agencies);
MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES (1976); Harris, supra note 13, at 540 (describing abuses committed by the CIA, some of
which "were committed at the direction of the highest levels of the nation's political leadership.");
Swire, supra note 13, at 1316-20 (listing abuses committed by FBI and intelligence agencies).
369. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
370. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
371. STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 1.
372. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 62 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
373. Professor Heymann, a former Deputy Attorney General in the Department of Justice, uses
the term "intelligence state" and warns of "drifting into an 'intelligence state."' HEYMANN, supra
note 6, at 133-57. Scholars have used the term "national security state" in the past to describe the
U.S. response to the Cold War. See HOGAN, supra note 93; DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE:
THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR (rev. & updated ed. 1990). General Hayden, the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence, has said that "the United States no longer ha[s] the luxury of maintaining
divisions between its foreign and domestic intelligence structures, because 'our enemy does not
recognize that distinction."' Jehl, supra note 304. Timothy Edgar, national security counsel for the
ACLU, has warned, "[s]pies and cops play different roles and operate under different rules for a
reason .... The FBI is effectively being taken over by a spymaster who reports directly to the White
House .... It's alarming that the same person who oversees foreign spying will now oversee domes-
tic spying, too." Eggen & Pincus, supra note 304.
374. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 420 (calling for improved congressional over-
sight).
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CONCLUSION
Post-9/1 1, the executive branch has made an aggressive assertion of
power, often with either congressional approval or acquiescence. The
government's response has reduced the distinction between external and
internal security. In part, this has occurred because of the nature of the
threat; international terrorism can be viewed as both a national security
and law enforcement problem. For policy reasons as well, no doubt the
President and Congress believed the measures they took were essential to
protect the United States.
This has resulted in two paradigm shifts. One has been the militari-
zation of the response to terrorism and a concomitant de-emphasis on
criminal prosecution. The military's indefinite detention of citizens cap-
tured in the war on terror was a manifestation of that response. In
Hamdi, the Supreme Court held that the executive branch had gone too
far. The government's most extreme position-its claim to be able to
detain citizens indefinitely and unreviewably on grounds of military ne-
cessity-has been rejected. Many questions remain unanswered, how-
ever, and the case is not an unqualified vindication of civil rights. In the
meantime, despite traditional American concerns about military in-
volvement in domestic affairs, the military will continue to play an ever
larger role in homeland security.
A second shift has been the centralization of intelligence functions
and a lowering of the wall that had historically separated foreign intelli-
gence and domestic law enforcement. This has occurred through the
creation of a Director of National Intelligence who oversees both foreign
and domestic intelligence collection and provisions of the Patriot Act that
make it easier for FISA orders to be used in connection with criminal
investigations and that facilitate the exchange of information between the
foreign intelligence community and domestic law enforcement. All of
this goes a long way toward creating a powerful, centralized intelligence
apparatus under the President's control with responsibility for both ex-
ternal and internal security.
Both paradigm shifts must be viewed in their historical context.
The power of the presidency has continued to grow in modem times.
Crisis only fuels the growth of that power. This is especially so when the
war on terror is all but endless and the threat involves weapons of mass
destruction. Moreover, power, by its nature, is not easily relinquished
once obtained, nor are rights, once lost, easily restored.375 Whatever the
375. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (opin-
ion upholding military exclusion order creates a principle that "lies about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need"); Acker-
man, supra note 3, at 1030 ("Unless careful precautions are taken, emergency measures have a habit
of continuing well beyond their time of necessity."); Barak, supra note 1, at 149 ("I must take human
rights seriously during times of both peace and conflict. I must not make do with the mistaken belief
that, at the end of the conflict, I can turn back the clock."); Gross, supra note 3, at 1073 ("Emer-
385
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:2
consequences of 9/11, the enlargement of executive authority is one of
them. 9/11, in that sense, represents a continuation and an acceleration
of a modem trend.
Perhaps this is as it should be; we live in troubled times.37 6  Chief
Justice Rehnquist poses the question of "whether occasional presidential
excesses and judicial restraint in wartime are desirable or undesirable. 377
The answer to that question, he writes as a legal realist, is "very largely
academic.,, 378 "There is no reason to think that future wartime presidents
will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt, or that future
Justices of the Supreme Court will decide questions differently from their
predecessors., 379  Nevertheless, as the lines blur between the military
and domestic law enforcement on the one hand and between domestic
law enforcement and foreign intelligence on the other, we find ourselves
in uncharted territory having set aside traditional concerns in pursuit of
the war on terror. As in Hamdi and Padilla, this blurring of lines will
undoubtedly lead to difficult questions regarding the limits of executive
prerogative. This article, then, sounds a cautionary note. In reviewing
post-9/1 1 governmental action, it is impossible not to be concerned with
the enlargement of executive power during the war on terror and its long-
term potential effect on our constitutional structure.
gency regimes tend to perpetuate themselves, regardless of the intentions of those who originally
invoked them. Once brought to life, they are not so easily terminable."). But see Epstein et al.,
supra note 3, at 81, 95 (based on quantitative analysis of Supreme Court precedent, arguing that
"[c]ontrary to widespread fear and speculation that doctrine created during wartime 'lingers' on in
peace time, the rights jurisprudence appears to 'bounce back' during peacetime," but suggesting that
"as long as the war on terror continues in a severity comparable to previous wars, we should see a
sharp turn to the right in ordinary civil rights and liberties decisions of the Court."); Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REv. 605, 610 (2003) ("critiqu[ing]
accounts of emergency that posit a ratchet effect, in which a succession of emergencies produce a
unidirectional, and irreversible, increase in some legal or political variable.").
376. The last few years have witnessed a slew of terrorist attacks around the world. In October
2002, nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia, killed 202 people. Cleric Convicted of Conspiring in
Bali Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A5. That same month more than 100 hostages died in
a Moscow theater that had been seized by Chechen guerillas. Steven Lee Myers, Hostage Drama in
Moscow: Russia Responds; Putin Vows Hunt for Terror Cells Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2002, at Al. In May 2003, suicide bombers killed 45 in Casablanca, Morocco. Whitlock, supra
note 153, at A10. In November 2003, bombs killed 57 and wounded more than 700 in Istanbul,
Turkey. Id. In March 2004, bombs set off in commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed 191 and
wounded more than 1800. Id. In September 2004, 331 died, including 186 children, in Beslan,
Russia, after their school was seized by Chechen guerillas. C.J. Chivers, 11 Months Later, Russian
School Siege Claims New Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A4. In October 2004, a series of
bombings killed 34 at or near the resort town of Taba, Egypt. Greg Myre & Mona El-Naggar,
Attacks in Egypt: Terrorism; Death Toll Rises in Egyptian Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, §
1, at 1. On July 23, 2005, three bombs in the Red Sea resort of Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, killed 64.
Greg Myre & Mona El-Naggar, It's Too Soon to Assign Responsibility for Bombings, Authorities in
Egypt Contend, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at A9. Bombings have also occurred in London, Eng-
land. On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers killed 52 in London. Elaine Sciolino, Bombings in
London: Intelligence; Europe Confronts Changing Face of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at
Al. Two weeks later, on July 21, 2005, there was a second attack in which the bombs did not ex-
plode. Id.
377. REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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ABSTRACT
On July 1, 2000, Colorado's Deferred Deposit Loan Act (DDLA) became
effective. This law regulates a small, short-term, high-cost form of con-
sumer loan commonly called a "'payday" loan. With the DDLA 's enact-
ment, the office of the Administrator of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, the state agency with regulatory oversight of the payday loan in-
dustry in Colorado, began collecting and studying data from Colorado
payday lenders concerning their loans and the consumers who obtain
them. This article reports on the results of that study. It (1) briefly ex-
plains payday loan mechanics and its origins; (2) discusses the advent of
modern payday lending, including initial regulation and the events sur-
rounding the DDLA's enactment; (3) examines the growth of and
changes in the payday lending industry in Colorado; (4) turns to the
study itself, including statistical analyses of consumer demographics,
loan terms and finance charges, and consumers' utilization of payday
loans and relationship of such utilization to lenders' revenues; and (5)
offers some suggested changes to the DDLA.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 2000, Colorado Gov. Bill Owens signed into law Sen-
ate Bill (SB) 00-144, the Deferred Deposit Loan Act (DDLA). This act,
codified as Article 3.1 of Colorado's Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
§§ 5-1-101, et seq., C.R.S. 2004 (Code), regulates a small, short-term,
high-cost form of consumer loan called a "deferred deposit loan"', also
commonly called a "postdated check" or "payday" loan.2
Since the DDLA's enactment, the office of the Administrator of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code3 has been collecting and studying data
from Colorado payday lenders concerning their loans and the consumers
who obtain them. This article reports on the results of that study, repre-
senting the first four and one-half years of experience under the DDLA.
From this, it is hoped that policy makers, regulators, and others can de-
termine whether the DDLA is fulfilling its purposes and meeting Colo-
rado consumers' needs.
I first present a brief primer on the mechanics of payday lending
(Part I) and its history (Part II). I then discuss the advent of modern pay-
day lending in Colorado and initial attempts to regulate it (Part III), pro-
viding the historical context for the Code's 2000 revision and passage of
SB 00-144 (Part IV). After examining the growth of and changes in the
payday lending industry in Colorado (Part V), I turn to the Administra-
tor's study (Part VI). I explain the study and its methodology and then
present its results. These results include statistical analyses of consumer
demographics, loan terms and finance charges, and consumers' utiliza-
tion of payday loans and relationship of such utilization to lenders' reve-
nues. Finally, based on my observations from these results, I offer some
1. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-102(3) (2005).
2. See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 9, 9 n.34 (2002); JEAN ANN FOX, THE GROWTH OF LEGAL LOAN SHARKING: A
REPORT ON THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 1 (1998),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/The_Growth-of LegalLoanSharking_1998.pdf (listing various
names for payday loans).
3. The Administrator is the administrative agency vested with regulatory authority to enforce
compliance with the Code, including the DDLA. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-6-104 (2005). See
generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-6-101 to -116 (2005). The Administrator is appointed by the
Attorney General and the agency is created and exists within the Department of Law. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 5-6-103 (2005).
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suggested changes to the DDLA to correct deficiencies arising from its
current structure (Part VII).
I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON PAYDAY LENDING
First, what, exactly, is a payday loan? This type of loan is a small,
single-advance, single-payment, short-term, and high-cost loan. As de-
scribed by the Federal Reserve Board, a payday loan is a credit transac-
tion
in which a cash advance is made to a consumer in exchange for the
consumer's personal check, or in exchange for the consumer's au-
thorization to debit the consumer's deposit account, and where the
parties agree either that the check will not be cashed or deposited, or
that the consumer's deposit account will not be debited, until a desig-
nated future date.
4
The DDLA similarly defines a "deferred deposit loan" as a con-
sumer loan in which the lender advances money to the borrower and in
return accepts from the consumer an "instrument," such as a check or
authorization to debit the consumer's bank account, in the amount of the
advance plus allowable finance charges.5 The lender agrees not to cash
the check or debit the account for the term of the loan.6
The DDLA limits the principal amount of the loan to no more than
$500. 7 The term of the loan may not exceed forty days.8 The DDLA
allows the lender to charge a maximum finance charge of up to 20% of
the first $300 of principal, and up to 7.5% of any principal amount in
excess of $300.9 Thus, the maximum allowable DDLA finance charge
for a maximum loan amount of $500 is $75. The "cost" of a typical
$300, two-week loan with a DDLA finance charge of $60, expressed as
an "annual percentage rate" (APR), is slightly over 520%.' 0 See Table 1.
At the end of the loan's term, i.e., when repayment of the loan, in-
cluding both principal and finance charge, is due, the consumer may pay
4. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I § 226.2(a)(14)(2) (2005). 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 is Federal Reserve
Board Regulation Z (Reg. Z), the primary regulation implementing the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (2005). See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2005). Supplement I to Reg. Z
is the Federal Reserve Board's Official Staff Commentary (OSC), which is the vehicle by which the
Federal Reserve Board's staff issues interpretations of TILA and Reg. Z. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226,
supp. I § 1 (2005) [hereinafter Supplement I].
5. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-102(3), (4) (2005) (defining "deferred deposit loan" and
"instrument," respectively).
6. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-102(3)(b), 103 (2005).
7. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-106(1) (2005).
8. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-103 (2005).
9. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-105 (2005).
10. The DDLA requires the same loan disclosures as is required with any other consumer loan
under the Code, TILA, and Reg. Z. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-103 (2005).
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Table 1: The "Cost" of a Typical Two-Week Loan (*Based Upon a
Fourteen-Day Loan Term)






this amount to the lender and redeem the instrument, or the lender may
negotiate the instrument. 1
Alternatively, the consumer may "renew" the loan for an additional
period of time by paying another DDLA finance charge.1 2  Typically,
both the finance charge for and loan term of the renewed loan are the
same as with the original loan. For example, let us take a fourteen-day,
$300 loan with a $60 finance charge. On day fourteen - the loan's due
date - the lender typically will allow the consumer to renew the loan for
an additional fourteen days by paying the $60 finance charge, with an-
other $60 finance charge due at the end of the second fourteen-day term.
11. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-103, 108(3), 111 (2005). For other descriptions of payday
loan mechanics, see, for example, Ex parte Speedee Cash of Ala., Inc., 806 So. 2d 389, 390 (Ala.
2001) (describing payday loans as loans where, in return for a cash advance, the borrower gives a
check to the lender in the amount of the advance plus an additional charge, and the lender agrees not
to deposit the check until some later date, at which time either the borrower may redeem the check
by paying its face amount or the lender presents the check for payment). See also Charles A. Bruch,
Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest
Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (2001); Lisa Blaylock Moss,
Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51
ALA. L. REv. 1725, 1728-30 (2000); Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Con-
sumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current
Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REv. 589, 600-605 (2000);
Scott A. Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C.
BANKING INST. 339, 341-342 (2001); ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF
CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 7.5.5 (3d ed. 2005); Fox, supra note
2, at 1-2.
12. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(2) (2005). "Renewals" are also commonly called
"rollovers" or "refinances." See, e.g., Schaaf, supra note 11, at 342 (using the term "rollovers");
LAURA E. UDIS, REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE REVISION COMMITTEE AND
ACTIONS OF THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON CONSUMER CREDIT 23-24 (1999) [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE UCCC] (using the term "refinances"). However, the term "rollover" also refers to
the practice, discussed infra Part VIE, whereby a consumer pays cash to pay off a loan in full on its
due date, but then immediately receives a new loan, typically for the same amount and for a similar
term. See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(3) (2005) (indicating that once the consumer com-
pletes the transaction by paying off the first loan, the consumer may enter into a new loan). Al-
though not a true "renewal" in the DDLA refinance sense of the term, the net economic effect to the
consumer of this latter type of "rollover" is the same as a renewal - for the net payment of the first
loan's finance charge, the consumer extends the payment of the principal amount for another term.
See infra Part VI.E. So as to avoid confusion, I limit my use of the term "renewal" to its statutory
definition in COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-3.1-108; I use the term "rollover" to refer generically to loan
"extensions" in manners other than true DDLA renewals.
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Then, on day twenty-eight, the renewed loan's due date, the consumer
may pay the loan off in full by paying $360, i.e., the $300 principal plus
the second $60 finance charge.
The DDLA prohibits a lender from renewing a payday loan at the
high DDLA finance charge rate more than once. 13 At the end of the re-
newal term, either (1) the consumer must pay the loan in full (whether by
paying cash to redeem the instrument or through the lender's negotiating
the instrument)14; or (2) the lender may refinance the loan as a regular
supervised loan under the Code at rates applicable to such loans.'5
Although the DDLA limits to one the number of renewals, it does
not contain any limits as to the number of times a lender may "rollover"'
16
the loan by extending a new loan to the consumer immediately after the
consumer pays off the prior loan. To illustrate using the prior example,
on day twenty-eight, the consumer pays off the renewed loan by paying
the lender $360. Immediately, the lender extends to the consumer a new
$300, fourteen-day loan, with a $60 finance charge. These types of
"rollover" transactions are variously called "touch and go," "back-to-
back," "same-day advance," "same day buy-backs," or "same day as
payoff.'
17
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PAYDAY LENDING
Payday lending is not new. Rather, it is merely a recent incarnation
of a form of credit transaction that has existed for over a hundred years.
Its roots are directly traceable to the "wage assignment," "salary buying,"
or "salary lending" transactions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.18 In these types of transactions, a lender would "buy" at a dis-
13. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(1) (2005).
14. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(3) (2005).
15. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(4) (2005). A "supervised loan" is a consumer loan
with an APR in excess of 12%. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-1-301(47) (2005). The Code generally
limits non-DDLA supervised loan interest rates to no more than 36% APR, but allows alternative
finance charges for certain small installment loans. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-201(2), 214
(2005).
16. See supra note 12 (describing "rollovers").
17. See, e.g., Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 601 (discussing "touch and go" transac-
tions); JEAN ANN FOX & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: How BANKS
HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 15 (2001),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf (discussing "touch and go" transactions); Mi-
chael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 156 (2004) (discussing "same-day ad-
vance" transactions); KEITH ERNST ET AL., QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY
PAYDAY LENDING 3-4 (2003), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy
121803.pdf (discussing "back-to-back" transactions).
18. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 618-20 (describing wage assignment transac-
tions); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 2.5, at 39, § 7.5.5.1, at 292 (observing that the market
for small, short-term loans has come full circle from turn-of-the-century "salary lenders" to present-
day payday lenders). See also Bruch, supra note 11, at 1267-68, 1270 (tracing history of payday
loans); Moss, supra note 11, at 1731 (describing payday lending as a "modem day version of con-
sumer abuses practiced at the beginning of the Twentieth Century"). A recent paper traces payday
lending's roots to several thousand years ago. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson,
Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military
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count the borrower's next expected wage payment. For example, a
lender would pay a borrower $20 in return for receiving the borrower's
$24 wage payment due two weeks later.' 9 Lenders claimed that these
types of transactions were not loans and therefore not subject to applica-
ble usury laws. 20 However, the courts had no trouble piercing the lend-
ers' veils of form and routinely held these transactions were loans and
the lenders' schemes merely devices to conceal usury.2'
III. THE EMERGENCE OF PAYDAY LENDING IN COLORADO AND EARLY
REGULATION
Modem payday lending emerged in the early 1990s. 22 In Colorado,
it commenced formally in June 1992. Some time prior to then, the Ad-
ministrator became aware of what were then being called "deferred pre-
sentment" check cashing transactions.23 Check cashers, who typically
cash third-party checks for consumers for a fee,24 started offering to con-
sumers a different type of "check cashing" transaction. In these transac-
tions, the check casher advanced money to the consumer in exchange for
receiving the consumer's personal check in the amount of the advance
plus an additional sum. Often, the consumer's check was post-dated;
regardless, the check casher agreed to defer presentment of the check for
a period of time, typically two weeks, after the advance. In Administra-
tive Interpretation No. 3.104-9201,25 the Administrator concluded that
Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 14-15, available at
http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/publications/pdf/peterson military.pdf).
19. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 618-19 (describing "5 for 6 boys" and similar
schemes); Bruch, supra note 11, at 1267-68; RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 2.2.3.1, at 15.
20. See Bruch, supra note 11, at 1267-68.
21. See, e.g., Gibbs-Hargrave Shoe Co. v. Peek, 103 So. 672, 673-74 (Ala. 1925) (finding that
the purchase and assignment of wages was a loan subject to small loan law); Hinton v. Mack Pur-
chasing Co., 155 S.E. 78, 80 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930) (indicated that wage assignment was a cover for a
usurious loan); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 152 S.E. 289, 291 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930) (holding that the
"sale" of $20 for $24 in wages payable in two weeks was a usurious loan); State ex rel. Smith v.
McMahon, 280 P. 906, 908 (Kan. 1929) (finding that assignments of wages were usurious loans);
Martin v. Pac. Mills, 158 S.E. 831, 832 (S.C. 1931) (finding that the sale of wages was a usurious
loan). See also Pub. Fin. Corp. of Lynchburg v. Londeree, 106 S.E.2d 760, 767 (Va. 1959) (noting
that the enactment of small loan laws was to eliminate the "evil of salary buying and other extortion-
ate schemes"). The Code expressly prohibits "wage assignments" and deems these transactions
loans. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-206 (2005). Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
similar type of transaction, involving the purported "purchase and assignment" at a discount of
anticipated income tax reflnds, was a disguised usurious loan subject to the Code. See Colorado ex
rel. Salazar v. Cash Now Store, Inc., 31 P.3d 161, 163-64, 167 (Colo. 2001).
22. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 11, at 1270; Schaaf, supra note 11, at 339. See also Barr,
supra note 17, at 149, 149 n.109 (noting few occurrences of the term "payday loan" prior to 1994 in
a search of a Nexis database).
23. See Administrative Interpretation NO. 3.104-9201, 1-2 (June 23, 1992) (Adm'r Colo.
Uniform Consumer Credit Code) (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Admin.
Interpretation No. 3.104-9201 ].
24. Colorado does not regulate check cashing. See id. at 1 (indicating that the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code ("Code") applies to "check cashing transactions" only if the transaction involves
an extension of credit).
25. Id.
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these transactions were extensions of credit governed by the Code.26 She
held that the Code's minimum finance charge provision, which allowed a
lender to charge a finance charge of no more than $25 regardless of the
resulting APR,2 7 applied to these transactions.28  However, she further
concluded that, if the transaction's resultant APR exceeded 12%, then the
check casher must be licensed as a supervised lender and must comply
with the Code's other provisions, such as those regulating loan disclo-
sures.29 Thus officially began modern payday lending in Colorado.30
26. Id. at 1-2.
27. See 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 391. The enactment of the DDLA made the Code's minimum
finance charge provision inapplicable to payday loans. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-201(7), 5-3.1-
108(4) (2005).
28. Admin. Interpretation No. 3.104-9201, supra note 23, at 4. Notably, the Indiana Supreme
Court held that, under Indiana's version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the Indiana Code's
"minimum finance charge" provision did not allow payday lending. See Livingston v. Fast Cash
USA, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 572, 576-77 (Ind. 2001). Indiana's version is significantly different from
Colorado's; the Indiana version omits the word "notwithstanding." Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-
2-201(7) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this section .. ") with
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(7) (2005) (omitting the "notwithstanding" phrase).
29. Admin. Interpretation NO. 3.104-9201, supra note 23, at 4-6.
30. Admin. Interpretation No. 3.104-9201 reflects a theme commonly seen in some lenders'
challenges to payday lending regulation - the disguising of the transaction as something other than a
loan so as to avoid application of usury and other consumer credit protection laws. While a thorough
discussion of the many artifices that have been used to disguise payday loans is beyond the scope of
this article, I present a brief synopsis.
Similar to what the Administrator faced, initially some payday lenders claimed their
transactions were non-credit, deferred "check cashing" transactions, with the fees merely "check
cashing" fees and not "finance" charges. The two seminal cases rejecting these claims are Hamilton
v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Ky. 1997), and Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tennes-
see, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (M.D. Tenn. 1999). See Hamilton, 987 F. Supp at 955-58; Turner, F.
Supp. 2d at 1047-49, 1052. Both courts applied basic "substance over form" maxims of usury
jurisprudence to hold that "deferred presentment" check cashing transactions were loans subject to
TILA and state usury laws. See id. In a Mar. 2000 amendment to the OSC, the Federal Reserve
Board removed any doubt that such deferred "check cashing" transactions are credit transactions
under TILA. See 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129 (Mar. 31, 2000) (publishing Supplement I § 226.2(a)(14)-2).
Significantly, the Federal Reserve Board emphasized that the amendment did "not represent a
change in the law." 65 Fed. Reg. at 17,130.
Other devices used to disguise payday loans include (1) making the loan under the guise
of the "sale" of an item, such as catalog merchandise, see, e.g., Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v.
Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1376 (S.D. Ga. 2000), Austin v. Alabama Check Cashers Ass'n, Nos.
1011907 & 1011930, 2005 WL 3082884, at *2 (Ala. Nov. 18, 2005); advertisements, see, e.g.,
Henry v. Cash Today, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 566, 568 (S.D. Tex. 2000); merchandise or gift certificates,
see, e.g., New York ex rel. Spitzer v. JAG NY, LLC, 794 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (App. Div. 2005);
Internet service or access contracts, see, e.g., Short on Cash.Net of New Castle, Inc. v. Dep't of Fin.
Insts., 811 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. NCCS Loans,
Inc., No. COA04-1660, 2005 WL 2848029 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005); pre-paid telephone cards,
see, e.g., Austin, 2005 WL 3082884, at *6, JAG GA, LLC v. Oxendine, No. 2004-CV-3197-6 (Ga.
Super. Ct. May 5, 2005) (judgment affirming administrative cease and desist order); and so-called
"sale/leaseback" transactions, see, e.g., Indus. Loan Comm'r v. Edwards Fin. Servs., Inc., No.
1998CV02055 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2002) (granting summary judgment); see also SAL Leasing,
Inc. v. State ex rel. Napolitano, 10 P.3d 1221, 1224-26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
sale/leaseback transaction was a disguised car loan). See generally Johnson, supra note 2, at 18-2 1;
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 604, 643-44; RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, §§ 7.5.5.4-.6.
Another method used by some payday lenders to circumvent state usury or other con-
sumer credit laws is to partner with a national bank or other federally-insured depository institution.
Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 17, at 15. In these so-called "rent-a-bank" arrangements, no pre-
tense is made as to whether the transaction is a loan. See id. (indicating that the "typical payday
loan-bank arrangement involves loans made over the counter at the non-bank company's location")
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As is seen, it was the Code's "minimum finance charge" provision 31
that allowed the lawful birth of payday lending in Colorado. Applying
this provision to authorize these types of transactions was, perhaps, an
unintended consequence of the provision, unforeseen at the time of the
Code's original enactment in 197 1.32
Accordingly, because payday lending did not exist (at least, not le-
gally) when the Code was first enacted, the Code's requirements were
unsuited for many of the issues peculiar to payday loans. For example,
(emphasis added). Instead, the payday lenders claim that the banks are the true lenders of the loan
and that they act merely as agents for the banks. See id. at 15-16. Since, the argument goes, the
banks are the true lenders, the banks may preempt local state usury laws under the interest rate
exportation powers, see id, provided by, for example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831d (2000), or National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000), see, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.),
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737-41, 747 (1996); Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha
Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 313-15 (1978). Thus, the payday lenders/"agents" argue the loan is not
subject to state usury limits or other state payday loan laws. See FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note
17, at 15-16. To date, with one exception the courts have rejected the "rent-a-bank" device. In-
stead, they have held that whether or not the bank is the true lender, or merely a straw man inserted
into the transaction to circumvent state consumer credit law, is an issue analyzed under traditional
"substance over form" usury jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d
1333, 1346-1351 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (rejecting a preemption challenge against a state law prohibiting
non-bank payday lenders from partnering with banks and using the "rent-a-bank" device where the
non-bank payday lender was the "de facto" lender), affid, 411 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 2005); Goleta
Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717-18 (E.D.N.C. 2002) (noting that whether a non-
bank payday lender, who partnered with a national bank, was the "de facto" lender was a sharp
factual dispute and such a finding would preclude the non-bank from relying upon the federal pre-
emption/exportation powers applicable to the bank); Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1284-85 (D. Colo. 2002) (holding that a non-bank payday lender agent
of national bank could not rely upon National Bank Act to remove to federal court the state's regula-
tory action against it). Butsee Hudson v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002 WL
1205060, at *4, 6-7 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (expressly eschewing the "substance over form" analysis and
relying on loan documents to hold that bank was the true lender, thus preempting plaintiff's state law
usury claims against the non-bank payday lender agent). See generally Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra
note 17, at 14-20; Barr, supra note 17, at 150-51; Johnson, supra note 2, at 105-16; RENUART &
KEEST, supra note 11, §§ 3.13, 7.5.5.7.
Similar to the Georgia law involved in Bankwest, supra, and in part to combat the "rent-a-
bank" device, the DDLA regulates not just the "true" lender, but also the lender's agent or other
arranger of the loan. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-102(5)(a) (2005). Thus, all payday loans made
using a non-bank agent or arranger must comply with the DDLA's substantive provisions, regardless
of whether or not the "true" lender is a bank or similar federally insured depository institution. For
example, at issue in Salazar, supra, was whether the DDLA's licensing requirement and one-
renewal limit applied to a non-bank agent of a national bank and the loans made through the agent.
See Salazar, 188 F.Supp. 2d at 1284. As part of a settlement reached in the case, the non-bank agent
agreed to become licensed and refund $1.3 million in excess finance charges by reason of violating
the one-renewal limit. See Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 01CV3739
(Denver Dist. Ct. May 6, 2002) (entering consent decree); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, §
3.13.2, at 116 n.740. In regulating not just the "true" lender but also the lender's agent/arranger and
all loans made through the agent/arranger, the DDLA is similar to other "loan arranger" statutes,
such as those in Maryland and Massachusetts. See Fox & MIERzwlNSKI, supra note 17, at 21-22.
Expectedly, most payday loan law circumvention devices occur in states whose legal
environment is hostile to payday lending. See BankWest, Inc. v. Oxendine, 598 S.E.2d 343, 348
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004), reconsideration denied, (Apr. 6, 2004), cert. denied, (Sept. 7, 2004) (observing
that a non-bank agent used the "rent-a-bank" arrangement only in states where payday lending was
illegal).
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
32. See 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 770-852 (enacting Uniform Consumer Credit Code). See also
Livingston, 753 N.E.2d at 576-77 (indicating that the Uniform Consumer Credit Code did not an-
ticipate short term payday loans).
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the Code did not regulate (1) maximum or minimum payday loan
amounts; (2) the numbers of payday loans a consumer could have out-
standing with one lender at any one time; (3) the imposition, besides the
finance charge, of other charges or fees that might be permitted under the
Code, such as deferral or delinquency charges; and (4) a payday lender's
charging the consumer a check cashing fee where the lender paid the
loan proceeds in the form of a check to the consumer. There was con-
cern among various stakeholders, including policy makers, industry
members, and others, that the nature of payday lending required more
regulation than the Code then provided.33
A matter of particular concern involved "loan splitting." As men-
tioned, the then-Code's minimum finance charge provision allowed a
lender to charge a minimum finance charge of $25, regardless of the re-
sultant APR.34 Relying upon this provision, some payday lenders
quickly saw an opportunity to increase the finance charges they collected
by engaging in the practice of "loan splitting. 3 5 This practice involved a
lender making multiple, smaller payday loans to a consumer in place of
one larger loan in order to multiply the finance charges. For example,
rather than make a single $200 loan to a consumer and charge one allow-
able $25 finance charge, a lender would make two separate $100 loans
and charge two $25 finance charges - one for each loan - and double its
revenue.
36
Although the then-Code prohibited "loan splitting" "for the purpose
of obtaining a higher finance charge than would otherwise be permit-
ted, 37 because the provision spoke in terms of "purpose," there were
perceived difficulties in enforcing this provision in the case of payday
lending.38 For example, a payday lender might argue that the "purpose"
33. See generally Rule 7 Official Record (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen. pursuant
to COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8.1) (2005)).
34. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35. See Administrative Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, 1 (Aug. 5, 1996) (Adm'r Colo. Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code) (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Admin.
Interpretation No. 3.409-9601 ].
36. See id; Bellizan v. Easy Money of La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-2949, 2002 WL 1066750, at
*3, 9-10 (E.D. La. May 29, 2002) (payday lender engaged in "loan splitting" by splitting one loan
into smaller ones), vacated in part on reconsideration, 2002 WL 1611648 (E.D. La. July 19, 2002).
"Loan splitting" may take many forms. For example, in In Re First American Cash Advance, LLC
(Adm'r Colo. Uniform Consumer Credit Code Dec. 15, 2003) (assurance of discontinuance), the
Administrator resolved issues of a payday lender's "loan splitting" where the lender did not allow
spouses to obtain one large joint loan, but instead required them to obtain two smaller loans, one to
each spouse individually.
37. 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 247 (amending § 5-3-409, now codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-
3-205 (2005)). See also Admin. Interpretation No. 3.104-9201, supra note 23, at 5 (applying Code's
"loan splitting" prohibition to payday lending). I use the more descriptive "loan splitting" rather
than the Code's "multiple agreement" terminology.
38. See Admin. Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, supra note 35, at 1-2 (observing that a "loan
splitting" violation may depend upon lender's "purpose and intent," itself a fact specific inquiry).
But cf Bellizan, 2002 WL 1066750, at *9-10 (holding that payday lender's practice of "loan split-
ting" violated state law's "multiple agreements" prohibition without inquiring into subjective "pur-
pose").
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of splitting loans was not to obtain a higher total finance charge, but to
increase the collectability of the loans. That is, by holding two smaller
instruments from the consumer instead of one larger one, a lender might
claim it increased the probability that, upon the loans' maturity, at least
one of the instruments would clear the consumer's bank. Thus, a payday
lender might attempt to circumvent the Code's "loan splitting" prohibi-
tion.
To address the "loan splitting" issue and some of the other Code de-
ficiencies vis-A-vis payday lending, in 1993 the Administrator promul-
gated Uniform Consumer Credit Code Rule 7.39 Essentially, Rule 7 cre-
ated a rebuttable presumption in the lender's favor that, so long as the
lender met a number of express conditions prescribed in the Rule, it
could make and have outstanding at any one time with a consumer up to
two payday loans - i.e., engage in limited "loan splitting" - without run-
ning afoul of the Code's "loan splitting" prohibition.40  Among these
conditions were that the lender, "or any person related to such lender by
common ownership or control, or in whom such lender has any financial
interest," could not (1) charge a finance charge greater than the lesser of
(a) 25% of the face amount of the consumer's post-dated check, or (b)
$25; (2) exceed an aggregate amount of $500 for the two outstanding
payday loans; (3) refinance or repay a payday loan with the proceeds of
another payday loan; (4) impose any other charges permitted under the
Code in connection with a payday loan other than the loan's finance
charge; and (5) charge a check cashing fee if it issued the loan proceeds
in the form of a check.4'
Although Rule 7 helped to alleviate some of the deficiencies in, and
provided both needed guidance to the industry and additional consumer
protections absent from the Code,42 from its outset it was more or less a
"stop-gap" measure. As some said during the Rule's rulemaking hear-
ings, what was needed was a statutory "fix." 43 Further, Rule 7 proved
difficult in its application, requiring the Administrator several years later
to issue a clarifying interpretation. 44 Compounded by the significant rise
in the number of payday lenders over the latter half of the decade,45 it
39. See 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 902-1 (1993). See Notice of Rulemaking, Proposed Regula-
tions, and Attorney General Opinions, COLO. REG., Jan. 10, 1993, at 16-42 to -43. See also Admin.
Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, supra note 35, at 1-5. Rule 7 was repealed with the DDLA's enact-
ment See 4 CODE COLO. REGS. § 902-1 (2000).
40. See 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 902-1 (1993); Admin. Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, supra
note 35, at 1-2.
41. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 902-1 (1993) (Rule 7 repealed Nov. 1, 2000).
42. Id. ("Statement of Basis, Purpose, and Statutory Authority").
43. See Summary of the Rulemaking Hearing for Multiple Agreements and Post Dated
Checks 1-2 (Feb. 3, 1993); Notes on the Council of Advisors on Consumer Credit Meeting 2-3
(Dec. 11, 1992). Both of these documents are part of the Rule 7 Official Record (on file with Office
of the Colo. Att'y Gen.).
44. See Admin. Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, supra note 35, at 2-5.
45. See infra, Part V.
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became apparent that neither Rule 7 nor the Code adequately provided
the necessary structure desired by payday lenders, consumers, and regu-
lators.
IV. THE CODE'S 2000 REVISION AND ENACTMENT OF THE DDLA
At a February 1, 1999, meeting of the Commission on Consumer
Credit,46 while discussing a bill to deregulate the Code, the Commission
unanimously passed a motion to rewrite the Code completely during the
General Assembly's 2000 session.47 Subsequently, the Attorney General
ordered the creation of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Revision
Committee (Committee).48 The Committee's mandate was to make rec-
ommendations for and draft legislation rewriting the Code, taking "due
consideration for, and balanc[ing]," the protection of consumers from
"financially detrimental or unfair" transactions on one hand, and legiti-
mate and scrupulous creditors from "unnecessary governmental regula-
tion" that puts them at a "competitive disadvantage" on the other.49 As
stated by the Attorney General, the impetuses for this wholesale rewrite
of the Code were the "technological developments, the widespread and
rapid availability of credit, and the development of creative and new
credit practices since 1971 when the [Code was first adopted] ...
This included such practices as payday lending.
The Committee consisted inter alia of representatives of both credi-
tor and consumer interests.51 As part of its mandate, it specifically con-
sidered and addressed payday lending.52  During its consideration of
payday lending issues, the Committee expanded its membership to in-
clude representatives of the payday lending industry.
53
The discussion of payday lending issues itself required several
Committee meetings. 54 The Committee considered such things as "loan
splitting," posting of fees, the applicability of civil bad check penalty
laws, permissible finance charges, and limits on renewals.55 Although
the Committee could not reach consensus on some critical payday lend-
ing issues, such as the maximum allowable finance charge or numbers of
renewals (if any),56 it unanimously agreed that a comprehensive payday
46. The Commission, created by 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 850 (enacting § 73-6-401, later
renumbered as § 5-6-401), was the "policy-making body for purposes of implementing" the Code.
Id. The General Assembly dissolved the Commission in the Code's 2000 revision.
47. See REPORT OF THE UCCC, supra note 12, at 2; Minutes of Meeting, Commission on
Consumer Credit, Feb. 1, 1999 (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.).
48. See Att'y Gen. Admin. Order 1999-4 (Colo. Att'y Gen. Apr. 27, 1999).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See REPORT OF THE UCCC, supra note 12, at 3, 29.
52. Id. at 3, 20-25.
53. Id. at 3, 29.
54. Id. at 3.
55. Id. at 21-25.
56. Id. at 22-24.
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loan law should be incorporated as a single article of a revised Code.57
The Committee finished its work in November 1999; its efforts resulted
in a proposed comprehensive revised Code draft, including a fully-
integrated article regulating payday loans.58
Meanwhile, during the summer of 1999, the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC) sponsored a conference for, and attended by,
state legislators from a number of states, including Colorado. 59 At this
conference, representatives of the payday lending industry pitched an
industry model payday loan law they hoped the attendees would take
back to their respective state legislatures. 60  As a result of this confer-
ence, the industry model bill was brought back to Colorado to be intro-
duced in the upcoming 2000 legislative session.
At this time, the Colorado legislative sponsors of the proposed bill
apparently were unaware of the Committee or its mandate; in particular,
they were unaware of the Committee's efforts to craft payday loan legis-
lation. Unlike the Committee's proposal, the industry model bill was a
stand-alone law. 61 Although contemplated as a separate part of the Code,
it made no references to the Code and did not include such basic provi-
sions as licensing, regulation, or examination, by an agency with regula-
tory and compliance oversight, of payday lenders.
Before the proposed industry bill was introduced, in late December
1999 (after the Committee's work had finished) one of the bill's sponsors
contacted the Administrator to advise her of the planned bill.62 Thus
aware of two potentially competing payday loan bills in the same legisla-
tive session, the Attorney General's office (the prime mover behind the
Committee's effort), decided to eliminate the payday loan provisions
from the Committee's contemplated Code revision.63 Instead, it worked
with the sponsors and the legislative drafting office to conform the indus-
try bill into something that would comport with the revised Code and
payday loan regulation, as the Committee had envisioned it.64 However,
much like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole, the initial draft of
57. Id. at21.
58. See Draft Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code, §§ 5-2-401 to 5-2-409 in Appendix,
REPORT OF THE UCCC (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Draft U.C.C.C.].
59. ALEC's goals are "[t]o promote the principles of federalism by developing and promoting
polices that reflect the Jeffersonian principles" of government and "[to enlist state legislators from
all parties ...who share ALEC's mission." Am. Legis. Exchange Couns., Mission Statement,
http://www.alec.org/about/mission-statement.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
60. See, e.g, Show Me the Money: A Survey of Payday Lenders and Review of Payday
Lender Lobbying in State Legislatures, http://uspirg.org/reports/paydayloans2000/showmethemoney
final.PDF (showing that the payday loan industry has actively lobbied state legislatures for laws it
deems favorable).
61. See Office of Legislative Legal Services, Colorado General Assembly, LLS 00-0610.01
(initial draft of the "Deferred Presentment Services Act," Dec. 20, 1999; this draft would have cre-
ated a new Part 7 to Title 5, Article 3 of the Code) (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.).
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the industry bill required major surgery to make it fit within the proposed
revised Code.65
The end result of these efforts was the introduction of two separate
bills: House Bill (HB) 00-1185, the culmination of the Committee's
work to revise comprehensively the Code, but without any payday loan
provisions; and SB 00-144, the separate payday loan bill, which upon
enactment would be a part of the revised Code. 66 However, and despite
the many changes, both pre- and post-introduction, to SB 00-144 to inte-
grate it into the Code, the result was not as perfect a fit as would have
been had the Committee's comprehensive revision instead been
adopted.67
One particularly contentious issue concerned the maximum allow-
able finance charge. As originally introduced, SB 00-144 provided for a
finance charge of 20% of the amount financed.68 While the industry
supported this figure, consumer advocates and others sought a lower
figure.69  The 20% figure survived the bill's debate in the Senate.
70
However, the House Business Affairs and Labor Committee subse-
quently amended the bill to lower the maximum finance charge to 15%.71
This figure was amended again, despite substantial dissent, during the
bill's second reading debate on the House floor to the finally enacted
version providing a "step" rate finance charge. 72 This compromise in-
corporated the industry's 20% finance charge rate for loans of $300 or
less, and a marginal rate of 7.5% for the next $200 in principal, yielding
a total maximum allowable finance charge rate of 15% for loan amounts
of the maximum allowable $500. 73  Significantly, the Commission, al-
65. See supra, Draft U.C.C.C. note 58.
66. HB 00-1185, 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (Colo. 2000) (repealing and reenacting the
Code in its entirety); SB 00-144, 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (Colo. 2000) (creating and adding
the DDLA as a new article to the Code.).
67. For example, the DDLA contains some perhaps superfluous repetition that did not exist in
the Committee's draft, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-115 (2005) (requiring same record keeping
and annual reporting as in COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-304 (2005)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-116
(2005) (requiring same licensure requirements as in COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-301 & 5-2-302
(2005)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-117 (2005) (providing for same compliance examinations and
investigations as in COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-305 (2005)). Additionally, whereas the Committee's
draft bill would have built upon Rule 7's loan splitting protections by specifically defining "lender"
to include any and all affiliates thereof, see Draft U.C.C.C., supra note 58 (§ 5-2-401(2), 5-2-
401(3)), SB 00-144 did not.
68. SB 00-144, 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (Colo. 2000).
69. See generally Hearings on SB 00-144 Before the Senate Business Affairs and Labor
Committee, 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (Jan. 31, 2000).
70. See Colo. S. Jour., 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess., at 197 (Feb. 1, 2000) (committee
report); id. at 268 (Feb. 11, 2000) (2d reading); id. at 299-300 (Feb. 14, 2000) (3d reading).
71. Colo. H. Jour., 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess., at 877-78 (Colo. Mar. 10, 2000) (com-
mittee report) [hereinafter House Journal]. See generally Hearings on SB 00-144 Before the House
Business Affairs and Labor Committee, 62d General Assembly 2d Sess. (Mar. 7, 2000).
72. See House Journal, supra note 71, at 1142-43 (Mar. 29, 2000) (2d reading amendment);
id., at 1146-47 (attempt to override amendment); see generally Hearings on SB 00-144 Before the
House Committee of the Whole (Mar. 29, 2000).
73. See COLO. REV. STAT. 5-3.1-105 (2005).
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though it could not reach consensus on an appropriate finance charge
figure, did not advocate a "step" rate.74
Ultimately, both bills became law, and the revised Code, including
the incorporated DDLA, became effective July 1, 2000. 75
V. THE GROWTH OF PAYDAY LENDING IN COLORADO
76
Over the last decade, Colorado has experienced a dramatic growth
in payday lending. This growth has occurred both in terms of (1) the
numbers of licensed lenders and their locations, and (2) total loan vol-
ume.
As of January 1, 1997, Colorado had 177 licensed payday loan loca-
tions. Over the next several years, growth was steady, but modest; as of
July 1, 2000, there were 212 licensed locations. Since July 1, 2000, the
effective date of the DDLA, growth has been nothing short of explosive.
As of January 1, 2005, there were 616 licensed payday loan locations in
Colorado. Further, over 80% of these locations obtained their licenses
after July 1, 2000. See Figure 1.
Mirroring the growth in numbers of payday lender locations, the in-
crease in total payday loan volume has been no less explosive. Total
payday loan volume for 1996 was $34 million. The next several years
saw steady growth, with total loan volume for 2000 of $106 million.
However, in 2001, the first full calendar year after the enactment of the
DDLA, volume jumped to $180 million; it has been mushrooming ever
since, totaling $368 million for 2004, the last full year for which data is
available.77 See Figure 2.
With this growth has come a change in the industry's complexion. Up
until the DDLA, most Colorado payday loan locations were stand-alone,
independent, and locally-owned "mom and pop" operations. However,
since the DDLA's enactment the industry has undergone a major con-
solidation. A number of national, out-of-state corporations
74. REPORT OF THE UCCC, supra note 12, at 22-23.
75. See 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 1257 (most provisions of the revised Code); id. at 444
(DDLA).
76. The data and figures reported in this section are derived principally from the Administra-
tor's Deferred Deposit Lenders Supervised Lenders' Annual Reports for the respective years, or
other records maintained by and publicly available from the Administrator. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-
2-304(2) requires every supervised lender (including payday lenders, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3. 1 -
115 (2005)) to file annual reports with the Administrator. The Administrator then prepares a com-
posite report consolidating the data received from the individual lenders' reports. The Administrator
does not audit or otherwise verify the information submitted by the individual lenders before includ-
ing it in her composite annual report.
77. Although an exploration of the reasons for the growth in payday lending is beyond the
scope of this article, a number of theories have been advanced, including (1) the deregulation of the
banking industry, (2) the absence of traditional small loan providers, and (3) the elimination of
interest rate caps. See generally Moss, supra, note I at 1732-33; Schaaf, supra, note 11, at 340-41.
No doubt, at least part of the growth since 2000 must be attributed to the friendly regulatory envi-
ronment created by the DDLA.
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Figure 2: Total annual payday loan volume.
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Table 2: The Ten Largest DDLA Licensees78 (as of Dec. 31, 2004)
Licensee # of Licenses
ACE Cash Express, Inc. 81
Advance America Cash Advance Centers
of Colorado, LLC
BN'T Loans, LLC 91
Check Into Cash of Colorado, Inc. 34
Monetary Management of California, Inc. 26
EZPawn Colorado, Inc. 25
Allied Cash Advance Colorado LLC 21
Valued Services of Colorado, LLC 20
Pawn One, Inc. 16
Checkmate of Colorado, Inc. 14
All Others 230
Total 616
78. ACE Cash Express, Inc., d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express, is a Texas corporation with
principal offices in Irving, Texas. It obtained its first licenses in Oct. 1992. By July 1, 2000, it
operated approximately 51 licensed locations. Although it subsequently cancelled its licenses,
resulting in the "rent-a-bank" litigation discussed supra, note 30, it reapplied for and received 53
new licenses, effective Nov. 2001. The number of ACE licenses in Table 2 does not include inde-
pendently-owned ACE franchise locations.
Advance America Cash Advance Centers of Colorado, LLC, d/b/a Advance America, is a
Delaware company with principal offices in Spartanburg, South Carolina. It obtained its first Colo-
rado license in June 1998 and, since July 1, 2000, has added 37 licensed locations.
BN'T Loans, LLC, is a Missouri corporation located in Springfield, Missouri. It opened
its first Colorado location in Feb. 2004. In Dec. 2004, the agent for BN'T, The Cigarette Store
Corp., d/b/a Smoker Friendly, d/b/a Gasamat, through whom BN'T made loans, obtained 45 licenses
for 45 locations in which it acted as BN'T agent. The figures in Table 2 includes the 45 licenses
held by BN'T's agent; BN'T itself had 46 licenses. Both BN'T and its agent cancelled their licenses
in Feb. 2005. This resulted in a drop of only a few points in the percentage of licenses held by the
ten largest licensees.
Check Into Cash of Colorado, Inc., d/b/a Check Into Cash, is a Colorado corporation with
principal offices in Cleveland, Tennessee. It opened its first location in Nov. 2000.
Monetary Management of California, Inc., d/b/a Loan Mart, is a California corporation
located in Berwyn, Pennsylvania. It first became licensed in Colorado in Sept. 2000. It is a subsidi-
ary of Dollar Financial Group, Inc., which in turn is a subsidiary of Dollar Financial Corp., a pub-
licly-traded company incorporated in Delaware with principal offices in Berwyn, Pennsylvania.
EZPawn Colorado, Inc., d/b/a EZMoney Payday Loans, is a Delaware corporation based
in Austin, Texas. It obtained its first Colorado license in June 2001.
Allied Cash Advance Colorado LLC, d/b/a Allied Cash Advance, is a Delaware company
with principal offices in Miami, Florida. It opened its first Colorado location in May 2003.
Valued Services of Colorado, LLC, d/b/a First American Cash Advance, is a Georgia
company based in Chattanooga, Tennessee. It obtained its licenses in May 2004, due to a change in
ownership of its predecessor entity, First American Cash Advance of Colorado, LLC. The predeces-
sor entity was a Tennessee company located in Cleveland, Tennessee, and first became licensed in
Colorado in Dec. 2000.
Pawn One, Inc., d/b/a Jumping Jack Cash, a Colorado corporation based in Westminster,
Colorado, is the only local company in the top ten. It obtained its current licenses beginning in
January 2004 (between Apr. 1997 and Jan. 1998, it briefly held a single license).
Checkmate of Colorado, Inc., d/b/a Checkmate Payday Loans and Check Cashing, is a
Nevada corporation with principal offices in Carlsbad, California. It opened its first Colorado li-
censed location in Aug. 2003.
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Figure 3: Ten largest DDLA licensees (as of Dec. 31, 2004).
either began doing business or expanded their operations in Colorado to
such an extent that they now dominate the market. As of December 31,
2004, the ten largest licensees accounted for nearly 63% (62.66%) of all
licensed locations, with the remaining licensed locations scattered among
some 109 separate, small sole proprietorships or companies.7 9 See Table
2 and Figure 3.
VI. THE STUDY, ITS METHODOLOGY OF DATA COLLECTION, AND ITS
RESULTS
A. The Databases and Data Collection Methodology
In July 2000, as part of their regular compliance examinations,"0 the
Administrator's staff began collecting various data from payday lenders
concerning their loans. This was done in part to provide insight into
payday lenders' lending practices and their consumers' borrowing habits,
79. This data seems to contradict the industry's position that payday loan outlets are "really
small businesses, not part of a [sic] enormous national industry scheme." Schaaf, supra, note 11, at
349.
80. Pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-305 (2005), the Administrator is authorized to con-
duct periodic compliance examinations of supervised lenders. These compliance examinations entail
reviewing the lender's "loans, business, and records". Id. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-117 (2005)
makes this compliance examination authority specifically applicable to payday lenders. This latter
section is another example of a DDLA "duplicative" provision that a comprehensive Code revision,
as envisioned by the Committee, likely would have eliminated. See supra, note 67.
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and thus facilitate a study and evaluation of the DDLA's efficacy.
Among the categories of loan data collected were: (1) the terms of the
loans being written, including the amount financed, the finance charge,
and the length of the loan; (2) whether, and how often, the loans were
renewed or "rolled over"; and (3) individual consumer borrowing infor-
mation, such as how many loans a particular consumer obtained or had
outstanding with a particular lender over the previous twelve month pe-
riod.
Additionally, beginning in July 2001, the staff started collecting
consumer demographic information. The staff culled this information
from the consumers' loan applications and income verification informa-
tion obtained by the lenders at the time of the consumer's first loan from
the lender. Among the demographic data collected were the consumer's
(1) age, (2) gender, (3) marital status, (4) monthly income, (5) job classi-
fication (e.g., professional, managerial, laborer, etc.), and (6) length of
time at current employment.
The staff recognized that the validity of any analysis of the data col-
lected depended upon the sampling from which the data was taken - that
is, the sample should be random. Accordingly, to assure randomness, for
loan data collection the staff selected for study a particular lender's thirty
most recent loan transactions preceding the date of that lender's compli-
ance examination. It is from these thirty loan transactions, and their re-
spective consumers' loan histories, that the examiners gathered informa-
tion concerning loan terms, renewals, and the consumers' borrowing
histories. The examiners gathered the same information from each set of
thirty most recent loans from whatever lender they happened to examine.
Thus, the database should not be skewed in any manner, such as by fa-
voring loans made (1) on particular dates or times of month, (2) by spe-
cific lenders or in particular geographic locations, or (3) to particular
consumer groups (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and the like).
Similar to the methodology used in collecting loan data, to assure
randomness in consumer demographic data the examiners selected for
study those consumers who applied for and obtained their first loan with
the lender being examined within the thirty days preceding the date of
the compliance examination. For manageability purposes, the examiners
limited the size of the sample of consumers per compliance examination
to thirty. That is, if more than thirty consumers obtained first loans from
the lender within the previous thirty days, then the sample was limited to
the most recent thirty consumers. In practice, because few lenders had
more than thirty new consumers in any thirty-day period, the examiners
rarely used this limitation.
The Administrator's staff continues to collect both loan and con-
sumer demographic data as part of their regular payday lender compli-
ance examinations. Accordingly, the databases are growing daily. How-
ever, for purposes of this article I use a database cut-off date of Decem-
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ber 31, 2004. As of this date, the Administrator's staff had amassed loan
data from over 22,000 separate loan transactions obtained during some
760 separate compliance examinations of 402 separate licensed payday
lender locations. Similarly, as of this date the consumer demographic
database consisted of over 10,000 separate entries collected during the
course of over 680 compliance examinations.8
Both databases can be analyzed from a variety of temporal perspec-
tives, such as calculating averages over the databases' entire lives or
from one particular point in time to another. In this way, the databases
can be used to discern trends over time in payday lending under the
DDLA. Most of the statistics in this paper are based on analyses of the
entire databases from their inception through the December 31, 2004,
cut-off. Whenever a statistic is based upon a particular temporal subset
of the databases, such as to spot trends, I so state.
82
B. Consumer Demographics
The "average" Colorado payday loan borrower is a thirty-six year-
old single woman, making $2,370 per month, employed as a laborer or
office worker and in her current job for about three and one-half years.
More specifically:
- The average age of a payday loan borrower is just over 35.8 years
old, with the average age between men and women nearly identical.
Borrowers are skewed towards the younger age groups, with almost
two-thirds - 62.41% - of all borrowers falling between the ages of
twenty to thirty-nine years old. Those 55 years or older comprise
7.42% of all borrowers, and those sixty-five years or older only
1.67%.
* Women make up more than half of all borrowers, 54.99% to
45.01% for men.
- Single borrowers outnumber married borrowers, 52.67% to
47.33%.
- The average borrower has worked at his or her current job for 3.49
years (3.57 years for men and 3.43 for women). However, nearly a
quarter - 22.07% - of all borrowers were employed at their current
jobs for less than six months.
81. The databases, appropriately redacted to remove any specific consumer or lender identify-
ing information, are available for public study upon request to the Administrator or Colorado Attor-
ney General's office.
82. Because not all lenders obtain identical consumer demographic information on their loan
applications, the sample size of this database varies depending upon the particular category of da-
tum. Further, where data in a particular category was not available from a particular lender, this was
not factored into the database. Accordingly, where averages are derived from the data, they are done
so only from samples where data was obtained.
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- The average monthly gross income for all borrowers is $2,373
($2,606 for men and $2,186 for women). Consumers earning less
than $2,500 per month comprised nearly two-thirds - 62.88% - of all
borrowers, and the median monthly gross income is $2,170.
The data also reveals a nearly inverse relationship between the bor-
rower's occupational category and monthly income, on one hand, and the
numbers of borrowers within that category, on the other. As shown by
Table 3, the majority of all borrowers - 62.80% - occupy the lowest three
income categories. Very few payday loan borrowers - from the database
sample, only twenty, or 0.24% - are "professionals," such as doctors,
lawyers, dentists, and the like, with average incomes in excess of
$50,000.83
C. Average Loan Terms
The "average" payday loan has the following characteristics:
- The average amount financed, or loan principal, is $285.36. This
figure has crept up slightly over time; for example, the average loan
amount during the 2003 calendar year was $283.20, and for 2004 was
$308.16.
- The average finance charge is $50.87. Here, too, the trend for this
figure seems to be on the rise; in 2003, the average finance charge
was $51.22, and in 2004 was $53.84.
- The average loan term is 16.63 days. However, slightly over 60%
(60.34%) of all loans are for fourteen days or less. These figures
have held fairly steady over time.
83. The study's consumer demographic data contrasts somewhat with that touted by the
industry. See, e.g., Schaaf, supra, note 11, at 348-49 (citing industry sources that claim the average
annual income is $33,000, with length of current employment at 4 years); see also, Community
Financial Services Association of America, Payday Advance Customer Profile,
http://www.cfsa.net/govrelat/pdf/Payday Advance Customer Profile.pdf (citing statistics showing
77% of borrowers have incomes greater than $25,000, with 25% greater than $50,000); Freedom of
Choice for Consumers: The Truth About Deferred Deposit Services - A Reasoned Response to the
CFA's Misrepresentations, http://www.fisca.orgddresponse.htm. (claiming average consumer has
income from $20,000 to $25,000 on the low side and $35,000 to $45,000 on the high side) [hereinaf-
ter Freedom of Choice for Consumers]. CFSA and FiSCA are the two leading national payday
lending trade associations. See Welcome to CFSA, http://www.cfsa.net ("CFSA is the only national
membership trade association [of the] Deferred Presentment industry", representing "approximately
two-thirds of this market"); Quick Facts About FiSCA, http://www.fisca.orglqa.htm ("FiSCA is a
national trade association that represents 5,000 neighborhood financial service centers); see also
Motion of Financial Service Centers of America, Inc. for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae at 1,
Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Colo. 2002) (No. 01-
D-1576) (FiSCA is the "largest voluntary trade association in the payday-loan industry"). At least
one commentator suggests the industry's data "should be treated with caution." Barr, supra, note 17,
at 153 n. 135. And, while military personnel represent less than 5% of all payday loan borrowers, a
recent paper suggests payday lenders disproportionately target military bases, including those in
Colorado, in which to set up shop and market their services. See Graves & Petersen, supra, note 18
at 93-97, 178-79.
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Table 3: Consumer Occupations












Benefits Recipient 1,358 8.76
Based on these averages, the average payday loan has an APR of
391.34%. There does not seem to be any particular trend for this fig-
ure; in 2003, the average APR was 398.76%, and in 2004 it was
381.56%.
Some statistics appear to be attributable directly to the DDLA's pe-
culiar two-tiered "step" rate finance charge limits. As previously men-
tioned, 4 the DDLA allows a maximum finance charge of 20% of the first
$300 of loan principal and 7.5% of the next $200 of principal, up to a
maximum loan amount of $500. Accordingly, the most profitable pay-
day loans, in terms of maximum allowable finance charges, are those
written for $300 or less. Above $300, the marginal rate of return dimin-
ishes significantly. See supra Table 1.
Not surprisingly, therefore, almost three-quarters - 72.93% - of all
payday loans are written for loan amounts of $300 or less. Indeed, the
most frequent single loan amount is exactly $300, accounting for nearly a
third - 29.92% - of all payday loans.
The DDLA's "step" rate system leads to potential problems. First,
as the data indicates these rates may encourage some lenders to "steer"
consumers to loans of $300 or less.
A more serious problem involves "loan splitting." 85 That is, some
lenders may require consumers, who may want a single, large loan above
the $300 threshold, to obtain two smaller loans under the $300 tier and
thereby realize a total finance charge in excess of what would be allow-
able with the single, large loan.
84. See supra, Part I.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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As discussed previously,8 6 "loan splitting" was a problem that ex-
isted under the pre-DDLA Code, in response to which the Administrator
promulgated Rule 7. However, rather than advance Rule 7's attempt to
combat "loan splitting," the DDLA's "step" rate structure statutorily cre-
ates an incentive for some lenders to engage in "loan splitting." Thus,
the DDLA seemingly brings the Code full circle back to its pre-Rule 7
days.
D. Finance Charge Rates and Competition - The "Race to the Bottom"
The payday loan industry in part justifies the high finance charges
and triple-digit interest rates associated with payday loans based on the
"huge" risks incurred with such loans; one industry paper pegs these
risks "typically at least seven to 10 times greater than banks are willing
to accept. '87 However, payday lenders' loss rate experience, as reported
to the Administrator by the lenders themselves, refutes this claim.
Specifically, for the years 1996 through 2004, payday lenders report
an average charge-off rate, or loss experience, of 3.34% of their total
loan volume.88 This loss rate compares favorably to commercial banks'
charge-off rates on consumer loans, as reported by the Federal Reserve
Board. For the same period, the charge-off rate for all consumer loans
made at commercial banks was 2.69%; for credit cards, it was 5.15%.89
The study also controverts the industry's claims of the role competi-
tive market forces play in determining finance charges. That is, a major
payday lending trade association has claimed that payday loan fees are
"set by competitive forces in the market." 90 However, the data does not
support this claim. Rather, competition among payday lenders appears to
86. See id.
87. Freedom of Choice for Consumers, supra, note 83; see also Schaaf, supra, note 11 at 349
(noting industry claims that rates are "proportional to the risk undertaken.").
88. See Annual Reports described supra, note 76. As part of their annual reports, payday
lenders are required to report their total volume of loans charged off. The loss experience is ex-
pressed as the ratio of total charge-offs to total loan volume. The charge-off ratio ranged from a low
of 2.28% in 2000 to a high of 4.14% in 2004. These figures are consistent with data reported else-
where. See, e.g., RENUART & KEEST, supra, note 11 § 7.5.5.2, at 294-95 (5.4% and 1.7% charge off
rates for two publicly-traded payday lenders); see also Bruch, supra, note 11, at 1279 n.243 (com-
paring payday lending charge-off rates with those of check cashers). Another publicly-traded pay-
day lender, Dollar Financial Corp., reported net charge-offs of 2.0% and 2. 1% in its quarterly results
for the quarters ending June 30 and Sept. 30, 2005, respectively. See Press Release, Dollar Financial
Corp. Announces Fiscal Fourth Quarter and Year End Results; Strong International Revenue Growth
of 25.5% and Total Revenue Growth of 21.5% Drive Results (Aug. 23, 2005), http://www.dfg.com
(follow "Investor Relations" hyperlink); Press Release, Dollar Financial Corp., Dollar Financial
Corp. Announces 2006 Fiscal First Quarter Results; Growth of 12.6% Drives Growth in Net Income
(Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.dfg.com (follow "Investor Relations" hyperlink).
89. See Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/chgallsa.htm (seasonally adjusted).
90. Freedom of Choice for Consumers, supra, note 83. This paper goes on to say these
"forces are already at work as is demonstrated by fee competition in many locales ... in this highly
competitive industry." Id.
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have little to do with what lenders charge consumers, and finance charge
amounts appear to be highly inelastic.
In particular, the study shows that in 89.27% of all loans, the loan's
finance charge was for the maximum amount, to the very penny, allowed
by the DDLA. Further, the trend over time shows a gravitation 9' by
lenders to charge the maximum allowable finance charge, with 91.70%
of all loans written in 2003 for the maximum charge. In 2004, that figure
rose to 92.75%.
Where there is any "competition" in finance charge pricing, it oc-
curs primarily in what can be characterized as "promotional" loans. For
example, some lenders offer discounts to consumers for the consumer's
very first loan; others will discount, for example, every tenth loan. Addi-
tionally, some lenders may offer discounts to consumers who refer new
business. Other than these types of "promotional" activities, very few
lenders regularly charge the consumer anything less than the maximum
the DDLA allows.92
Accordingly, it does not appear that competitive "market-place
forces" are what drive payday loan fees.93
E. The Consecutive Loan and Repeat Customer - the Lenders'Bread
and Butter
A common concern among consumer advocates and others involves
the so-called "debt treadmill" or "debt cycle" in which payday loan bor-
rowers often find themselves.94 That is, many consumers who take out a
91. Or, perhaps more accurately, a "levitation."
92. The study revealed that some lenders will round down to the nearest dollar the finance
charge on certain "odd-amount" loans (e.g., charging $71 instead of the maximum allowable $71.25
on a $450 loan). A few lenders charge a straight 15% finance charge regardless of the size of the
loan. However, as shown by the data, these instances are rare.
93. This result should not be surprising. Consumers who find it necessary to patronize pay-
day lenders likely are in dire financial straits. See Jackson v. Check 'N Go, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 544,
547 (N.D. 111. 2000) (observing that consumers would not borrow money from payday lenders, at
triple digit interest rates, unless "necessitous"); see also Taylor v. Halsted Fin. Serv., LLC, No. 99 C
2466, 2000 WL 33201925, *8-10 (N.D. 11. Jan. 13, 2000) (granting class certification in action
against payday lender where putative class members alleged to be "poor and unsophisticated or
financially necessitous"). Further, it long has been a paradigm of usury jurisprudence that necessi-
tous borrowers are willing "to concede whatever may be demanded or to promise whatever may be
exacted in order to obtain temporary relief from financial embarrassment." Hurt v. Crystal Ice &
Cold Storage Co., 286 S.W. 1055, 1056 (Ky. 1926); see also, Wilcox v. Moore, 93 N.W.2d 288, 291
(Mich. 1958) (noting purpose of usury laws "is to protect the necessitous borrower from extortion").
Thus, it may be inferred that consumers who, by reason of their financial circumstances, need pay-
day loans largely are rate insensitive. See also Bruch, supra note 11, at 1282-83 (noting because
payday loan consumers are often in dire financial straits with nowhere else to go, they are unable to
exercise meaningful choice and payday lenders enjoy a "captive market"); Drysdale, supra note 11,
at 662 and nn.442-44 (showing that justification for payday loans - that consumers face financial
emergencies with nowhere else to go - belies contention that market forces are at work); Schaaf,
supra note 11, at 344, 345 (noting that by reason of their financial situation, payday loan consumers
are not "price driven").
94. See, e.g., Drysdale, supra note 11, at 605-09 (reporting on "debt treadmill"); Barr, supra
note 17, at 157-58 (observing "debt trap" resulting from payday loans); Bruch, supra note 11, at
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payday loan are unable to pay off the loan in full on its due date. The
lenders will then allow the consumer to renew the loan for an additional
period of time by paying an additional finance charge. This cycle is re-
peated over and over, with the borrower continually renewing the loan
but never getting out from under the loan by paying it off completely. In
one seminal case, a consumer initially borrowed $300 and, after renew-
ing the loan numerous consecutive times over an eight month period, in
which she paid the lender a total of $840 in finance charges, ended up
defaulting on the loan.95
In what is perhaps the most striking aspect of the study is the con-
firmation that Colorado payday loan consumers also often find them-
selves trapped in a cycle of debt. This is true despite the DDLA's one-
renewal limit.96 Indeed, it is the "repeat" customer that accounts for the
overwhelming majority of the payday lender's loan volume and revenue,
i.e., its "bread and butter."
I start with the overall picture. According to the study, the average
payday loan consumer obtains 9.38 payday loans from the same lender
within any given twelve-month period. Therefore, using the study's av-
erage loan amounts, finance charges, and loan terms, 97 the average pay-
day loan consumer pays a total of $477.16 in finance charges and is in-
debted for a total period of just over five out of twelve months at each
licensed payday lender location with which the consumer does busi-
ness.
9 8
These figures present only the gross picture. A more in-depth
analysis of the data reveals a sharper, and perhaps starker, image. It is to
that picture I now turn.
First, the study's empirical data likely understates the frequency
with which the "average" consumer obtains a payday loan or the overall
length of time, in any given time period, in which that consumer is in-
debted to a payday lender. Specifically, and similar to other regulators'
studies, 99 the study's data collection and analysis so far does not entail a
cross-referencing of consumers between or among several payday lend-
ers. Accordingly, the study does not account for whether an individual
consumer obtained or had outstanding loans from more than one licensed
1273-74 (payday loans create "debt treadmill"); Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 17, at 7 (payday
loan consumers run high risk of "becoming trapped in perpetual debt"); see also Schaaf, supra note
11, at 345-47 (high cost of payday loans causes consumer to become captive to lender).
95. See Turner v. E.Z. Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tennessee, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1046 (M.D. Tenn. 1999).
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(1) (2005); see supra text accompanying note 13.
97. See supra, Part VI.C.
98. $50.87 average finance charge times 9.38 loans equals $477.16. The 16.63 day average
loan term times 9.38 loans equals 155.99 days, or a little over 5 months.
99. See, e.g., Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 17, at 8 (observing that several regulators'
studies do not include information on rate at which consumers borrow from more than one lender);
ERNST, supra note 17, at 5 n.14, 7 (same).
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location. 00 Nevertheless, anecdotally there is evidence that indicates
consumers may have more than one payday loan outstanding to more
than one payday lender at any one time, and that consumers borrow regu-
larly from more than one payday lender.1 ' Further, this evidence indi-
cates that consumers often will "borrow from Peter to pay Paul," that is,
they will obtain a payday loan from one lender in order to pay off an
outstanding payday loan due another lender. 10 2 Based on this anecdotal
evidence, it is likely that the gross "averages" set out above underreport
the true nature of the "debt trap" in which consumers find themselves.103
Second, the study shows that the "repeat" consumer - i.e., a bor-
rower who obtains more than the occasional loan from the same lender in
a given period - accounts for the bulk of payday lenders' loan volume
and revenue. For example, according to the study consumers who ob-
tained sixteen or more payday loans with the same lender in any twelve-
month period accounted for 20.10% of all payday loan borrowers. These
consumers accounted for nearly half - 46.72% - of lenders' total annual
loan volume. Indeed, nearly two-thirds (65.42%) of a lender's annual
loan volume is comprised of consumers who borrow twelve or more
times a year, yet these consumers make up only 33.34% of all payday
loan borrowers. See Figures 4-6.
As these figures demonstrate, the "repeat" consumer accounts for a
disproportionately large share of lenders' revenues. From this, it may be
concluded that Colorado payday lenders derive the majority of their
revenues from, and hence are economically dependent upon, the "repeat"
borrower. ' 04
100. The DDLA does not prohibit one payday lender from extending a loan to a consumer who
may be indebted to another separate payday lender.
101. During their regular compliance examinations, the examiners saw many of the same
consumers' names appearing time and again in various lenders' records. See also ERNST, supra note
17, at 7 (reporting survey showing 47% of payday loan borrowers use more than one lender per
year).
102. See, e.g., Drysdale, supra note 11, at 601; Johnson, supra note 2, at 57; Barr, supra note
17, at 156.
103. Recently, the Administrator undertook a limited exercise of the type of precise examina-
tion that so far is absent from the study. She compared all individual consumers who had loans
outstanding at a group of different Front Range, Denver/Colorado Springs metro area payday loan
locations during one week in March 2005. Although the data from this comparison is limited, is not
part of the main study, and no broad conclusions should be drawn therefrom, this data reveals the
following. This group of locations had loans with a combined total outstanding (net of finance
charges) of just over $3 million ($3,019,228) from 7,358 consumers. A little over 20% of these
consumers (20.11%) had multiple loans outstanding at any one time from more than one of these
locations. These multiple-loan consumers accounted for a disproportionate 38.75% of outstanding
loan volume. Further, the average loan amount generally increased with the number of outstanding
loans, starting at $324.14 for consumers with two outstanding loans and rising to $347.14 for con-
sumers with six outstanding loans. Two consumers had seven loans outstanding at one time. Their
average loan amount was $485.71, meaning that some consumers may have as much as or more than
$3,400 in payday loans outstanding at any one time. This limited comparison suggests confirmation
of the anecdotal evidence reported above.
104. This result is consistent with what has been reported elsewhere. See, e.g., Drysdale, supra
note 11, at 608 (both Indiana and Illinois report that repeat customer is lenders' main source of
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Figure 4: Proportion of DDLA consumers by number of loans (preceding
twelve months).







Figure 5: Proportion of lenders' DDLA loan volume by consumer loan
frequency (preceding twelve months).
revenue); Barr, supra note 17, at 157 (frequent-use customers are "revenue drivers" for payday
industry (citing North Carolina statistics)); ERNST, supra n.17, at 4-5 (based on analysis showing
that 56% of payday industry revenues are generated from consumers with 13 or more loans per year
and other studies, authors conclude industry relies on "business model that encourages chronic
borrowing" and that such "churning" "is largely responsible" for industry's volume).
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30%
Number of Loans Per Individual
Figure 6: Comparison of proportions of DDLA consumers and propor-
tion of loan volume (preceding twelve months).
Third, the study indicates the issue of renewals is of significant con-
cern. As previously mentioned, a renewal occurs when, at the end of the
initial loan's term, the consumer pays just the loan's finance charge to
extend the loan for an additional term.'15 As above mentioned, the
DDLA limits to one the number of times a lender may consecutively
renew a payday loan.
10 6
According to the study, 18.85% of all payday loan transactions are
renewals. Further, this appears to be an increasing trend. For the calen-
dar year 2003, this percentage grew to 19.56%, and in 2004 the rate was
20.28%.
Fourth, and perhaps more pernicious because they are unregulated,
are the non-renewal rollovers. 10 7 According to the study, a third of all
payday loan transactions - 34.40% - involve same-day, or "touch and
go," rollovers. As with true renewals, this trend is increasing - for 2003,
34.70% of all loan transactions were "touch and go" rollovers, and in
2004, this figure increased to 37.48%.
105. See supra text accompanying note 12.
106. See COLO. REV. STAT. 5-3.1-108(1) (2005); see also text accompanying note 13.
107. See supra Part I and note 12 (distinguishing between renewals and rollovers).
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As mentioned, although the DDLA limits to one the number of re-
newals, there are no limits to the number of times a lender may "roll-
over" a loan by extending a new loan to the consumer immediately after
the consumer pays off a previous loan.'0 8 However, the net economic
effect of these types of "rollovers" is identical to that of a "true" renewal:
(1) the consumer does not receive any net funds; (2) for the net payment
of an additional finance charge, the lender extends the consumer's loan
for an additional term; and (3) at the end of the additional term, the con-
sumer still owes the same principal amount of the first loan.'0 9
When the numbers of both true renewals and rollovers (collectively
called "consecutive" loans) are summed together, it is seen that consecu-
tive loans make up the majority of all payday loan transactions. Over the
course of the study, consecutive loans comprised 53.25% of all loans
made. Further, this percentage has climbed steadily over time - in 2003,










Figure 7: Proportion of "consecutive loans."
108. See supra text accompanying note 16.
109. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 17, at 156; ERNST, supra note 17, at 3-4; Drysdale, supra note
11, at 601 (all observing that a "touch and go" or like "rollover" transaction is the functional and
economic equivalent of a "true" renewal; both cases result in a continuous flow of interest-only
payments, with no reduction in principal).
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Further, the study shows a direct correlation between the loan
amount and the percentage of loans that were consecutive. Not surpris-
ingly, the larger the loan, the more likely it is that the consumer will re-
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% Consecutive Loans 33.4% 44.9% 54.6% 64.7% 68.7%
Figure 8: Proportion of "consecutive" loans by amount.
Importantly, because a "touch and go"-type rollover ostensibly is a
"new" loan, and not a "renewal" subject to the DDLA's one-renewal
limit, a lender can alternate true "renewals" with "rollovers" indefinitely,
ad infinitum. In this way, a lender easily can circumvent the DDLA's
limits on renewals. 110 This lack of regulation over rollovers, together
with the revenues derived from and dependence upon the "repeat" cus-
tomer, may create an incentive for some less scrupulous payday lenders
to disguise their renewals. That is, they may structure the transaction so
that it in form appears to be a lawful payoff in full of one loan followed
immediately by a new loan, but that in reality is a renewal with no ex-
change of moneys between the borrower and the lender other than the
borrower's payment of an additional finance charge."'
110. See, e.g., Fox & MIERZW1NSKI, supra note 17, at 8-9 (state law renewal limits easily
evaded via "touch and go's"); Barr, supra note 17, at 158 (lack of regulation on same-day advances
"leave[s] open a big loophole" to evade renewal limits).
111. Colorado is no stranger to such disguised renewals. In In Re Kentucky Cash Connection,
LLC, No. CCC 2002-001 (Adm'r Colo. Uniform Consumer Credit Code July 18, 2003) (final
agency order) (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.), the Administrator required a payday
lender to surrender its licenses where the Administrator alleged the lender renewed its loans more
than once in violation of the DDLA's one-renewal limit. In that case, two former high-ranking
executives of the lender provided testimony that the lender falsified its records to make it appear as
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Indeed, the study reveals that lenders' continually extending numer-
ous, consecutive loans to consumers - whether by lawfully alternating
"true" renewals with "touch and go" rollovers or otherwise - occurs with
perhaps inordinate frequency. According to the study, 10.16% of all
consumers were continually indebted to the same location being exam-
ined every single day of the six months preceding the particular examina-







Figure 9: Proportion of six-month continually indebted customers (at one
location).
Further, as with "repeat" borrowers, these continually-indebted con-
sumers account for a disproportionately large share of the lenders' annual
total loan volume. For example, study-to-date, the six-month continually
indebted consumers represent 20.4% of lenders' total annual loan vol-
ume. This figure, too, has risen over time. See Figure 10.
The foregoing data confirm, and are consistent with, results reported
and theories advanced elsewhere. First, despite the DDLA's one-
renewal limit, Colorado payday loan consumers are not protected against
the continual cycle of debt, or "debt treadmill," common to the payday
if the unlawful multiple renewals were new, rollover same-day "touch and go" loans. See also
Graves & Petersen, supra note 18, at 92 (citing to and reporting on In Re Kentucky Cash Connec-
tion).
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loan industry.1 12 Second, and perhaps of greater concern, is the indus-
try's financial dependence upon the "repeat," "debt trapped" consumer;








Figure 10: Proportion of total loan volume attributable to six-month con-
tinually indebted consumers.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The study's data and analysis expose significant problems in current
Colorado payday loan regulation. These problems are directly traceable
to flaws and shortcomings in the DDLA. However, these flaws easily
are rectified by conceptually simple changes to the statute. In no particu-
lar order of priority, I offer some modest proposals.
First, to help combat the problems of "loan splitting" and "steering"
of consumers to particular loan amounts, the DDLA's current "step-rate"
finance charge provision should be eliminated. There should be one, and
only one, maximum allowable finance charge rate, regardless of the size
112. See supra text accompanying note 94.
113. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 11, at 1281 (through continual rollovers, lenders encourage
consumers "to prolong their ride on the "debt treadmill"); Johnson, supra note 2, at 69-71 (because
repeat transactions generate majority of lender revenue, "rollover practice is part of its business
model"); ERNST, supra note 17, at 4-5 (payday loan industry "relies on business model that encour-
ages chronic borrowing.").
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of the loan. This change also would help lenders by simplifying the loan
process and their concomitant finance charge and APR calculations.
Second, to further prevent "loan splitting" and potential circumven-
tion of both the maximum loan amount and renewal limits, the DDLA's
definition of "lender" should be amended to include affiliates or similar
related entities. To illustrate, under the DDLA's current form, one
"head" payday lender might set up a number of ostensibly separate, in-
dependent "lender" companies, but which in reality are closely related
and inter-connected "tentacles," such as through common ownership or
management. By using this structure, together with a business model of
shuffling consumers between and among the various "tentacles," the
"head" lender may attempt to circumvent renewal or loan amount limita-
tions. Notably, both Rule 7 and the Committee's draft legislation de-
fined "lender" to include affiliates" 14 and would have prevented this de-
vice; this omission from the DDLA should be corrected.
Third, to alleviate the perceived difficulty in enforcing the Code's
current "loan splitting" prohibition, 1 5 the section should be restored to
its pre-1975 version.1 6 In this way, unlawful "loan splitting" would not
be dependent upon a determination of the lender's "purpose" of, but in-
stead would occur where the "result" was in, obtaining a higher finance
charge.
Fourth, the study reveals a gaping disconnect between the theory
and expressed purpose of payday loans, on the one hand, and their real-
ity, on the other. That is, although these loans are intended for one-time,
emergency purposes 1"' - a theory the industry purports to embrace"
l8 -
their reality presents a starkly different picture, one inhabited by con-
sumers repeatedly rolling over their "emergency," "stop-gap" loans. The
DDLA's one-renewal limit has proven ineffective in eliminating the debt
trap common to payday lending. Indeed, the disproportionate contribu-
tion the repeat consumer makes to lenders' revenues likely entices lend-
ers to allow, and perhaps encourage, borrowers to obtain numerous, con-
tinual consecutive loans. The study shows lenders find this temptation
hard to resist. Because the DDLA does not regulate non-renewal roll-
overs, it does not discourage lenders from succumbing to this temptation.
Further, because the DDLA does not prevent one payday lender
from extending a payday loan to a consumer to payoff a payday loan due
114. See supra Parts III-IV.
115. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-205 (2005); supra Part IIl.
116. See 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 247 (amending § 5-3-409).
117. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-104 (2005) (requiring lenders to provide notice to consum-
ers that payday loans are not "intended to meet long-term financial needs" but "should be used only
to meet short-term cash needs").
118. See Freedom of Choice for Consumers, supra note 83 (payday loans are intended for
emergency, "stop-gap" needs). This report goes on to claim that "[dieferred deposit service busi-
nesses do not want to do business with customers engaged in excessive rollovers." Id.
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another lender - i.e., the "borrowing from Peter to pay Paul" syndrome -
it does nothing to cut off the unending debt cycle. Instead, it allows the
cycle to be transferred from one lender to another.
Therefore, the DDLA should be amended to prohibit the practice of
using one payday loan to pay off another. Additionally, it should man-
date a "cooling off' period of, say, seven days, between the time one
payday loan is paid off and the time any lender may extend a new payday
loan. To facilitate and make effective these provisions, the DDLA
should provide for the creation of a statewide database, to which all pay-
day lenders must subscribe, containing information on consumers and
their payday loans. 19 Before a lender may extend a payday loan to a
consumer, the lender must verify from the database the consumer's eligi-
bility for a loan.
Fifth, the DDLA currently prohibits any one lender from having
more than $500 in payday loans outstanding to any one consumer at any
one time. 2° However, this prohibition does not prevent another lender
from extending another payday loan to the consumer at the same time.
Thus, a consumer could have a number of payday loans outstanding at
any one time from a number of different lenders, with each loan up to the
maximum $500 limit. 121 This exacerbates the debt treadmill problem.
Accordingly, the DDLA's current prohibition should be expanded
so as to prohibit a lender from extending a payday loan to a consumer
who has a payday loan outstanding from any other payday lender. Here,
too, there should be created a statewide database that the lender would be
required to consult in order to verify the consumer's loan eligibility. An
alternative, but more limited, expansion of the prohibition is to prohibit a
lender from extending a payday loan in an amount that would cause the
consumer's aggregate outstanding payday loans, from all lenders, to ex-
ceed $500. However, this alternative may defeat the purpose and effec-
tiveness of the cooling off period. For example, this alternative allows
several small loans, whose aggregate amount falls under the cap, to be
extended to one consumer, but whose terms and due dates are staggered.
By staggering the terms, so that the loans overlap, the consumer is never
truly out from under the debt trap of a payday loan.
The sixth recommendation does not derive from the study, but in-
stead from amendments to the DDLA, contained in House Bill (HB) 04-
119. The concepts of statewide databases and "cooling off' periods are not novel. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 560.404(19) (2005) (24-hour cooling off period); FLA. STAT. § 560.404(23) (2005)
(database); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5(b) (2005) (seven day cooling off period); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 122/2-15 (2005) (database); IND. CODE.§ 24-4.5-7-401(2) (2005) (seven day cooling off
period); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7-404(4)(b) (2005) (database); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(4) (2005)
(three business day cooling off period and database).
120. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-106(1) (2005).
121. See supra note 103.
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1069, enacted during the 2004 legislative session. 122 1 start with some
background.
Contained in the Code is the concept and doctrine of "unconscion-
ability.' 23 This doctrine prohibits creditors from making "unconscion-
able" consumer credit transactions and provides various remedies, in
favor of both consumers and the Administrator, in the event a court de-
termines a transaction is "unconscionable."'' 24 One factor a court is to
consider in making this determination is whether, at the time the transac-
tion was made, the creditor had a reasonable belief that the consumer had
the ability to repay the transaction according to its terms.1
25
In 2002, the Administrator issued an advisory opinion letter con-
cerning "unconscionability" and its incorporated "ability to repay" re-
quirement.1 26 Specifically, she reminded payday lenders that this doc-
trine applied to them and their loans to the same extent as it applied to
any other lender or any other consumer credit transaction.' 27 She stated
that, under the doctrine, the Code "obligates a responsible lender to in-
quire about a consumer's repayment ability whenever a loan is made,"
which "logically ... includes reviewing" the consumer's assets and in-
come versus his or her liabilities.1 28 She observed that it was the practice
of some payday lenders not to perform such typical loan underwriting
diligence and not to inquire into such things as the consumer's income or
credit worthiness.12 9 She advised that payday lenders, who did not verify
a consumer's "ability to repay," ran substantial risks that their loans
might be declared unconscionable and "strongly discouraged" such prac-
tices. 30
Payday lenders, through their industry trade associations,' 3' ob-
jected to what they perceived as the Administrator's imposition of unrea-
sonable burdens on their lending practices. 132 In response to these objec-
tions, and the lenders' requests for specific guidance as to what may or
may not be "unconscionable" practices, in 2003 the Administrator issued
a revised opinion letter. 133 Although she acknowledged that (1) the un-
122. See 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 317-21 (enacting HB 04-1069).
123. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-5-109, 5-6-112 (2005).
124. See id.
125. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-6-112(3)(a) (2005).
126. See Admin. Opinion Letter, "Reasonable Probability of Payment in Full and Record
Retention" (Adm'r Colo. Consumer Credit Code Dec. 2, 2002), at 1 (on file with Office of the Colo.
Att'y Gen.).
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id. at2.
129. Id. at 1,2.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Specifically, the CFSA and the Colorado Check Holders Association. See Admin. Opin-
ion Letter, "Reasonable Probability of Payment in Full and Record Retention - Revised" (Adm'r
Colo. Consumer Credit Code June 16, 2003), at 1, http://www.ago.state.co.us (on file with Office of
the Colo. Att'y Gen.).
132. See id. at 1.
133. See id.
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conscionability doctrine required flexibility in its application and de-
pended upon a factual review of the transaction, and (2) she was statuto-
rily prohibited from promulgating rules or regulations on unconscionabil-
ity, she acceded to the payday lenders' requests by adopting enforcement
policy guidelines and enumerating certain recommended practices that, if
followed, would not result in the taking of any administrative enforce-
ment action based upon a consumer's repayment ability (absent a com-
plaint or specific evidence of inability to repay).134  These guidelines
covered such things as (1) the frequency with which a payday lender
should obtain a new loan application and verify consumer income and
employment, (2) minimum loan-to-income ratios, and (3) minimum loan
terms and the scheduling of a payday loan's due date so as to coincide
with or come after the consumer's next payday.
135
Apparently, payday lenders remained unsatisfied. Accordingly,
during the 2004 legislative session they pushed for and were the moving
force behind HB 04-1069.136 With the bill's passage, the industry might
lay claim to have obtained three significant benefits.
First, the industry may claim the bill all but removes entirely the
"ability to repay" concept from the Code's unconscionability doctrine for
payday loans, save for minimal loan-to-income ratios and income verifi-
cation requirements. 137  Thus, payday lenders might say they received
legislative imprimatur allowing them to ignore basic loan underwriting
diligence required of any other creditor to avoid having a transaction
declared unconscionable.
Second, were this not enough, through the bill payday lenders
sought to weaken further the "unconscionability" doctrine vis-d-vis pay-
day loans by adding factors a court is to consider in making this determi-
nation. 138 These factors include weighing (1) the benefits of the loan to
the consumer versus the lender's risk; (2) the absence of collateral other
than the consumer's instrument; and (3) the relation between the amount
of the payday loan and the cost in making it.
1 39
On their face, these factors perhaps are not neutral but instead might
be seen to be skewed heavily in favor of the payday lender. For exam-
ple, the industry claims that (1) payday loans serve an essential consumer
134. See id. at 2-5.
135. See id. at 3-4. The Administrator also made special mention of the "cycle of debt." She
observed that some payday lenders' practices of allowing consumers to continually roll over their
loans via a same day, "touch and go" new loan raised questions concerning the consumer's ability to
repay the loan according to its scheduled terms. See id. at 4. One possible solution she advanced to
address this concern was the concept of a central database. See id.
136. Of the industry's trade associations, it is significant that only the Colorado Check Holders
Association spoke on the bill's behalf; in particular, neither the CFSA nor FiSCA publicly supported
it. See supra note 83 (describing CFSA and FiSCA).
137. See 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 320 (enacting COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-122(2) and (3)).
138. See id. (enacting COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-122(1)).
139. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-122(l)(a)-(c) (2005).
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need not met by conventional sources of credit; (2) the fixed transaction
costs associated with payday lending are significant in relation to the size
of the loan and disproportionately higher than in conventional lending;
(3) payday lenders' risks are higher than conventional lenders' risks; and
(4) the benefits to the consumer of obtaining a loan far outweigh the al-
ternatives and include such things as enhancing financial standing, avoid-
ing the incurring of returned check charges, and not having to pledge
tangible collateral as would be required in a comparable pawn transac-
tion.140  Further, these factors simultaneously (1) deprive payday loan
consumers of protections to which all other borrowers are entitled under;
and (2) give payday lenders anti-competitive advantages over all other
creditors subject to; the Code.
Importantly, because it seemingly substantially eviscerates the "un-
conscionabilty" doctrine as applied to payday loans, HB 04-1069 may
further aggravate the "debt cycle" problem. 141 That is, lenders who con-
tinually and repeatedly roll over their loans, and extend to consumers
numerous consecutive loans, likely are unconcerned with whether a loan
would be repaid according to its terms. Yet this practice would seem to
be unconscionable on its face - such lenders cannot harbor a "reasonable
belief' that the consumer would repay the loan as scheduled. 142 Further,
because (1) as the study shows this practice accounts for the majority of
lenders' revenues; 43 and (2) the DDLA currently does not prohibit the
practice of repeatedly alternating renewals with rollovers, ad infinitum,
HB 04-1069 potentially weakens a significant, and perhaps the only,
deterrent against this practice and thereby encourages lenders to engage
in it with apparent impunity.
Third, the bill provides payday lenders with special substantive and
procedural protections, along with immunity from certain types of ad-
ministrative discipline, in the event of administrative disciplinary pro-
ceedings arising out of violations of the Code.' 44 These include such
things as providing payday lenders with a limited "bona fide error" de-
fense, allowing them a limited "right to cure," and giving them a ninety-
day time period within which to comply with administrative rules, inter-
pretations, or opinions. 45 Here, too, these special privileges apply only
to payday lenders; no other supervised lender is accorded such status.
140. See Freedom of Choice for Consumers, supra note 83.
141. Whether this was an intended or unintended consequence of the bill is not known.
142. See Bruch, supra note 11, at 1280-82; see also, e.g., id. at 1278-80 (describing how pay-
day loans are otherwise unconscionable); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 7.5.5.6, at 301-02
(same).
143. See supra Part VL.E.
144. See 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 319-20 (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-118 by adding
subsections (2)(c) and (3)).
145. Id.
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HB 04-1069 is an example of special interest legislation. However,
the legislation seems ill-advised. It must be remembered that payday
lenders are allowed to make the most expensive, highest cost loans in
Colorado, exceeding by several orders of magnitude Colorado's 45%
criminal usury rate. 146 Further, payday lenders' clientele, by reason of
their desperate financial circumstances, likely are the most vulnerable of
borrowers and most in need of the Code's consumer protections. Yet,
HB 04-1069 perhaps (1) deprives payday loan consumers of fundamental
consumer protections to which all other borrowers are entitled; and (2)
accords special treatment and privileges to payday lenders by: (a) carving
out exemptions from Code provisions of general applicability; and (b)
creating special procedural and substantive protections unavailable to
any other creditor. This makes HB 04-1069 simultaneously both anti-
competitive and anti-consumer protective. To restore a proper balance
between the legitimate needs of payday lenders and their consumers,
those aspects of HB 04-1069 that provide special privileges and protec-
tions to payday lenders should be repealed in their entirety. This in-
cludes the bill's provisions relating to the doctrine of "unconscionability"
to ensure that the doctrine retains its full vigor and applicability to pay-
day loans as it does to any other extension of credit.
CONCLUSION
Whether payday lending should be legal in Colorado is a debate that
is beyond the scope of this article. For now, the General Assembly has
concluded that it should be, albeit subject to and under the DDLA's regu-
lation. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that payday lending is but
the modem incarnation of what in earlier eras was outlawed and con-
demned as usurious loan sharking. Given its unsavory ancestry, the sig-
nificant potential for abuse, and the devastating consequences of such
abuse, payday lending demands the strictest of regulation and closest of
scrutiny.
146. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-104(1) (2005).
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While scholars debate the fairness and efficiency offull priority secured
lending and asset securitization, lawmakers pass statutes that only ex-
pand these types offinancing. Lawmakers seem compelled to err in fa-
vor ofsophisticated secured creditors and against creditors in weak bar-
gaining positions. This article addresses why non-adjusting creditors
remain on the sidelines as lawmakers embrace legislation encouraging
asset securitization and expanding UCC Article 9. It argues that non-
adjusting creditors'positions must be understood in relation to a socio-
political climate steeped in deference to the needs of institutional credi-
tors. Contemporary media on finance and business evidence this socio-
political climate. There is an acute lack of critical distance from financ-
ing activities that pervades journalism in the United States. This lack of
critical distance in public discourse on finance is a form of disregard of
economic inequality among Americans. This article hypothesizes that
disregard of inequality in business reporting indicates an imagined
community of investors with which even disadvantaged creditors identify.
Widespread identification with an imagined community of investors en-
ables secured creditors to present unfettered expansion of business credit
as consonant with public interest both within the UCC drafting process
and before the state legislatures. Legal scholars have failed to take is-
sues of broad socio-political climate into account in analyses of how and
why the law continues to expand secured creditors' domain.
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INTRODUCTION
The major overhaul of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC")' that concluded in 2002 went unreported in the mainstream
media. Lawmakers, reporters and UCC scholars seem to regard Article 9
as a technical statute inappropriate for widespread public debate.2 In
addition, many scholars find that Article 9 is drafted in an insular proc-
ess 3 dominated by secured creditors that disregards third party effects of
secured transactions.4 This article presents an alternative view of the
politics 5 that enable secured creditors' control over current laws govern-
ing secured transactions. This article rejects the notion that secured
creditors' control results primarily from the insularity of the UCC draft-
ing process or the obscurity or technical complexity of the code.
A range of scholars have voiced fairness, efficiency, and moral haz-
ard concerns surrounding central features of Article 9.6 These scholars
I. Article 9 of the UCC governs debt financing that is secured by personal property. U.C.C.
§ 9-101, cmt. 1 (2002). It has revolutionized finance by providing clear rules under which lenders
can take security interests in an unprecedented range of collateral. The UCC was originally promul-
gated in 1951. The Permanent Editorial Board approved revisions to Article 9 in 1971 and again in
1999. Citations herein to the UCC are to the 2002 official text.
2. See Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code, U. ILL. L. F. 321, 327 (1962), quoted in Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law
Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 632
(1998).
3. The UCC is produced by joint efforts of the American Law Institute (ALl) and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). The ALl, generally, cre-
ates restatements of law. The NCCUSL drafts uniform laws in various fields. To revise the UCC,
the ALl and NCCUSL agree to prepare a report on the article of the code in question. The report is
prepared by a study group appointed by the ALl. The study group sends its report to the ALl and
NCCUSL. The NCCUSL then appoints a drafting committee to reformulate the report into statutory
language. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1804-06 (1994)
[hereinafter Politics].
4. See infra note 6.
5. This article defines politics broadly, in terms of the dominant values and socio-political
climate that drive public policy.
6. These scholars argue that Article 9 disadvantages unsecured creditors and other third
parties affected by secured transactions. Although they arguably consent to be creditors, employees
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lament that Article 9 allows a secured creditor to recover all of the prop-
erty of a debtor when the debtor becomes insolvent, while non-adjusting
creditors like employees or tort claimants can be left with nothing.7 On
the other hand, proponents of full priority secured credit argue that Arti-
cle 9 produces efficiencies and facilitates access to essential sources of
capital for businesses. 9 Neither group can establish whether or not full
priority secured lending is efficient. Both concede that only empirical
study can answer this question and that a conclusive empirical study is
unlikely.'0 Article 9 dissenters state that even if full priority were proven
efficient it would continue to raise serious fairness and distributive jus-
generally cannot adjust their compensation to reflect the risk that a secured creditor will be paid
before them - they are "non-adjusting creditors." Tort claimants, on the other hand, do not choose to
be creditors at all - they are "non-consenting creditors." Since they are non-consenting creditors,
they also, of course, are non-adjusting creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1953-54 (1994); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect
Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1374-76 (1997);
Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Credit in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L. J. 857, 865 (1996) (analyzing economic costs of full priority secured credit
to show that full priority can result in inefficient contracting between borrowers and lenders and
other efficiency costs); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 1279, 1287-89 (1997); see Part I infra for a summary of the current state of the relationship
between Article 9 and unsecured creditors. The unsecured creditors on which this article focuses are
those who do not consent to, or adjust expected returns in response to, the creation of a secured
credit facility.
7. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Article 9: The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994) (stating that "security is an agreement between A and B that C take
nothing.") Arguments that full priority is justified under freedom of contract principles fail to ex-
plain why two parties - a debtor and secured creditor - should be permitted to contract away the
rights of third parties such as unsecured creditors with no chance to consent or adjust their return.
Also, the UCC explicitly overrides contractual restrictions on assignment contained in certain ac-
counts receivable, in franchise rights, licenses, and in permits. Contractual restrictions on assign-
ment do not preclude Article 9 security interests. However, secured parties may not enforce their
security interests in intangibles that contain a prohibition on assignment in a way that compromises
the interests of other parties to the intangibles. Note that I am not sure how the UCC committee
envisions determining "compromise of interest." It seems that if a party contracted to prohibit
assignment, then that party had an interest in prohibiting assignment which is compromised by an
Article 9 secured creditor's disregard of the clause. The fact that Article 9 overrides restrictions on
assignment indicates a policy decision to facilitate secured credit despite concerns of third parties.
8. "Full priority secured credit" refers to debt financing in which the lender takes as collat-
eral a "floating lien" - an assignment of all of the business's present and future assets - and has
priority over other parties with claims to those assets for the full value of its loan to the business. If
a secured creditor follows the prescribed steps for perfection of its security interest set forth in Arti-
cle 9, then it can recover its collateral before all subsequent lien creditors, including a bankruptcy
trustee. "Floating lien" is a short hand name in UCC parlance for a series of Article 9 provisions, the
most important of which are: § 9-204(c) permitting future advances in financing, § 9-323 giving
security for future advances priority as of the date of the original financing, § 9-204(a) permitting
security interests in collateral acquired after completion of a financing, and § 9-205 validating ar-
rangements under which the debtor has the right to transfer collateral. See infra Part L.A for a sum-
mary of how the 1999 revisions to Article 9 expand full priority secured credit.
9. See, e.g., James J. White, Work and Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 2089,
2089-90 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6, at 1373-74.
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tice concerns." Supporters of full priority respond by treating such dis-
sents as futile attempts to muck the course of an unstoppable train.'
2
In the midst of this vigorous and inconclusive debate over the value
and efficiency of full priority, the revised version of Article 9 recently
adopted in all fifty states only expands secured creditors' domain. 3 In
addition, recent legislative initiatives encourage asset securitizations - a
type of transaction that can amplify the efficiency, distributive justice
and fairness concerns that drive the debate about Article 9.14 In other
words, in the face of uncertainty regarding the social value, fairness and
efficiency of Article 9 secured lending and asset securitization, lawmak-
ers consistently err in favor of capital and against non-adjusting credi-
tors.
This article does not advocate any particular reform to Article 9 or
the laws enabling securitization 1 5  It does not focus on solutions to the
problem that the law continues to encourage inequitable financing prac-
tices without pause and without any safeguards should these practices
11. See, e.g., Janger, supra note 2, at 573.
12. Note that other scholars have focused on the issue of why secured credit exists at all.
When Article 9 was introduced in 1951, people thought that secured credit served to lower interest
rates available to debtors that issue collateral. But in the late 1950s, Modigliani & Miller argued that
altering the capital structure of a corporate entity should not change its value, because creditors will
simply adjust the interest rate charged for debt and the amount they will pay for an equity interest to
reflect the riskiness of the investment. See Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capi-
tal, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 276 (1958).
Therefore, debtors have no interest rate based reason to offer security to lenders. Since then, a
wealth of scholarship has addressed what is known as the "Puzzle of Secured Credit." The puzzle is:
If an entity cannot change its average costs of capital by altering its capital structure, then why do
secured creditors and debtors take on the transaction costs associated with secured transactions? To
explain the puzzle of secured credit, scholars have focused on two general possibilities: (1) secured
credit produces efficiencies, or (2) it imposes on or transfers costs to third parties. See generally
Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984).
13. Many legal scholars attribute the expansion of Article 9's full priority structure to the
nature of the UCC drafting process. Observers and participants tend to report that the UCC drafting
process focuses on technical issues in finance and law that exceed the comprehension of most citi-
zens. Secured creditors are reputed to dominate the process, driving the drafting committee to focus
only on expanding secured credit. See, e.g., Janger, supra note 2, at 631-32.
14. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of asset securitization, including the asset backed secu-
rities or "ABS" statutes recently enacted in several states.
15. Such a project, the likes of which has been undertaken by others, might include proposals:
(i) to preserve some percentage of debtors' assets for unsecured creditors, (ii) to enact a federal law
of secured transactions, (iii) to reform of the bankruptcy code to mitigate Article 9's effects, or (iv)
to advocate for creditors' insurance coupled with partial priority. A federal law of secured transac-
tions might be more accommodating of non-adjusting creditors since the drafters would not have to
worry about uniformity in the law's enactment and secured creditors' ability to undercut that uni-
formity by lobbying individual state legislatures to eliminate provisions that erode their priority. Cf
Janger, supra note 2, at 578-80. However, it is unlikely that a federal law would be any less suscep-
tible to the same influence of secured creditors and social context that affect Article 9. Regarding
reform of the bankruptcy code, see infra text accompanying notes 47-54. The idea behind creditors'
insurance is that Article 9 secured creditors could carry insurance to cover the risk that unsecured
claimants take before the secured creditors when creditors are receiving less than 100 cents on the
dollar. The costs of this insurance, however, would be passed on to borrowers, which would in-
crease costs of capital. Increased costs of capital are associated with credit constriction. The threat
of credit constriction is used as a debate stopper to block proposed reforms to Article 9. See infra
Part III.C.
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ultimately prove inefficient. 16 Rather, this article excavates the nature of
this problem and proposes an explanation for its Persistence. It presents
a certain political efficiency of Article 9 and asset securitization that
seems to overwhelm questions both of equity and of economic effi-
ciency. Specifically, this article critiques contemporary public discourse
on business and finance and presents the concept of an imagined com-
munity of investors. It does so in order to facilitate strategic thinking
about the hegemony of capitalist values 17 that permits UCC drafters and
state legislatures to treat Article 9 as a non-political, technical statute.
Critics such as Robert E. Scott, Elizabeth Warren, and Edward J.
Janger suggest that if non-adjusting creditors could understand Article
9's effects and could organize opposition, the law on secured credit
would not favor secured creditors so heavily. They seem to just con-
clude - without direct analysis - that diversity of interests among unse-
cured creditors, coupled with the nature of the UCC drafting process,
makes the costs of educating these creditors to oppose Article 9 prohibi-
tively high.
This article addresses directly the issue of why the costs of inform-
ing certain classes of unsecured creditors seem prohibitively high.
Building on the concept of imagined communities, originally developed
by Benedict Anderson, 18 this article proposes that the costs of informing
unsecured creditors about Article 9 are explained neither by the code's
technical complexity, nor by secured creditors' alleged domination of the
UCC drafting process. Rather, these costs can be understood in relation
to a socio-political climate in which deference to the needs of capital' 9 -
16. The analysis in infra Parts II & III suggests that perhaps a grassroots effort to generate
public awareness and controversy over commercial secured loans could prompt reform. Elizabeth
Warren has taken this approach in her involvement with bankruptcy reform. She makes an explicit
call for greater public awareness of commercial law in her article entitled What is a Women's Issue?
on how bankruptcy law affects women. See Warren, infra note 219, at 56. This article does not
follow Warren's prescriptive stance. Such a prescriptive project would need to account for the
descriptive reality that this article presents. Within this descriptive reality the lack of critical dis-
tance in public discourse on finance and the myth of an imagined community of investors to which
Americans belong would severely complicate any effort at consciousness-raising about commercial
secured transactions. See infra note 167 and text accompanying notes 183-84. See also Heather
Lauren Hughes, Contradictions, Open Secrets, and Feminist Faith in Enlightenment, 13 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L. J. 187 (2002) (challenging the efficacy of conscious-raising as a strategy for common
law reform).
17. Hegemony is domination by ideas; it compels people to take initiative in their own subju-
gation by subscribing to certain values. See generally ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE
PRISON NOTEBOOKS, (Quentin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., ElecBook London 1999)
(transcribed from the edition published by Lawrence & Wishart, London 1971). The hegemony of
capitalist values refers to the psychic, social and political dominance of the ideas that (i) maximizing
material wealth is the best social objective, and (ii) inciting individuals to pursue material wealth is
the best way to maximize collective wealth. The hegemony of these views in the United States
stunts discourse in the aesthetic, social, cultural, spiritual, environmental and other consequences of
capitalism.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
19. This article uses the term "capital" to mean monetary resources and the social and politi-
cal currency associated with access to or control of monetary resources.
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driven by hopes of wealth and fear of poverty - facilitates belonging in
an imagined community of investors with which even disadvantaged
creditors identify.
Contemporary media on finance and business evidence this socio-
political climate. There is an acute lack of critical distance from busi-
nesses' financing practices that pervades journalism in the United
States.20 This lack of critical distance in public discourse on finance is a
form of disregard of the severe socio-economic inequalities among
Americans. This article proposes that the disregard of inequality in con-
temporary business reporting indicates an imagined community of capi-
talists or investors. This community of investors is imagined because its
members assume commonalities with one another despite the fact that
they may never meet or even have any contact with one another. It is a
community because those who identify with its values share a unified
field of exchange that generates comradeship despite vast differences and
inequalities among members.21 The myth of this community is that eve-
ryone belongs. Media on business and finance further the myth of op-
portunity - of an open playing field - for financial gain.22 This myth
fuels imaginings that encourage even those who struggle financially to
identify as members.
This article intends to explore to the greatest extent possible how it
is that Article 9 manages to seem apolitical. Though the absence of one
thing - critical distance in reporting on finance - cannot in a formal
sense prove the existence of another - an imagined community of inves-
tors - it is very important to more fully excavate how and why secured
lending continues to expand despite serious, unresolved policy concerns.
This article's presentation of an imagined community of investors
relates the problem of informing non-adjusting creditors to a larger ab-
sence of class consciousness in the United States.23 This article hypothe-
sizes that widespread public identification with an imagined community
of investors enables secured creditors to present unfettered expansion of
20. See infra text accompanying notes 111-58.
21. For more explanation of this article's use of the term "community," see infra Part ll.B.
22. To illustrate the false nature of these illusions, consider that according to The Federal
Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances, one half of all Americans do not own a single share of
stock even through a retirement account. The majority of those who do hold some stock have only a
trivial amount. See Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence
from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Jan. 2003, at 16, Table 6.
23. A lack of class consciousness refers to failure of individuals to identify with and under-
stand the position of their class, leading to a failure to act in the best interests of their class. Class
consciousness is the self-awareness of a social class and the capacity of the class to act in its own
rational interests. It refers to the extent to which individuals are conscious of the historical tasks
their class sets out for them. The concept of class consciousness originates in socialist or Marxist
theory. See generally GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST
DIALECTICS (Rodney Livingstone trans., MIT Press 1971). Its contemporary meaning has evolved
to include class allegiances that are not confined to the strict class hierarchies and economic deter-
minism characteristic of Marx.
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access to credit as consonant with public interest both within the UCC
drafting process and before the state legislatures.
Finally, this article considers a few, leading scholars' responses to
Article 9 in light of the imagined community concept. These commercial
law scholars have failed to explore wide socio-political contexts in
analyses of why the law of secured credit continues to expand the range
of collateral and the reach of secured creditors.
James White observes that "[b]anks and other secured creditors ....
worship secured credit with apostolic zeal. The secured creditors argue
for stronger and broader security, not for weaker and narrower security.
And no one has less power in such a debate than a law professor with a
counterintuitive idea.",24 Yet, as Elizabeth Warren ("Warren") points out,
the law does draw lines to limit the scope of security.25 It does not per-
mit security interests in the form of servitude, or in human organs. 26  If
the law of secured credit were concerned only with expanding credit and
increasing secured creditors' returns, then this would not be the case.27
Warren's stance is based on the reasoning or the logic that as long as
lines are being drawn, there is no reason why they cannot be drawn to
give more protection to non-adjusting creditors. 28 But considering the
current state of public discourse on finance and the myth of an imagined
community of investors to which Americans belong,29 reasoned argu-
ments that academics deploy are not likely to move the line between en-
forceable and void or unenforceable security interests.
Part I describes recent debates over whether secured credit and asset
securitization harm non-adjusting creditors. Part II explores how and
why non-adjusting creditors have been unable to effectively participate
in the debate described in Part I. Part II describes the current state of
public discourse on finance, which is sorely missing alternative perspec-
tives on the goals and social value of businesses' financing decisions.
Part II presents the ideas that (i) the lack of critical distance in media
coverage of business indicates an imagined community of investors,
large or small, with which non-adjusting creditors identify, and (ii) this
24. White, supra note 9, at 2090-91.
25. Warren, supra note 6, at 1386-87.
26. Id. at 1386.
27. Id.
28. The Article 9 drafting committee flatly rejected a proposal by Warren to amend § 9-301 to
preserve twenty percent of debtors' assets for unsecured creditors. Warren submitted her "Carve-
Out Proposal" to the ALl in April 1996. Under Warren's proposal, a levying creditor could obtain
20% of the value of Article 9 collateral through a levy and execution under state law. Accordingly,
in bankruptcy, a trustee using her power could carve out 20% of the value of a debtor's encumbered
personal property for the benefit of the estate. At the Symposium on the Priority of Secured Debt at
Cornell Law School in 1997, Steven Harris announced that a carve-out for unsecured creditors is
"dead in the water." Warren, supra note 6, at 1374 n.3. See also William J. Woodward, Jr., The
Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Proc-
ess, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1511, 1511-13 (1997).
29. See infra Part 1I.
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identification limits unsecured creditors' capacities to respond critically
to dominant financial industry practices. 30  Part III critiques several
prominent legal scholars' responses to Article 9 and the UCC drafting
process in light of the discourse, social context and imagined community
analysis presented in Part II. Part III shows how the idea of an imagined
community of capitalists with which creditors identify affects scholars'
arguments about full priority secured credit.
This article presents: (i) the inconclusive debate over secured trans-
actions and lawmakers' deference to capital, (ii) the state of public dis-
course on finance, and (iii) how some prominent legal scholars seem to
accept and ignore the larger socio-political context in which laws govern-
ing secured finance evolve. In doing so, it focuses attention on the he-
gemony of capitalist values that enables secured creditors' control over
Article 9. It is this hegemony that yields laws that consistently err in
favor of capital and against non-adjusting creditors - not just an insular
UCC drafting process or the law's technical complexity.
I. THE COMPULSION TO ERR IN FAVOR OF CAPITAL
A. Debates over Article 9 and Asset Securitization
Full priority secured lending may produce net benefits for the par-
ties involved.3" Or, it may enable debtors to pursue negative-value pro-
jects to the detriment of parties with no ability to consent or respond to
the risks imposed by the financing. Scholars' arguments on these posi-
tions remain ultimately inconclusive.
33
Proponents of Article 9 celebrate the relative ease with which con-
temporary lenders can secure loans and establish priority in a wide range
of types of collateral. 34 They praise the increased access to capital pro-
vided by Article 9's clear rules applicable to virtually all of a debtor's
personal property.35 Capital raised through secured lending can fund
value-adding projects, support employment, and contribute positively to
collective economic health.36 Proponents reason that just because some
secured loans may be inefficient or produce negative externalities, this is
30. For a comparison of this article's imagined community hypothesis to collective action
problems, see infra note 167.
31. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539,
1563-67 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Lynn LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1897-
99(1994).
33. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6, at 1393.
34. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Secu-
rity Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2021-22 (1994).
35. See id. at 2050-52.
36. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1544.
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not cause to limit a financial practice that has become so central to con-
temporary finance.37
Yet Article 9's full priority schema, under which a secured creditor
can recover the full value of its loan before any other creditors have a
chance to recover, has raised equity concerns since the UCC was first
promulgated.3 8 These concerns were well voiced during the recent draft-
ing process to substantially revise Article 9,39 during which Lynn
LoPucki, Lucian Bebchuck and Jesse Fried, and Warren all argued for
various forms of equity cushion or carve-out to full priority. 40 These
arguments echo sentiments of Grant Gilmore himself,41 who wrote in the
comments to the 1972 version of Article 9 (of which he was a principal
architect):
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating
charge was based on a feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that
a commercial borrower should not be allowed to encumber all his as-
sets present and future, and that for the protection not only of the bor-
rower but of his other creditors a cushion of free assets should be
preserved. This inarticulate premise has much to recommend it.
42
Gilmore's comment, along with the more recent scholarship of LoPucki,
Warren, Bebchuck and Fried, evidences deep-seated concerns for equity
and fairness raised by full priority secured credit.43
Scholars' concerns about full priority seem well-grounded when
one considers that many unsecured creditors are either non-consenting or
non-adjusting creditors. Unlike sophisticated, institutional unsecured
creditors, non-consenting and non-adjusting creditors of a company have
37. See, e.g., Harris & Mooney, supra note 34, at 2023-24.
38. Janger, supra note 2, at 597-98.
39. Revised Article 9 was enacted in forty-six states and Washington, D.C. in 2001. It was
effective in all states by January 1, 2002.
40. See sources cited supra note 6.
41. See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 (1981).
42. U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 4 (1972) (amended 1998).
43. Of course there are many scholars who defend Article 9. Though couched in a wide range
of specific arguments, these scholars generally state that the capital raised through full priority
secured transactions benefits all creditors involved with a given debtor. This is because the proceeds
of secured transactions fund value-increasing projects, create jobs and increase productivity. See,
e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property Based Theory of Security Interests:
Taking Debtor's Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2052 (1994) (arguing that the transfer of a
security interest does not differ fundamentally from other transfers of property interests for equiva-
lent value); with respect to securitization see Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 1539, 1563-67 (2004) (arguing that harms from overinvestment should be more
than offset by the benefits of securitization and that unsecured creditors themselves view securitiza-
tion as providing net value). Despite these types of arguments, whether or not secured lending is
efficient is an empirical question that is unanswered. Even if scholars could demonstrate that full
priority secured credit and asset securitization are, in fact, efficient, such a demonstration would do
nothing to assuage the fairness and equity concerns raised by LoPucki and Warren.
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no power to consent or respond to the risk of non-payment that arises
when the company assigns its assets to a secured lender.44
In the midst of this debate, the 1999 revisions to Article 9 only ex-
pand the reach of full priority secured credit.45 As Edward Janger puts it:
"Bankruptcy partisans view the recent revisions to Article 9 as shifting
previously settled allocation of property and regulatory rights in favor of
secured creditors, and against unsecured creditors ....
In addition, recent efforts to reform the federal bankruptcy code to
soften the effects of Article 9 on unsecured creditors have failed.4 7  In
July 2002, Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Illinois) and Rep. William D.
Delahunt (D-Massachusetts) introduced the Employee Abuse Prevention
Act of 2002.48 This bill was an effort to enable the bankruptcy trustee to
include assets assigned to a perfected secured creditor in the bankruptcy
estate under certain circumstances. 49 It was packaged as a reform to pro-
tect workers and retirees from corporate misconduct.50 The Durbin-
Delahunt bill suffered an onslaught of criticism from organizations such
as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
44. Note that Article 9 defenders contest the assertion that non-adjusting creditors are hurt by
full priority. They argue that non-adjusting trade creditors receive the second highest returns of any
creditor in bankruptcy (second to secured bank creditors). With respect to employees, they cite that
certain wage claims are given priority as administrative expenses in bankruptcy and that any chapter
11 debtor has to pay ordinary wage claims in order to keep going and reorganize. However, these
assertions do not fully address the equity concerns raised by full priority. Why should non-adjusting
creditors always take second to secured creditors? A debtor's obligation to pay wage claims and to
continue to pay wages during reorganization does nothing to protect creditors who lose their jobs or
have unpaid claims because the bankruptcy estate is not sufficient to pay them. Again, whether
these unsecured creditors are in fact hurt by full priority can only be established with empirical
research that currently does not exist. Further, whether full priority is efficient regardless of con-
cerns for equitable treatment of non-adjusting creditors is also not known. This article presents the
political efficiency of full priority regardless of its economic efficiency. This political efficiency
might perhaps explain why such research appears unlikely to be done.
45. The revisions expand secured lenders' reach by permitting security interests in several
new types of collateral. For example, old Article 9 only covered deposit accounts insofar as they
constituted proceeds of other collateral. New Article 9 generally permits security interests in deposit
accounts as original collateral. Old Article 9 only applied to sales of receivables arising from goods
or services transactions (accounts). See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(D), 9-104, 9-102(a)(29) (1951). Old
Article 9 did not cover rights to payment arising from other transactions. Revised Article 9 covers a
broader spectrum of sales of receivables. The definition of "accounts" is expanded to include pay-
ment obligations arising from the sale, lease or license of all kinds of tangible and intangible prop-
erty. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2002). Revised Article 9 also covers commercial tort claims, sofi-
ware, and letter of credit rights, all of which were excluded under old Article 9. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
102(a)(75), 9-102(a)(13), 9-102(a)(51), 9-107 (2002).
46. Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOzo L. REv. 1759, 1760
(2004).
47. These failures are disturbing in light of recent empirical research showing that by the time
a company enters bankruptcy it likely has many poorly adjusting creditors. See Elizabeth Warren &
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L.
Rev. 1197, 1202-03 (2005).
48. S. 2798, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002).
49. See Statement of the Honorable William D. Delahunt of Massachusetts Regarding the




(NCCUSL), The Bond Market Association, The Depository Trust and
Clearing Corporation, and The Options Clearing Corporation.51 Its spon-
sors withdrew the bill in early September, 2002.52
Even if the federal bankruptcy code could be reformed to success-
fully protect non-adjusting creditors when companies enter the bank-
ruptcy system, such a reform would not help unsecured creditors who are
adversely affected by secured credit outside of the bankruptcy system.
Many secured lenders are concerned primarily with the control over a
debtor that they gain by taking an Article 9 lien - not their priority in the
event of bankruptcy. 53 A secured loan agreement contains covenants -
negative and affirmative - and sets forth events of default. These cove-
nants can include detailed criteria for debtor performance and behavior.
The notice and remedy provisions set forth in covenants permit a secured
creditor to police a debtor's behavior and even to step in and take certain
actions on behalf of the debtor if it fails to comply.
5 4
Scholars have argued that the control that secured creditors gain
over debtors benefits all creditors and equity holders as well.55 The se-
cured creditors are looking to be repaid, not to deal with a bankruptcy
trustee. 56 For example, Scott contends that monitoring efforts of a se-
cured creditor may also benefit unsecured creditors because a floating
lien creditor expects to be repaid out of the proceeds of the business, not
out of the collateral per se.57
However, Ronald Mann responds effectively that a secured credi-
tor's interests and direction to a company will not necessarily coincide
with unsecured creditors' interests.58 For example, what is good for the
company from a secured lender's perspective may be very harmful to
employees. Mann finds that secured creditors focus on the enhanced
leverage that security gives them to enforce payment. 59 A measure that
increases the likelihood that one creditor will be repaid may increase the
51. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death
of the Avoidance Powers Under Section 103 of the Durbin-Delahunt Bill: What Were They Think-
ing?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829, 1831-32 (2004) (arguing that the Durbin-Delahunt bill was much
more expansive in its attempt to avoid the interests of secured creditors in bankruptcy than the bill's
sponsors had indicated).
52. Id. at 1831.
53. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Secured Lending and Its Uncertain Future, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1789, 1795 (2004) ("As long as the security interest is perfected outside of bankruptcy's prefer-
ence window, everyone else must take a back seat.").
54. For an anecdotal example of how a secured creditor can control a debtor, see Douglas G.
Baird's discussion of how Warnaco's lenders directed it to appoint a new officer. Baird, supra note
53, at 1792-96.
55. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
901,903-04 (1986).
56. See, e.g., id. at 965.
57. ld. at 931.
58. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625,
654-55 (1997).
59. Id. at 649.
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risk of nonpayment to other creditors, as secured lenders do not account
for third party costs of secured credit in exercising their leverage to en-
force payment.6 °
The multi-trillion dollar securitization or structured finance industry
raises concerns for unsecured creditors that make plain old Article 9 se-
cured lending appear equitable in contrast.61 Recent debate over the effi-
ciency and fairness of asset securitization is similar to the debate over
full priority secured lending. 62 Proponents claim that securitization actu-
ally reduces costs for companies.63 Dissenters assert that the gains en-
joyed by some parties to a securitization result in losses to others. 64
Asset securitization is the practice of selling assets to a special pur-
pose entity (SPE) and then having the SPE either (i) assign the assets to
secure a loan that will enjoy a better rate than the originator or seller
could get, or (ii) sell securities backed by the pool of assets held by the
SPE.65 In either case, the costs of capital for the seller are reduced66 be-
cause once the assets are transferred to the SPE they are isolated from
other creditors of the seller. 67 The SPE is set-up to be remote from the
seller's bankruptcy, so that an investor or lender to the SPE does not
even need to participate in proceedings in the event of the seller's bank-
ruptcy. The SPE's assets are simply not part of the bankruptcy estate
since they were sold (and not just assigned as collateral for a loan).68
This type of financing raises some obvious questions. How does
the originator on the one hand sell assets such that they are no longer part
of the originator's estate, and yet on the other hand enjoy the proceeds of
a loan or investment in the SPE? The current law on how to respond to
60. Id.; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEx. L.
REv. 795, 818-19 (2004) (stating that a secured lender with a floating lien will not represent the
interests of unsecured creditors).
61. Secured lending and asset securitization have traditionally been treated like industries
with coterminous interests. Asset securitization or structured finance was viewed as a type of se-
cured financing. However, recent legislative efforts to isolate securitizers from the true sale doctrine
and even from Article 9 requirements indicate that the two types of financings have interests that are
more divergent than it once appeared. See Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 1759, 1760-62 (2004).
62. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6, at 1393.
63. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 55, at 931-33.
64. See Lynn LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23-30; Lynn LoPucki, The
Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55, 59-67 (1999) (arguing that securitiza-
tion is a negative-sum game).
65. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLERS HANDBOOK: ASSET
SECURITIZATION 2 (1997), http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/assetsec.pdf (for a definition of asset
securitization).
66. Some commentators claim that asset securitization provides as much as a 150 basis point
spread over basic secured lending. See Janger supra note 46 at 1769 (citing Lowell Bryan, The
Risks, Potential and Promise of Securitization, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 171-73 (Leon T.
Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996)).
67. See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 3-5 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996)
68. See II U.S.C. § 541 (2005).
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this question differs depending on the state in which the originator is
located. In addition, model Article 9 itself gives inconsistent directions
on whether courts can treat a transaction that the parties call a sale as a
secured loan in a securitization context. 69 Section 9-318(a) states that "a
debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or
promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collat-
eral sold., 70  This provision is meant to give securitizers assurance that
securitized assets will be deemed sold to the SPE as long as the parties
characterize the transfer from the originator to the SPE as a "sale". 7'
Yet, § 9-318(b) directs courts to look to the substance of a transaction to
distinguish a sale from a secured loan. 72 It finds - in contrast to subsec-
tion (a) - that a sale without perfection by the "buyer" leaves the seller
(or debtor) with an interest in the assets sufficient to come within reach
of the seller's creditors.73
Securitizers have insisted for some years that provisions like § 9-
318(a) - not to mention the ABS statutes discussed below - are not nec-
essary to establish that an SPE has purchased the assets it holds.74 As
long as certain true sale criteria recognized by courts and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board are met, they argue, a sale has occurred and
courts should not override the parties' intentions and find a secured
loan.75 A transaction that meets the recognized standards for a sale can
nonetheless permit the originator to offer some recourse to the SPE.
However, the inclusion of § 9-318(a) in revised Article 9 and the passage
of the ABS statutes indicate that asset securitizers may harbor doubt as to
the legal status of their transactions.76
69. Texas and Louisiana have enacted versions of Article 9 that function like ABS statutes to
resolve this inconsistency. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2003); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.109(e) (Vernon 2004).
70. U.C.C. § 9-318(a) (2002). Note that this section applies to sales of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes. Asset securitization itself is not limited to these
types of assets or collateral. Just about any type of Article 9 collateral can be securitized. However,
accounts and other payment rights are the most commonly pooled and securitized assets.
71. U.C.C § 9-318 cmt. 2 (2002).
72. U.C.C. § 9-318(b) (2002).
73. Id.
74. See Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy
Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287,288-90 (2001).
74. Id. at 288.
76. See In re LTV Steel, Inc., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). In this case Judge
Bodoh issued a preliminary opinion that ordered the "secured lenders to turnover to Debtor the cash
proceeds of the inventory and receivables" that the "Debtor," LTV Steel, Inc., had transferred to two
SPEs which in turn had entered into secured credit facilities with several lenders. This case sent
shock waves through the securitization industry, as Judge Bodoh's opinion found that LTV Steel had
an equitable interest in assets that it had sold to SPEs pursuant to an asset securitization. The opin-
ion was preliminary and issued by the bankruptcy court - not an appellate court - and it was nulli-
fied by the fact that LTV gave up its challenge to the securitization shortly after the opinion was
issued. See James J. White, Threats to Secured Lending and Asset Securitization: Panel 1: Asset
Securitization and Secured Lending: CHUCK AND STEVE'S PECCADILLO, 25 CARDOzO L. REV.
1743 (2004) (describing In re LTV Steel, Inc. and the inconsistency between §§ 9-318(a) and (b)).
Nonetheless, In re LTV Steel, Inc. has been the subject of much controversy and part of the inspira-
tion for the statutes discussed in the text accompanying note 80 infra.
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In most jurisdictions parties and courts faced with a challenge to
their asset securitization, look to the "true sale" doctrine to determine
whether a transaction is a sale or a loan. This doctrine, gleaned from the
law of contract and property, looks to the economic substance of a trans-
action - not just its characterization by the parties. 7 It does not draw
hard and fast lines as to when a sale has occurred. Rather, courts are
directed to assess whether, in a given transaction, the buyer has assumed
the risks and benefits of ownership or instead merely advanced capital in
exchange for a guaranteed return.79
Some jurisdictions have passed asset backed securities statutes
(ABS statutes) to facilitate securitization. These statutes are meant to
override the true sale doctrine and the murkiness of Article 9.80 The
ABS statutes state that a sale made in the context of a securitization
transaction shall be treated as a true sale regardless of economic sub-
stance, so long as the documents call the transaction a "sale. 81 The most
prominent such statute is Delaware's Asset-Backed Securities Facilita-
tion Act, which states that assets transferred in a securitization transac-
tion "shall be deemed to no longer be the property, assets or rights of the
transferor.,
82
Asset securitization can raise some serious concerns for unsecured
creditors of the originator. Edward J. Janger points out that a traditional
secured lender cannot avoid state law rules surrounding foreclosure.83
They must comply with Article 9's rules for perfection, which provide
notice of their interest to third parties.84 Property that is assigned to a
secured lender is still part of a debtor's bankruptcy estate until the se-
cured party establishes its priority and takes its collateral or is given ade-
quate protection by the bankruptcy trustee. 85 Asset securitization, on the
other hand, enables companies to move assets out of reach of the bank-
ruptcy estate all together.86 Furthermore, companies operating under an
ABS statute can accomplish this without having to provide any notice to
third parties.87
77. See Stephen J. Lubben, Beyond True Sales: Securitization and Chapter 11, 1 N.Y.U. J. L.
& Bus. 89, 95-97 (2004).
78. Id. at 96.
79. Id.
80. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A
(2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (2005); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-10 (2005); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.109(e) (2005).
81. For a discussion of the differences among these various statutes, see Janger supra note 46,
at 1764-68.
82. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(1).
83. See Janger, supra note 46, at 1767.
84. Id.
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2005).




Those who extol the virtues of asset securitization remind naysayers
that the originator sells the assets to be securitized to an SPE for cash or
other consideration in a sale transaction. 8 Therefore, the creditors of the
originator should not complain. The assets have not been assigned to a
prior creditor, but exchanged for other assets - most often cash - of
equivalent value. Securitization's skeptics are not placated by this re-
sponse. Once the originator's assets are exchanged for cash, the origina-
tor can dispose of that cash in any way it deems appropriate. 89 For ex-
ample, the originator could pay dividends to shareholders with the cash,
circumventing creditors with claims that would have been enforceable
against the assets sold to the SPE. The investors in the SPE have no in-
centive to monitor an originator once the true sale transaction is com-
plete. 90
There are at least some securitizations and some secured loans that
are inefficient. A financing is inefficient when a debtor or originator
uses the proceeds in a way that reduces the firm's value.91 Scholars can-
not prove whether these inefficient transactions: (i) represent a small
exception to a norm of value-adding transactions, or (ii) reveal dubious
incentives that make these types of financing attractive to businesses in
the first place. 92 In other words, the fact that securitizations and full pri-
ority secured loans permit businesses to shift costs to non-consenting
third parties may be the reason for their popularity.
B. Common Sense Deference to Capital in the Face of Inconclusive De-
bate
Proponents of full priority and asset securitization concede that they
cannot demonstrate that these modes of financing are efficient, nor do
they offer satisfying responses to concerns about fairness and distributive
justice that these transactions raise. In the face of this uncertainty, recent
legislative trends only encourage asset securitization. 93 Similarly, law-
makers seem to have ignored concerns about non-adjusting creditors
raised by LoPucki and Warren, Bebchuck and Fried during debates over
reform of Article 9.
88. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN.
L. REv. 1 (1999) (responding to Lynn LoPucki's assertion that asset securitization constitutes judg-
ment proofing by the originator); but see Lynn LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proof-
ing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55, 59-67 (1999).
89. See Schwarcz, supra note 88, at 18-20.
90. See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76
TEx. L. REv. 595 (1998).
91. For an explanation of overinvestment, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron,
25 CARDozo L. REv. 1539, 1555-57 (2004).
92. Id. at 1553-55.
93. Another example of this trend is the attempt of securitizers to insert into the bankruptcy
code a safe harbor provision for sales made pursuant to a securitization. See Janger, supra note 46,
at 1776.
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Many scholars who observe this trend explain it in terms of com-
mon sense. Consider William H. Widen's common sense approach to
his Article 9 scholarship:
I can design models in which secured credit is efficient and I can de-
sign models in which it is not efficient. Thus, in my view, what you
have is really just a political choice. Once a political choice is made
as to which social relationships to allow (e.g., absolute priority se-
cured credit), I am in favor of whatever rules let me create the social
relationship at lowest cost without really worrying too much about
whether we should have a rule that allows the relationship to form in
the first place.
94
To whom does Widen concede the political choice to permit full prior-
ity? Widen finds that absent more certain evidence of particular harms to
non-adjusting creditors, the debate over efficiency is undecideable. As
long as this debate is undecidable, efficiency should not be a primary
consideration in addressing questions of grand reform to Article 9. It
does not make sense to focus on efficiency in a political climate commit-
ted to expand access to capital through full priority.
Similarly, James J. White finds debate over the efficiency or fair-
ness of Article 9 largely irrelevant so long as businesses and financial
institutions continue to passionately embrace full priority.95 In stating his
dismissal of any inefficiency claims, he writes:
I conclude that [Article 9] is probably efficient .... The pervasive-
ness of security not only in modem industrial society but also in more
primitive and ancient societies supports the argument. Never has se-
curity been required by law; always it has been chosen by debtors
and creditors. Were it inefficient, why and how has it persisted for so
long, in so many ways, in so many places? 96
White chooses to ignore obvious responses here, including the response
that debtors chose secured credit precisely because it enables them to
transfer costs to non-adjusting creditors. He speaks of secured credit
generally without recognizing that Article 9's absolute priority schema is
relatively new and has been highly controversial. Further, he implies
that Article 9 is simply the latest evolution of a longstanding financial
practice, rather than a creation of legal scholars and lawmakers fulfilling
a political commitment to capital.
94. E-mail from William H. Widen to Heather L. Hughes (June 14, 2005) (on file with au-
thor); see also William H. Widen, Lord of the Liens: Towards Greater Efficiency in Secured Syndi-
cated Lending, 25 CARDoZO L. REv. 1577, 1641 (2004).
95. See White, supra note 9.
96. Id. at 2089-90.
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II. CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON FINANCE
What explains lawmakers' consistent deference to secured creditors
in the face of unresolved concerns over full priority and asset securitiza-
tion? Does the public offer an opinion or consensus on these transactions
that justifies this deference? What enables some legal scholars to regard
the political choice to permit certain relationships among non-adjusting
creditors and powerful investors as settled, such that it is beyond the
scope of the debate?
This section takes up these questions by exploring the current state
of public discourse on finance and presenting the concept of an imagined
community of capitalists with which non-adjusting creditors identify.
This section analyzes the socio-political context that seems to paralyze
lawmakers and non-adjusting creditors who might otherwise oppose the
legislative trend towards expanding secured lending and asset securitiza-
tion. It presents a political efficiency enjoyed by Article 9 and the ABS
statutes that seems to simply overwhelm issues of economic efficiency or
equity.
The reporters for the drafting committee that completed revisions to
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1999 have declared Article
9 to be "the ... most publicly vetted uniform law project to date." 97 Yet,
not surprisingly, there are few references to Article 9 in the past fifteen
years in any serials of general distribution, even during the late nineties
and in 2001 when the law was overhauled and the revised version
adopted by states. 98 Why is an overhaul of the rules governing secured
debt finance, a major source of capital for business, absent from main-
stream business reporting?
97. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC
Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1400 (1999). By "publicly
vetted" Harris and Mooney may mean passed by many legislatures without dissent or material alter-
nation. Commentators such as Lynn LoPucki reject the assertion that revised Article 9 was publicly
vetted in the sense of being crafted in response to a range of commentary.
98. This statement is based upon the following three searches: (1) LexisNexis, News &
Business, News All (English, full text), search terms: Article 9; Nexis, News & Business, News,
Major Papers, date restricted 01/01/94 through 01/01/03, search terms: "article 9" and (UCC or
"uniform commercial code"); (2) LexisNexis, News & Business, News, Major Papers, search terms:
"article 9" and (UCC or "uniform commercial code"); and (3) LexisNexis, News & Business, News,
Magazine Stories, Combined, search terms: "article 9" and (u.c.c. or "uniform commercial code").
For an analysis of the references to Article 9 that these searches produces, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 124-34. In addition to the few substantive references analyzed in infra Part ILA, the
newspaper searches produced the following results: reference to Article 9 in obituaries of a com-
mercial law practitioner and UCC advocate, announcements of professional conferences for lawyers
and business groups on the changes to Article 9, alumni notes citing graduates who co-authored a
book on the UCC, and other passing references. Again, in addition to the references analyzed in Part
ILA, magazine coverage was limited to reports on Article 9 appearing in the American Bar Associa-
tion magazine and other publications geared towards industry participants such as Business Credit,
The Bond Buyer, ABA Banking Journal, American Banker, Purchasing, American Business Law
Journal, The Journal of Lending and Credit Risk Management, and various state bar journals. The
coverage of Article 9 in these publications is devoted almost entirely to describing the revisions to
Article 9 and how the revisions affect various, everyday business practices.
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Homer Kripke finds that Article 9 is too complex for widespread
understanding and that it lacks "popular appeal." He states, "The Code
was 'lawyers' legislation,' largely outside the potential understanding of
most members of state legislatures .. . .Difficult legislation like this
without popular appeal can seldom be passed without a broad consensus
of agreement of interested parties." 99  Banks, finance companies and
other private trade groups, in Kripke's view, were the universe of inter-
ested parties., 00
Kripke's statement that most state legislators - not to mention the
general public - cannot understand Article 9 due to its technical diffi-
culty continues to pervade writings on the UCC. Yet, the bankruptcy
code, which is arguably more technical and complex than Article 9, re-
ceives attention in popular sources.' 0 ' In fact, media representations
have impacted the legislative process.102 Melissa Jacoby has analyzed
how media treatment of bankruptcy issues has affected the course of
Congress's recent bankruptcy reform efforts. 10 3  Some scholars reason
that if unsecured creditors could understand their relationship to the law
of secured transactions they might be able to organize to oppose full pri-
ority secured credit. 10 4 The critique of business journalism that follows
begins to excavate the dynamics of the information asymmetry that per-
sists between secured creditors and third parties affected by Article 9.
Many scholars have studied the role of media in shaping public dis-
course and policy. 105 News media have a documented agenda-setting
power.l°6 Some even refer to the media as the "fourth branch" of Ameri-
can government. 1 7 This article accepts these findings about the power of
news media and applies them to media on business and finance. How-
ever, the approach here to the relationship between media and law is
99. See Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code, U. ILL. L. F. 321, 327 (1962), quoted in Edward J. Janger, supra note 2, at 632.
100. See Kripke, supra note 99.
101. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media, 41




104. See infra Part III.B.
105. See generally GARY C. WOOD, PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICAL MEDIA 237
(1997) (asserting that we cannot assess the forms of American political discourse without consider-
ing popular media); Robert H. Giles, The Media and Government Regulation in the Great Tradition
of Muckraking, 11 KANS. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 567, 570 (2002) (describing the formative role of news
media in the development of policy and legislation); SIDNEY KRAUS & DENNIS DAVIS, THE EFFECTS
OF MASS COMMUNICATION ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1976) (discussing the centrality of media to
policy making); TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION (1998) (arguing that news is a political institution).
106. See Everett Rogers et al., A Paradigmatic History of Agenda-Setting Research, in DO THE
MEDIA GOVERN? POLITICIANS, VOTERS, AND REPORTERS IN AMERICA 225 (Shanto Iyengar &
Richard Reeves, eds., 1997); Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Func-
tion of the Mass Media, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 176, 176-85 (1972).
107. See DOUGLASS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 13 (1959) (describing
news media's power); Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1093.
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different from most prior approaches. This article attempts to identify
and explore the causes and implications of an absence of reporting on
commercial law and an absence of journalistic perspective on finance. It
proposes that these absences indicate the presence of a dominant, imag-
ined community of capitalists that accepts obedience of finance experts'
rules and predictions as consonant with public interest. 
08
A. Business So-Called Journalism and the Reign of Finance Experts
Contemporary discourse on finance bears resemblance to the views
of religion in sixteenth century Italy presented in Carlo Ginzburg's book,
The Cheese and the Worms. 109 Ginzburg features a miller who is perse-
cuted for having his own opinions about the Bible in a society where
reading and interpreting the Bible is the sole province of an educated
clergy.110 Imagine a non-executive employee of a publicly traded com-
pany looking at his or her employer's disclosures on the Securities and
Exchange Commission website and then raising a stink about executive
decisions to assign the employer's assets to a secured creditor, or about
the employer's current loan to value ratio.
Many unsecured creditors likely do not even identify with the con-
cept that they are creditors of a company that have a stake in the rules
governing secured finance. Businesses can fail at their attempts to in-
crease wealth for society as a whole, but the financing mechanisms and
structures that they employ along the way are not directly critiqued. Sto-
ries of bankrupt entities that have left their employees pension-less and
their unsecured creditors without recourse abound. But these stories
generally decline to mention - let alone critique or analyze - the financ-
ings that preceded the loss of pensions. Companies' financing decisions
are only criticized when they involve fraudulent or criminal dealings.
Stories that portray businesses simply using Article 9 to assign their as-
sets to secured creditors, rendering themselves judgment proof, to obtain
loans that they can then use to engage in risky behavior, are virtually
impossible to find.
The scenario of a secured creditor taking all of the assets of a debtor
leaving tort claimants and employees out of luck is simple and provoca-
tive enough for widespread consumption. The image of a family forced
from home after foreclosure of a mortgage is culturally salient. Stories
about consumer debt and the consequences of credit extended to indi-
viduals are common. Yet, stories that critique the effects on unsecured
108. Again, in a formal sense, the absence of one thing does not prove the existence of another.
However, it is very important to explore to the greatest extent possible how a law with controversial
distributive consequences stays under the radar of public opinion.
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creditors of businesses' decisions to finance their operations or projects
with secured credit are not in the news.
Popular writing indicates that Americans feel a collective, personal
stake in businesses' financing options. Bill Wasik of Harper's Magazine
states,
"[Business writing today] is the serialized fiscal bildungsroman of
you, the reader: you invest your 401k, . . . the reader-investor be-
comes, implicitly, the protagonist.... That crooked financier has ab-
sconded with your money .... Try, for example, to imagine a col-
umn in The New Republic devoted to how to contact one's congress-
man, .... or Rolling Stone with fold-out bass tablature."' l
Finance experts' learned and moneyed status authorizes them to shape
the law on secured finance. But these experts are not speaking in an iso-
lated UCC drafting forum that disregards social context. Rather, their
task - offering businesses as much debt financing as possible - is of
wide-ranging, personal relevance to the constituencies of the state legis-
latures to which they appeal. Scholars like LoPucki and Warren have
tried to persuade UCC drafters and state legislatures to reform the law on
secured credit. In doing so, they are speaking to representatives of a
public that feels personally dependent on the business growth associated
with secured transactions.
The protagonist of a story is its leading character or principal figure.
In reporting on business and finance the reader becomes the implied pro-
tagonist in the sense that this reporting implicitly casts the reader's own
financial position as the sine qua non of relevance. The reader is pre-
sumed to be a participant in capital markets or real estate markets. Main-
stream media report the activities of various enterprises with a view to-
wards providing information that will enable the implied protagonist to
understand market trends and evolving business practices in order to
protect and enhance her own position. 112
For example, go to the internet homepage for National Public Ra-
dio's popular Marketplace program produced by American Public Me-
dia."l3 Marketplace assumes its listeners to be willing participants in the
activity of capitalism. The following examples are taken from that
page's content on January 11, 2005. First, notice that we see weather
symbols next to each of DOW, NASDAQ, and S&P. On January 11 we
see three little clouds indicating that market performance is negative."
4
111. Bill Wasik, Dismal Beat: The March of Personal-Finance Journalism, HARPER'S MAG.,
Mar. 1, 2003, at 82. (critiquing the narrow range of perspectives and lack of journalistic distance in
reporting on finance and business) (hereinafter Wasik, Dismal Beat).
112. See Wasik, supra note 111.





These symbols naturalize the market. In the world of Marketplace, ma-
jor markets are like the weather: constantly relevant to daily life, larger
than all of us, and part of the forces of nature.
Further, just above the weather report, we have a headline that
reads: "Playing economics with China."'"1 5 Apparently economics is a
game we can "play." Yet games are played by players who consent to
participate and know the rules of the game. Can we speak of economics
as a "game" when its alleged players are nations compelled to reckon
with one another, and whose decisions have grave, life-long conse-
quences for many who are never permitted to play? We learn in the ac-
companying blurb that "while the U.S. and Chinese economies have fu-
eled the global economic growth of the past decade, commentator Robin
Bew believes the fun won't last in 2005. '116 Global economic growth
sure is "fun" - if, of course, you are an investor who profits from expan-
sions in production and not an under-compensated worker whose labor
enables growth the benefits of which accrue primarily to others.
Move now to CNN.com. 117 It appears that CNN.com does not regu-
larly devote journalistic efforts to reporting on business and finance.
Instead, it has partnered with Money magazine to create "CNNMoney" -
a page of "news" provided by Money for CNN's audience. 18 As one
might guess from its title, CNNMoney does not venture any reporting
that questions the objectives or social consequences of business or fi-
nance. Instead, we read stories with the same presumption of the reader
as protagonist, as capitalist participant. A headline alerts us to "The dark
side of the boom."' 19 The boom here is rising real estate prices and the
dark side is that "as home values rise, so do property taxes."'' 20 We are
given "seven tips for easing the sting."' 12 1 This story projects the image
of a readership of home owners. 22 The bad news is that the reader has to
deal with a higher tax bill. 23 The "dark side of the boom" for those un-
able to afford a home - namely, that as prices rise this goal falls farther
and farther out of reach - does not receive attention. Part II.B explores
how this presumed readership functions as an imagined community of
capitalists with which many unsecured creditors identify.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., CNN.com Home Page, http://www.cnn.com.
118. See, e.g., CNNMoney Home Page, http://money.cnn.com.
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Reporting that mentions commercial law is sparse, 124 and the report-
ing that does exist tends to further the image of the reader as investor-
protagonist. For example, two stories that reference the UCC in the New
York Times inform readers who own homes in co-op buildings about
rules for making loans to the Co-ops. 125 A question-and-answer column
in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch references Article 9 as it responds to con-
cerns of a reader who has sold a car to a friend who has failed to pay in
accordance with their agreement. 126  Finally, a Seattle Times business
columnist reports on a local bank that plans to profit from changes to
Article 9 by offering electronic search and filing services. 12 7 This article
simply describes the bank's plan to offer filing services.128  This story
appears to inform investors of the filing service in hopes of receiving
their business.
Defying the general trend is one story from the Chicago Tribune
that reports on unsecured trade creditors who lost money doing business
with companies who assigned assets to a secured lender that subse-
quently foreclosed on the assets. 129 In this rare exposure of the effects of
the UCC on smaller unsecured creditors, freelance reporter Joanne
Cleaver reports that some venture capital firms convert their failing eq-
uity investments to secured debt and then foreclose on their loans.
130
Cleaver presents a photographer who is owed $1,500 and will not be
paid, and a visual communications firm that was forced to write off a
debt of $177,000 and fire six of its nine employees. Both losses are ex-
plicitly attributed to the status of secured creditors under the law.
13 1
Cleaver explains that "one technique the venture firms are using is to
extend a bridge loan to the firm and then foreclose on it under Article 9
124. See supra note 55. Two stories in the Financial Times (London) report on proposed
changes to collateral security rules in England and reference Article 9 as a successful model statute.
See A. H. Hermann, Business Law: Credit and the Quickening Pace of Change, FIN. TIMES, July 10,
1986 at 10, available at 1986 WLNR 575736; Editorial Comment, Creditors in a Legal Jungle, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1983. at 14, available at 1983 WLNR 309783.
125. See Jay Romano, YOUR HOME: New Rules on Loans for Co-ops, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2001, § 11, at 5; Jay Romano, YOUR HOME: Share-Loan Payoff in a Co-op, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1999, § 11, at 5. LexisNexis maintains in its commercial law database a file called "The New York
Times - Commercial Law Stories." However, a search of this file for "Article 9" yields no results.
A search for "unsecured w/s creditor!" is also fruitless; "security interest" produces the two stories
by Jay Romano cited above. A search for "uniform commercial code" yields several stories which
indicate that The New York Times is aware that the UCC exists, but does not regard it as fodder for
critical discussion. The lack of reporting on commercial law that appears in this file may result from
the way in which LexisNexis maintains the file, rather than from a dearth of attention to the subject
in The New York Times generally. The fruitlessness of similar searches in the general news database
corroborates the accuracy of the file-specific searches.
126. See John Roska, Signed Papers Must Include "Security Interest" to Repossess, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 2002, at 2.
127. See Stephen H. Dunphy, The Newsletter, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, at C 1.
128. Id.
129. See Joanne Cleaver, New Debt-free Life for Shaky Firms; Venture Capitalists are Employ-
ing Legal and Financial Tools to Salvage Investors' Money, Often Leaving Smaller Creditors in the





of the Uniform Commercial Code."' 132 She makes clear that secured
creditors are first to be paid when a company is in trouble and that
smaller, unsecured creditors get only what is left over.' 
33
Cleaver's story does provide a journalistic perspective on business
practices. It presents a few companies using Article 9 to shift assets to
secured creditors and out of the hands of non-adjusting creditors. Unfor-
tunately, it is one 980-word piece in a huge volume of reporting on busi-
ness and finance that generally fails to report on companies' financing
practices that harm non-adjusting creditors. Also, the article's subject is
limited to predatory "venture capitalists." Cleaver implies that the fi-
nancing practice she describes occurs when these aggressive speculators
are looking to salvage investors' money using any and all available
means. 134 The fact that banks and other investors routinely take full pri-
ority security interests in the assets of businesses to the potential detri-
ment of various non-adjusting creditors is still missing from the main-
stream media landscape.
Plenty of reporting informs us on the fall-out of financial failures.
Stories abound about lay-offs, about decimated pension funds and irre-
sponsible accounting, about corrupt executives, about consolidation of
major enterprises. Again, these stories assume the reader is an investor.
As Wasik observes, these stories feel relevant because the reader's own
retirement funds might be involved. 1
35
Why do the media decline to report thoroughly and critically on fi-
nancings that affect the courses that businesses take and the implications
of those courses for a range of interested parties? Why do the media
ignore recent, major changes to the law on secured finance that will ag-
gravate the effect of financial failure on labor and other non-consenting
or non-adjusting creditors? Stories about lay-offs or unemployment after
bankruptcy read like "people stories" - stories about individuals and
communities - not stories appropriate for the financial pages. The "peo-
ple" will want to hear about a community's hardship. But are they up to
hearing about the structure and legal rights that make up the financings
that result in community hardship? No, no - that's way too complex and
technical. The fact that a statute exists that enables companies to assign
all assets to secured lenders, placing them beyond the reach of other
creditors goes unmentioned in the people-friendly, community story.
These stories do not question the validity or desirability of the enterprise
(created and enabled by statute) concerned solely with profit. Busi-





135. Wasik, supra note 111.
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LTV Steel, Inc. is an example of a large employer that entered into
several secured debt financings, went into bankruptcy several times, and
finally shut down, leaving many thousands of retirees' pensions and
health benefits in jeopardy. 136 Coverage of the bankruptcies and eventual
shutdown of LTV Steel included numerous community interest stories.
137
Many of these stories do not even mention the financings that enabled
secured creditors to take LTV's assets ahead of workers and retirees de-
pendent on company health care benefits and pensions.1 38  The stories
that do mention secured debt and explain that workers and retirees can-
not get paid until secured lenders are paid in full report this fact with no
explanation or critique. 39 The idea that certain laws create and protect
secured creditors' rights - let alone that workers could organize to op-
pose the one-sided formulation of such laws - does not appear in the
reporting.
Granted, cash did flow to LTV companies with employees and other
creditors as a result of LTV's securitizations1 40 Whether this cash flow
should have adequately protected workers - and why it ultimately did not
- raises more questions the press declined to explore.
One reporter, Peter Krouse, does venture an explanation of how
LTV securitized its accounts receivable in the Cleveland Plain Dealer's
coverage of In re LTV Steel Company.141 This controversial and well-
publicized case considered the status of assets sold to a bankruptcy re-
mote special purpose vehicle for purposes of securitization1 42 In this
case the bankruptcy court allowed LTV Steel to use funds collected from
assets it had previously "sold" to a special purpose vehicle. 43 Krouse
explains the securitization of LTV's receivables as follows:
LTV Sales bought the accounts receivable of LTV Steel and used
them as collateral to borrow from Abbey National .... LTV Steel
wanted to borrow money at a lower rate, but the lender, Abbey Na-
tional, was concerned about repayment. When LTV switched its col-
lateral to LTV Sales Finance, that sheltered Abbey from LTV Steel's
troubles.'"
Krouse keeps his description to a bare minimum. His willingness to ex-
plain structured finance to his lay readership is refreshing, but Krouse
136. See, e.g., Jim Weiker, Steel Era, and a Way of Life, Ends in Cleveland, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 9, 2001, at 1A.
137. See, e.g., id.
138. See, e.g., id.
139. See, e.g., Jennifer Scott Cimperman, LTV's Court Battle: Who Will Survive, Who Will be
Shuttered, CLE. PLAIN DEALER, July 7, 2002, at A7; Peter Krouse, British Bank Cries Foul in LTV
Ruling, CLE. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 2, 2001, at IC.
140. Cimperman, supra note 139.
141. Krouse, supra note 139; 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
142. In re LTV, 274 B.R. at 285-87.
143. Id. at 278-81.
144. Krouse, supra note 139.
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and others at the Cleveland Plain Dealer145 never explain that the sale of
LTV Steel's assets to LTV Sales Finance meant that these assets were to
be stripped from the company that actually employs workers at the plant.
The concept of debt finance as judgment-proofing schema - as a way to
shelter assets from claims by LTV Steel's workers or other unsecured
creditors is completely absent.
Finance industry experts, of course, wrote and read plenty on LTV
Steel. Reports on LTV's financings appear in publications circulated
among finance experts such as Asset Securitization Report, Investment
Dealers Digest, CFO Magazine, Bankruptcy Strategist and others.
146
These publications are specifically written and published for those who
participate in and already understand structured finance. They do not
expand the public discourse on structured finance to the greater public.
The scope and perspective in the reporting on LTV's bouts with
bankruptcy typify reporting on financing and bankruptcy of large com-
panies. For example, The Miami Herald offers similar fare in its cover-
age of Winn-Dixie. 147 On September 1, 2004, The Miami Herald ran a
story entitled "Winn-Dixie shares plunge amid talk of bankruptcy. 148
The story reports that shareholders have been selling their interests in
Winn-Dixie and that the company is making plans to avert bankruptcy.
149
About three-fourths of the way through, we learn that "in late June, lend-
ers agreed to give the company a $600 million loan. The three-year deal
includes a $400 million revolving credit line and a $200 million letter of
credit.' 50 The fact that this loan is secured by the assets of the company
is not mentioned. Of course, since the security interest itself goes
unmentioned, there is no reference to the possible effects of Winn-
Dixie's credit facility on the company's unsecured creditors and equity
holders. The loan appears as a glimmer of hope that the company might
survive, that is has bought some time in which to turn itself around so
that it may yet be a good investment. We learn that "'steps are being
145. The Plain Dealer ran a number of stories on LTV Steel (which had a large steel plant in
Cleveland). See, e.g., supra note 139.
146. These publications devoted ample energy to assessing the health and future of the securi-
tization industry after In re LTV Steel. See, e.g., Kevin Donovan, Is There Safety in Structure When
Structures Can Change?, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Mar. 15, 2004 (discussing uncertainty sur-
rounding securitization and citing the bankruptcy of LTV Steel); Michael Gregory, Lessons of Risk
in AAA-Rated ABS, In the Rare Bankruptcy, it's Servicers, Not Collateral, That are the Problem,
INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Mar. 15, 2004 (discussing the role of servicers when a company that
has securitized assets entered bankruptcy and citing LTV Steel); Barbara M. Goldstein, Decision of
Note; How Secure Are Your Securitizations? LTV Case Raises Important Issues for Creditors,
BANKR. STRATEGIST, Apr. 2001, at 1 (discussing asset securitization and the impact ofIn re LTV
Steel, Inc.).
147. Josh Fineman, Winn-Dixie Shares Plunge Amid Talk of Bankruptcy, MIAMI HERALD,
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taken to shrink the company and strengthen remaining operations.'
' ' 51
The nature of these steps is not relevant - only that the steps exist, indi-
cating that Winn-Dixie shares may be a good buy at their reduced price.
Imagine the alternative headline: "Winn-Dixie Assigns Away As-
sets as It Staves Off Bankruptcy." Such a story could report that Winn-
Dixie's recent financing assigns all assets to its lenders and out of reach
of its non-adjusting creditors should the company ultimately fail. Jour-
nalists could report whenever businesses with significant numbers of
non-adjusting creditors enter into secured credit facilities. Such stories
might read: "Manufacturing Co. Assigns All Assets to Bank, Taking
Loan to Fund Activities. 152 These stories would treat as news the event
of a businesses' assignment of all of its assets to secure a loan.
Even reporting on Enron's financings failed to broadcast the basic
ethical issues described in Part IA above surrounding asset securitiza-
tions. 153 Enron was criticized for abusing securitization; its methods of
accounting for securitizations were examined. But statements criticizing
securitization itself were few and far between. 154 Rather, securitization
industry participants were quick to distinguish the practice of securitiza-
tion generally - which they present as common and efficient - and En-
ron's failures to accurately account for assets it transferred to special
purpose entities. Lobbying organizations like the American Securitiza-
tion Forum arose after Enron to protect the industry from onerous regula-
tion.
In a story that is exemplary of its Enron coverage 155 The New York
Times reported the following:
151. Id.
152. Such a story might also alert readers to possible deficiencies in Manufacturing Co.'s
liability insurance coverage.
153. Asset securitization has received widespread attention when it occurs in a public finance
context - primarily, as states securitize tobacco settlement payments. In this context, critics are
quick to point out that the state is taking and spending cash upfront to fix short term budget crises,
relinquishing its rights to future revenue. See e.g., Dennis Chaptman, Tobacco Money is a Quick
Fix; State 's Planning Called Weak, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 5, 2002, at B 1; American Lung
Association of California, In the Spotlight: Securitizing Tobacco Settlement Funds, Questions and
Answers, www.califomialung.org/spotlight/securitizing000710.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
The policy considerations surrounding this type of securitization differ significantly from those
surrounding a business asset securitization. For example, the state may not want to depend on future
revenue that is tied to particular industry performance. Despite differences, the fact that securitiza-
tion is openly criticized in a public finance context makes the lack of serious criticism in a business
finance context even more perplexing.
154. Reporting on Enron's failure and suspect accounting practices did offer a few statements
that speak to ethical concerns of securitization generally. These stories, however, are a small minor-
ity and have largely disappeared since reporting on the scandal has diminished. See e.g., Janet Kidd
Stewart, Flashing Yellow on Asset-Backed Debt, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2002, at C1; Mary Vanac, Now
Investors are Wondering Whether They Can Trust the Numbers ofAny Company That Uses Off-the-
Balance-Sheet Arrangements; Enron Shows Your Ignorance Can Hurt You, CLE. PLAIN DEALER,
Apr. 3, 2002, at C1.
155. E.g., cf Riva D. Atlas, Enron 's Many Strands: The Law Firm; A Law Firm's 2 Roles Risk
Suit by Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at C I; Floyd Norris & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many
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'Enron gives a very useful tool a bad name for no reason,' said
Ronald Gilson, a law professor at both Stanford and Columbia.
'Structured finance is used for a zillion different and worthwhile pur-
poses. The problem is Enron used it to create a structure that was
genuinely not transparent, to hide things.' 156
The story continues:
[Gilson's] concern was echoed by David M. Eisenberg, a partner at
the law firm Simpson Thacher & Bartlett and a pioneer in securitiza-
tion, the process of creating asset-backed securities. 'Any financing
techniques can be abused,' Mr. Eisenberg said. 'Securitization is not
special in that. But true securitization is about transferring risk to
others - and Enron only appeared to be doing that, when in reality
they were retaining the risk themselves.' 157
This story offers no statements to counter these characterizations of secu-
ritization. The problem with Enron was that it just did not get its asset
securitizations right.
Given the volume of information provided by CNNMoney, Market-
place, NPR, The New York Times and other similar sources, the uniform-
ity of vantage point in the business and finance stories of these sources
raises questions. Obviously The New York Times, CNN and NPR are
well aware of wealth disparities. In addition, as major providers of jour-
nalistic reporting, people within these organizations are aware of the
concept of objectivity, of distance from a subject, essential to decent
reporting. Why are wealth disparities and critical distance from one's
subject suddenly ignored when the subject is business finance?
Business writing reports on business successes and failures for an
audience of self-interested players or pawns in a game the objectives of
which are beyond questioning. Wasik states that with few exceptions
"business writers base their work on . . .the idea that, as the ultimate
authors of business, . . . Americans need not be lectured about its plots,
themes, and subtexts. ' ' 58 Contemporary business "journalism" suggests
that Americans view finance as the province of experts and large finan-
Strands: The Accounting; Fuzzy Rules of Accounting and Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl;
Kurt Eichenwald, After Enron, Bankers Weigh Clients' Motives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at Cl.
156. Diana B. Henriques, The Brick Stood Up Before. But Now?, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2002,
§ 3, at31.
157. Id.
158. Wasik, supra note 111. Wasik writes that business reporting has not always been so
monolithic. He contrasts contemporary writing on business to writing in Fortune magazine in the
1930s: "Reading the Depression-era Fortune at seventy years' remove, one is struck not by the
magazine's purported progressivism ... but instead by its critical distance. Although aimed at the
businessman, Fortune never pretended to serve his immediate self-interest. It held industry apart as
an object of analysis." Wasik, supra note 111. Wasik attributes the change in practices of reporting
on business to "democratization" of stock ownership. Id. An analysis of whether contemporary
discourse on finance differs from that of the past, and the causes of such difference, are beyond the
scope of this article.
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cial institutions as our keepers, our sources of capital and livelihood.
What is scandalous about Enron, or insider trading, is that individuals
have taken advantage of the corporate form and engaged in dishonesty
for illicit personal gain. The idea of the corporation itself as paternal, as
having interests that are aligned with public interests, remains extremely
salient.
The absence of critical distance in widely circulated writing about
business evidences the hegemony of the idea that business growth is
Americans' best and even our only source of economic and social stabil-
ity. 159 This hegemony obviates the space in which we might find in ref-
erence to Article 9 the irony or emotional response that socially conten-
tious topics command. Without critical distance, conversations about
secured financing will continue to seem boring, neutral, technical and
irrelevant to those not invited into the board room or the drafting session
despite secured financing's broad social implications.
B. Unsecured Creditors and an Imagined Community of Individual
Investors, Large and Small
The lack of critical distance in reporting on business and finance is
a form of collective disregard of severe socio-economic inequalities
among Americans. This article proposes that this disregard enables se-
cured creditors to present full priority secured credit as a system that
furthers the public's best interest. Where does this collective disregard
come from and how does it persist?
Building on the work of Benedict Anderson 160 and others, this arti-
cle hypothesizes that contemporary reporting on business and finance
indicates an imagined community of capitalists or investors. This com-
munity of investors is imagined because its members assume commonal-
ities with one another despite the fact that they may never meet or even
have any contact with one another. It is a community (as discussed in
greater detail below) because those who do and those who aspire to par-
ticipate in capitalism as investors share a unified field of exchange that
generates comradeship despite vast differences and inequalities among
members. The myth of this community is that everyone belongs. Media
on business and finance further the myth of opportunity - of an open
playing field - for financial gain. This myth fuels the imaginings that
encourage even those who struggle financially to identify as members.
Contemporary reporting on business and finance shows an uncriti-
cal deference to businesses' objectives, to finance experts and the capi-
159. Again, hegemony means a system or set of ideas that is so dominant that people living
within the system of ideas have internalized its premises and values to the point where those values
become invisible. See supra text accompanying note 17.
160. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (2nd ed. 1983).
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talist values they express.' 6 1  How might we infer the existence of an
imagined community from this reporting? What are this community's
salient features? Further, how does the concept of an imagined commu-
nity of investors affect legal scholars' responses to Article 9 and the
UCC drafting process? The remainder of this article pursues these ques-
tions.
Benedict Anderson's book, Imagined Communities162 has widely in-
fluenced scholars in many fields, including many legal scholars. 163 This
article relates Anderson's concept of imagined community and the lack
of critical distance in public discourse on finance to critique legal schol-
ars' responses to the expansion of full priority secured credit.
Anderson develops his concept of imagined communities in a study
of the rise of the nation-state. 164 This article extracts the concept of
imagined communities from Anderson's work in order to name and to
capture the sense of collective identification with the needs of capital that
enables secured creditors' control over laws governing secured transac-
tions.
Though this article is by no means a thorough reading or application
of Anderson's thesis, it can be read to imply a relationship between an
imagined community of capitalists and the identity of the United States
161. See supra Part II.A.
162. See ANDERSON, supra note 160. Anderson's idea of the nation as imagined community
has widely influenced the study of nationalism in the twenty years since its publication. Though the
study of nationalism has evolved significantly since 1983, the idea of imagined community as a basis
for national consciousness remains central to many scholars' understandings of the subject. Scholars
of nationalism describe Anderson's book as "unavoidable in recent discussions of nationalism."
Ross POOLE, NATION AND IDENTITY 10 (1999); see generally E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY (1990); BECOMING NATIONAL: A
READER (Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny eds., 1996). This article does not address nationalism
or the idea of nation as imagined community. Rather, it uses Anderson's concept of imagined com-
munities to propose the existence of an imagined community of investors or capitalists the existence
of which limits unsecured creditors' possibilities for response to Article 9.
163. Many legal scholars writing in a wide range of areas draw on Anderson's concept of
imagined communities. There are so many references to Anderson and "imagined communities"
within legal scholarship that a thorough inventory of them is not possible here. Following are a few
examples of some recent, and some common, uses of Anderson by legal academies: Rachel F.
Moran applies Anderson's ideas to discuss of the evolution of law and history. See Rachel F.
Moran, Critical Race Studies: Race Representation, and Remembering, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1513,
1515-20 (2002). Imagined communities are created in part through a telling of the community's
history. Id. This telling of history in the process of creating an imagined community involves sup-
pression or erasure of counter-history. Id. at 1528. Hence, in Moran's words, "slavery and its leg-
acy represent one of the most direct challenges to America's imagined community, bound by ties of
fraternity and equality." Id. Anderson's work has influenced numerous other scholars in the area of
critical race theory as well. These writers cite Anderson - or simply reference the concept of imag-
ined communities - to show how certain groups imagine themselves to have a particular racial,
national, or other social identity. Martha Minow cites Anderson in her discussion of the social
construction of identity. See Martha Minow, Speech: Not Only for Myself Identity, Politics, and
Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647, 662-63 (1996). Paul Schiff Berman draws heavily on Anderson's presen-
tation of nation-states as imagined communities in his critique of jurisdiction. See Paul Schiff Ber-
man, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 462-65 (2002).
164. ANDERSON, supra note 160, at 4-7.
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as a nation-state. 165  Robert E. Scott has stated that "Article 9 simply
cannot be rationalized as a panglossian experiment in nation-building."'
' 66
Scott is right if nation-building means institutionalizing a preference for
national over local creditors in the market for secured loans. However,
this article might be read to hypothesize that Article 9 has a relationship
to nation-building in the United States separate from whether it facilitates
local or national markets in the sense that it institutionalizes collective
deference to the demands and viewpoints of finance experts and financial
institutions.
The purpose here is to introduce the idea of an imagined community
of investors that: (i) undermines non-adjusting creditors' capacity for
organized political participation, 67 and (ii) provides an explanation for
secured creditors' control over Article 9 that commercial law scholars
have heretofore overlooked. This purpose is fulfilled regardless of
whether the imagined community of investors could ever be related suc-
cessfully to United States nationalism.
The critical reading of contemporary media on business in Part II.A
suggests that the persistence of full priority can be viewed as the product
of a docile acquiescence with which the public responds to finance in-
dustry rules and statements. 68 This docile acquiescence is not a function
165. The analysis in this article could perhaps be expanded to argue that belonging to an imag-
ined community of capitalists is a crucial component of national identity in the United States. Par-
ticipating in common capitalist endeavors could be viewed as a way in which citizens of the United
States identify one another as sharing nationality. See LIAH GREENFELD,THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM:
NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 363-472 (2001) (tracing the history of capitalist values in
the formation of United States nationalism and describing a "spirit of capitalism" that has permeated
the formation and development of America). Though every such participation may not represent an
instance of national consciousness, one could present the phenomenon of collective participation in
capitalism and deference to finance experts in the United States as one facet of national identity. An
analysis sufficient to sustain these claims about American nationalism could go on to argue that this
facet of national identity has gone unexplored in legal scholars' critiques of how Article 9 expands
the scope of secured credit despite serious and legitimate concerns for fairness and just distributions
of wealth. This deference can be viewed as a crucial component of national identity. This article
leaves such an assessment of United States national identity and Article 9 to another project.
166. Robert E. Scott, The Mythology ofArticle 9, 79 MINN. L. REV. 853, 856 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Mythology].
167. The imagined community hypothesis presented here suggests an affirmative identification
with or desire to belong to a class of people that invests on some level. This identification aggravates
and precedes problems of collective action. Collective action problems arise from the fact that
rational and self-interested behavior in individuals does not lead to self-interested behavior at the
collective or group level. Theorists of collective action have shown that in a large group, in order for
collective interest to give rise to collective action, there must be compulsion or individual incentive
to act in the group's interest. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). Disadvantaged unsecured creditors, however,
do not even recognize themselves as a class or as having collective interests vis-A-vis the laws gov-
erning secured finance that they could articulate and then pursue either out of individual interest or
through compulsion. The constant urging by the media to identify with an imagined community of
investors discourages the possibility of alternative collective identification. Failure to identify col-
lective interest undermines capacity for action. Whether, and under what conditions, collective
identification would in fact yield collective action is a separate problem.
168. For a discussion of instances of dissent that disrupt this docile acquiescence, see infra, text
accompanying notes 183-84.
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of inability to comprehend sophisticated financial concepts. Rather, it
can be attributed to a widespread identification among unsecured credi-
tors of belonging to an imagined community of capitalists. To imagine
oneself as belonging to a community one must be willing, on some level,
to disregard or suppress inequalities between oneself and one's fellow
members of the community. 69 Critics of UCC Article 9 have not con-
sidered the possibility of such an imagined community, or the myths that
perpetuate it, in assessing how and why full priority secured credit per-
sists.
Anderson writes about the capacity of strangers to imagine them-
selves as belonging to one, abstract community. 170 The rise of print capi-
talism, in Anderson's view, fostered this capacity.171 He writes the fol-
lowing about reading newspapers:
The significance of this mass ceremony - Hegel observed that news-
papers serve modem man as a substitute for morning prayers - is
paradoxical. It is performed ... in the lair of the skull. Yet each
communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being
replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of
whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the
slightest notion .... At the same time, the newspaper reader, observ-
ing exact replicas of his own newspaper being consumed by his sub-
way... neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world
is visibly rooted in everyday life .... [F]iction seeps quietly and con-
tinuously into reality, creating ... remarkable confidence of commu-
nity in anonymity .... 172
Reporting on business and finance in the United States enjoys an audi-
ence the members of which, by virtue of their shared consumption of this
reporting and the capitalist values it reflects, can imagine commonalities
with one another despite anonymity. If readers are protagonists and there
are many readers, then there are many protagonists - many in the same
position vis-A-vis businesses' activities, vis-A-vis a world of investment
activity. This shared position urges business owners in one region, for
example, to imagine that business owners in another region read the
same Wall Street Journal, care for the profitability of their businesses,
and hope for financial success, just as they do. It urges collective identi-
fication with investment options. An employee in one state can assume
that an employee in a completely different state must consider the same
interest rate trends, think about the same 401K investment options, and
169. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 165, at 365 (finding that "equality is a central value in
all nationalisms"); ANDERSON, supra note 160, at 7 (stating that a community achieves horizontal
comradeship despite actual inequality and exploitation among its members).
170. ANDERSON, supra note 160, at 37-46.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 35-36. Note that the final phrase of this passage in the original text is: "which is the
hallmark of modem nations."
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hope to take advantage of the latest home mortgage incentives, just as he
or she does. The media's constant appeal to reader-investors, coupled
with the existence of common endeavors for profit, enables business
owners or employees to imagine commonality with one another despite
the fact that they will never meet.
This imagined commonality generates a sense of community.
Readers of business or finance journalism share a unified field of ex-
change in the form of markets, primarily capital markets and real estate
markets. The public discourse surrounding these markets projects the
image of participation as a necessary, common endeavor. The rhetoric of
economics, of game metaphors, of competition - deployed in the voice
of the self-interested player - invite readers to imagine their fellow
"players." Readers can be confident that these players exist even if they
never meet. We imagine a community of investors in the sense that for
every seller we can infer a buyer (and vice versa). Everyone's individual
investments are growing in proportion to everyone else's. Sometimes
members of this community view one another as competitors, such as
when two buyers bid for the same asset. Sometimes they view one an-
other as cohorts, such as when collective excitement about a certain stock
raises its value. Regardless of perpetual shifting of interests within the
community, the mode of reporting described in Part II.A constantly rein-
forces the existence of fellow community members and their basic com-
mitment to capitalist values.
Anderson writes that the imagined community that comprises a na-
tion can be described as a community because it is based on a sense of
comradeship that persists regardless of inequality and exploitation within
its borders. 173 This article views lack of critical distance in business so-
called journalism as disregard for or denial of inequality. This virtually
uncontested denial suggests existence of an imagined community of in-
vestors or capitalists that maintains a sense of horizontal comradeship, of
common endeavor, despite intense inequality and exploitation within the
group.
One major difference between this community and Anderson's
imagined communities is that the limits of this community are not explic-
itly delineated by reference to an "other". Anderson's imagined commu-
nities are limited "because even the largest of them, encompassing per-
haps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, be-
yond which lie other nations. ' 174 Again, Anderson's focus is on the na-tion-state as imagined community. 175
173. Id. at7.
174. Id. at7.
175. See generally id.
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Many definitions of community focus on constructions of otherness
and exclusion to evidence affiliation among members. But clear indicia
of unity and exclusion are not endemic to the idea of community. 76 For
example, Jerry Frug does "not cede the term community to those who
evoke the romance of togetherness."1 77 Frug presents community as "the
being together of strangers"; community is not limited to "feelings of
identity or unity. ' 78 Yet, to speak of a community, one must identify
some commonality or sharing of space that makes the concept of com-
munity relevant. The communities Frug describes and proposes, for ex-
ample, are rooted in geographic commonality.
179
Who is the "us" for whom popular writing on business and finance
is produced? The community of investors shares no specific territory.
Rather, the community of investors congregates in the virtual space of
the marketplace. Scholars have researched and written about communi-
ties that transcend traditional boundaries.1 80 As one such scholar, Jessica
Berman, writes: "We move in a realm of being-in-common that rests
upon the border between 'I' and 'we,' a border that may not necessarily
coincide with the political boundaries that surround us' 8 1 when we
speak of community.
The "us" of the imagined community of capitalists is expansive in
that it extends beyond physical borders to various marketplaces -for
home mortgages, for retirement plans, for stocks, for leases. These mar-
kets themselves are limited by the laws that create and police them, and
the "us" that participates in these markets is restricted as well. This
community presumes and imposes highly specific, particular thought
patterns and behaviors. It is limited in the sense that, though the range of
members is broad and wide, the members can picture a proverbial "bot-
tom rung of the social ladder" to which the community does not extend.
The excluded are rarely held up and spoken about as an "other" against
which the "us" of the community must be defined. Rather, the presence
of, and the fear for many of falling into or remaining forever within, that
"other" is conspicuously absent. This conspicuous absence functions as
a threat of exclusion for those who do not participate in the community
or who reject the community's values.
176. Ample scholarship in anthropology and other fields addresses the question of what is a
community, but comes to very little consensus. See, e.g., George A. Hillery, Jr., Definitions of
Community: Areas ofAgreement, 20 RURAL SOC. 111 (1955) (compiling ninety-four attempts within
the social sciences to define community and finding that the only significant overlap among them
was that all of the definitions deal with human beings); NIGEL RAPPORT & JOANNA OVERING,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 60-65 (2001) (discussing various theorists approaches to
community).
177. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1047, 1049 (1996).
178. Id. at 1048-49.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., JESSICA BERMAN, MODERNIST FICTION, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE POLITICS
OF COMMUNITY 1-27 (2001); Special Issue, Globalization, 12 PUB. CULTURE 1-289 (2000).
181. BERMAN, supra note 180, at 3-4.
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This article proposes that employees and other non-adjusting credi-
tors identify with the imagined community of investors. 182 This use of
the concept of imagined community relates obstacles to informing non-
adjusting creditors to a lack of class consciousness in the United
States. 83 This article does not intend to imply that class consciousness is
completely non-existent in the United States. Rather, this article situates
the relative obscurity of laws governing debt finance within a more gen-
eral apathy towards challenging the legal mechanisms with which busi-
ness raise capital. This apathy can be described as a lack of class con-
sciousness, given the distributive effects of the laws in question. Identi-
fication with or a sense of belonging to an imagined community of inves-
tors is one way to explain this apathy.
Instances of dissent that disrupt identification with this imagined
community, like labor or environmental movement responses to capital-
ist behavior, are products of specific types of direct violence. Also, labor
and environmental movement advocates remain voices from the outside
vis-A-vis business finance. The indirect violence of a secured loan - that
a company continues or even augments exploitative practices in order to
service debt agreements - escapes notice. (Default can mean loss of
control, of assets, of viability).
Widespread identification with an imagined community of investors
is not just a simple matter of ignorance of the effects of financing prac-
tices like secured credit that can be attributed to a lack of reporting on
business finance. Identification with an imagined community of inves-
tors stems in part from the knowledge - reinforced in public discourse -
that social safety nets are thin and becoming thinner in the United States.
Americans need to be able to identify with the activities of capitalism
and investment, even if they personally can only hope to invest on a
small scale. The alternative - again, conspicuously absent from the dis-
course - is to weather the threat of a life of severe constriction, poor
182. Organized labor has traditionally been one of the few, powerful voices against unchecked
capitalism in the United States. However, this historical role does not prevent workers from identi-
fying as members of the imagined community of capitalists. Far from feeling a sense of opposition
to an investor class, a great many workers identify as investors themselves. See, e.g., Stephen F.
Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assess-
ment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351 (2002). Many workers organize employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs) to own their employers and to bid for companies or company divisions. Investment bank-
ing firms encourage unions - whose pension funds are major investors in leveraged buyout pools -
to consider bidding.
183. Phenomena of identification among middle and working class individuals in the United
States with institutions and political programs that are exploitative have been described by a wide
range of writers. For example, with respect to labor, see ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS:
CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS 32 (1994) (discussing how white working-
class racism has undermined black labor struggles and undercut the potential for working class
solidarity); Befort, infra note 182, at 375 (referencing the American labor movement's embrace of
capitalist objectives); Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor




health, and poverty in old age. This threat has been taken on. But it has
only been taken on to avoid the violence of substandard labor conditions
and of cruel diseases associated with environmental pollution and de-
struction. Because violence associated with secured credit ensues indi-
rectly, it seems that fidelity to the values of an imagined community of
investors will preclude any targeted uprising of disadvantaged creditors
against absolute priority credit.
Very few individuals in the United States succeed in exempting
themselves from the imagined community of investors. Many may ig-
nore the type of reporting and information described in Part II.A, but few
can claim independence from the financial activities, both personal and
institutional, on which that reporting focuses. If social security were
ever "privatized" the general public would feel that identification with
the imagined community of investors even more intensely.' 84 Wide-
spread media makes this identification seem necessary to achieve a sense
of personal security, especially in old age and in light of difficulties in
accessing decent health care.
This reading that an imagined community both produces and is cre-
ated by the monolithic investors' vantage point in popular media on
business and finance may feel like a throwback to the "myth and sym-
bol" school of the 1950s. The myth and symbol historians and writers
were among the first American scholars to analyze the intellectual con-
tent of popular culture. 85 They showed the power of myth and symbols
to affect public policy and social values even when the myth or symbols
themselves were irrational or lacked any relation to actuality. 86 Later,
this mode of scholarship was highly criticized for presenting an "Ameri-
can world view" that is monolithic - that excluded heterogeneous, mi-
nority and other viewpoints.' 87 More recent trends have focused on re-
jecting the construction of dominant myths or on how dissident groups
reject the myth. 188 However, in contemporary times (e.g., during George
W. Bush's campaigns and presidency) symbolic language and myth-
making in public discourse has gained prominence. Contemporary
scholars have recognized the need to revisit understandings of the crea-
tion and role of dominant myths in policy making.' 89
184. See generally The Diane Rehm Show: Social Security and Market Risk (NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO broadcast Feb. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.wamu.org/prorams/dr/O5/02/23.php (discussing the effects and desirability of Bush's
proposed social security reforms).
185. See, e.g., HENRY NASH SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND
MYTH (1950); C. Wyatt Evans, An Analysis of 'Myth and Symbol', THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
Feb. 11, 2005, at B4.
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This article's presentation of an imagined community of capitalists
- the projected readers of widespread media on business and finance -
does not intend to suggest homogeneity within the community. Rather, it
presents a dominant myth projected by media - that Americans are in-
vestors or capitalists who encounter business and finance as self-
interested players, large or small - and then speculates on the audience
for and effects of this dominant myth.
UCC scholars write that Article 9's full priority schema was re-
cently expanded without opposition in part because unsecured creditors'
interests are too diffuse to oppose the relatively coherent interests of se-
cured creditors. 90 The story goes that this diffusion, plus the technical
difficulty of the code, makes effective popular opposition to Article 9
impossible. This work builds on this reading of the capacities of unse-
cured creditors by considering why these creditors' interests seem so
diffuse. The existence of an imagined community of investors, plus the
myth that everyone belongs to such a community, would lead non-
adjusting creditors to accept without pause secured creditors' standard
refrains, such as: (i) giving companies maximum ability to raise capital is
in the community's common interest, and (ii) any limitation on full prior-
ity will restrict access to capital.
III. READING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN LIGHT OF CREDITORS' IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES
This Part demonstrates how the idea of an imagined community of
capitalists with which non-adjusting creditors identify affects arguments
about full priority secured credit. It critiques the work of prominent
commercial law scholars Robert E. Scott, Warren, Lynn LoPucki and
others. Scott writes about the UCC drafting process and certain struc-
tural peculiarities of Article 9, while Warren and LoPucki propose revi-
sions to Article 9 to counter its distributive effects. This article builds
upon the works of Scott, Warren and LoPucki by situating them within
the socio-political context described in parts I and II.
A. Robert E. Scott's Analysis of the UCC Drafting Process
In The Politics of Article 9, Robert E. Scott rejects the "standard
scholarly practice" of treating "the UCC and similar laws as if they were
created by rule-generating 'black boxes." ' 191 Because of this scholarly
practice, Scott contends, scholars have failed to debate whether internal
workings of institutions that produce laws like the UCC are desirable.
192
Scott seeks to begin such a debate by "examining the Article 9 law mak-
190. See supra notes 6-7. For example, there is an organization - The National Association of
Credit Management - that represents trade creditors and has about 50,000 members. This associa-
tion did not insert itself into the Article 9 debate leading up to the 1999 revisions.




ing process in much the same way that political scientists study legisla-
tures."
'1 93
Scott focuses on how special interest groups can dominate uniform
commercial law revision because uniform laws are drafted by what he
calls "private legislatures."'194 The ALI and NCCUSL function as a "pri-
vate" lawmaking or policy setting team. 95 We can regard the ALI and
NCCUSL as a "legislature" since states largely adopt pro forma laws like
Article 9 that the ALl and NCCUSL propose.196 Yet, despite their law-
making function, according to Scott, the ALL and NCCUSL "believe that
their function is to deal with technical problems that can be resolved by
legal expertise and to avoid issues whose resolution requires controver-
sial value choices."' 97  State representatives apparently regard this "leg-
islature's" task in drafting revised Article 9 as non-political. How can
the drafting of a statute with profound consequences for wealth distribu-
tion and liability stand as a non-political process?
A "private legislature" - like the UCC drafting committee - has no
constituency or independent power base to which it answers.' 98 There-
fore, it needs interest group support (or lack of opposition) to have its
proposed laws enacted.' 99 Also, Scott writes:
Ordinary legislatures have mechanisms for finding facts [hearings]
that are unavailable to [private legislative groups], and are exposed to
many more sources of information concerning the effects of the pro-
posals that they consider. Truth is a likely corrective to outputs that
are skewed by the process itself.
200
Scott does not draw a firm conclusion as to whether the Article 9
drafting process is in fact dominated by interest group influence, but he
suggests that evidence weighs in favor of such a conclusion. 20  Scott's
work co-authored with Alan Schwartz predicts that a private legislature
such as ALl and NCCUSL would adopt bright-line rules and not flexible
193. Id.
194. Scott's private legislature analysis of the UCC drafting process first appeared in an article
that he co-authored with Alan Schwartz. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Econ-
omy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 595 (1995). Schwartz also studied the ALl and
NCCUSL predicting that "a private legislature (a "PL") would: (a) have a status quo bias, rejecting
serious reforms; (b) adopt rules (as opposed to standards) when lobbied by a single interest group;
and (c) adopt standards, or succumb to paralysis, when lobbied by competing groups." Alan
Schwartz, The Still Questionable Role of Private Legislatures, 62 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2002)
(responding to Robert Rasmussen's arguments on the competence and desirability of private legisla-
tures).
195. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 194, at 596.
196. See id.
197. Scott, Politics, supra note 3, at 1805-06.
198. Id at 1813.
199. Id. at 1813-14.
200. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 194, at 651.
201. See Scott Politics, supra note 3, at 1816.
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202standards when lobbied by a single interest group. Revised Article 9consists primarily of bright-line rules.
Scott asserts that the efficiency of the ALINCCUSL private legisla-
ture depends in large part on whether the interests of the dominant group
in the drafting process are aligned with public interest. 203 Scott does not
opine as to whether this is the case for Article 9.204 However, throughout
his argument we see that the relation between interest group interests and
the private legislature participants' conception of public interest is cen-
tral to assessment of the nature and quality of the Article 9 drafting proc-
ess.20 5 This article builds on Scott's theory by proposing that the lack of
critical distance on finance and the existence of an imagined community
of investors encourage lawmakers to perceive creditors' interests as con-
sonant with public interest.
If the Article 9 drafting process is controlled by a coherent interest
group, then, Scott suggests, this interest group is permitted to control in
large part because of a perceived consonance of industry objectives and
public good.206 Scott repeatedly references the issue of whether the pub-
lic's interest is aligned with the interests of the dominant group in the
Article 9 revisions process.20 7 Interest group influence on the Article 9
revisions process is benign, Scott states, as long as interests of the group
sufficiently align with the public interest.208 Scott never articulates a
position or offers any evidence as to whether such an alignment of inter-
ests actually exists.20 9
This article argues that the interest groups that participate in the Ar-
ticle 9 drafting process do benefit from a societal view that increasing
businesses' access to credit is in the public interest. The analysis in Part
II articulates and makes controversial the social reality that implicitly
drives Scott's argument. The current state of public discourse on finance
and the existence of an imagined community of investors with which
unsecured investors identify, make secured creditors' influence on the
UCC drafting process appear benign.
Scott writes:
[An] underlying intellectual premise of the ALI and NCCUSL [is that
i]f Article 9 rules can be derived from uncontroversial moral prem-
ises and constructed with traditional legal skills, then small groups of
202. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 194, at 597.
203. Scott, Politics, supra note 3, at 1850.
204. See generally id. (discussing ALI/NCCUSL efficiency in general without applying the
analysis specifically to Article 9).
205. See generally id (describing the private legislature Article 9 drafting process).
206. Id. at 1818.
207. Id. at 1790.
208. Id.




'experts' can create ... reforms, and larger groups of less informed
practitioners and judges ... can choose the best ones.
2 10
The study group convened by the ALI to propose revisions to Article 9
was comprised of experts whose technical expertise authorized them to
propose rules to govern security interests in personal property. The ex-
perts' proposals were offered to the remainder of the private legislature
participants for review. Scott states that the messages of an expert "will
be taken as credible when ... not inconsistent with the uninformed pref-
erences of the median PL [private legislature] members. ' 211 "People of
good judgment," Scott writes, "tend to heed . . . expert advice, espe-
cially when they are unable to inform themselves independently.,
212
But Scott does not ask: What constitutes these "uninformed prefer-
ences" of the private legislature participants? Why are they "unable to
inform themselves independently?" The lack of critical distance in me-
dia on business and finance is perhaps one very important factor driving
these uninformed preferences. From the vantage point of an imagined
community of investors to which everyone belongs, secured creditors'
views can appear fully consonant with public interest. The limited range
of viewpoints in public discourse on business and finance, and the myth
of belonging to an imagined community of investors that this discourse
generates, converge to facilitate secured creditors' influence on the law
and limit the range of unsecured creditors' responses.
B. Information Asymmetry as a Hindrance to Reform
Scott repeatedly implies that secured creditors' control over Article
9 would erode if the public were more aware of and engaged by the sub-
ject of commercial secured finance.213 The interests of unsecured credi-
tors, he writes, are just not sufficiently cohesive to oppose secured credi-
214tors. Scott states that unsecured creditors must bear the costs of be-
coming informed and organizing to oppose the effects of Article 9.215
These costs are high, according to Scott, because of the heterogeneity of
interests among unsecured creditors and the infrequency of involvement
in transactions involving secured credit.216
210. Id. at 1808. The Article 9 study group was comprised of two academic reporters and
sixteen members - three legal academics and thirteen practicing lawyers. On particularly technically
complex issues, the reporters and chair sought recommendations from advisory groups of "experts."
Id. at 1907-08. Given the UCC drafters' conception of their task, Scott continues, "The principal
currency in the [Article 9] Study Group is technical expertise . and the greatest asset is knowl-
edge of how the rules 'really work' in practice." Id. at 1808.
211. Id. at 1815.
212. Id.
213. See id at 1850.
214. Id. at 1806.
215. See id. at 1848-49.
216. Id. at 1807.
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Scott is far from alone in this conclusion. A range of scholars cite
as an obstacle to reform the apparent inability of unsecured creditors to
inform themselves sufficiently to oppose Article 9's favoring of secured
creditors. For example, Edward J. Janger, like Scott, writes that unse-
cured and non-consenting creditors are too diffuse to mount any opposi-
tion to secured creditors. 217 Warren also echoes the sentiment that unse-
cured creditors have not been able to articulate their positions in the de-
bate over full priority.218 In addition, Warren suggests that many law-
yers concerned with social justice are not adequately engaged and in-
formed when it comes to commercial law issues.219
It is true that costs to unsecured creditors of becoming sufficiently
informed to oppose the distributional consequences of Article 9 are high.
However, these scholars have not thoroughly, critically addressed why
they are high. The interests of all unsecured creditors, viewed as a single
class, may be highly diverse. But there are many large groups of unse-
cured creditors - such as employees - whose interest in having recourse
against a debtor that assigned all of its assets to a secured creditor are
fairly coherent. Also, employees cannot be said to deal infrequently with
secured transactions when their financial security may be affected by one
or a few secured transactions that encumber the assets of their employer
for the duration of their working life. Likewise, trial lawyers represent-
ing tort claimants are a relatively coherent group with an interest in their
clients' ability to recover awards. They may deal repeatedly with defen-
dants who do not pay awards because the defendant's liability insurance
is inadequate and a secured creditor recovers all of the value of a defen-
dant as collateral before the company pays a tort judgment.
20
The high cost to unsecured creditors of becoming sufficiently in-
formed to oppose Article 9 is not due to the UCC's technical difficulty or
complexity. Rather, it is due to a privileged position that contemporary
writing on finance and business gives to the statements of finance insid-
ers. It is due to the monolithic quality of the information on business and
finance made widely available. The information asymmetry between
secured creditors and non-adjusting creditors is entrenched by the lack of
217. See Janger, supra note 2, at 587. Janger's take on how secured creditors maintain control
over the substance of Article 9 focuses on concerns for uniformity in the enactment of Article 9 in
state legislatures and state legislatures' ability to externalize the costs of full priority secured credit.
State legislatures, he argues, have incentive to enact the full priority version of Article 9 because to
do otherwise might increase costs of capital in the state, causing businesses to incorporate or do
business elsewhere. The costs of secured credit do not necessarily affect the state in which a busi-
ness is located. A business may be registered or have headquarters in one jurisdiction, but have
employees, hold assets and conduct risky activities in another jurisdiction. See id. at 581.
218. See Warren, supra note 6, at 1394-95.
219. See generally Elizabeth Warren, What is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial
Law, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 19 (2002) (arguing that students
and lawyers concerned with social justice must learn to understand and consider commercial and
bankruptcy law in order to be effective).
220. See LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,4 (1996) (explaining how parties to
secured transactions use such transactions to avoid liability).
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critical voices in discourse on finance that might otherwise provide
needed information to non-adjusting creditors.22' The monolithic van-
tage point of widespread public discourse on finance encourages non-
adjusting creditors to identify with belonging to an imagined community
of investors irrespective of their personal financial situations.
C. The Threat of Credit Constriction as a Hindrance to Reform
The most obvious and powerful response that secured creditors
make when faced with the prospect of partial priority is that that they
will extend less credit under a partial priority system.222 Participants in
the Article 9 revisions process echo the secured creditors' position.223
Steven Harris and Charles Mooney, the reporters for the Article 9 draft-
ing committee, for example, cite purported diminution in financing in
their defense of full priority.224 Warren describes how assertion of credit
225constriction is treated as a debate stopper. Warren points out that
whether partial priority will reduce credit is untested and unfounded
226
and that debtors in nations with partial priority systems do not appear to
suffer from a dearth of credit.227
Bebchuck and Fried make an efficiency based argument to debunk
the credit constriction claim.22 8 They argue that "on an aggregate basis,
the availability and cost of credit need not change substantially under a
rule of partial priority. 229 In practice, they claim, many current secured
claims do not end up having full priority in bankruptcy, so lenders cannot
claim that they wouldn't lend under a partial priority system.2 30 They go
on to argue, among other things, that projects that would not go forward
under a partial priority system would be projects that externalize costs
onto non-adjusting creditors that are not offset by the overall value the
2311project creates.
But Warren, LoPucki, Bebchuck and Fried seem to discount the
force of secured creditors' threat of credit constriction. Bebchuck and
Fried make a thorough case that this threat is not rational. But rationality
seems to have little to do with how the laws on priority of secured claims
221. Again, on whether better informing unsecured creditors would lead to reform, see supra
note 167 and text accompanying notes 183-84.
222. Harris & Mooney, Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of
Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1349, 1359 (1997).
223. See id. at 1356-64; Jeffrey S. Turner, The Broad Scope ofRevised Article 9 is Justified, 50
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 328, 328-29 (1996).
224. Harris & Mooney, supra note 222, at 1363-64.
225. Warren, supra note 6, at 1386.
226. Id. at 1379.
227. Id. at 1385 n.34.
228. Lucian A. Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1332
(1997).
229. Id. at 1329.
230. Id at 1291-92.
231. Id. at 1332-35.
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are structured. The absence of critical distance on finance permits se-
cured creditors to air threats of credit constriction without opposition or
questioning. Members of an imagined community of investors heed fi-
nancial industry warnings. Article 9 reflects a pervasive social reality
that when faced with a threat of diminished credit availability, which
might have consequences like diminished growth or diminished business
opportunity, lawmakers acquiesce in pursuit of collective well-being.
Secured creditors are asserting their interests within a social context in
which finance experts know best and lawmakers perceive any threat -
however unsubstantiated - of constricting access to capital for businesses
as against public interest.
In his argument to establish priority for non-consenting creditors,
LoPucki seems to disregard concerns about increased costs of capital.
He reasons that "[i]n a world where involuntary creditors have priority,
the secured creditor who can anticipate the priority contest can react to it
by declining to extend credit beyond the debtor's ability to pay.
232
LoPucki reinforces precisely the prediction that drives much of the oppo-
sition to partial priority. His writing seems blind to the strength of the
fear of credit constriction against which he is working.
Harris and Mooney go so far as to denounce the moral hazard of
threatening businesses' access to credit. 233 They state, "data may con-
firm that small businesses (and, accordingly, minority-owned businesses)
would disproportionately comprise that group [that would face constric-
tion of credit]. 234 Warren balks that this argument "can be rephrased to
say that banks want full priority to help their minority friends" 235 and that
Harris and Mooney have no more than anecdotal evidence to support
236their contention. But Harris and Mooney do not need empirical evi-
dence to make an assertion that is so squarely rooted in public belief that
restricting businesses' access to capital will result in a parade of social
travesties.
Within a society steeped in capitalist values - irrespective of how
orthodox its capitalist practices - business growth, credit, and increases
in sources of capital are good. If partial priority would potentially reduce
the availability of credit, then it is highly suspect. Secured creditors do
not need empirical or other evidence to support their claims that partial
priority will mean less credit. Their threat is enough.
232. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics ofArticle 9: The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L.
REv. 1887, 1909 (1994).
233. Harris & Mooney, supra note 222, at 1371.
234. Id.




D. Warren's and LoPucki's Calls for Reason and Morality in the Face of
Impoverished Discourse on Finance
Warren and LoPucki each make principled demands that either Ar-
ticle 9 must be made more fair or its proponents must offer some well-
reasoned justification for full priority.237 Warren advocates preserving
twenty percent of debtors' assets for unsecured creditors. 238  LoPucki
argues for granting priority to tort claimants. 239 In making their argu-
ments, both Warren and LoPucki decry the lack of principled justifica-
tion for full priority. But their insistence that scholars and UCC drafters
either provide a reasoned defense of Article 9, or reform Article 9 to con-
form to their well-reasoned critiques, disregards the mythology through
which full priority persists.
Writers who defend the current formulation of Article 9 invoke a
sense of inevitability about the continued expansion of secured credit.
Many commentators on Article 9 treat proposals to temper full priority
secured credit as if they would only mangle the parts and make bumpy
the course of an unstoppable train. But, as Warren observes, if secured
creditors are like a locomotive just plowing ahead towards more and
more ways to extend secured credit, what stops them from attempting to
secure loans with servitude or with human organs?
240
Warren describes academic proponents of full priority as sheepish
and equivocal in their defenses of Article 9. She writes:
While the attack on full priority is quite spirited, the defense of full
priority is hedged in qualifications. Commercial lenders and their
lawyers are willing to come out foursquare for full priority for se-
cured creditors, but the academic analysis has been very different in
tone. Most academic supporters carefully note the limited evidence
on which a conclusion can be based, often describing themselves as
agnostic or waiting for the empirical studies before they commit to a
position on full priority.
241
Warren suggests that commercial lenders and lawyers can perhaps be
expected to advocate the priority schema that allocates the most money
to them.242 But academics, she implies, recognize the moral poverty of
that position and therefore skirt around defending it squarely.24 3
LoPucki laments that so little of legal scholarship has focused on
"whether the institution of security is justified [or] good.",244 He argues
237. Id. at 1390; LoPucki, supra note 232, at 1917.
238. See Warren, supra note 6, at 1388 n.44.
239. LoPucki, supra note 232, at 1900-0 1.
240. Warren, supra note 6, at 1386.
241. Id. at 1373.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Lynn LoPucki, supra note 232, at 1890.
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that security misallocates resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a
bargain to which many, if not most, of them have given no meaningful
consent.245 He states that security enables secured creditors to extract a
246subsidy from unsecured creditors. He argues that Article 9 is essen-
tially a judgment-proofing device that debtors should not be able to use
to avoid liability to non-consenting unsecured creditors.247
But given public discourse on business and finance and the myth
that we all belong to an imagined community of investors, reasoned ar-
guments by legal scholars are not likely to define the scope of enforce-
able security interests. Consider the following statement by Jean
Baudrillard: "Capital, which is immoral and unscrupulous, can only
function behind a moral superstructure .... Secured creditors repre-
sent capital in the most literal sense. What conception of social good
might drive the endurance of full-priority secured credit?
Homer Kripke has written that "the legal structure of secured credit
developed to make possible the mass production and the distribution of
goods" and "that these developments have increased human welfare. 249
The public discourse on finance described in Part II.A corroborates
Kripke's view. Part II.B casts the reader-participants in that discourse as
part of an imagined community of investors that comprises the constitu-
encies to which state representatives answer. Warren's and LoPucki's
calls for reason or morality-based opposition to laws that increase access
to capital and facilitate business growth disregard the presence and
power that such an imagined community presents. Warren and LoPucki
appeal directly to non-adjusting creditors and those who would be their
advocates. Their calls go largely unheard because of a failure of wide-
spread identification with those groups.
E. Robert E. Scott's Presentation of Internal Incoherence in Article 9
According to Scott "the mythology of Article 9 asserts that in-
formed creditors use the filing system to signal less informed creditors,
and that this signaling function justifies the unique priority position cer-
tain creditors enjoy. ' 250  Filing is inadequate to address many fairness
concerns because it helps only voluntary creditors, but it is a fairness
mechanism nonetheless.
245. Id. at 1891.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 1905.
248. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Simulacra and Simulations, in JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED
WRITINGS 166, 173 (Mark Poster ed., 1988).
249. Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial
Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA:. L. REv. 929, 931 n.14 (1985).




The aims of the filing system are undermined by other central fea-
tures of Article 9 such as, for example, the protection given the floating
lien and the special priority given to the purchase money security interest
(PMSI).21  On the one hand, Article 9 presents a rule: secured creditors
must file a UCC-1 financing statement to perfect and the first to file will
be first in line to recover.252 But at the same time, exceptions within Ar-
ticle 9 to this rule reveal a policy-driven structure designed to maximize
access to credit regardless of fairness. The best way to describe the pol-
icy furthered by revised Article 9 is as a policy of maximizing secured
credit. Whether Article 9 pursues this maximization to further effi-
ciency, administrative capacity, freedom of contract, etc., in the litany of
classic policy objectives, is unclear in both the drafting sessions and the
scholarly literature on Article 9.253
Scott finds that:
The [1999] revisions reflect a dramatic escalation of the tension be-
tween the twin goals of Article 9: the maintenance of public confi-
dence through the use of a broad-based, facially neutral filing system
and the development of rules that reduce costs for particular classes
of secured creditors.
254
Scott identifies this contradiction as "an institutional and structural prob-
lem, a function of the political economy of the process by which the
UCC is produced and revised.
' 255
Scott accepts as trenchant a contradiction between maintaining the
"mythology of a filing system"256 and at the same time enacting excep-
tions, or other rules, in the name of expanding secured credit. Scott
writes of this tension:
It is proof positive of the fact that legal doctrine masks inherent and
irreducible contradictions, and recalls that it is the role of the legal
critic to expose these contradictions in order to displace the privi-
leged status of law and return the debate to the realm of pure poli-
tics.
257
But is it possible to "expose" contradiction? Is there any such thing as a
"realm of pure politics" separate from "the privileged status of law" to
which the debate over full priority secured credit could be relegated? It
is indeed difficult to distinguish law and politics, but not because "it's all
251. See U.C.C. § 9-323 (2002) (giving security for future advances priority as of the date of
the original financing); U.C.C. § 9-103 (2002) (defining purchase money security interest); U.C.C. §
9-324 (2002) (codifying re priority of purchase money security interest).
252. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (2002).
253. See supra notes 7 & 12.
254. Scott, Politics, supra note, 3, at 1851.
255. Scott, Mythology, supra note, 166, at 857.
256. Scott, Politics, supra note, 3, at 1851.
257. Scott, Mythology, supra note, 166, at 857-58.
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just politics." An attempt to distinguish "the privileged status of law"
from "pure politics" denies the legal institutions, rules and structures that
create political forums and enable political exertions of will.
The erosion of the effectiveness of filing with the expansion of ex-
ceptions for certain secured creditors should not be mistaken for triumph
of political forces driven by capital over a rule of law meant to ensure
fairness. From the vantage point of an imagined community of investors,
(i) exceptions to encourage increased secured lending; and (ii) rules that
signal to other creditors - are both fair. Scott's "twin goals" of Article 9
represent two valid sets of interests that UCC drafters must balance.
258
From the vantage point of critical theory, there is no meta-theory
with which to balance these interests if they are in fact incoherent as
Scott presents them to be. In the words of Duncan Kennedy: "The im-
agery of balancing presupposes exactly the kind of more abstract unit of
measurement that the sense of contradiction excludes., 259 But the imag-
ined community of investors believes that just such an abstract unit of
measurement exists in the form of commitment to wealth maximization.
The way in which Article 9 strikes that balance, the community accepts
in deference to capital, must reflect finance experts' judgments about
how to best increase access to capital for all.
CONCLUSION
Article 9 disregards the effects of full priority on non-adjusting
creditors. But this disregard for fairness should not be mistaken for a
disregard for distributive consequences or attributed to an isolated or
exclusionary drafting process. Article 9 is not the product of secured
creditors asserting their interests in an isolated forum impervious to so-
cial consequences. Rather, it is a product of secured creditors asserting
their interests in a socio-political climate in which the general public
accepts the needs of capital as consonant with public interest.
This article directs attention to the background values and commit-
ments that fuel support for full priority and asset securitization. It ques-
tions the common sense that leads lawmakers and many scholars to con-
sistently err in favor of encouraging these types of financing despite seri-
ous concerns about fairness and efficiency. Article 9's expansion of full
priority secured lending cannot be explained completely by the nature of
the UCC drafting process, the code's technical complexity, or a fatal
diversity of interests among unsecured creditors. No analysis of Article
9 - or asset securitization - is complete without direct acknowledgement
of the hegemony of capitalist values that informs institutional and indi-
vidual common sense with respect to the laws governing finance.
258. See id. at 856.
259. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1775 (1976).
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DEEMED LIQUIDATION: A CASE FOR THE STATUTORY
AMENDMENT OF U.S. CUSTOMS LAW GOVERNING THE




The U.S. scheme for the collection of antidumping and countervailing
duties is flawed as administered Imported goods subject to such duties
may be deemed liquidated under 19 U.S. C. Section 1504(d). Deemed
liquidation occurs by operation of law when Customs fails to affirma-
tively liquidate imported goods. The final duty rate is then "deemed" to
be the same as the preliminary duty paid at the time of importation. The
significance of deemed liquidation is that the preliminary duty rate and
the final duty rate, which should have been collected, frequently are dif-
ferent, thereby causing importers to lose money when they have overpaid
duties upon importation and causing the U.S. government to lose money
when importers have underpaid duties. Practically, deemed liquidation
occurs because the Commerce Department and Customs fail to take ac-
tion required by statute or make mistakes in taking such action. The
current statutory scheme does not create incentives for those administra-
tive agencies to take timely action because delay may benefit the U.S.
government. These delays may injure importers and threaten U.S. multi-
lateral trade-relations. The U.S. scheme does not provide an administra-
tive remedy to address the problem and judicial remedies are ineffective.
Therefore, the U.S. trade and customs laws should be amended to (1)
impose mandatory deadlines within which these U.S. agencies must act,
(2) protect importers by imposing negative consequences to the U.S.
government for failure to meet those deadlines, and (3) create an admin-
istrative remedy for importers to protest and undo deemed liquidation
once it has occurred
t The author is an associate with Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C. in Denver, Colo. He is
and has taught as a visiting assistant and adjunct professor of law at the Sturm College of Law at the
University of Denver. The author has represented clients before the U.S. Department of Commerce
and U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Customs in antidumping proceedings and the
liquidation process. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contributions made to this
article by Professor Jay Brown at the Sturm College of Law, Gregory S. McCue of the law firm
Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C., and his research assistants: Kathryn Garner, Ryan Howell,
Suzanne Meintzer, Pax Moultrie and Thomas Wagner.
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INTRODUCTION
Goods imported into the United States are subject to import duties.
For certain goods, the duty liability may include antidumping duties, a
type of "unfair trade" duty.1 Unfair trade duties are statutorily mandated,
imposed by the Department of Commerce ("DOC") and collected by the
U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection ("Customs") through a
process called "liquidation.",2  Importers pay preliminary duties upon
importation. The DOC subsequently determines the final duty liability,
which may be higher than, lower than or the same as the preliminary
duties paid. Customs must liquidate goods within six month of receiving
notice from the DOC of the final duty liability.3 If Customs does not do
so, the goods are "deemed" liquidated at the preliminary duty rate paid
upon importation. The DOC and Customs frequently delay in determin-
ing the final duty liability and liquidating, causing deemed liquidation to
occur.
Deemed liquidation results in a windfall for the importer and a
"loss" for the United States government if the final duty liability is
higher than the preliminary duty paid upon entry. Conversely, deemed
liquidation results in a loss for the importer and a windfall for the U.S.
government if the final duty liability is lower than the preliminary duty
paid upon entry. Deemed liquidation also affects representatives of U.S.
industry in the sense that U.S. industry either gains more or less protec-
tion against unfairly traded foreign imports.
Customs Headquarters Ruling HQ 2282494 illustrates how Cus-
toms' failure to timely liquidate entries may injure an importer and bene-
fit the government. In 1986, an importer imported bricks from Mexico
and paid a preliminary unfair trade duty of 3.51 percent ad valorem.5
The DOC subsequently revoked the unfair trade duty and, in May 1996,
sent instructions to Customs to liquidate the importer's entries of bricks
at zero percent duty. Customs failed to do so and discovered in July
1998, approximately twenty-five months after receiving notice of the
final duty liability, that the goods were deemed liquidated at the 3.51
1. For purposes of this article, the processes for the collection of antidumping and counter-
vailing duties are essentially the same. For simplicity's sake, this article discusses collection of
antidumping duties only.
2. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2005).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
4. U.S. Customs Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ 228249 (Aug. 23, 1999), available at HQ
228249 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Cust. HQ 228249].
5. Many of the facts involved in Customs transactions are confidential. Therefore, it is
frequently impossible to find out the monetary value at stake in a given situation. In Cust. HQ
228249, the importer paid a preliminary unfair trade duty of 3.51 percent ad valorem. Id Assume
that the importer imported bricks worth $10 million. The importer would then have paid $351,000
in unfair trade duties. Because the DOC subsequently revoked the unfair trade duty, the importer
should have received a $351,000 refund. Instead, deemed liquidation occurred and prevented the
refund. Consequently, the importer would have lost $351,000.
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percent duty paid upon entry. Despite the fact that Customs' own delay
in liquidating the entries caused the negative outcome for the importer,
Customs rejected the importer's argument that it was entitled to a refund
of the 3.51 percent duty paid upon entry. As a result, the U.S. govern-
ment benefited from its own failure to liquidate in a timely manner be-
cause it was not forced to refund the overpaid duties while the importer
lost money it was entitled to have refunded.
This article argues that the current liquidation scheme is flawed as
administered. The problems associated with the scheme stem from the
failure of administrative agencies to act in a timely manner, the lack of
consequences in the statutory scheme for such failure to act, and the lack
of an administrative remedy for interested parties to undo deemed liqui-
dation once it has occurred. As a result, unfairly traded goods are arbi-
trarily exposed to over- and under-enforcement of U.S. unfair trade laws.
This exposure has considerable implications for the business com-
munity, both domestically and internationally, and potentially jeopard-
izes U.S. relations with multi-lateral trading partners. 6  U.S. trade and
customs laws reflect benefits and obligations that the United States has
carefully bargained for in multilateral trade negotiations. Administrative
failure in implementing these international obligations may negate bene-
fits resulting from years of negotiations between a large number of coun-
tries. At stake are substantial amounts of money 7 and importers' and
6. Prior to 1978, there was no time limit within which liquidation had to occur. S. REP. NO.
95-778, at 31 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2211,2242 [hereinafter S. REP.]. Congress
imposed such a time limit, partly motivated by requests from U.S. trading partners.
The committee notes that several of the countries participating in the multilateral Trade
Negotiations have requested that the United States establish a time limit within which
liquidation must occur. The committee has approved the limitations on liquidation with
these requests in mind and expects appropriate compensation in the MTN for this action
by the United States.
Id. at 32. Similarly today, recent focus on the liquidation process in courts and before Customs and
the substantial amounts of unliquidated entries in high-profile U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duty proceedings make it likely that U.S. trading partners will pay close attention to the U.S. liquida-
tion process in the future. Problems arising may be subject to discussion in trade negotiations or
before international dispute settlement tribunals.
7. The monetary significance of problems in the liquidation process is evident. In 2004,
goods worth approximately $1,400 billion were imported into the United States. Press Release, U.S.
Dept. of Com., U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services: Aug. 2005 (Oct. 13, 2005), at 6,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current-press-release/ft900.pdf. All of those
goods must be liquidated at some point in time. Of course, errors in the liquidation process play the
most significant role for entries of goods subject to unfair trade duties. Only a certain percentage of
total imports is subject to unfair trade duties. The author has been unable to obtain relevant statistics
on the liquidation process despite attempts under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2000). One approximation for the amount of goods subject to unfair trade duties are the distribu-
tions of collected unfair trade duties made to U.S. industry under the Continued Dumping and Sub-
sidy Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000, Pub. L. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675c
(2000)) ("Byrd Amendment"). Customs distributed $231 million in 2001, $330 million in 2002 and
$293 million in 2003. Letter from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Bill
Thomas, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means (Mar. 2, 2004),
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfrn?index=5130&sequence=0 [hereinafter Eakin Letter]. The distri-
butions for 2004 are projected to be $300 million. Id. at 4. In addition, the value of unliquidated
goods far exceeds the amounts distributed. For example, goods subject to the most recent U.S. trade
case against softwood lumber from Canada were imported in the amount of $6 billion in 2001.
Softwood Lumber from Canada, USITC Pub. 3509, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-414 & 731-TA-928 (Final),
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foreign countries' faith in the fundamental fairness of the U.S. interna-
tional trade system. The United States also risks losing trade concessions
in future multi-lateral trade negotiations or in World Trade Organization
("WTO") dispute settlement proceedings.8 U.S. trade laws are perceived
to be prejudiced against foreign imports and biased for U.S. industry.
Therefore, errors in the administration of these laws leading to negative
consequences for foreign imports inevitably lead to speculation about the
good faith of Congress and U.S. administrative agencies in implementing
U.S. international trade obligations. To remedy these problems, this arti-
cle proposes that the U.S. statutes governing the determination and col-
lection of unfair trade duties should be amended to prevent the negative
consequences caused by arbitrary delay in the administrative process.
Most importantly, the applicable statutes should be changed to prevent
the government from benefiting from its own nonfeasance.
Part I of this article provides a description of the legal framework
surrounding the entry of goods, antidumping proceedings and liquida-
tion. Part II discusses the problems associated with the liquidation proc-
ess in the context of goods subject to unfair trade duties, highlighting
how the U.S. government stands to gain from its failure to follow statuto-
rily mandated procedures. Part III analyzes the legislative history of the
deemed liquidation provision and its interpretation by courts. This part
argues that in order to fully implement congressional intent to protect
importers, the negative consequences of deemed liquidation should only
be applied against the U.S. government. Part IV provides an overview of
the potentially available judicial remedies to correct errors in the liquida-
tion process. The remedies include declaratory judgments, writs of man-
damus, injunctions and court-orders compelling agency action under
Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). 9 This
section asserts that these remedies are inadequate because: (1) they are
unable to undo deemed liquidation once it has occurred, (2) they cause
additional delay and (3) they are costly to implement. Because the U.S.
government's delays are within its exclusive control, forcing importers to
bear this additional burden is inconsistent with congressional concern
IV-2, Table IV-1 (May 2002). The U.S. government has collected some $3 billion in preliminary
unfair trade duties on entries of softwood lumber from Canada since 2001. Canadian Lumber
Groups Discuss Resumption of Talks with U.S., INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 12, 2004 § 46; see, e.g.,
Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final
Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,062, 56,077
(Nov. 6, 2001); Notice of Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Preliminary
Affirmative Critical Circumstances Determination, and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty
Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products
From Canada, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,186, 43,215 (Aug. 17, 2001). None of these entries has been liqui-
dated yet. The softwood lumber case illustrates the large amounts of money at risk of potential
administrative failure. The softwood lumber case is but one example of the myriad of foreign prod-
ucts subject to unfair trade duties for which the U.S. government has collected preliminary unfair
trade duties. Thus, the total amount of money involved is staggering.
8. The author intends to further develop any WTO aspects of deemed liquidation in a subse-
quent article.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).
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with the protection of importers. Part V discusses the necessity for
prompt administrative action in providing notice of the final duty liabil-
ity. Currently, the statutory provisions are directory rather than manda-
tory.' ° This article argues that statutorily imposed deadlines with nega-
tive consequences for the U.S. government for failure to meet them are
necessary because the delays are within the exclusive control of the gov-
ernment. Finally, Part VI argues that the U.S. trade laws should provide
for a speedy administrative remedy to resolve the deemed liquidation
problem. Currently, it appears that deemed liquidation cannot be pro-
tested before it has occurred and cannot be undone thereafter." Instead,
the statutes should be changed to allow importers a way to protest or
reserve their rights before deemed liquidation occurs.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Entry of Goods and Liquidation
Importers bring goods into the United States through a process
called "entry" of goods.' 2 During the entry process, the importer 13 files
certain documents with Customs containing information about the goods
entered, such as value and classification. 14 The information about value
and classification determines the duties assessed on the goods.15 At the
10. See, e.g., Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 191 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Cana-
dian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 563, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
11. Courts have not made a definitive finding on the issue. In the majority of cases, courts
and Customs have stated that deemed liquidation cannot be protested or undone. See, e.g., Wolff
Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998); United States v. Cherry Hill
Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 110
F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000), aff'd, 283 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); U.S. Customs
Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ 228929 (Sept. 27, 2002), available at HQ 228929 (Westlaw) [here-
inafter Cust. HQ 228929]; U.S. Customs Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ 228712 (May 13, 2002),
available at HQ 228712 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Cust. HQ 228712]. However, in two recent cases,
the Court of International Trade ("CIT") has indicated in dicta that deemed liquidation possibly
could be protested under certain circumstances. See Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. v. United States, 350
F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1178-79 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d
1357, 1362 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003), aff'd, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Norsk Hydro, the Court
of International Trade also indicated that under certain, limited circumstances there might be an
administrative remedy available to importers to undo deemed liquidation once it had occurred.
NorskHydro, 350 F. Supp. 2d. at 1178-79.
12. For purposes of this article, an "entry" of goods refers to goods properly imported into the
U.S. customs territory for consumption (i.e., for use or sale) under the "formal entry" procedure. 19
C.F.R. § 141 .Oa (2005). Customs defines "entry" not merely as the arrival of goods at the port, but
as the process of presenting documentation for clearing goods through Customs. U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. IMPORT REQUIREMENTS 3,
http://www.customs.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/publications/trade/usimportrequirements.ctt/usim
portrequirements.doc [hereinafter U.S. IMPORT REQUIREMENTS]; 19 C.F.R. § 141.Oa (2005).
13. Frequently, importers hire customs brokers to work through the entry process. A "cus-
toms broker" is defined as "a person who is licensed . . . to transact customs business on behalf of
others." 19 C.F.R. § 111.1 (2005); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1641(a)(1) (2000) (defining a customs
broker as a "person granted a customs broker's license").
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 141.90(b)-(c) (2005); 19 C.F.R. § 142.6(a)(3)-
(4) (2005).
15. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000). Goods are classified according to their characteristics
into what is popularly referred to as "HTS numbers." See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES 59 (2002) http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/
toolbox/publications/trade/iius.ctt/iius.doc [hereinafter IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES]. The
HTS numbers are derived from the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("USHTS")
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time of entry, the importer usually pays estimated duties based on the
classification and value asserted in the entry documentation.1 6 Customs
later determines the final duty liability through a process called "liquida-
tion., 17 During liquidation, Customs reviews the information submitted
in the entry documentation to determine the proper classification and
value, and hence the duty liability, of a particular entry.1 8  If Customs
agrees with the information submitted in the entry documentation, it will
liquidate the entry at the duty liability asserted in the entry documenta-
tion.' 9 However, Customs may find that the preliminary duty liability
asserted at the time of entry was either underestimated or overestimated.
In those situations, Customs sends the importer a bill for the additional
duties owed or a refund, as the case may be.20 The importer has the op-
portunity to challenge Customs' determination of its final duty liability
by filing a protest with Customs.
21
As discussed in the following part, certain goods are subject to un-
fair trade duties.22  Unfair trade duties are imposed above and beyond
that which is provided for in the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule
("USHTS").23 The DOC determines the amount of the unfair trade duty
after entry but before Customs' liquidation. All goods are subject to
liquidation regardless of whether they also are subject to unfair trade
duties.
B. Basic Introduction to Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Pro-
ceedings
The DOC is responsible for determining whether foreign goods are
unfairly traded in the United States.2 4 The two principal unfair trade
actions are antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. In anti-
dumping proceedings, the DOC investigates whether a foreign company
which is turn is derived from the international Harmonized System. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000);
Customs Regulations Amendments To Conform With Harmonized System of Tariff Classification,
53 Fed. Reg. 51244 (Dec. 21, 1988) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. ch. I). The HTS number corre-
sponds to a particular duty rate. For example, if you want to import a grand piano you will find that
it appears to be classified under HTS number 9201.20.00 and that it is subject to a 4.7 percent duty
rate. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES § XVIII
ch. 92, 2 (2004), http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/archive/2004/basic/bychapter/0400C92.pdf.
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 141.101 (2005); U.S. IMPORT REQUIREMENTS,
supra note 12, at 5.
17. See 19 U.S.C. § 1500(c) (2000). Liquidation is defined as the "final computation or
ascertainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an entry." 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2005).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (2000); IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15, at 59.
19. See id. at 59.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 159.6(c) (2005); see U.S. IMPORT
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 12, at 6.
21. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (2000).
22. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673 (2000).
23. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e(a)(3), 1673e(a)(3) (2000).
24. The International Trade Commission ("ITC") and the DOC are the two administrative
agencies involved in the determination of whether unfair trade duties should be imposed. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671, 1673, 1677(1)-(2) (2000). Unfair trade duties can only be imposed if the ITC concludes
that the dumping or subsidization either injures a domestic industry or materially retards the estab-
lishment of one. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2) (2000).
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is engaged in "dumping," i.e. selling its products in the U.S. market for
less than it sells them in its home (domestic) market.25 In countervailing
duty proceedings, the DOC investigates whether a foreign government is
subsidizing the production of goods, thereby conferring a benefit on the
foreign producers allowing them an unfair advantage over their U.S.
competition.26 If the DOC finds dumping or subsidization, it imposes an
antidumping or countervailing duty on the foreign goods as they cross
the U.S. border to make up the difference in price or cost.27 For the sake
of simplicity, this article discusses the trade action and liquidation proc-
esses for antidumping duties only, as the processes are similar for entries
subject to antidumping and countervailing duty findings. This subsection




The U.S. antidumping laws are retrospective in nature. During an
antidumping investigation, the DOC determines how much dumping
occurred during a particular period of investigation (usually one year)
prior to the initiation of the investigation. 29  The dumping which oc-
curred during that period will be reflected in the cash deposits (equiva-
lent to the dumping margin) required for any future entries of goods.3°
The U.S. antidumping statutes do not impose antidumping duties on
goods entered during the period of investigation. Rather, the dumping
found during the period of investigation determines the cash deposit rate
to be collected on goods entered after the DOC's affirmative preliminary
determination.31
25. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673e(a), 1677(34)-(35) (2000); see also U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY HANDBOOK 1-3 (10th ed. 2002),
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/webpubs.htm (follow hyperlink to article) [hereinafter AD & CVD
HANDBOOK].
26. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1671e(a), 1677(5) (2000); see also AD & CVD HANDBOOK at I-
3.
27. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1671e(a), 1673e(a) (2000). For example, in an antidumping
proceeding, if Foreign Corporation A sells widgets in its home market for 10 dollars (referred to as
normal value) and sells the same widgets in the U.S. market for 5 dollars (referred to as export
price), the dumping margin is 5 dollars (normal value minus export price) or 100 percent. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673 (2000).
28. 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(a) (2005).
29. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(b) (2005).
30. 19 C.F.R. § 351.21 l(b)(l)-(2) (2005). Cash deposits are the equivalent of safety deposits:
the DOC requires importers suspected of dumping to pay a deposit of preliminary duties upon im-
portation to make sure that there is money from which to collect the final duty liability once the
DOC makes the final determination, often several years after importation.
31. 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.205(a), 351.21 l(b)(l)-(2) (2005). An importer also may choose to post
a bond to ensure payment of antidumping duties. 19 C.F.R. § 351.205(a) (2005). After the DOC
issues an antidumping order (which occurs after a final, affirmative determination), an importer may
not post a bond and must instead post cash deposits. 19 C.F.R. § 351.211 (a) (2005). The difference
between a bond and cash deposits is that a bond is similar to an insurance premium where the im-
porter pays a third-party to insure against the potential increase in duties while the cash deposits
consist of an ad valorem payment of estimated duties (i.e. X percent of the value of the imported
goods).
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Generally, the DOC initiates an antidumping investigation after re-
ceiving a petition for relief from unfairly traded imports from representa-
tives of U.S. industry.3 z An antidumping investigation is divided into a
preliminary and a final phase.33 During the preliminary phase, the DOC
relies on financial and market information submitted by the parties. 34 If
the DOC finds dumping, it publishes its preliminary results in the Federal
Register and instructs Customs to "suspend liquidation" and collect
"cash deposits" on goods entered after the date of the preliminary deter-
mination. 35 The suspension of liquidation is necessary due to the retroac-
tive nature of the U.S. antidumping laws because it prevents Customs
from prematurely liquidating entries before the DOC has determined the
actual duty liability during what is known as an "administrative re-
view. ' 36  The "cash deposit" is the amount of dumping duty found to
have existed during the period of investigation. 37 The cash deposits col-
lected on goods imported after the DOC's affirmative, preliminary de-
termination do not represent the amount by which those goods were ac-
tually dumped. Rather, the cash deposits represent the dumping which
occurred for goods previously imported during the period of investiga-
tion as an approximation of the dumping expected to occur thereafter.
In the final phase of the investigation, the DOC verifies the infor-
mation submitted by the parties during the preliminary phase and makes
necessary revisions to the preliminary duty rate. 38 If the final determina-
tion is affirmative, the DOC publishes the final results (including the
final dumping margin) in the Federal Register and issues instructions to
Customs to continue the suspension of liquidation of past entries and to
collect cash deposits on future entries in the amount of the final dumping
margin. 39 An affirmative final determination results in an antidumping
order.40 An antidumping order remains in effect until revoked. 4' Liqui-
dation remains suspended until the DOC completes an administrative
review (or fails to initiate one).
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b) (2000). The DOC may also sua sponte initiate an antidumping
investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (2000).
33. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b, 1673d (2000); AD & CVD HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 11-3.
34. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(a) (2005).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d), (f) (2000); AD & CVD HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 11-13;
IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15, at 101. The cash deposit does not represent
the actual margin at which the imported goods subject to it are dumped. The actual dumping margin
of the goods subject to the cash deposit will be determined in a subsequent administrative review.
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.21 l(b)(3) (2005).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(l)(B) (2000).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.307 (2005).
39. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(1), (d) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.211 (2005). If the DOC's final
determination is negative, i.e., finding no dumping during the period of investigation, the DOC will
publish the results in the Federal Register and instruct Customs to terminate the suspension of liqui-
dation and to refund the cash deposits. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2) (2000).
40. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(c)(2); 1673e(a) (2000).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) (2000); 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.222, 351.211(a) (2005). The DOC may
revoke an antidumping order based on absence of dumping. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) (2000). The DOC
and ITC also conduct so called "sunset" reviews every five years after the institution of an order to
determine whether the order should "sunset" or if it needs to stay in effect longer. 19 U.S.C. §
1675(c), (d) (2000).
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2. Administrative Review Phase
The DOC determines the actual dumping margin for entries made
after the preliminary determination in the investigation phase during
what is known as administrative reviews.42 The DOC does not conduct
administrative reviews automatically; a party must request one.43 During
the administrative review, the DOC determines the actual dumping mar-
gin by examining financial information for each entry of goods an im-
porter has made since the imposition of the cash deposits.44 The time
period from the preliminary determination in the investigation to the ini-
tiation of the administrative review constitutes the period of review for
the first administrative review after imposition of the antidumping or-
der.45 Liquidation of the covered entries remains suspended during the
administrative review.4 6 The dumping margin found in an administrative
review constitutes the actual dumping margin for the entries subject to
the original investigation (the final, actual duty liability). This final
dumping margin serves as the final duty liability for the covered entries
and as the cash deposit rate for any entries made after the date of the
final results of the administrative review.47
After concluding an administrative review, the DOC publishes the
final results in the Federal Register, notifies Customs Headquarters that
suspension of liquidation has been lifted, and instructs Customs to liqui-
date the covered entries at the final antidumping duty rate determined in
the administrative review.48 Customs Headquarters, in turn, instructs the
different Customs ports to liquidate the covered entries at the duty rate
determined by the DOC. Finally, the individual Customs ports liquidate
the entries, in one of three ways: (1) if the final duty liability deter-
mined in the administrative review is lower than the cash deposits col-
lected, Customs will refund the difference; 49 (2) if the final duty liability
determined in the administrative review is higher than the cash deposits
collected, Customs will issue a bill for the difference;5° finally, (3) if the
cash deposit is the same as the final duty liability determined in the ad-
ministrative review, no money is due or refunded. 51
42. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2000). Administrative reviews are initiated in the anniversary
month ofantidumping orders. Id.
43. Id. The entries in question will be liquidated at the final dumping margin found in the
original investigation if no party requests an administrative review. 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c)(1)(i)
(2005).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B), (a)(2) (2005).
45. The DOC will conduct a new administrative review every year after the imposition of the
antidumping order for as long as the order remains in effect (if requested). The period of review for
the second and all subsequent administrative reviews consists of the twelve month period preceding
the anniversary month of the antidumping order. 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(e) (2005).
46. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.221(b)(6) (2005).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(c) (2000).
48. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.221(b)(5)-(6) (2005).
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3. Judicial Review Phase
An interested party 52 may appeal the DOC's final determinations in
antidumping proceedings to the Court of International Trade ("CIT")
within thirty days of publication of the result in the Federal Register.
53
The DOC is required to publish notice of the CIT's decision in the Fed-
eral Register within ten days of the decision's issuance. 4 The DOC also
instructs Customs to liquidate the entries according to the CIT's deci-
sion.55 The administrative suspension of liquidation in effect during in-
vestigations and administrative reviews ceases to be in effect after the
conclusion of an administrative review. 6 Consequently, Customs may
liquidate entries subject to an appeal even though the final duty liability
has not yet been reviewed by the CIT. To prevent such premature liqui-
dation, the appealing party usually requests a court-ordered suspension of
liquidation in the form of an injunction lasting through the appeals proc-
ess.57 A court-ordered suspension of liquidation is lifted when the time
for appeal of the court decision has expired.
58
4. Sample Timeline for Antidumping Proceedings
59
The following is an example of how an antidumping proceeding
progresses.6 ° If an antidumping investigation is initiated on January 1,
2005, the period of investigation might consist of the year 2004. The
DOC would examine entries of the product under investigation made
during 2004 to see whether they were dumped. Sometime in May 2005
the DOC would issue its preliminary determination. Assuming that the
DOC found that entries made during 2004 were dumped at a margin of
fifteen percent, the DOC would direct Customs to collect cash deposits
of fifteen percent on all entries made subsequent to that date (i.e. May
2005) and also suspend liquidation for those entries. Sometime in Au-
gust 2005 the DOC would issue its final determination. Assume that the
52. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(A) (2000) (defining "interested party" to include both representa-
tives of U.S. and foreign industry).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) (2000). An appellant in effect has sixty days to file the appeal: it
must file the summons within thirty days of publication of the DOC's determination and the com-
plaint within thirty days of filing the summons. Id. Keep in mind that a party may appeal aspects of
the DOC's determinations in both the investigation and administrative review. Therefore, it is not
certain that the CIT's decision will result in a final dumping margin suitable for liquidation. For
purposes of this article, it is assumed that the CIT's decision results in a final duty determination.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e) (2000).
55. Id.
56. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.221 (b)(6) (2005).
57. See, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330-35 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004) (holding that a preliminary injunction suspending liquidation is effective from date of issuance
to completion of any appellate proceedings).
58. See, e.g., Peer Chain Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359-60 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004) (finding that the suspension of liquidation was lifted after the time for appealing a decision of
the Federal Circuit (filing a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court) had expired).
59. Countervailing Investigations Timeline, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351, Annex VI (2005); Antidump-
ing Investigations Timeline, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351, Annex VII (2005).
60. Please note that this is a very simplified description of the process and that it does not take
into account potential extensions of time and judicial appeals.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
DOC in its final determination found that the dumping margin for 2004
was twenty percent. The DOC would issue an antidumping order some
time in October 2005.61 The order would instruct Customs to collect
antidumping duties of twenty percent on all entries from that date and to
continue to suspend liquidation on all entries made after the preliminary
determination in May 2005.62
Approximately one year after the final order in October 2005, an in-
terested party could request that the DOC conduct an administrative re-
view. During the review, the DOC would examine at what rate the en-
tries of goods made after the preliminary determination in the investiga-
tion (i.e. May 2005) through the initiation of the administrative review
(i.e. October 2006) actually were dumped. The DOC would issue its
final results some time in October 2007. Assume that the DOC finds that
the actual dumping margin for the period of review is thirty percent.
Then, the DOC would inform Customs that suspension of liquidation for
entries made between May 2005 and October 2006 has been lifted and
direct Customs to liquidate those entries at the dumping margin found in
the administrative review, i.e. thirty percent. The DOC would also in-
form Customs to continue the suspension of liquidation of entries made
after October 2006 and to collect cash deposits of thirty percent on all
entries made after October 2007. The DOC will conduct administrative
reviews every year, if requested, until the antidumping order is revoked.
Thus, some time in October 2007, the DOC could initiate an administra-
tive review of entries made between October 2006 and October 2007.
As illustrated, an importer who imported goods in May 2005 will
learn in October 2007, at the earliest, the final duty liability for those
goods. This time period would be longer if the schedules for the investi-
gation and/or the administrative review were extended or if there were
intervening judicial reviews. In addition, the importer also must wait for
Customs to liquidate the entries in question which might take months and
even years. During this lengthy time period, almost a minimum of three
years, the importer must take into account the uncertain duty liability in
its business model and financial records.
C. Deemed Liquidation Under 19 U.S.C. §1504
Deemed liquidation occurs as a consequence of Customs' failure to
liquidate a particular entry within a statutorily set deadline.63 Deemed
liquidation may occur for all entries, regardless of whether they are sub-
61. Provided that the ITC issues an affirmative finding of injury.
62. Even though the final dumping margin in the investigation was higher than the prelimi-
nary margin, Customs will not collect the difference because the preliminary rate is capped under the
statute. 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a)(1) (2000). Had the final dumping margin been lower than the prelimi-
nary rate, Customs would have refunded the difference. 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a)(2) (2000).
63. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (2000).
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ject to antidumping duties.64 According to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), entries
which have been subject to a statutorily imposed or court-ordered sus-
pension of liquidation as a result of an antidumping proceeding, are
deemed liquidated if Customs fails to liquidate them within six months
after receiving notice that the suspension of liquidation has been re-
moved.65
Customs and courts have taken inconsistent positions regarding the
moment when the six-month time period in Section 1504 begins. The
timing of notice is crucial as it may determine whether deemed liquida-
tion has occurred. Customs has consistently argued that the six-month
time period begins when the DOC issues liquidation instructions to Cus-
toms. 66  The DOC sends liquidation instructions in e-mails to Customs
Headquarters. 67 These instructions may be public or non-public. 68 Cus-
toms Headquarters then issues liquidation instructions to its different
Customs ports.69  The Customs ports liquidate the entries and post the
liquidation notice on their bulletin boards.7° Customs argues that its role
in the antidumping enforcement procedure is ministerial only.71 Accord-
ing to Customs, it merely mechanically applies the dumping margin de-
termined by the DOC and, therefore, cannot act until the DOC instructs it
to do so.
The courts, however, have found that the time period should be
measured, at the latest, from the publication in the Federal Register of the
final results in an antidumping administrative review or the final results
64. The statutory deadlines for deemed liquidation vary depending on whether the particular
entries are subject to a dumping finding. Compare § 1504(a) (for entries not subject to an antidump-
ing finding, "an entry of merchandise not liquidated within 1 year from... the date of entry of such
merchandise.., shall be deemed liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duties
asserted by the importer of record."), with § 1504(d) (for entries subject to an antidumping finding,
"[a]ny entry ... not liquidated... within 6 months after receiving ... notice shall be treated as
having been liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted at the time of
entry ... ").
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
66. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
67. Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1270.
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b) (2000). See, e.g., Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, No. 04-1058 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004) (non-public email
instructions).
69. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1316.
70. Id. at 1317.
71. See, e.g., id at 1324 ("Customs' role in making antidumping decisions ... is generally
ministerial .... "); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1273 ("The government argues that because Customs
acts in a ministerial capacity when liquidating antidumping duties, the suspension of liquidation
cannot be removed until Customs has all the information it needs to perform its ministerial task...
."); Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004)
(citing Yacheng Baolong Biochemical Prods. Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2003)) ("In implementing the instructions of Commerce to liquidate entries subject to an
antidumping or countervailing duty order, Customs' actions are ministerial in nature."); Am. Hi-Fi
Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1340, 1342 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) ("[Customs] con-
tends ... that interest assessed on antidumping duties is not protestable ... as Customs does not
make any 'decisions,' but performs merely a ministerial role .... "); U.S. Customs Headquarters
Ruling Letter HQ 230339 (June 25, 2004), available at HQ 230339 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Cust. HQ
230339] ("[Customs] role in the antidumping process is simply to follow Commerce's instructions..
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after judicial review.72 According to the courts, publication provides a
public and unambiguous date from which to measure the six-month time
period.73 In the absence of publication, Customs may receive notice of
the removal of the suspension of liquidation also through public, unam-
biguous liquidation instructions from the DOC to Customs (actual no-
tice) 74 and by participating directly in the underlying litigation, in cases
involving judicial review.75
II. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LIQUIDATION PROCESS
A. The Immediate Effects of Antidumping Proceedings and Delay in the
76Liquidation Process
The time between entry of goods and the determination of final duty
liability through liquidation can be substantial. For goods subject to an-
tidumping investigations, in the best-case-scenario, liquidation will occur
approximately two-and-one-half years after importation.77 The length of
the process increases significantly if it also involves judicial review.
72. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (inter-
preting post-Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA") statute); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United
States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1277 (interpreting pre-
URAA statute). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently decided the issue of whether
the statutory amendments made to Section 1504(d) in 1994 as a result of the enactment of the
URAA, which implemented U.S. WTO obligations, changed this analysis. Congress added the
clause: "[e]xcept as provided in section 1675(a)(3) of this title" to the beginning of the sub-section in
the 1994-version of Section 1504(d). The URAA also added a brand new section 1675(a)(3) to title
19 of the United States Code which provides that:
If the administering authority orders any liquidation of entries pursuant to a review under
paragraph (1), such liquidation shall be made promptly and, to the greatest extent practi-
cable, within 90 days after the instructions to Customs are issued. In any case in which
liquidation has not occurred within that 90-day period, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall, upon the request of the affected party, provide an explanation thereof.
19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(3)(B). The U.S. Government took the position that the addition of this clause
removed the consequence of deemed liquidation from all entries falling under § 1675(a)(3). Int'l
Trading, 412 F.3d at 1306-07. According to the government, the only consequence attaching to
Customs' failure to liquidate within 90 days is that the importer is entitled to ask the Secretary of the
Treasury for an explanation of the delay. Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1265,
1268 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004). The CAFC rejected these arguments in the second round of Int'l Trad-
ing cases and followed its precedent in the first round oflnt'l Trading cases. See Int'l Trading, 412
F.3d at 1308-09.
73. Int'l Trading, 421 F.3d at 1308; Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1380; Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at
1275.
74. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381; NEC Solutions (Am.), Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d
1340, 1341 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (holding that Customs received actual notice of the removal of
suspension of liquidation through e-mail instructions from the DOC to Customs despite the fact that
the DOC failed to publish the final results after judicial review).
75. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1370.
76. This article does not purport to provide a full analysis of the economic effects of anti-
dumping proceedings and the liquidation process. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this
article.
77. See, e.g., Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g
granted, No. 04-1058 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004) (non-public email instructions).Cemex, 384 F.3d at
1316-17 (importation between 1991 and 1992; final results of judicial review in April 1998; DOC
issued liquidation instructions in March 1998; Customs liquidated in April 2001); Fujitsu Gen. Am.,
Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (importation in 1986 to 1988; DOC
published final results after administrative review in February 1991; final results after judicial re-
view in October 1996; DOC published final results after judicial review in September 1997; DOC
issued liquidation instructions in September 1997; Customs liquidated between November 1997 and
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There are three main actors who are affected by the length of the
liquidation process: the U.S. government, representatives of U.S. indus-
try and importers. The length of the liquidation process has little impact
on the U.S. government because the government will collect the final
duty liability or refund over-paid duties at some point.
Analyzing the effects on U.S. industry is more complicated. Before
doing so, it is useful to briefly consider the nature of U.S. unfair trade
laws and the characteristics and motivations of the two disputing parties
in an antidumping proceeding.78 Although the DOC has the power to
initiate such proceedings sua sponte, most are initiated after a petition by
representatives of U.S. industry. 79 Representatives of U.S. industry are
referred to as petitioners. Companies on the "defendant" side of the dis-
pute are called respondents. It is imperative to understand that the peti-
tioner and respondent sides do not necessarily consist of one group of
U.S. companies versus a group of foreign companies. The particular
U.S. industry may consist of foreign-owned companies.8° Conversely,
respondent companies may be owned by U.S. owners. Hence, these
trade disputes are rarely of a de facto "us-and-them" character. The mo-
tivating factor behind filing a petition for trade relief is to close the U.S.
market to import competition. The effect of a successful petition is to
make foreign imports more expensive when sold in the U.S. market.
Thus, antidumping proceedings serve as a form of WTO-consistent pro-
tectionism. 81  Not surprisingly, U.S. trade laws are more favorable to
petitioners than to respondents.8 z
February 1998); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1270-71 (importation in 1993 and 1994; DOC published
final results after administrative review in February 1996; DOC issued liquidation instructions in
August 1996; Customs liquidated in October 1996); Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 191 F.3d
1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (importation in 1979; DOC published final results after administrative
review in January 1985; final results after judicial review in August 1989; DOC issued liquidation
instructions in October 1989; Customs liquidated in April 1994); Peer Chain Co. v. United States,
316 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359-60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (importation in 1985 and 1986; final results
after administrative review in September 1992; final decision after judicial review in January 1996
(not published); DOC issued non-public liquidation instructions in May 2000; Customs liquidated in
June and August 2000); Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1119-21 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(importation between 1980 and 1982; liquidation suspended pending final duty determination, 1980-
1982; court-ordered injunctions maintaining suspension of liquidation, 1983-1985; liquidation in
1986); LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 668, 670-72 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)
(importation from 1984 to 1988; suspension of liquidation between 1984 and 1990; settlement
reached in May 1994; DOC sent instructions to Customs in September 1994; Customs never liqui-
dated; and LG Electronics filed suit in 1996).
78. It is beyond the scope of this article provide an in-depth analysis of the effects of trade
actions on the U.S. economy.
79. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a)-(b), 1673a(a)-(b) (2000).
80. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(B), (9)(A) (2000).
81. See, e.g., Marie Louise Hurabiell, Comment, Protectionism Versus Free Trade: Imple-
menting the GATTAntidumping Agreement in the United States, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 567, 567
(1995) ("The trade policy of the United States government reflects an attempt to reconcile the inher-
ently incompatible goals of free trade and protectionism.... [T]he United States regularly invokes
antidumping measures. These protectionist policies are incompatible with a system of free trade...
.11).
82. See, e.g., Bruce M. Steen, Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative Approach in
Defining 'Like Product' and 'Domestic Injury' under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 73 VA. L.
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The initiation of an antidumping investigation will affect the market
conditions for both petitioners and respondents. Immediately, both sides
incur litigation costs.8 3 The effects of litigation costs on petitioners and
respondents depend on how well they can absorb the costs associated
with the process. 84  Next, provided that the DOC makes an affirmative
preliminary finding in the investigation phase, foreign imports will be
subject to cash deposits, making imports comparatively more expensive
than the domestic equivalent. The petitioners are likely to enjoy positive
effects of the imposition of cash deposits. For example, imports become
more expensive and the uncertainty of supply from foreign sources may
force purchasers to switch suppliers from foreign to domestic sources.
The longer the cash deposits remain in effect, the longer time period the
petitioners enjoy protection from foreign imports. Thus, it is usually in
the interest of U.S. industry to delay the process for as long as possible.
The effects of antidumping proceedings and the length of the liqui-
dation process on respondents are easy to discern. The long time period
between importation and final determination of duty liability has two
primary negative effects.
First, the payment of cash deposits represents an opportunity cost
and an importer also risks suffering a loss on goods sold if the final duty
liability exceeds the cash deposits paid. The length of the liquidation
process may mean that an importer will not be able to internalize the
future increase in duty liability into the price of its products. Arguably,
the negative effects of the uncertainty can be alleviated by the importer's
awareness of the antidumping proceeding upon importation allowing the
importer to make necessary price adjustments for future duty liability. 5
However, due to the uncertain nature of the final duty liability, the im-
porter would have to "guesstimate" the final duty liability. Not infre-
quently, the final duty liability applied at liquidation is higher than the
cash deposits paid at importation.86 On the other hand, the final duty
liability might be lower than the cash deposits paid. In that case, the
REv. 1459, 1471 (1987) (arguing that "the current approach of United States antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty law and enforcement is biased in favor of affirmative findings of injury.").
83. The parties incur litigations costs only to the extent to which they participate in the pro-
ceedings. Before participating, a rational economic actor will evaluate the costs and benefits from
participating. Respondents often find that it is not economically defensible to participate because the
costs of doing so will be higher than any reduction in dumping duties expected. In particular, small
respondent-companies find it too burdensome to participate and may choose to stop importing into
the United States.
84. To a certain extent, the cost of litigating a case may be spread among the representatives
of one side by choosing joint representation or a division of labor, where applicable. The legal bills
alone for an antidumping investigation may end up anywhere from in the hundred thousands of
dollars to over a million. On top of that, a litigating party may find it wise to pay for legal represen-
tation in administrative reviews and judicial appeals.
85. Cf H.R. REP. No. 95-621, at 25 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
86. See, e.g., Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359 (Ct. Int'l Trade),
aff'd, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Various entries were deemed liquidated as entered at rates
under 60%, instead of at the antidumping duty rate sustained by the courts, which was over 106%.");
Int'I Trading, 281 F.3d at 1270-71 (Imported towels initially subject to a 2.72% duty rate but were
liquidated at a 42.31% duty rate).
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importer would receive a windfall if the importer already took the poten-
tial for a duty increase into account when selling the goods. However, if
the importer was unable to raise prices to recoup the cash deposits paid at
importation, the importer has not gained anything.
87
The second negative effect of the long time period between impor-
tation and final determination of duty liability is that a corporate entity
must carry the uncertain duty liability in its financial statements during
the time from importation until liquidation. This type of uncertain liabil-
ity has accounting and business implications for importers. Under gen-
erally-accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), an uncertain liability
must be mentioned in a footnote to the financial statement.8 8 If the liabil-
ity can be estimated, a loss contingency, the company must accrue this
loss in its financial statement. 89  The uncertain duty liability may also
distort the company's financial statements and mislead investors because
the unknown future duty liability is not taken into consideration in the
cost of goods sold.90 Therefore, the company may look more profitable
than it actually is. However, the uncertain duty liability will have no
effect on the company's cash flow.91 From a business standpoint, the
company may choose to segregate a potential future loss on its balance
sheet.92 Many importers set up an escrow account for the potential future
duty liability. An uncertain liability may affect the creditworthiness of
the company and its ability to plan its business. 93 In addition, the CIT
has found that "[t]he public interest is also prejudiced by the impediment
to the free flow of commerce caused by these inordinate delays. 94
87. The antidumping statutes intend that the cost of the antidumping duty be passed along to
U.S. customers, thereby increasing the price of foreign imports sold in the U.S. market. While
"unaffiliated" importers may choose to absorb the antidumping duties, the antidumping scheme
prevents affiliated importers from doing so. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (2000) (export price of unaf-
filiated party); 19 C.F.R. § 351.401 (2005) (dumping calculation generally); 19 C.F.R. § 351.403
(2005) (sales to affiliated parties); 19 C.F.R. § 351.402(f) (2005) (adjustment for duty absorption).
88. ALLAN AFTERMAN, GAAP PRACTICE MANUAL § 9.3.2 (2005) ("The basic types of cur-
rent liabilities [include] ... [a]ccruals."); see also id. § 9.4 ("GAAP requires that the total amount of
current liabilities ... be presented on the face of a classified balance sheet.").
89. Id. § 33.3.1 ("A contingency is... an existing... situation... involving uncertainty as to
a possible gain or loss that will ultimately be resolved when or more future events occur or fail to
occur."); id. § 33.3.2 ("An estimated loss from a contingency should be accrued and charged ... if
both of the following conditions are met: (1) Information ... indicates that . . . a liability incurred as
of the date of the financial statements; and (2) The amount of the loss can be reasonably esti-
mated."); see also id. § 33.4 ("For a loss contingency, the following information should be disclosed:
... If an estimated loss has been accrued ... the nature of the contingency [and] the amount of
accrued loss.").
90. Linda C. Quinn, Federal Disclosure Developments, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 83, 287 (1998) ("Offsetting a contingent liability against expected third-
party recovery may mislead investors as to the probability of recovery and reflect unfounded opti-
mism regarding the creditworthiness of the entity from whom recovery is expected."), available at,
SD11 ALI-ABA 83 (Westlaw).
91. Patric R. Delaney et al.,WILEY GAAP 2001: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 98 (2002) ("The statement of cash flows includes
only inflows and outflows of cash and cash equivalents.").
92. Id. at 41 ("Assets [and] liabilities.., are separated in the balance sheet so that important
relationships can be shown and attention can be focused on significant subtotals.").
93. See id. at 37.
94. Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 358, 364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
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As illustrated, the long time period between importation and liqui-
dation has a multitude of effects on petitioners and respondents. On the
one hand, given that the process is lengthy from the start, further delays
should be avoided. On the other hand, there are circumstances under
which it would be beneficial to either side to delay as long as possible. It
is in the interest of petitioners to achieve as much protection, i.e. with
high margins, for as long as possible. Conversely, the respondents wish
to minimize their margins and keep them in effect for as short a period of
time as possible. Therefore, faced with a threat of having the situation
change for the worse, e.g., if petitioners feared that the DOC would issue
a lower rate than already in effect or the respondents feared a higher rate,
either side has an incentive to delay to keep the favorable status quo for
as long as possible. This conclusion is the simple effect of the time-
value-of-money. The incentive to delay may create inefficiencies, such
as judicial appeals doomed from the start.95 To increase certainty in cus-
toms transactions by speeding up the liquidation process, Congress en-
acted 19 U.S.C. § 1504 in 1978 which provides for deemed liquidation.96
B. The Immediate Effects of Deemed Liquidation
The immediate effects of deemed liquidation on an importer, the
U.S. government and representatives of U.S. industry of deemed liquida-
tion depend on whether the importer overpaid or underpaid estimated
duties at the time of entry.97 The effects on the government and the im-
porter are fairly straight-forward: deemed liquidation will result in a
windfall to one and a loss to the other. If an importer overpaid duties
upon entry, meaning that the cash deposits determined by the DOC in the
investigation were higher than the actual duties found to be owed in the
administrative review, the importer will not be entitled to a refund if
deemed liquidation occurs. Customs and courts take the position that
deemed liquidation bars them from issuing a refund.98 As a result, the
importer lost money and the U.S. government received a windfall. 99
95. The DOC's decisions can be appealed to the CIT and those decisions, in turn, can be
appealed to the Federal Circuit, adding a couple of years during which time the status quo is re-
tained. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2000).
96. See Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, §
209(a), 92 Stat. 902 (1978). Courts have found that the purpose of the concept is to provide cer-
tainty in the customs protest for individuals and entities with a potential liability resulting from a
customs transaction. See, e.g., Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 n.5 (citing Dal-Tile Corp. v. United
States, 829 F. Supp. 394, 399 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993)); see also Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1272;
United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
97. Put differently, whether the final duty liability is less (overpayment) or more (underpay-
ment) than the preliminary duties (cash deposits) paid at the time of entry.
98. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that Customs cannot refund over-paid countervailing duties for deemed liquidated entries);
Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11 (finding that Customs cannot refund over-paid duties for deemed
liquidated entries); Cust. HQ 228712, supra note 11 (finding that Customs cannot refund over-paid
countervailing duties for deemed liquidated entries).
99. Traditionally, antidumping duties are paid into the U.S. Treasury. Mark L. Movsesian,
Actions against Dumping and Subsidization - Antidumping and SCM Agreements - United States
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 ("Byrd Amendment")-Interest Group Legisla-
tion, 98 AM J. INT'L L. 150, 151 (2004). Currently, by reason of the Continued Dumping and Sub-
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Conversely, if an importer underpays duties upon entry, i.e., the cash
deposits determined by the DOC in the investigation were lower than the
actual duties found to be owed in the administrative review, the importer
will not have to pay the difference if deemed liquidation occurs. This
scenario results in a windfall to the importer, who does not have to pay
the additional duties owed, and in a loss to the government because it
was unable to collect the duties owed.
The effects of deemed liquidation on representatives of U.S. indus-
try are more amorphous. Generally, the antidumping statutes are in-
tended to protect U.S. industry from unfairly traded imports causing in-
jury.100 U.S. industry may gain such protection by initiating an anti-
dumping investigation followed by an affirmative finding by the DOC
sidy Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment"), collected antidumping duties are distributed to the affected
U.S. industry. See 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2000). Hence, the U.S. industry also has a significant, direct
financial stake in the liquidation of entries beyond seeing the relief afforded by the administrative
agencies under the U.S. trade laws properly enforced. However, the Appellate Body of the WTO
has found the Byrd Amendment inconsistent with the United States' WTO obligations and the
United States is under an obligation to repeal it. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/D5234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003)
[hereinafter WTD AB Report Byrd Amend.], 42 I.L.M. 427; David Armstrong, WTO Rebuffs U.S. on
Tariffs: Trade Partners May Impose Tit-for-Tat Levies, It Rules, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2004, at C1
("Early indications were that Washington intends to comply with the WTO decision and that the
Byrd Amendment could be off the books before sanctions are applied."). So far, Congress has not
repealed the Byrd Amendment.
100. James T. Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy through International Legal Minimalism: A
Re-characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 67 (2004)
("Both anti-dumping law and presidential constitutional and legal authority over foreign commerce
were increasingly deployed to protect domestic industries."). While tariffs on imports traditionally
have been used for a host of reasons, such as to generate revenue, the purpose of antidumping law
and similar trade actions is not to generate revenue but to protect the domestic industry from unfairly
traded injurious imports. See, e.g., Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("The antidumping laws protect United States industries against the domestic sale of foreign manu-
factured goods at prices below the fair market value of those goods in the foreign country."); Kemira
Fibres Oy v. United States, 61 F.3d 866, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Indeed... [the] ... primary purpose
of the antidumping law . . . is to protect domestic industry."); Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United States,
755 F. Supp. 397, 403 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990) ("The Act is not intended to penalize the foreign indus-
try, but to protect the domestic industry which is likely to be injured or prevented from being estab-
lished by the sale of foreign goods in the United States market .... ); Badger-Powhatan v. United
States, 608 F. Supp. 653, 656 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (finding that antidumping law "was designed to
protect domestic industry from sales of imported merchandise at less than fair value which either
caused or threatened to cause injury"); S. REP. No. 96-249, at 37 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 423, (stating that purpose of statute was to bolster and protect domestic industry);
Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 491 (1993)
("Antidumping laws were designed to protect domestic industry from foreign competition."); James
R. Cannon, Jr., Should the Federal Circuit Take a "Hard Look" at International Trade Cases in the
1990s?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1093, 1099 (1991) ("[T]he purpose of the law is to protect domestic
industry from unfair trade .... ); Judith A. Smith, Note, American Lamb Co. v. United States: More
Protection or Less for the Domestic Industry, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 983, 986 (1987) ("Congress devel-
oped the antidumping laws to protect domestic industries from potentially injurious unfair pricing
practices by foreign competitors."). Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to
Implement World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM.
U. INT'L L. REv. 399, 494 (2002) ("Some WTO policies, such as the rules contained in the Anti-
dumping Agreement, have resulted in a proliferation of disputes because they offer a potent means
of protecting domestic injury from dumping practices."); Nicole DiSalvo, Note, Let's Dump the 1916
Antidumping Act: Why the 1994 GATT Provides Better Price Protection for U.S. Industries, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 791, 809 (2004) ("[T]he members of the WTO signed the Uruguay Round
Code, and it is the current antidumping agreement used by member countries to protect domestic
industry.").
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and ITC.'0' The imposed antidumping duty is intended to compensate
for the dumping taking place by raising the price of foreign imports to
the level at which those goods are sold in the foreign manufacturer's
home market, thereby leveling the playing field.102  Thus, the protection
afforded U.S. industry is the amount of the dumping duty - nothing more
and nothing less. In the overpayment situation, the cash deposits col-
lected are higher than the dumping found, and U.S. industry is therefore
afforded a higher level of protection than it is entitled to. 10 3 Conversely,
in the underpayment situation, the cash deposits are lower than the final
antidumping duty liability, and U.S. industry is not afforded the level of
protection it is entitled to.
An additional benefit to the U.S. industry from the collection of an-
tidumping duties is the disbursement of those duties to the affected U.S.
industry under the Byrd Amendment.104  As long as the Byrd Amend-
ment remains in effect, U.S. industry will have an added incentive to file
antidumping petitions because it has a direct financial stake in the out-
come of the liquidation process. 10 5 Therefore, it is in the U.S. industry's
interest that entries are liquidated at the highest possible rate, through
regular or deemed liquidation.
101. See 19 USC § 1673, 1673a(2)(B) (2000).
102. See 19 U.S.C § 1673 (2000) ("there shall be imposed ... an antidumping duty... in an
amount equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price ... for the mer-
chandise"); Globe Metallurgical, Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1157 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002);
GTS Indus. S.A. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002); Elkem Metal
Co. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1335 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Alan F. Holmer et al.,
Enacted and Rejected Amendments to the Antidumping Law: In Implementation or Contravention of
the Antidumping Agreement?, 29 INT'L LAW 483, 507 (1995) ("The antidumping law is not intended
as a revenue raiser for the government but as a remedial provision to 'level the playing field."').
There are several business rationales for dumping goods in a particular market. One strategy is to
gain market share from competitors. Adam C. Hawkins, Comment, Antidumping Beyond the GATT
1994: Supporting International Enactment of Legislation Providing Supplemental Remedies, 10 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 152 (1999) ("By reducing prices below cost of production and a rea-
sonable profit (an inefficient act), producers seek to drive out the competition, gain market share,
and ultimately reap monopoly profits."). The manufacturer dumping the goods may decide to take a
lower profit for a finite period of time hoping to out-compete competitors in order to be able to reap
monopoly returns at a later stage. Id. Similarly, a manufacturer may settle for a lesser profit per unit
by dumping hoping to recoup it on a higher volume of sales.
103. Arguably, this scenario is not an example of over-deterrence of the foreign manufac-
turer/importer because it has already imported the merchandise and paid the higher, estimated duties.
104. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000). However, as mentioned supra note 99, the U.S. govern-
ment is under an obligation to repeal the Byrd Amendment as a result of the WTO appellate body
finding that it is inconsistent with U.S. WTO obligations. See WTD AB Report Byrd Amend., supra
note 99; David Armstrong, WTO Rebuffs U.S. on Tariffs:Trade Partners May Impose Tit-for-Tat
Levies, It Rules, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2004, at Cl ("Early indications were that Washington intends
to comply with the WTO decision and that the Byrd Amendment could be off the books before
sanctions are applied.").
105. See Eakin Letter, supra note 7. (noting that the Byrd Amendment "encourages more firms
to file or support antidumping cases... [because the] linkage of payments to support for a case is a
direct incentive."). However, a recent Government Accountability Office ("GAO") study did not
find any clear evidence that the Byrd Amendment had caused an increase in the number of trade
cases filed or in the scope or duration of antidumping orders. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND
SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 37-40 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05979.pdf.
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C. The Sources of the Problems Associated with Deemed Liquidation
The problems associated with deemed liquidation stem from the
failure of administrative agencies to act in a timely manner, the lack of
consequences in the scheme for failure to act, and the lack of an adminis-
trative remedy for interested parties to undo deemed liquidation.
Deemed liquidation occurs six months after Customs receives no-
tice that the suspension of liquidation has been removed. 0 6 Interpreting
courts have concluded that the six-month time period starts to run when
the DOC publishes the final results of an administrative or judicial re-
view in the Federal Register, 10 7 when the DOC issues public and unam-
biguous liquidation instructions to Customs, 10 8 and, potentially also if
Customs is a party to the proceedings resulting in the removal of the sus-
pension of liquidation. 0 9 However, Customs takes the position that it
106. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
107. Int l Trading, 412 F.3d. at 1313 (results after administrative review, post-URAA statute);
Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381 (results after judicial review); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1274-77 (results
after administrative review, pre-URAA statute). For information on URAA, see supra note 72.
108. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321 ("Our case law further requires that, in addition to being unam-
biguous, the notice to Customs be public."); Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381-82 ("It is just as important
that there be 'an unambiguous and public starting point for the six-month liquidation period' under
these circumstances as it is when liquidation of entries is suspended pending an administrative
review and thereafter the suspension is removed when the final results of the review are an-
nounced."); In Int'l Trading, the court states:
[T]he date of publication provides an unambiguous and public starting point for the six-
month liquidation period, and it does not give the government the ability to postpone in-
definitely the removal of suspension of liquidation (and thus the date by which liquida-
tion must be completed) as would be the case if the six-month liquidation period did not
begin to run until Commerce sent a message to Customs advising of the removal of sus-
pension of liquidation.
281 F.3d at 1275. It is unclear whether non-public liquidation instructions may provide the
requisite notice to Customs. See Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1320-21 (holding that electronic mail
liquidation instructions from Commerce to Customs were neither unambiguous nor public, but
not deciding whether non-public instructions provided the requisite notice to Customs). Argua-
bly, non-public instructions would provide actual notice to Customs. However, non-public
instructions would not provide notice to parties involved in Customs transactions who are not
privy to such instructions. As a result, such parties would be unable to safeguard their interests
by monitoring the liquidation process. From a policy standpoint, it would appear that the better
approach is not to allow non-public instructions to trigger the six-month time period for
deemed liquidation.
109. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1379. In Fujitsu, the court stated:
[S]ection 1504(d) requires that Customs receive notice that a suspension of liquidation
has been removed from "the Department of Commerce, other agency, or a court with ju-
risdiction over the entry." There is no evidence in the record that Customs received such
notice prior to September 16, 1997. It is true, as Fujitsu points out, that on or about July
3, 1996, the Clerk of the Federal Circuit served counsel for the government, the Depart-
ment of Justice, with the decision in Fujitsu General. That fact does not help Fujitsu,
however. The Justice Department represented Commerce, not Customs, before this
court. Service of the Fujitsu General decision upon it did not constitute notice to Cus-
toms.
Id. Similarly, in NEC Solutions (America), Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit applied the
Fujitsu rule described above. 411 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005). NEC argued that service of a court's
opinion on the Justice Department's attorneys provided notice to Customs that the suspension of
liquidation had been lifted. NEC Solutions, 411 F.3d at 1346. NEC distinguished Fujitsu by point-
ing out that in that case, the notice was of a Federal Court decision determining a dumping margin
while in NEC's case the notice was of a CIT decision ordering the lifting of suspension of liquida-
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does not have to monitor the Federal Register and that it will only liqui-
date entries after receiving liquidation instructions from the DOC.l °
Thus, the DOC issues two types of notices to effect liquidation: first, it
is required by statute to publish the final results of administrative and
judicial reviews in the Federal Register,"' and second, it issues liquida-
tion instructions to Customs. "
2
In practice, both agencies frequently fail to act in a timely manner.
For example, the DOC may fail to publish the final results in the Federal
Register or fail to issue liquidation instructions to Customs. In such
situations, the time period for deemed liquidation may never start to
run."13 Because Customs takes the position that it will not liquidate en-
tries until it receives instructions from the DOC, if ever, when Customs
finally receives the instructions, the deemed liquidation period may al-
ready have passed.' 14
Peer Chain Co. v. United States"5 is an example of how the DOC's
delay in providing Customs with notice of the final duty liability may
significantly injure an importer. In that case, the Peer Chain Company
had imported roller chain from Japan subject to a preliminary antidump-
ing duty rate of zero percent in 1985.1i6 In 1992, the DOC determined
that the final duty rate was 43.29 percent."17 However, the DOC neither
published notice of the final duty liability nor provided Customs with
tion. Id. The Federal Circuit rejected NEC's argument and agreed with the lower court that "'ser-
vice of an opinion on Justice was not service on Customs."' Id. (quoting Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1379).
110. Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1274 n.2 ("Customs has stated its view that the six-month
period of section 1504(d) is not triggered until Customs receives liquidation instructions from Com-
merce."). Customs' role in the liquidation procedure is purely "ministerial" in that Customs only is
charged with executing the mandate given by the DOC. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1324 ("Cus-
toms' role in making antidumping decisions ... is generally ministerial."); Allegheny Bradford
Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169, (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (citing Yacheng Baolong
Biochemical Products Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003)) ("In
implementing the instructions of Commerce to liquidate entries subject to an antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty order, Customs' actions are ministerial in nature."); Fujitsu Ten Corp. of Am. v.
United States, 957 F. Supp. 245, 248-49 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that Fujitsu had no basis upon
which to file suit against Customs, since Commerce made all the decisions): Am. Hi-Fi Int'l, Inc. v.
United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1340, 1342 (1995) ("Customs does not make any 'decisions,' but
performs merely a ministerial role in the collection of interest pursuant to the antidumping duty
laws."); see Cust. HQ 230339, supra note 71. ("[Customs] role in the antidumping process is simply
to follow Commerce's instructions .... ).
111. 19 U.S.C. §§ 151 6 a(c), (e), 1675(a)(1) (2000).
112. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(c)(1), (2), 1673d(d) (2000).
113. See, e.g., Peer Chain Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004) (finding that the six-month time period will not begin to run if the DOC does not send liquida-
tion instructions to Customs, despite the DOC's five-year delay).
114. See, e.g., Int'l Trading, 421 F.3d at 1303 (suspension lifted Oct. 30, 1996, deemed liqui-
dation occurred six months thereafter, DOC sent liquidation instructions on July 1, 1997); Fujitsu,
283 F.3d at 1364 (suspension lifted on Oct. 1, 1996, deemed liquidation occurred six months thereaf-
ter, DOC sent liquidation instructions on Sept. 26, 1997); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1268 (suspen-
sion lifted Feb. 12, 1996, deemed liquidation occurred six months thereafter, DOC sent liquidation
instructions on Aug. 29, 1996).
115. 316 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
116. Peer Chain, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
117. Id. In essence, the DOC determined that the entries imported at the zero percent duty rate
at the time of importation were dumped and should have been subject to a 43.29 percent duty rate.
Id. at 1358-59.
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actual notice of the final duty liability. 18 Hence, the six-month time
period for deemed liquidation never started to run. Finally, in 2000, the
DOC provided Customs with actual notice of the final duty liability."
19
Customs liquidated the Peer Chain Company's entries within six months
of receiving actual notice from the DOC."2 ° The CIT found that Peer
Chain Company's entries had been properly liquidated and that it could
not provide any equitable relief, despite "the government's egregious
delay."'12' Deemed liquidation did not occur because the six-month time
period never started to run because of the DOC's failure to provide no-
tice to Customs. 122 Consequently, the Peer Chain Company was forced
to pay $167,111 in back-duties, together with interest which had com-
pounded daily from 1986 to 2000.123
Customs also often fails to act in a timely manner, causing deemed
liquidation to occur. In International Trading Co. v. United States, 24 the
importer had imported shop towels from Bangladesh between 1993 and
1994 and paid antidumping duty cash deposit of 2.72 percent. 25 On Feb-
ruary 12, 1996, the DOC published in the Federal Register the final re-
sults of the administrative review covering the subject entries. 126 The
final AD duty rate was 42.31 percent. 12 7 The DOC sent an e-mail mes-
sage to Customs the next day noting that the administrative review had
been completed but advising Customs not to liquidate until receiving
liquidation instructions. 128 In August 1996, the DOC sent a non-public e-
mail message to Customs notifying it that the suspension of liquidation
had been lifted and instructing it to liquidate covered entries at the AD
duty rate of 42.31 percent. 29 Customs liquidated the entries in October
1996, nine months after publication of the final results in the Federal
Register but only approximately two months after receiving liquidation
instructions from Customs, and issued a bill for additional antidumping
duties. 30 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Cir-
cuit") held that the entries in question liquidated by operation of law six
months after publication of the final results after administrative review,
February 12, 1996, at the rate asserted upon entry. 13  In International
118. Id. at 1359-60.
119. Id. at 1360.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1362, 1368.
122. Id. at 1363.
123. Id. at 1360.
124. 281 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The case dealt with the pre-URAA version of 19 U.S.C.
Section 1504(d). In a subsequent case involving the same parties, the Federal Circuit reached the
same general result when interpreting the post-URAA version of Section 1504(d). See Int'l Trading
Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).





130. Id. at 1270-71.
131. Id. at 1277.
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Trading, deemed liquidation worked to the advantage of the importer and
to the detriment of representatives of U.S. industry and the U.S. govern-
ment.
Cemex, S.A. v. United States'32 is an example of how the DOC and
Customs' mistakes in the liquidation process may injure the U.S. gov-
ernment and U.S. industry. A U.S. importer had imported cement from
Mexico, subject to a preliminary antidumping duty rate of 56.94 percent
ad valorem. 133 The DOC determined the final duty rate to be 106.846
percent. 134 The DOC failed to publish official notice of the final results
in the Federal Register but did send non-public liquidation instructions to
Customs in March 1998.131 In April 2001, approximately three years
later, Customs, erroneously believing that the entries in question had
been deemed liquidated six months after March 1998, liquidated the en-
tries at the preliminary duty rate of 59.94 percent rather than the final
rate of 106.846 percent. 136 The Federal Circuit concluded that the March
1998 notice was ineffective and that the six-month time period for
deemed liquidation never started to run.137 Nevertheless, Customs erro-
neous liquidation in April 2001 at the lower, preliminary duty rate had
become final on the parties and was therefore valid.
Part of the problem caused by the DOC's delay in notifying Cus-
toms about the removal of the suspension of liquidation is the lack of
statutory deadlines for doing so and the lack of consequences for failure
to do so. In addition, the DOC is not under a statutory obligation to send
liquidation instructions to Customs. 38 While the statutes obligates the
DOC to publish in the Federal Register final results after an administra-
tive review, they do not contain any deadline within which to do So.
13 9
Finally, the statutes require that the DOC publish the final results after
judicial review within ten days of the court's decision. 140 However, in-
terpreting courts have concluded that the ten-day requirement is directory
rather than mandatory and that no consequences attach for the DOC's
failure to act.141 In contrast, Section 1504(d) contains both a statutorily
132. 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
133. Id. at 1316.
134. Id. at 1315.
135. Id at 1316, 1318 n.3.
136. Id. at 1317.
137. Id. at 1321.
138. While not mandated explicitly by statute or regulations, it appears reasonable to conclude
that issuing liquidation instructions is a necessary part of fulfilling the statutory scheme. The DOC
appears to agree. In its Antidumping Manual, the DOC sets forth its internal procedure for issuing
liquidation instructions to Customs. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, ch. 18
at 10-17 (Mar. 25, 1998) [hereinafter ANTIDUMPING MANUAL] (liquidation instructions are also
known as appraisement instructions), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual. Among other
things, the DOC states that failure to issue liquidation instructions means that "the DOC has not fully
applied the AD law." Id. at 11.
139. 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(1) (2000).
140. 19 U.S.C. §1516a(c), (e) (2000).
141. See, e.g., Cemex 384 F.3d at 1321 n.6 ("[S]ection 1516a(e) sets forth no consequences for
failure to comply with its publication requirement."); Fujitsu, F.3d at 1382 ("[T]here is no language
in section 1516a(e) that attaches a consequence to a failure by Commerce to meet the ten-day publi-
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mandated deadline, six months, and a consequence for Customs' failure
to meet it - deemed liquidation. Therefore, thr appropriate way to pre-
vent negative effects of deemed liquidation will depend on whether the
remedy is sought against the DOC or Customs.
Finally, it appears that interested parties have no available adminis-
trative remedy to prevent negative effects of deemed liquidation.
142
While there is a procedure for protesting Customs' decisions available to
importers, in the majority of cases, courts and Customs have found that
deemed liquidation is not a Customs decision and, therefore, cannot be
protested. 43 Besides, before deemed liquidation has occurred, there has
not been any Customs decision or action to protest; conversely, after
deemed liquidation has occurred, it cannot be undone. 44 In addition, this
protest procedure is not available to U.S. industry, which has a vested
interest in monitoring the implementation of the protection afforded by
cation requirement, let alone the consequence of deemed liquidation under section 1504(d)."); Cana-
dian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 563, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he lack of conse-
quential language in the latter part of section (d) if the Customs Service does not meet that time
frame leads us to conclude that Congress intended this part of section (d) to be only directory."). But
see Timken Co. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 373, 377 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) ("Section 1516a(e)
thus mandated Commerce to publish notice of [a] decision ... ").
142. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In a recent case, the CIT indicated that there
might be an available administrative remedy to deal with deemed liquidation once it has occurred in
certain, limited circumstances. Norsk Hydro Canada Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2004). In Norsk Hydra, the CIT re-affirmed that Customs notices of reliquidation are
protestable. Id. at 1178. More importantly, the CIT raised the possibility that a Customs notice that
a particular entry has been deemed liquidation may be challenged under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c). Id at
1178-79. Under § 1520, an importer may request reliquidation to correct mistakes of fact, clerical
errors, or other inadvertences in Customs liquidation decisions within one year of liquidation. 19
U.S.C. §1520(c)(1) (2000) (repealed 2004). The CIT stated that "Customs' failure to liquidate
entries in accordance with Commerce's instructions cannot be categorized as a mistake of fact or a
clerical error [but that] liquidation by operation of law may result from inadvertence." Norsk Hydro,
350 F. Supp. at 1179. According to the CIT, an importer may challenge such inadvertence under §
1520(c)(1). It is unclear what type of "inadvertences" would be challengeable under § 1520, espe-
cially in light of the consistent statements by courts and Customs that deemed liquidation cannot be
protested or undone once it has occurred. See, e.g., infra note 143.
143. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fujitsu Gen.
Am., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000), affd, 283 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2002); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11 (review of protest application); see Cust. HQ
228712, supra note II (decision to a request for internal advice). See also Allegheny Bradford
Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) ("The application of the
voidance doctrine is supported by the inadequacy of administrative remedies and the inappropriate-
ness of Customs as a forum for any such remedies. Here, as in other cases where liquidations vio-
lated an order of this Court, there is no meaningful protest to be had at the administrative level nor is
a determination of Customs really at issue."); Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1288,
1289-90 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321-23 (Ct.
Int'l. Trade 2003) (holding that the plaintiff did not have "standing to challenge the illegality of these
liquidations ... because it is not an importer, and ... 19 U.S.C. § 1516a and not § 1514 was the
[sole] mechanism governing challenges to antidumping duty determinations"); Yacheng Baolong
Biochemical Products Co., Ltd. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1358 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003).
Courts have not made a definitive finding on the issue. In two recent cases, the CIT has indicated in
dicta that deemed liquidation possibly could be protested under certain circumstances. See Norsk
Hydro Canada, Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1178 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); Cemex, 279
F. Supp. 2d at 1362, aff'd, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
144. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that deemed liquidation cannot be protested before it has occurred and cannot be undone
thereafter); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11; see Cust. HQ 228712, supra note II (finding that
Customs decisions are protestable but that deemed liquidation occurs by operation of law and does
not involve a Customs decision).
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the U.S. trade laws. 45 Furthermore, there is no administrative remedy
available to force the DOC to provide notice of the removal of the sus-
pension of liquidation. As illustrated, the current liquidation scheme is
plagued by statutory gaps and administrative failure which may injure
importers, the U.S. Government or representatives of U.S. industry.
D. Pertinent Public Policy Considerations
The problems associated with the liquidation process are caused by
the DOC and Customs' delays in executing their statutory duties. But,
the DOC's obligation to act is hard to enforce because the statutes do not
contain deadlines or consequences for the DOC's failure to act. How-
ever, Customs is under a clear obligation to liquidate within six months
of receiving notice of the removal of the suspension of liquidation.
1 46
The proper administration of U.S. trade laws is "clearly in the public
interest."''47 Any solution to the problems associated with the liquidation
process must take into consideration public policy concerns.
First, it is necessary to examine the interests of the parties involved
in the process. Foreign manufacturers and importers have an interest in
market access and the ability to sell imported goods in the United States.
This interest has a discernable effect on the U.S. economy. For example,
foreign manufacturers and importers may have operations in the United
States providing jobs, goods and services to the U.S. market. In addition,
competition from foreign goods has beneficial effects on consumer
choice and prices in the U.S. market. Of course, competition from for-
eign imports may have negative effects on the U.S. market as well. Rep-
resentatives of U.S. industry, in turn, also provide jobs, goods and ser-
vices to the U.S. market. Many U.S. companies are dependent on for-
eign imports for manufacturing inputs. The imposition of duties on for-
eign imports will decrease the competitive pressure on U.S. industry
from foreign sources. On the other hand, additional duties imposed on
important production inputs will negatively affect U.S. industry. In addi-
tion, U.S. industry has a direct stake in the collection of antidumping
duties as long as the Byrd Amendment remains in effect. The Byrd
Amendment provides that the collected duties be distributed to the af-
fected industry. 48 The U.S. government has an interest in maintaining a
healthy economy which can provide job opportunities for the population.
To the extent that collected duties are not distributed to the affected in-
dustry, the government also has a direct stake in the collection of duties
because it goes into the federal Treasury. This stream of revenue could
145. 19 U.S.C. §1514(c)(2) (1994). See also Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1323 n.9; Cemex, 279 F.
Supp. 2d at 1362.
146. See 19 U.S.C. §1504(d) (2000).
147. U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1351
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (finding that proper administration of trade laws is in the public interest for
purposes of meeting the fourth requirement of the test for issuing a preliminary injunction).
148. 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2000).
[Vol. 83:2
2005] ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 497
be used for governmental purposes. 149 The U.S. government also has an
interest in the proper administration of U.S. laws and policies. Finally,
U.S. multilateral trading partners also have a stake in the outcome of the
U.S. liquidation process. WTO members negotiate international trade
concessions and rules in complicated multilateral negotiations under the
auspice of the WTO. These negotiations take years to complete. The
resulting international trade law represents painstakingly negotiated
compromises. In addition, the development of international trade law is
intimately connected to the negotiation of trade concessions as WTO
members grant trade concessions in exchange for support of trade rule.
Antidumping laws are examples of such negotiated international trade
rules. The United States incorporated the outcome of the latest WTO
negotiation round, the Uruguay Round, into U.S. law. The DOC and
Customs are responsible for executing U.S. international trade obliga-
tions. These agencies' failure to follow the WTO-implementing U.S.
laws negates the beneficial results trade negotiations are intended to pro-
duce and causes friction with U.S. multilateral trading partners.
150
Second, the incentives created by the current scheme, and any fu-
ture scheme, must comport with public policy. Courts have concluded
that the effects of deemed liquidation are binding on all parties with an
interest in the liquidation process.15 1 Importers stand to lose money in
the overpayment situation if deemed liquidation occurs. The U.S. gov-
ernment and representatives of U.S. industry stand to lose money and
protection against unfair imports in the underpayment situation. The
three parties stand to gain or save money in the converse situations.
From an equity standpoint, it would appear wise public policy to impose
negative consequences only on the party who is in control of those con-
sequences occurring: in this case, the U.S. government. Indeed, the
economic principle of the least-cost avoider is well-recognized in law
and economics, tort law and contract law.' 52 The U.S. government itself
149. For example, Customs has recently been given new, additional responsibilities in protect-
ing the United States against terrorism. These new responsibilities add new stress to already scarce
and stretched administrative resources. The money lost through deemed liquidation could have been
used to fund such activities.
150. Colloquially, compare U.S. international trade obligations to a football game. The WTO
negotiations represent a close-to-100-yard drive starting at one end zone and ending close to the
other. The benefits of the negotiations represent the goal line of the opposing team. When the DOC
and Customs fail to fulfill their statutory obligations, mandated by U.S. international trade obliga-
tions, it is as if the football team fumbles the ball on the one-yard line of the opposing team after a
99-yard drive.
151. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(finding that an importer was not entitled to a refund of duties paid for entries which were deemed
liquidated); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note II (holding that Customs is unable to reliquidate
entries already deemed liquidated); see Cust. HQ 228712, supra note 11 (denying a refund because
entries were deemed liquidated).
152. See, e.g., Conoco Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 289 F.3d 819, 827 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
district court's equitable calculus relies in part on the concept that placing liability with the least-cost
avoider increases the incentive for that party to adopt preventive measures and ensures that such
measures would have the greatest marginal effect on preventing the loss.") (internal quotations
omitted); Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The liability
resulting from placing such a duty on the party who is not the least-cost avoider would expose that
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in Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States,153 argued against
deemed liquidation applying to an importer because importers who had
overpaid duties then would be unjustly affected. 54 The Federal Circuit
recognized the validity of the argument but, in the end, found that
deemed liquidation had not occurred. 55 The current interpretation of the
statutes gives the U.S. government little incentive to prevent deemed
liquidation from occurring in the overpayment situation.
In addition, the government has the power to prevent deemed liqui-
dation from occurring in the underpayment situation by preventing the
six-month time period from starting. The Federal Circuit has noted that
19 U.S.C. Section 1504 was enacted to remove from the government the
power to delay liquidation indefinitely, which was the case prior to
1978.156 The interests of U.S. industry and the government are aligned in
this respect. Hence, whether deemed liquidation occurs and the effect it
has is wholly within the control of the government. The money collected
will directly benefit the U.S. government. Granted, the benefit currently
is passed through to U.S. industry in the form of Byrd Amendment dis-
tributions. 157 However, the WTO appellate body has found that the Byrd
Amendment is inconsistent with U.S. WTO obligations and that the
United States must repeal it.'
58
In the overpayment situation, if deemed liquidation occurs, U.S. in-
dustry also benefits indirectly by gaining more protection against foreign
imports than allowed under the statute (and WTO rules). The fact that
the government stands to lose money in the underpayment situation is of
no consequence as it is the desired result under equitable principles be-
party to an almost incomprehensible number of claims in which a variety of plaintiffs - related and
unrelated to defendants - allege the duty was breached because this particular plaintiff was supposed
to be designated the beneficiary or, conversely, the owner of the account really meant for no one to
be designated."); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 5 F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(Silberman, J., concurring) ("Placing liability with the least-cost avoider increases the incentive for
that party to adopt preventive measures and ensures that such measures would have the greatest
marginal effect on preventing the loss."); Roger G. Noll, Reforming Risk Regulation, 545 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 165, 167 (1996) ("In addition, regulation shifts some of the costs of
identifying and ameliorating the risk to those who are most informed about it... [thus,] regulation
has a potential efficiency benefit according to the 'least-cost avoider' principle ...."); David W.
Bames & Rosemary McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to Take Corrective Precau-
tions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 357, 367 (1994) ("Whenever the unilateral precautions of one of the actors
involved in an accident scenario would be sufficient to avoid the risk of harm, an efficient incentive
is one that motivates the least cost avoider of the risk to take his available cost-justified precau-
tions."). For more information on the concept of least cost avoider, see generally GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-40 (1970) (discussing the concept of "least cost
avoider," a theory Calabresi authored).
153. 613 F. Supp. 364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
154. Canadian Fur Trappers, 613 F. Supp. at 365-66.
155. Id. at 617-18.
156. Int'l Trading Co., 281 F.3d at 1272 (citing Int'l Cargo & Surety Ins. Co. v. United States,
779 F. Supp. 174, 177 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991)) ("'Customs could delay liquidation as long as it
pleased, with or without giving notice.").
157. See 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2000).
158. WTD AB Report Byrd Amend., supra note 99, 318; David Armstrong, WTO Rebuffs U.S.
on Tariffs; Trade Partners May Impose Tit-for-Tat Levies, It Rules, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2004, at
CI ("Early indications were that Washington intends to comply with the WTO decision and that the
Byrd Amendment could be off the books before sanctions are applied.").
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cause the government controls the prevention of such loss. Of course,
one could argue that U.S. industry will suffer a loss of protection against
unfairly traded imports in the underpayment situation. However, any
potential loss of protection is of little concern from a policy standpoint.
In antidumping proceedings, U.S. industry affirmatively avails itself of
the protection afforded by the U.S. government. Because errors are
within the exclusive control of the government, U.S. industry has to ac-
cept them as part of doing business with the government. Importers, on
the other hand, are involuntarily involved in the process and should not
be forced to bear negative consequences resulting therefrom.
Third, public policy dictates that the scheme must operate in a cost-
effective manner. The DOC and Customs usually point to a large work-
load, lack of personnel and human error for failure to take prompt ac-
tion. 159 Potential costs associated with removing these delays could in-
clude the hiring of more personnel, the creation of new administrative
agencies to alleviate the work load of current agencies or the develop-
ment of a procedure to eliminate human error.160 Most likely, a remedy
to prevent agency delay would involve the federal government providing
additional funding to the agency. From that standpoint, other non-
monetary remedies, such as statutory deadlines with consequences en-
forceable in a federal court or before an administrative agency, might be
more cost-efficient.
Fourth, it is important to make sure that any remedy for the prob-
lems with the liquidation process does not give rise to new inefficiencies.
For example, the tightening of administrative deadlines could lead to
more erroneous agency decisions. In addition, the creation of a new ad-
ministrative remedy may add to the already large administrative burden
of the involved agencies, thereby giving rise to more errors and delays.
Finally, judicial economy dictates that problems in the process are
remedied at the agency level as opposed to in federal courts. Without
any change in the statutory scheme, as evidenced by the apparent recent
increase in litigation, courts will become increasingly involved in the
enforcement of statutory mandates. Courts have expressed frustration
with agency delays in the process and indicated that changes in the proc-
159. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1316-17 (confusing communications between Customs and the DOC);
NEC Solutions (Am.), Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346 n. 15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003)
("According to the Government, [its] administrative oversight occurred, in part, because of Com-
merce's 'time consuming' publication process," but "Commerce's self-imposed bureaucracy... is no
excuse for delay."); LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v United States, 991 F. Supp. 668, 676-77 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1997) (erroneous electronic and automatic liquidation).
160. In this respect, it is interesting to note that Customs has in place an automated system for
the liquidation of goods. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Yes You Can (n.d.), available at
http://customs.gov/ (follow "publications" hyperlink; then follow "Trade Automated Systems"
hyperlink; then follow "Yes You Can on ACS" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2005). Customs'
Automated Commercial System ("ACS") enables Customs "to track, control, and process all com-
mercial goods imported into the United States ... (and] facilitates merchandise processing, signifi-
cantly cuts costs, and reduces paperwork requirements for both Customs and the importing commu-
nity." Id. Despite the use of this system, errors occur.
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ess are necessary.' 61 In particular, courts appear concerned with the fact
that the agencies are not following clear statutory mandates and that par-
ties instead must rely on the judiciary branch for enforcement.16  In this
respect, it is important to point out that judicial review also may serve as
a source of delay in the liquidation process. Under the principle of time-
value of money, it may be beneficial to a party to delay the liquidation
process as long as possible if the expected end-results will be unfavor-
able to the party. For example, if an importer has paid low cash deposits
but faces the possibility of high liquidation rates, it may be in the best
interest of the importer to delay liquidation as long as possible by, e.g.,
filing a judicial appeal. The converse situation applies to U.S. industry.
III. DEEMED LIQUIDATION AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Deemed liquidation may result in a windfall to either the importer
or the U.S. government depending on whether the importer overpaid or
underpaid duties at the time of entry. 163 The plain language of the statute
does not make a distinction between whether deemed liquidation is bene-
ficial to importers or the government. 164 However, this interpretation
appears somewhat at odds with the legislative history of 19 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1504(d). In enacting the provision, Congress appears to have in-
tended that deemed liquidation would protect importers from unknown
future liabilities.
165
Congress has long recognized that undue delay in liquidation re-
sulted in losses to importers and surety companies.166  Before enacting
Section 1504(d) in 1978, there was no statutory requirement that liquida-
161. See, e.g., NEC, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 n.15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003). In NEC, the court
stated:
Commerce's self-imposed bureaucracy... is no excuse for delay. Commerce is aware of
its statutory obligations and should have crafted its procedures accordingly. The Gov-
ernment brazenly claims that an interested party who believes it will be injured by a delay
"is not without remedy" because it can seek relief by petitioning for a writ of mandamus.
... The idea that a party must seek such an extraordinary remedy to ensure that Com-
merce simply fulfills its statutory responsibilities is untenable. By delaying liquidation in
this manner, Commerce undermines both the antidumping duty laws and Congress' intent
to settle importers' liabilities promptly.
Id. See also Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 358, 360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (quot-
ing the transcript from a telephone conference between the parties and the trial court) ("Suffice it to
say, [the Court] will not permit the Court to be the administrative agency nor is the Court interested
in being involved in impeding the administrative process.").
162. See, e.g., NEC, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 n.15.
163. See supra Part lI.B.
164. 19 U.S.C. §1504(d) (2000) ("Customs ... shall liquidate the entry... within 6 months
after receiving notice of the removal [of the suspension]... Any entry... not liquidated.., within
6 months after receiving such notice shall be treated as having been liquidated at the rate of duty,
value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record."). See
Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11 ("[T]he relief and certitude of deemed liquidation [does not] turn on
who, the government or the industry, lays claim to the event. When the clock is ticking, it is ticking
for both parties.")
165. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32.
166. Surety companies are in essence "insurance companies" vouching for the duty liability of
a principal, e.g., an importer. See http://www.surety.org/content.cfm?lid=70&catid=2 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2005).
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tion be completed within a specified time limit. 67  The enactment of
Section 1504(d) appears to have been prompted by a fear that delay in
liquidation would negatively affect U.S. relations with foreign nations as
well as the financial situation of importers and surety companies. During
the 1975 hearings regarding Customs Administration and Valuation (in
the context of the Antidumping Act of 1921 168), a congressional witness
from the U.S. Treasury Department pointed out that the intentional with-
holding of liquidation created "an unjustified impediment to trade" be-
cause it "would risk a major confrontation with [U.S.] trading part-
ners."' 169  The U.S. Treasury further stated that "a purposeful delay in
liquidation would unfairly subject the U.S. taxpayers and the importer, to
tax liabilities which could not be reasonably anticipated.' 70  Even
though the U.S. Treasury did not so state, it is obvious that undue delay
of liquidation has the same potential negative effect regardless of
whether it is inadvertently or purposefully delayed.
When enacting Section 1504 in 1978, both the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate emphasized that the provision was intended to
protect importers and surety companies from unknown future liabilities.
The House Committee on Ways and Means reported that adoption of the
deemed liquidation provision would lead to "considerable benefit to...
importers."'' 7  The deemed liquidation concept would eliminate future
Customs' requests for additional duties from an importer which had al-
ready sold the goods at a price that did not take into consideration the
future increase in duty liability. 72 Similarly, the Senate Committee on
Finance stated that the adoption of Section 1504 would "increase cer-
tainty in the customs process for importers, surety companies, and other
third parties with a potential liability relating to a customs transac-
tion."' 73  According to the Committee, the problem with the pre-1978
167. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 31; see H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 24. See also Customs
Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, § 209(a), 92 Stat. 888, 905
(1978). Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976), with 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. 111978).
168. Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-12, 42 Stat. 11-15 (1921), amended by Trade Agree-
ment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978-2076 (1975). The Anti-Dumping Act of 1921
was subsequently repealed except as to findings or court orders in effect on the date of repeal. Trade
Agreement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 193 (1979).
169. Customs Administration and Valuation of Imports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 9 (1975) (statement of David R. Mac-
donald, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs; answers
to questions submitted by the Hon. William J. Green, Chairman of the subcommittee).
170. Customs Administration and Valuation of Imports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 25 (1975) (answers by the Treasury De-
partment to questions submitted by the Hon. William J. Green, Chairman of the subcommittee).
171. See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 4. The Committee also noted that Customs would benefit
from the enactment of the provision through "improved management of the liquidation process
which would result in some costs savings." Id.
172. Id. In addition, the deemed liquidation provision would allow surety companies to better
control their liabilities and alleviate the risk of loss caused by the dissolution (default) of the surety
companies' principals caused by undue delay in liquidating entries. Id.
173. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32 (cited in Cemex S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d
1357, 1360 n.5 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (citing Dal-Tile Corp. v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 394, 399
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted))); see also Int'l Trading Co., 281
F.3d at 1272; Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559.
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scheme (without deemed liquidation) was that "an importer may learn
years after goods have been imported and sold that additional duties are
due, or may have deposited more money for estimated duties than are
actually due but be unable to recover the excess for years as he awaits
liquidation." 174  The legislative history lends strong support for the ar-
gument that Congress intended Section 1504 to protect mainly importers.
Customs and interpreting courts have agreed that the main purpose
of Section 1504 is to protect importers and surety companies from un-
known liabilities by providing finality in the liquidation procedure. For
example, in United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc.,175 the Federal
Circuit noted that "the 'deemed liquidation' provision of section 1504
was added to the customs laws in 1978 to place a limit on the period
within which importers and sureties would be subject to the prospect of
liability for a customs entry." 176 As was pointed out earlier, in Canadian
Fur Trappers v. United States,177 the U.S. Government actually argued,
and the CIT recognized, that importers would be injured in the overpay-
ment situation if deemed liquidation occurred barring them from receiv-
ing a refund. 17  However, the CIT concluded that deemed liquidation
had not occurred in that case.
179
The legislative history expresses a clear intent that Section 1504
was enacted to protect importers. "A clear statement in the committee
report responsible for drafting a proposed statute is reliable evidence of
congressional intent where that congressional statement is not contrary to
other sources of legislative history or the clearly expressed language in
the statute."1 80 Congress expressed a concern with delays in the process
and the negative effects those delays had on the financial health of im-
porters and surety companies. Congress also expressed a strong prefer-
ence for the protection of importers, recognizing that they are valuable
174. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32. In addition, the Committee noted that the provision of
deemed liquidation would allow surety companies to better control their liabilities and to protect
them from the risk of default by the principals caused by undue delay in liquidating entries. Id. See
also supra note 166 (regarding definition of "surety"companies).
175. 112 F.3d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
176. Id. at 1559. The Federal Circuit further stated that "[t]he purpose of section 1504 was to
bring finality to the duty assessment process." Id See also Int'l Trading Co., 281 F.3d at 1272
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Dal-Tile Corp., 829 F. Supp. at 399) ("The primary purpose of [section
1504] was to 'increase certainty in the customs process for importer, surety companies, and other
third parties with a potential liability relating to a customs transaction."').
177. 691 F. Supp. 364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
178. Canadian Fur Trappers, 691 F. Supp. at 369 (the defendant, the U.S. Government, argued
that "if deemed liquidation ... resulted as a consequence of Custom's [sic] failure to liquidate within
90 days of the termination of suspension, then importers who ha[d] deposited estimated duties
greater than the amount that they actually owe[d would] be unjustly affected by this outcome, as
they [could] not be entitled to a refund.").
179. Id.
180. Id. at 616 (citation omitted). The U.S. Customs Court has stated that:
It is the function of this court on judicial review to interpret and apply the tariff laws in
light of the intent of Congress. In the performance of this function, the court cannot defer
to an administrative interpretation or application of a statute if it is inconsistent with the
statutory language or congressional intent.
C.B.S. Imports Corp. v. United States, 80 Cust. Ct. 61, 66 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
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U.S. taxpayers and market actors. Absent from the legislative history is
a discussion of the potential negative or positive effects of deemed liqui-
dation for the government or U.S. industry.1 8 1 The legislative history
would support an argument that the negative consequences of deemed
liquidation should apply only against the government.
A counter-argument is that Section 1504 in its current interpretation
fulfills congressional intent because it creates certainty and finality for
importers regardless of whether deemed liquidation results in negative
consequences to importers or not. Indeed, the duty liability is certain and
final at the time deemed liquidation occurs. From that time on, the im-
porter no longer has to suffer from the negative effects of an uncertain
liability. While congressional concern with "finality" to a certain extent
is answered even when deemed liquidation applies against importers,
equity dictates that the government act in a timely manner to prevent a
negative outcome for importers because, whether or not liquidation is
completed in a timely manner is within the exclusive control of the gov-
ernment. Congress' main motivator in enacting Section 1504 was to
minimize delays in the process.' 82 It is questionable whether delays will
be minimized by deemed liquidation in a system where the government
may have incentives to delay, such as in the overpayment situation. Of
course, courts operate under the presumption that U.S. agencies act in a
diligent manner and that any delays are caused solely by nonfeasance as
opposed to malfeasance.183 Regardless of the propensity of the govem-
ment to willfully delay liquidation, the current scheme certainly provides
an incentive to do so. Therefore, it would be consistent with congres-
sional intent to apply the negative consequences of deemed liquidation
only against the government. One commentator even has gone so far as
181. The Senate Committee on Finance estimated in 1978 that the enactment of the provision
would result in a "maximum annual customs revenue loss of $9.5 million." See S. REP., supra note
6, at 32. The sum $9.5 million in 1978 would equal between S21.9 and 45.4 million today See
Economic History Services, What is its Relative Value in US Dollars?, http://eh.net/hmit/compare.
More interestingly, the total value of imports in 1978 was $176 million. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 1 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf. The sum $176 million would equal between $406 and 842
million today. See Economic History Services, supra. The total value of imports in 2004 amounted
to almost $1,500 billion. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Int'l Trade in Goods &
Services July 2005, Exhibit I (Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-
Release/currentpress release/exh I .pdf.
182. See, e.g., Customs Administration and Valuation of Imports: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 25 (1975) (answers by the Treas-
ury Department to questions submitted by the Hon. William J. Green, Chairman of the subcommit-
tee); see S. REP., supra note 6, at 32.
183. See, e.g., Spezzaferro v. F.A.A., 807 F.2d 169, 173 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)
("Government officials are presumed to carry out their duties in good faith.... Unsubstantiated
suspicions and allegations are not enough. The proof must be almost 'irrefragable."'); Kalvar Corp.,
Inc. v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 192, 198 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citing Librach v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl.
605, 612 (Ct. Cl. 1959)) ("Any analysis of a question of Governmental bad faith must begin with the
presumption that public officials act 'conscientiously in the discharge of their duties."').
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to argue that deemed liquidation was intended to be a penalty on the
government for failure to act in time.
184
An added wrinkle to an argument based on legislative history is the
recent decision in Tianjin Machinery Import & Export Corp. v. United
States.185  In Tianjin, the CIT held that the DOC's practice of sending
liquidation instructions to Customs within fifteen days of the publication
of final results after administrative review conflicted with the statutory
right of the interested parties to appeal the DOC's decision to the CIT
within sixty days. 186 The government argued that it would be administra-
tively unwise to wait sixty days before sending liquidation instructions to
Customs because liquidation is time-consuming and Customs, then, may
not have enough time to liquidate within the six-month deemed liqui-
dated period.
8 7
The court rejected the argument finding that the DOC had failed to
explain why a sixty-day wait would be "administratively unwise.'
188
From a policy standpoint, the CIT noted that the DOC's practice might
"compel parties, in every instance, to seek a preliminary injunction
within fifteen days to prevent liquidation and preserve the Court's juris-
diction, regardless of whether the party ultimately decides to [file an ap-
peal]."' 189 Under Tianjin, the DOC must wait 60 days before sending
liquidation instructions to Customs.
The court's decision in Tianjin is consistent with prior court deci-
sions finding that suspension of liquidation is removed upon the expira-
tion of the time for an appeal of the DOC's decision. 190 However, it
gives rise to some tension with the line of cases holding that publication
in the Federal Register of final results constitutes notice to Customs of
the removal of the suspension of liquidation.191 Section 1504(d) provides
that Customs has six months to liquidate entries. 192 The six month time
period starts to run when the DOC publishes final results in the FederalRegister. 193 Under Tianjin, the DOC must wait sixty days after making a
final determination before sending liquidation instructions to Customs.
184. Lawrence M. Segan, Deemed Liquidation: Whose Rate is This Anyway?, 10 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 689, 704-06 (1987) (addressing whether the deemed liquidation rate should be the rate
asserted by the importer or the rate asserted by Customs).
185. 353 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
186. Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-10.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1310. The court found the DOC's argument was "conveniently vague and entirely
fail[ed] to address exactly how 'time-consuming' the liquidation process [was]." Id.
189. Id. at 1309.
190. See, e.g, Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g
granted, No. 04-1058 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004) ("[T]he suspension of liquidation under 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(c)(2) cannot be removed until the time for petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari ex-
pires." (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
191. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381-82; Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1275
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that "[p]ublication of the final results in the Federal Register constitutes
notice to Customs within the meaning of section 1504(d)").
192. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
193. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381-82; Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1275.
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Provided that the DOC publishes final results in the Federal Register in
close proximity to making its final determination,' 94 Customs may have
as little as four months left to liquidate before deemed liquidation occurs.
In Section 1504(d), Congress explicitly provided a six-month time period
during which Congress must liquidate. Under Tianjin, the time period
effectively has been reduced to four months which appears contrary to
congressional intent as expressed in the current version of Section
1504(d). However, Congress does not appear to have put any particular
relevance on the length of the liquidation period when comparing previ-
ous versions of Section 1504. Earlier versions required liquidation
within ninety days of the removal of the suspension of liquidation.1 95 In
those earlier versions of Section 1504, Congress considered ninety days
long enough to liquidate. Therefore, the effective four-month time pe-
riod to liquidate resulting from the decision in Tianjin would be long
enough when judged by Congress' intent in prior versions of the statute.
Furthermore, the CIT in Tianjin did not appear categorically op-
posed to the government's argument that the sixty-day wait was "admin-
istratively unwise."' 96 The court merely found that the DOC's argument
was "conveniently vague and entirely fail[ed] to address exactly how
'time-consuming' the liquidation process [was]. 197 It would appear that
the CIT would have been willing to further entertain the argument had
the DOC provided a full explanation of its position. Therefore, given an
opportunity to further elaborate, the government may provide a more
persuasive explanation which potentially could influence the CIT to
reach a different position.
Amending the statute or re-interpreting it to only apply against the
government would prevent the negative effect of deemed liquidation for
an importer. Under this suggested revision, the government would be
obligated to refund overpaid antidumping duties regardless of whether
deemed liquidation has occurred. But, deemed liquidation would still
prevent the government from collecting additional antidumping duties in
case of underpayment of duties. Obviously, this solution would not take
care of the concerns of representative of U.S. industry. In addition, this
solution would not fully take care of the importer's concern with carry-
ing uncertain liabilities for long periods of time.
194. The DOC is not under a statutory deadline to publish final results of an administrative
review. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2000). But, the DOC must publish in the Federal Register the
final results of a court decision within ten days. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(f) (2000).
195. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (1978).
196. See Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2004).
197. Id.
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IV. POSSIBLE JUDICIAL REMEDIES: INADEQUACY OF DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS, WRITS OF MANDAMUS, INJUNCTIONS AND COMPELLING
AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE APA
A party injured by delay or error in the liquidation process has ac-
cess to a number of judicial remedies. In addition to the more traditional
remedies, federal courts also may compel agency action under the Ad-
ministrative Protective Act' 98 ("APA").
There are two administrative agencies whose delay in the liquida-
tion process may give rise to negative effects: Customs and the DOC.
Customs is obligated to liquidate an entry within six months of receiving
notice of the removal of the suspension of liquidation. 99 If Customs
fails to do so, the entries are deemed liquidated at the duty rate paid upon
entry.200 Reviewing courts have found that Customs receives notice of
the removal of the suspension of liquidation upon publication by the
DOC in the Federal Register of the final results of an administrative re-
view or judicial appeal, or in the absence of publication, by receiving
actual notice in unambiguous, public liquidation instructions from the
DOC.20 1 The DOC's failure to provide such notice prevents the six-
month deemed liquidation time period from starting. 20 2 Consequently, a
party may be interested in compelling the DOC to issue timely liquida-
tion instructions to Customs or compelling Customs to liquidate in a
timely manner.
Judicial remedies available include requesting a declaratory judg-
ment, an injunction, a writ of mandamus, or other remedies to "compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. ''20 3 How-
ever, those remedies are inadequate to safeguard the interests involved
both from a pragmatic and policy standpoint.
A. Declaratory Judgment
A declaratory judgment may serve as an acceptable remedy in cer-
tain situations but cannot undo deemed liquidation once it has occurred.
A party may request a declaratory judgment that deemed liquidation has
198. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (2000).
199. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
200. Id.
201. See Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Fujitsu Gen.
Am. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281
F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2000), rehg granted, No. 04-1058e (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004).
202. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321 ("The Court of International Trade correctly held that.
notice purporting to lift the suspension of liquidation was not [published] and, as such, failed to
commence the six-month statutory period.").
203. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000). The CIT has exclusive jurisdiction of the enforcement by
Customs of laws and regulations over imports. Anderson v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 975, 977
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (citing Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The
CIT has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000).
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or has not occurred. 2 4  In the underpayment situation, a declaratory
judgment that deemed liquidation has occurred is useful to an importer as
a "shield" against the government's enforcement action to collect addi-
tional duties owed.2 °5 Similarly, in the overpayment situation, a declara-
tory judgment may be useful to an importer to prevent Customs from
erroneously liquidating entries as deemed liquidated.20 6 But, an importer
has little incentive to request a declaratory judgment that deemed liquida-
tion has not occurred in the underpayment situation because the importer
then would potentially have to pay additional duties on top of the cash
deposits already paid. Similarly, an importer would not benefit from a
declaratory judgment that deemed liquidation has occurred in the over-
payment situation. Obviously, the opposite situations would pertain to
representatives of U.S. industry but their access to judicial remedies is
limited.0 7
The biggest flaw of a declaratory judgment is that it cannot undo
deemed liquidation if it already has occurred.0 8 Therefore, a declaratory
judgment is an inadequate remedy for both importers and representatives
of U.S. industry, to the extent available to U.S. industry, when deemed
liquidation already has occurred.
B. Writ of Mandamus20 9
Before the enactment of the APA, a party had to request that a court
issue a writ of mandamus or an injunction to compel action by govern-
204. See, e.g., Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2000) ("[Where] an importer believes its entries were deemed liquidated under [19 U.S.C.] §
1504(d), and Customs has not actively liquidated the entries anew, the importer's only remedy, at
that point, is to seek a declaratory judgment from the CIT confirming that there was a deemed liqui-
dation under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).").
205. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(construing United States v. Sherman & Sons, Co., 237 U.S. 146 (1915)) (stating that once the
government's cause of action expires through deemed liquidation, Customs cannot breathe new life
into it by liquidating the entry anew).
206. Note that the importer must protest such Customs action under 19 U.S.C. § 1514. See,
e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1323-25 (finding that Customs' liquidation decision becomes final and
conclusive on all persons under § 1514(a)(5) regardless of legality); Cherry Hill, 112 F.3d at 1557
("[L]iquidation is 'final and conclusive' ... when the liquidation has not been protested in accor-
dance with the provisions of section 1514."); LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 991 F.
Supp. 668, 676 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) ("A decision to liquidate, including the legality of the liquida-
tion itself, becomes final unless a protest of the decision is filed ....").
207. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1322 (noting that U.S. industry does not have any "avenue of relief for
improper liquidation" under the current statutory scheme). In Cemex, the Federal Circuit noted that
representatives of U.S. industry had access to prospective remedies under 19 U.S.C. § 1516 to con-
test Customs' decisions regarding appraisal, classification or duty rates applied to imported goods
and also to judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings under 19 U.S.C. §
1516a. Id. Neither § 1516 nor § 1516a permits U.S. industry to challenge Customs' liquidations
after-the-fact. Id. at 1323.
208. See, e.g., Fujitsu, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (noting that deemed liquidation occurs as an
operation of law and, therefore, cannot be reversed). See also Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 306
F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273-74 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000); Rheem Metalurgica S/A v. United States, 951 F.
Supp. 241, 247 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
209. Black's Law Dictionary defines a writ of mandamus as "[a] writ issued by a superior court
to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties
correctly." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th Ed. 1999).
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ment officials. Today, federal courts, such as the CIT, still have the
power to issue writs of mandamus under the All Writs Act.21° It appears
that neither the CIT nor the Federal Circuit has ever issued a writ of
mandamus to compel Customs or the DOC to act in a timely manner.
The CIT has stated that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is "an
extraordinary equitable remedy which should be employed to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty specifically enjoined by law where
performance has been refused, and no meaningful alternative remedy
exists., 211 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the key prerequisite
for a writ of mandamus to issue is the presence of an obligation to act in
a ministerial capacity leaving the agency no discretion as to whether to
act.212 Unreasonable delays in the agency performance of ministerial
duties may also constitute sufficient basis for a writ of mandamus to is-
sue.213 The CIT and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit both agree
that a reviewing court must ensure that agencies comply with statutory
deadlines in a timely manner.2 1 4 "Regardless of [whether the statutory
time frame] is mandatory or directory, the Court has a duty to determine
'whether the agency's delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.'' 215
1. Writ of Mandamus to Compel Customs Action
Customs' obligation to liquidate fits the CIT's test for issuing a writ
of mandamus. However, a writ of mandamus is an ineffective remedy to
compel Customs to liquidate in a timely manner under the current
scheme.
Section 1504(d) of title 19 provides that Customs must liquidate an
entry within six months of receiving notice of the removal of the suspen-
sion of liquidation.216 Customs' involvement in the liquidation process is
ministerial in nature because the DOC determines the duty rate to apply
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). The CIT has the power to issue a writ of mandamus
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1585, 1651(a), and 2643(c)(1) (2000). Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 691 F.
Supp. 358, 361 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (citing Sharp Corp. v. United States, 837 F.2d 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1988)). Section 2643(c)(1) provides that: "[T]he Court of International Trade may... order any
other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action, including, but not limited to, declaratory
judgments, orders of remand, injunctions, and writs of mandamus and prohibition." 28 U.S.C. §
2643(c)(1) (2000).
211. Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at 361 (quoting UST, Inc. v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1, 5 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1986), affdon other grounds, 831 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). The CIT issues a writ of
mandamus provided that there is: "(1) a clear right of the plaintiff to the relief sought; (2) a clear
duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) absence of an adequate alternative
remedy." Timken Co. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 373, 375 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
212. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
213. See Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at 361 ("Unreasonable delays in the agency performance of
ministerial duties may also constitute sufficient basis for a writ of mandamus to issue.") (citing UST,
Inc. v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1, 5 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), af d on other grounds, 831 F.2d 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 617, 621 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988).
214. Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at 361 (citing Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797 (D.C.
Cir.1987)).
215. Id.
216. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (2000).
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and Customs merely liquidates entries using the pre-determined rate.217
Thus, Customs has no discretion in deciding whether to act, within which
time frame to act or which duty rate to employ. Therefore, Customs'
obligation to liquidate appears to fall squarely within the parameters
within which the CIT issues a writ of mandamus because Customs is
under a clear obligation to liquidate within six months of receiving notice
of the removal of suspension of liquidation. As noted by the CIT in Tim-
ken v. United States218 , the law not only authorizes the demanded action
(i.e. liquidation), it requires it.
21 9
Similarly, Section 1500(e) imposes an absolute obligation on Cus-
toms to issue liquidation notices to, among others, importers.220 While
this obligation is absolute, Section 1500(e) does not contain any time
frame within which Customs must act. Hence, this notice obligation
leaves some discretion to Customs as to timing and a party would only
be able to enforce the obligation after unreasonable delay. Customs is
not under an obligation to notify representatives of U.S. industry about
liquidation decisions.
2 21
Arguably, the availability of an administrative remedy for importers
in the form of a protest filed under 19 U.S.C. Section 1514 could serve as
another, meaningful, alternative remedy, thereby precluding the issuance
of a writ of mandamus under CIT case law.2 22 However, the filing, and
subsequent denial by Customs, of a protest is essentially a prerequisite
for judicial review under Section 1514(a) and the doctrine of exhaustion
of judicial remedies. Therefore, the CIT's no-meaningful-alternative-
remedy requirement for issuing a writ of mandamus should not be an
obstacle for importers. Representatives of U.S. industry may not protest
Customs' liquidations and, therefore, do not have access to any meaning-
ful, alternative remedy.
In the end, obtaining a writ of mandamus is an inadequate remedy
for importers and representatives of U.S. industry. In the underpayment
situation, U.S. industry would want to compel Customs to liquidate be-
fore deemed liquidation occurs in order to achieve the full protection
afforded by U.S. trade laws, while importers would want to compel Cus-
toms to issue a notice that deemed liquidation has occurred after the fact.
217. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1324 ("Customs' role in making antidumping decisions.., is gener-
ally ministerial."); see Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (Ct.
Int'l Trade. 2004) ("In implementing the instructions of Commerce to liquidate entries subject to an
antidumping or countervailing duty order, Customs' actions are ministerial in nature.") (citing
Yancheng Baolong Biochemical Prods. Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2003)); Fujitsu Ten Corp. of Am. v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 245, 248 (1997); Am. Hi-Fi
Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1340, 1342-43 (1995); see Cust. HQ 230339, supra
note 71.
218. 715 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
219. See Timken, 751 F. Supp. at 375.
220. 19 U.S.C. § 1500(e) (2000).
221. See id.
222. See, e.g., Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at 361.
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The roles are reversed in the overpayment situation where U.S. industry
would want to compel Customs to issue a notice that deemed liquidation
has occurred after the fact, and the importer would want to compel Cus-
toms to liquidate before deemed liquidation occurs in order to obtain a
refund. The problem associated with requesting a writ of mandamus to
compel Customs to liquidate is that deemed liquidation cannot be undone
after the fact. A writ of mandamus would, therefore, only be useful if
issued before deemed liquidation has occurred. But, before deemed liq-
uidation has occurred, Customs has not yet violated its statutory duty to
liquidate and is not guilty of unreasonable delay as the six-month time
period for liquidation has not yet expired. 23 Arguably, the CIT should
not issue a writ under its current case law before expiration of the statu-
torily mandated time frame. Hence, a writ of mandamus could never be
issued.
Nevertheless, the CIT has noted in dictum that a writ of mandamus
would be appropriate to compel Customs to liquidate in a correct and
timely manner. 224 It would appear that the CIT believes that a writ of
mandamus could be issued under these circumstances. If so, and if is-
sued before deemed liquidation has occurred, a writ of mandamus could
provide the necessary relief for importers and U.S industry. However,
the CIT has never actually issued a writ of mandamus in that situation.
Finally, a writ of mandamus could prove useful in compelling Cus-
toms to recognize that deemed liquidation has occurred. For example, in
the underpayment situation, importers might be interested in using
deemed liquidation as a "shield" against the government's enforcement
action to collect additional duties owed. 225  However, a declaratory
judgment might be a better vehicle for this.226 Nevertheless, a writ of
mandamus could serve the same purpose.
2. Writ of Mandamus to Compel DOC Action
A writ of mandamus could be an effective remedy to compel the
DOC to provide notice to Customs of the removal of the suspension of
liquidation. Under current case law, however, it appears that the CIT
only would compel the DOC to issue notice of the final duty liability
after an appeal but would not compel issuance of a notice after comple-
tion of an administrative review or the issuance of liquidation instruc-
223. See § 1504(d) (2000).
224. See, e.g., Fujitsu, 110 F. Supp. at 1078 (noting that judicial action might compel Com-
merce to act in a timely and proper manner).
225. See, e.g., Cherry Hill, 112 F.3d at 1559 (stating that once the government's cause of
action expires (through deemed liquidation), Customs cannot breathe new life into it by liquidating
the entry anew). Conversely, representatives of U.S. industry might be interested in compelling
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tions to Customs because the former is subject to statutory deadline
while the latter two are not.
To issue a writ of mandamus, the CIT requires, among other things,
that the agency has failed to take action mandated by statute.227 The
DOC is not under a statutory obligation to issue liquidation instructions
to Customs. Hence, the CIT would not issue a writ of mandamus to
compel the DOC to issue liquidation instructions to Customs because the
DOC is not required to do so by statute. This result is not problematic
under the current scheme, provided that the DOC publishes final results
in the Federal Register, because the Federal Circuit has determined that
publication in the Federal Register constitutes notice to Customs that the
suspension of liquidation has been removed, thereby starting the six-
month time period for deemed liquidation.22 8
In contrast, the DOC is under an obligation to publish notice of the
final results of an administrative review but is not subject to any dead-
line. 229 The duty to publish notice, therefore, appears to fall within the
CIT's test for issuing a writ of mandamus because the DOC is subject to
a statutory mandate. However, the absence of a statutory deadline leaves
the agency with some discretion as to when to publish which could in-
crease the burden of persuasion of the requesting party. The CIT appears
to focus its inquiry on whether the agency has "refused" to act and, there-
fore, will not issue a writ if the agency promises to take prompt action or
has a "good cause" explanation for the delay.230 In light of this, a writ of
mandamus might an adequate remedy de jure but not de facto.
Finally, the DOC must publish notice of a court decision after ap-
peal within 10 days of the decision under Section 1516a. t In Timken,
the CIT granted a writ of mandamus to compel the DOC to comply with
232the ten-day publication rules. Hence, as illustrated by Timken, a writ
227. Nakajima, 691 F. Supp at 361 (citing UST Inc. v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1, 5 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1986), afidon other grounds, 831 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The CIT will issue a writ
of mandamus provided that there is: "(1) a clear right of the plaintiff to the relief sought; (2) a clear
duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) absence of an adequate alternative
remedy." Timken, 715 F. Supp. at 375.
228. Int'l Trading Co., 412 F.3d at 1313; Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1383; Int'l Trading Co. v. United
States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that the six-month time period begins to run
upon publication of final results in the Federal Register).
229. See 19 U.S.C. § 167 1(a) (2000).
230. See, e.g., Daido Corp. v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 533, 536 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992)
(declining to issue a writ of mandamus after the DOC's fifteen-year delay where the DOC agreed to
take action within an agreed-upon time frame); Sharp Corp. v. United States, 725 F. Supp. 549, 556
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus after noting that long delays were not
caused solely by the DOC's refusal to act but rather also by the importer); Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at
359 (declining to issue a writ of mandamus where the DOC indicated that it would take prompt
action).
231. 19 U.S.C. §1516(f) (2000).
232. Timken, 715 F. Supp. at 378. The ten-day publication rule subsequently was dubbed
"Timken notice." The issue in Timken was whether the DOC was under an obligation to publish
such notice within ten days after the CIT decision in the case. Id. at 374. The court found in the
affirmative. Id. at 378. Hence, Timken Co., a domestic producer, was entitled to a writ of manda-
mus to force the DOC to publish in the Federal Register the results after judicial review of the under-
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of mandamus would serve as an adequate remedy to compel the DOC to
publish final results after judicial appeals. However, the number of final
determinations after completion of administrative reviews greatly out-
numbers the number of court decisions after appeal. Hence, the statutory
mandate in Section 1516a providing prompt notice of results after judi-
cial appeals should be replicated in Section 1675 to provide prompt no-
tice of results after administrative reviews.
C. Injunctions
233
An injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy which can be
used to either prevent an agency from taking a particular action or to
234compel agency action. As with a writ of mandamus, an injunction will
not solve the problems associated with deemed liquidation: before expi-
ration of the six-month time period, the importer has not suffered any
harm and an injunction could not be issued, after expiration, deemed
liquidation cannot be undone and an injunction would have no effect.
A moving party is not likely to be successful in requesting an in-
junction to compel Customs to liquidate in a timely manner. The CIT
issues an injunction if the movant can show that: "(1) without ... the
injunction, [the movant] will suffer irreparable harm; (2) the balance of
hardships weighs in [the movant's] favor; (3) it is likely that [the
movant] succeed on the merits of the case; and (4) granting the ... in-
junction will not run counter to the public's interest., 23' No doubt,
deemed liquidation will result in hardship to at least one of the parties
involved in a Customs transaction. The problem is that a party will only
suffer hardship after deemed liquidation has occurred. Hence, a moving
party would be unable to show hardship until after that. At that time,
deemed liquidation cannot be undone and an injunction would be inef-
fective. Thus, an injunction would only be useful if issued before
deemed liquidation has occurred. However, the CIT is unlikely to issue
an injunction at that time because of the lack of hardship.
Similarly, a moving party is not likely to be successful in requesting
an injunction to compel the DOC to provide notice of the removal of
lying proceeding. Id. The court found that it was "unlawful for Commerce to hold in abeyance the
effectiveness of the final decision" of the court beyond the statutory deadline. Id. at 376.
233. It is beyond the scope of this article to fully explore the CIT and Federal Circuit's use of
injunctions in antidumping proceedings.
234. See Ugine-Savoie Imphy v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 2d 684, 687 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000)
(noting that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy). A movant may request an injunc-
tion to prohibit an agency from taking action, as in Anderson v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 975, 977
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), or to compel agency action, as in Johnson v. Guhl, 91 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759
(D.N.J. 2000).
235. SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (citing
NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000)). See also
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982) (discussing the basis for injunctive
relief). Additionally, "the court 'balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to
them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction."' Id. at 312
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, (1944)).
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suspension of liquidation. The lack of notice in itself does not amount to
hardship for the parties. As illustrated, an injunction is not an adequate
remedy for parties involved in Customs transactions.
D. Compelling Agency Action Under the APA
236
The APA generally allows both importers and representatives of the
U.S. industry to seek judicial review of agency action.23 7 However,
standing to challenge agency decisions in the liquidation process is lim-
ited to importers. Under the APA, reviewable actions include "[a]gency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court."238 The scope of review is
provided for in APA section 706 which includes compelling "agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed., 239 It appears that
neither the CIT nor the Federal Circuit has used APA Section 706(1) to
compel Customs or the DOC to act in a timely manner.
The Supreme Court has found that, under the APA, courts may
compel only agency action required by law.2 40  Federal courts may
"compel an agency 'to perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act,' or
'to take action upon a matter, without directing how it shall act."' 24 1
Thus, a court may compel agency action within a statutorily required
time period but may not specify what that action must be (provided the
substance of the act is left to the discretion of the agency).2 42 In addition,
courts may compel agency action unreasonably delayed. Generally,
courts will defer to the agency so long as no significant prejudice has
resulted to the party seeking relief from the delay.243 Thus, an importer
seeking to show an "unreasonable delay" on the part of Customs or the
DOC would need to meet a fairly high quantum of proof.
Customs is required by statute to liquidate entries within six months
of receiving notice of the removal of the suspension of liquidation.2 "
APA Section 706(1) does not provide a remedy before liquidation has
occurred. That is, a party cannot use APA Section 706(1) to force Cus-
236. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore fully the role of APA § 706(1) in the con-
text of agency inaction. Instead, the discussion focuses on the application of § 706(1), in its current
interpretation, to the liquidation process.
237. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action ...is entitled to judicial review thereof."); see
generally Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 828-29 (1985) (discussing judicial review under the
APA).
238. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000); see generally Heckler, 470 U.S. at 828-29 (discussing judicial
review under the APA).
239. 5 U.S.C. § 706(l)(2000); see generally Heckler, 470 U.S. at 828-29 (discussing judicial
review under the APA).
240. See, e.g., Norton, 542 U.S. at 63 ("This limitation appears in § 706(l)'s authorization for
courts to 'compel agency action unlawfully withheld."').
241. Id. (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
108 (1947)).
242. Id. at 65.
243. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 263, 268-69 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
244. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
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toms to liquidate in a timely manner because before deemed liquidation
has occurred, agency action has not been unlawfully withheld nor has
there been unreasonable delay. But, under the plain meaning of the pro-
vision, a party should be able to use APA Section 706(1) to provide a
remedy after deemed liquidation has occurred. Deemed liquidation oc-
curs because an agency has failed to act within a statutorily imposed
deadline. Arguably, such inaction constitutes "agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed" remediable under APA Section
706(1). Regardless, Customs and courts take the position that deemed
liquidation cannot be undone after it has occurred.245 Therefore, under
current precedent, APA Section 706(1) cannot remedy Customs' delay in
liquidating.
However, if some of the suggestions described in this article were
implemented, APA Section 706(1) could serve as an adequate remedy.
For example, provided deemed liquidation only occurs against the gov-
ernment, importers could use Section 706(1) to force Customs to liqui-
date after expiration of the six-month time period. It would be unwise,
however, to also allow the U.S. government and representatives of U.S.
industry access to a remedy under Section 706(1) to undo deemed liqui-
dation. Allowing this would contravene congressional intent to protect
importers by inserting certainty in the process because liquidation would
never be final. Of course, adopting other suggestions made in this article
might obviate the need for a remedy under APA Section 706(1). For
example, the creation of a new, administrative remedy would supplant
the use of Section 706(1).
In contrast, the DOC is not under a statutory deadline to publish fi-
nal results after concluding an administrative review or to send liquida-
tion instructions to Customs. 24 6 Because the Federal Circuit has found
that the six-month time period for deemed liquidation starts to run upon
publication of final results,247 the DOC's inaction might result in the six-
month time period for deemed liquidation never starting. In Norton, the
Supreme Court held that only agency action statutorily mandated can be
compelled under the APA.248 Therefore, because the DOC is under no
legal obligation to publish notice, a party cannot compel the DOC to act
245. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding
that an importer was not entitled to a refund of duties paid for entries which were deemed liqui-
dated); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11 (holding that Customs is unable to reliquidate entries
already deemed liquidated); see Cust. HQ 228712, supra note I I (denying a refund because entries
were deemed liquidated).
246. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2000). However, the DOC is under an obligation to publish
in the Federal Register the final results of a court decision after appeal within ten days. 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(c), (e) (2000).
247. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co., 412 F.3d at 1313; Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1380 ("Commerce's
publication of notice ... in the Federal Register ... constituted notice to Customs .... ); Int'l Trad-
ing Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
248. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 63.
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under APA Section 706(1). Instead, a party must seek to compel agency
action "unreasonably withheld."
E. Imposition of Judicial Deadlines
Lastly, another possible remedy for agency inaction is the imposi-
tion of judicial deadlines within which the agency must act in cases
where a particular statute does not contain any deadlines. 249 Judicially
imposed deadlines might be appropriate to force the DOC to publish the
final results of an administrative review and to issue liquidation instruc-
tions to Customs as the DOC currently is not under any statutory dead-
lines to do S.250
However, federal case law has established the principle that courts
are hesitant to impose judicial deadlines in the absence of congressional
acquiescence. In Heckler v. Day,25t the Supreme Court refused to im-
pose judicial deadlines on the Secretary of Health and Human Services in
adjudicating social security disability benefit claims because Congress
had not. The complainants argued that the delays violated their statutory
right to a "hearing within a reasonable time. 252 The Court found that
Congress was aware of the problem but nevertheless had repeatedly de-
clined to impose mandatory deadlines to prevent delays. 2 3  The Court
found that congressional concern with the quality and uniformity of
agency decisions had prevailed over considerations of timeliness.25 4 In
that situation, according to the Court, judicially imposed deadlines would
constitute "an unwarranted judicial intrusion into [a] pervasively regu-
lated area., 25 5 Similarly, it is unlikely that the CIT would impose judicial
deadlines on the DOC when Congress has not.
F. Public Policy Considerations
The currently available judicial remedies are inadequate to remedy
the problems associated with the liquidation process. Most glaringly,
courts cannot undo deemed liquidation once it has occurred. Even if
adequate judicial remedies were available, public policy dictates that the
249. As was previously described, in cases where a particular statute contains a deadline but it
does not attach any consequences for failure to meet it, courts find that those deadlines are "direc-
tory" as opposed to "mandatory" and that no consequence follows from failure to meet them. See,
e.g., Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 563, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he lack
of consequential language ... leads us to conclude that Congress intended this [section] to be only
directory."); Alberta Gas Chem., Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780, 785 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
Hence, the courts have indicated that it is up to Congress to attach consequential language to the
statute, negating any attempt at a judicial remedy.
250. See Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2004) (striking down the DOC's policy of issuing liquidation instructions to Customs within
fifteen days of making a final determination). This remedy is not an issue for Customs because
Customs is under a mandatory statutory obligation to liquidate. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
251. 467 U.S. 104 (1984).
252. Id. at 108.
253. Id. at I11.
254. Id. at 113.
255. Id. at 119.
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problems associated with the liquidation process be resolved at the ad-
ministrative level as opposed to by judicial intervention. Therefore, a
statutory amendment is necessary to solve these problems.
First, judicial remedies require a party, who should be able to rely
on the involved administrative agencies performing their duties under the
statute, to take affirmative action in enforcing its rights at significant
cost. Courts have frequently expressed their frustration with agency de-
lay in the liquidation process. In NEC Solutions (America), Inc. v.
United States, 2 6 the CIT rejected the government's argument that the
rights of a party injured by the DOC's delay in publishing notices of final
results after administrative reviews were adequately protected by the
availability of a judicial remedy: a writ of mandamus.257  The CIT
stated, "[t]he idea that a party must seek such an extraordinary remedy to
ensure that Commerce simply fulfills its statutory responsibilities is un-
tenable. 258 Judicial economy dictates that agencies diligently exercise
their statutory mandates thereby obviating the need for judicial review.
Second, agency inaction may thwart congressional intent and upset the
balance between coordinate branches of government. More importantly,
unchecked agency delay may negate trade concessions and rules care-
fully negotiated under the auspice of the WTO. Third, recourse to judi-
cial remedies causes more delay in the liquidation process thereby exac-
erbating the negative effects associated therewith, at least for importers.
Finally, access to judicial remedies is a burden on the moving party and
costs significant sums of money, thereby causing further injury. In addi-
tion, judicial review of agency inaction is truly only an effective check
on the executive branch in situations where the benefit of obtaining the
remedy outweighs the associated costs. That is, there is a "twilight zone"
in which no party would find it cost-efficient to seek a judicial remedy
because the costs, e.g. for legal representation, of doing so would be lar-
ger than the potential gain. In these "small-stake" situations, an agency
is effectively insulated from challenge and has little incentive to dili-
gently monitor its actions. Of course, given the size of the administrative
process of liquidation, it is unlikely that an agency would have the ability
to single out small stake situations for less-than-optimal agency action.
For these reasons, judicial remedies should only be used as a last re-
sort to solve the problems in the liquidation process. Instead, the statu-
tory scheme must be amended to take care of the associated problems at
the administrative level.
256. 277 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003), affld, 411 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
257. Id. at 1346.
258. Id.
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V. THE CASE FOR A STATUTORY AMENDMENT CREATING DEADLINES
AND CONSEQUENCES FOR FAILING TO MEET THEM
The problems associated with the liquidation process under the cur-
rent scheme are caused by the DOC and Customs' delay in taking action.
The DOC publishes in the Federal Register the final results of an admin-
istrative review and sends liquidation instructions to Customs.2 5 9 After
receiving notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation, Customs
liquidates the covered entries.260 However, both agencies frequently fail
to act in a timely manner or, even worse, fail to act at all.2 61 The delays
cause injury to importers, the U.S. government, and representatives of
U.S. industry. Judicial remedies are inadequate to protect the parties
involved in the liquidation process from the negative consequences of
deemed liquidation. Therefore, statutory amendments are necessary to
solve the problems at the administrative agency level.
Section 1504(d) of title 19 U.S.C. provides both a time requirement
within which liquidation must occur and a consequence for Customs'
failure to meet it, deemed liquidation.2 62 In contrast, no consequences
follow from the DOC's failure to publish the final results of administra-
tive or judicial reviews.263 In fact, the DOC is not even under a statutory
deadline to publish the final results of an administrative review (unless
the final results were appealed under 19 U.S.C. Section 1516a).2 4 In
addition, the DOC is not under a statutory deadline to send liquidation
instructions to Customs (unless the final results were appealed under 19
U.S.C. Section 1516a).265 Publication in the Federal Register of final
results of an administrative review or the DOC's providing actual notice
259. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(c) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 354.18 (2005); 19 C.F.R. § 351.207(b)
(2005).
260. 19 U.S.C. § 1500(d) (2000); 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(B); 19 C.F.R. §§ 159.2, 351.207(e)
(2005).
261. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Cemex
S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1316, 1317 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, No. 04-1058
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Daido Corp., v.
United States, 796 F. Supp. 533, 534-55 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992); Nakajima All Co. v. United States,
691 F. Supp. 358, 361 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 1187,
1189 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) affd, 831 F.2d 269 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
262. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
263. See 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(1) (2000) ("[The DOC] shall publish in the Federal Register the
results of [an administrative review], together with the notice of any duty to be assessed .... ); 19
U.S.C. §1675(a)(3)(C) ("[The DOC] shall, within 10 days after the final disposition of [a judicial]
review ... transmit to the Federal Register for publication the final disposition and issue instructions
to the Customs Service with respect to the liquidation of entries pursuant to the review.").
264. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(B)-(C) (2000). However, the DOC is under an obligation to
publish in the Federal Register final results of judicial reviews of administrative reviews within 10
days after a court decision. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(e), 1675(a)(3)(C) (2005). Courts which have
interpreted 19 U.S.C. Section 1516a(e)(2) have found it to be directory rather than mandatory. See,
e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321 n.6 ("[S]ection 1516a(e) sets forth no consequences for failure to
comply with its publication requirement." (citing Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1382)); Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at
1382 ("[T]here is no language in section 1516a(e) that attaches a consequence to a failure by Com-
merce to meet the ten-day publication requirement ...."); NEC Solutions, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1346
(stating that the defendant was "technically correct" that Section 1516a(e) is directory rather than
mandatory).
265. See 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(3)(C) (2000).
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of the removal of the suspension of liquidation to Customs through liqui-
dation instructions mark the start of the six-month time period for
deemed liquidation.266 Consequently, the DOC can prevent deemed liq-
uidation from ever occurring by not publishing the final results or failing
to send liquidation instructions to Customs.
Courts are generally hostile to imposing time limits on administra-
tive agencies in the absence of clear congressional intent.2 67 In addition,
the CIT and the Federal Circuit have found that "a statutory time period
is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency or public
official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence
for failure to comply with the provisions. '268
The current notice regime appears to conflict with congressional in-
tent in enacting Section 1504 in 1978. Before Section 1504, there was
no statutory requirement that liquidation be completed within a specified
time limit.269  Congress enacted Section 1504 out of concern for the
negative effects delay in liquidation would have on importers and others
involved in customs transactions.270 One court noted that one of Con-
gress' concerns was that the DOC and Customs could delay liquidation
indefinitely prior to 1978.271 Despite the enactment of Section 1504,
under its current interpretation, the DOC still has the power to delay liq-
uidation indefinitely by failing to publish notice of the final results of an
administrative or judicial review, or failing to send liquidation instruc-
tions to Customs. 272 Of course, federal courts operate under the judicial
presumption that federal agencies exercise their duties in a diligent man-
ner.273 However, the frequently egregious delays in the liquidation proc-ess caused by the DOC and Customs have led courts to voice their frus-
266. Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (post-URAA
entries); Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1376; Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1271 (pre-URAA entries). For infor-
mation on URAA, see supra note 72.
267. See, e.g., Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 112, 119 (1984) (finding that a court-ordered
injunction imposing an administrative deadline constituted an "unwarranted judicial intrusion"
where Congress had expressed concern over serious delays but nevertheless declined to impose a
deadline).
268. Alberta Gas Chem., Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780, 785 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981)
(citations omitted) cited in Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 364, 367 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988). See also Liesegang v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 312 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (noting that courts should refrain from imposing their own consequences when Congress fails
to specify a statutory consequence for failure to comply with a time deadline).
269. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 31; See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 24.
270. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 31.
271. Ambassador Div. of Florsheim Shoe v. United States, 748 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
272. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321 (finding that Customs did not receive notice that the
suspension of liquidation had been lifted for purposes of § 1504(d) where the DOC had issued pre-
mature, non-public liquidation instructions to Customs and did not publish notice under § 1516a(e)).
273. See generally Spezzaferro v. FAA, 807 F.2d 169, 173 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)
("Government officials are presumed to carry out their duties in good faith.... Unsubstantiated
suspicions and allegations are not enough. The proof must be almost 'irrefragable."'); Kalvar Corp.,
Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("Any analysis of a question of Govern-
mental bad faith must begin with the presumption that public officials act 'conscientiously in the
discharge of their duties."' (citing Librach v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 605, 612 (1959)).
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tration. For example, in NEC Solutions (America), Inc. v. United
States,274 the CIT stated that:
Commerce's self-imposed bureaucracy . . . is no excuse for delay.
Commerce is aware of its statutory obligations and should have
crafted its procedures accordingly. The Government brazenly claims
that an interested party who believes it will be injured by a delay "is
not without remedy" because it can seek relief by petitioning for a
writ of mandamus. The idea that a party must seek such an extraor-
dinary remedy to ensure that Commerce simply fulfills its statutory
responsibilities is untenable. By delaying liquidation in this manner,
Commerce undermines both the antidumping duty laws and Con-
gress' intent to settle importers' liabilities promptly .... [T]he court
finds no excuse for Commerce's failure to comply with the statute
and will likely craft future orders under the presumption that Com-
merce will fail to timely publish.275
To remedy the shortcomings of the current scheme, U.S. trade laws
should be amended to impose strict statutory deadlines within which the
DOC must publish in the Federal Register the final results of administra-
tive and judicial reviews, and issue liquidation instructions to Customs.
Failure to do so should result in some form of consequence to the gov-
ernment in order to make sure that the government does not have an in-
centive to delay action. For example, 19 U.S.C. Section 1675(a)(3)(C)
provides that the DOC must publish the final results after a judicial re-
view within ten days of the decision (and issue liquidation instructions to
Customs). Congress should enact the same or a similar rule for publica-
tion of the final results after an administrative review, and for sending
liquidation instructions to Customs, regardless of whether the review
274. 277 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003). In NEC Solutions, NEC had imported televi-
sion sets subject to an antidumping order between 1982 and 1989. Id. at 1341-43. NEC challenged
Customs' liquidation of two groups of entries, the fifth through eight review periods and the ninth
through tenth review periods. Id. at 1343-44. After judicial review of the fifth through eighth re-
view periods, the suspension of liquidation was automatically lifted in September 1999 but the DOC
did not publish the final results as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e). Id. at 1342. In June 2000, the
DOC sent an informational email to Customs noting that "THERE SHOULD BE NO
UNLIQUIDATED ENTRIES" in the fifth through eighth review periods, requesting Customs to
report the statuts of the covered entries. Id. at 1342-43. In January and March 2001, the DOC
informed Customs that the suspension of liquidation had been lifted. Id. at 1343. Customs liqui-
dated the entries between February and June 2001 and NEC protested, arguing that the entries were
deemed liquidated. Id. Similarly, suspension of liquidation for the entries in the ninth through tenth
review periods was lifted in June 1996. Id. The DOC sent liquidation instructions to Customs in
April and May 2000 and Customs liquidated the entries between June and September 2000. Id.
NEC protested arguing that the entries were deemed liquidated. Id. at 1343-44.
275. NEC Solutions, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1346, n.15 (citation omitted). The CIT further noted
that:
In 2002 and the first four months of 2003, Commerce published a total of eight (8)
amended final determinations .... [N]one [of which] were published within [the requi-
site] ten days .... The most egregious violations occurred (a) 1 year and 3 months, (b) 3
years and I month, and (c) 5 years and 8 months after the reviewing courts' decision be-
came final. According to Defendant, there is presently one matter pending before [the
CIT] concerning the delay of eight years and two months. Such delays are unacceptable.
And, of course, here there was no publication at all.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
results were appealed. In addition, any such rule should contain a conse-
quence for failure to publish, currently absent even from Section
1675(a)(3)(C) which only contains a deadline. One way to do this would
be to explicitly provide that the six-month time period for deemed liqui-
dation starts to run at the expiration of the publication period, e.g., the
ten-day period in Section 1675(a)(3)(C).
Such statutorily-imposed consequences are found in 19 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1504(d) and other U.S. trade and customs law provisions. For ex-
ample, 19 U.S.C. Section 1499(c)(1) provides that Customs has five days
to determine whether to release or detain merchandise presented for ex-
amination. "Merchandise not released within such 5-day period shall be
considered to be detained merchandise. 276 Another subsection of the
same provision provides that a failure to make a final determination of
admissibility for detained goods within 30 days after the merchandise has
been presented for examination "shall be treated as a decision ... to ex-
clude the merchandise. 277 Similarly, 19 U.S.C. Section 1515(b) and (c)
provide that Customs' failure to act on requests for accelerated disposi-
tions of protest and to set aside denial of further review, respectively,
result in a deemed denial of the requests. 78
As illustrated, statutorily-imposed deadlines with consequences for
failure to act are already used in trade and customs law provisions and
Congress should amend the publication provisions similarly. Such
amendment would greatly enhance the transparency of the trade laws and
provide certainty for importers, consistent with congressional intent in
enacting Section 1504.279 The absence of statutory deadlines and conse-
quences in the relevant statutory provisions has left courts reluctant to
enforce rights accruing to parties negatively affected by agency delay.
Clear statutory deadlines with consequences attached would make
the liquidation process more efficient. By creating statutory deadlines,
the DOC and Customs would be under unambiguous obligations to act.
The DOC and Customs are unlikely to object to adhering to clear, statu-
tory mandates which would enable interested parties to enforce rights
accruing to them at the agency level without judicial intervention.
Should the agencies fail to take timely action, the application of conse-
quences for failure to act would allow courts to enforce the deadlines
because the deadlines would be mandatory, as opposed to directory.28 °
276. 19 U.S.C. §1499(c)(1) (2000).
277. 19 U.S.C. §1499(c)(5)(A). If Customs decides to "exclude" a particular good, it means
that it is not allowed into the Customs territory of the United States.
278. 19 U.S.C. §1515(b)(c) (2000).
279. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 31 (1978). See also H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 24.
280. See, e.g., Canadian Fur Trappers, 691 F. Supp. at 367 ("It is settled that 'a statutory time
period is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency.., to act within a particular time
period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provisions.") (citation omitted);
Philipp Bros. v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) ("In several other
contexts courts have recognized that statutory time periods are directory, as opposed to mandatory,
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Courts would no longer be forced to show deference to agency promises
to take prompt action, as currently is the case.
Of course, clear statutory deadlines and attached consequences will
not prevent the negative effects of deemed liquidation once it has oc-
curred. Instead, the suggested statutory amendments described in this
section must be combined with other changes to the liquidation scheme.
For example, if deemed liquidation only applies against the government,
importers would not be concerned as much with the DOC's sending in-
structions to Customs because if Customs failed to liquidate in time, the
importer would not be injured in the overpayment situation. Therefore,
multiple, simultaneous amendments to U.S. trade and customs laws may
be necessary as the different suggested remedies are interdependent.
VI. A CASE FOR THE CREATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY TO
PROTECT AGAINST THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF DEEMED LIQUIDATION
There is no administrative remedy available for interested parties to
compel timely and accurate liquidation. More importantly, it appears
that there is no administrative remedy available that is capable of undo-
ing the negative effects of deemed liquidation. 281 Generally, importers
may protest Customs' liquidation decisions under 19 U.S.C. Section
1514.282 Representatives of U.S. industry have no similar right.283
Deemed liquidation cannot be protested under Section 1514: before
deemed liquidation has occurred, there is no decision to protest and after
it has occurred it cannot be undone.284 Therefore, U.S. customs law
should be amended to allow importers, and potentially representatives of
when no restraint is affirmatively imposed on the doing of the act after the time specified and no
adverse consequences are imposed for the delay.").
281. See supra text accompanying note 11.
282. 19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(5), (c)(3) (2000). Congress recently amended Section 1514 to give
importers 180 days to protest Customs decisions as opposed to the prior 90-day deadline. Miscella-
neous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-429, §2103(2)(A), 188 Stat.
2434, 2597-98 (2004). Section 1514 only allows an importer to challenge Customs decisions and
not DOC decisions. Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(stating that when Commerce is alleged to have committed an error in providing liquidation instruc-
tions, § 1514 does not apply). Instead, an action challenging the DOC's liquidation instructions is a
challenge to the administration and enforcement of final results, and accordingly finds its jurisdic-
tional basis in 28 U.S.C. Section 1581(i)(4). Id. at 1305 (citing Consol. Bearings Co. v. United
States, 348 F.3d 997, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
283. Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003), af'd,
384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
284. Courts have not made a definitive finding on the issue. In the majority of cases, courts
and Customs have stated that deemed liquidation cannot be protested or undone. See, e.g., Fujitsu
Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1380-82 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that only Cus-
toms decisions are protestable and that deemed liquidation occurs by operation of law and is not a
decision of Customs); Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1558-1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fujitsu Gen.
Am., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000), aftd, 283 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2002); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11; see Cust. HQ 228712, supra note 11. How-
ever, in two recent cases, the CIT has indicated in dicta that deemed liquidation possibly could be
protested under certain circumstances. See Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp.
2d 1172, 1178 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
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U.S. industry, a way to preserve their rights in case of deemed liquida-
tion, either before or after it has occurred.
A. An Administrative Remedy for Importers
In general, an importer dissatisfied with Customs liquidation deci-
sions may protest such decisions within 180 days under 19 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1514.285 Section 1514 provides that Customs decisions are final and
conclusive unless protested.286 Hence, the statute grants a right of protest
to importers but also imposes a burden on them to diligently monitor the
liquidation of entries in order to preserve their right of protest; unless an
importer exercises its right to protest, its cause of action is waived.
Deemed liquidation is connected to the protest requirement in a
number of ways. First, deemed liquidation may occur because Customs
failed to liquidate an entry within the six-month time period after proper
notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation. For example, in Cus-
toms Headquarters Ruling HQ 228249,287 an importer imported bricks
from Mexico in 1986 and paid a preliminary unfair trade duty of 3.51
percent ad valorem. The DOC subsequently revoked the unfair trade
duty and, in May 1996, sent instructions to Customs to liquidate the im-
porter's entries of bricks at zero percent duty. Customs failed to do so
and discovered in July 1998, approximately twenty-five months after
receiving notice of the final duty liability, that the goods were deemed
liquidated at the 3.51 percent duty paid upon entry. Customs rejected the
importer's argument that it was entitled to a refund of the 3.51 percent
duty paid upon entry. Similarly, in the majority of cases, courts have
taken the position that deemed liquidation cannot be undone and that it is
not protestable, as it is not a Customs "decision" under Section 1514.288
285. The statute states:
[D]ecisions of the Customs Service... as to... (5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an
entry ... shall be final and conclusive upon all persons (including the United States and
any officer thereof) unless a protest is filed in accordance with this section, or unless a
civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, is commenced in the
United States Court of International Trade ... within the time prescribed by [28 U.S.C. §
2636] .... ).
19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(5), (c)(3) (2000). See supra note 282 regarding a recent statutory amendment of
§ 1514.
286. 19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(5) (2000).
287. See Cust. HQ 228249, supra note 4.
288. See, e.g., Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1380-82; Wolff Shoe, 141 F.3d at 1122-23; Cherry Hill
Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1558-59; Fujitsu, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v.
United States, 991 F. Supp. 668, 673 n.7 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) (noting that Customs asserted that it
cannot reliquidate an entry that has been deemed liquidated); see Cust. HQ 228249, supra note 4.
Courts have not made a definitive finding on the issue. The Federal Circuit has held that 19 U.S.C.
Section 1514 does not apply to decisions made by other agencies, but only to Customs decisions
named in the statute. See Mitsubishi Elec. Am. Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973, 976-77 (Fed. Cir.
1994). Deemed liquidation is not listed in § 1514 and because it only applies to Customs, and not to
the DOC, an importer cannot protest DOC decisions. Furthermore, the "final and conclusive" lan-
guage found in § 1514 refers to Customs decisions. 19 U.S.C. §1514 (2000). Arguably, if deemed
liquidation occurs by operation of law and not as a result of a Customs decision, it cannot become
conclusive and final on the parties under Section 1514. In two recent cases, the CIT has indicated in
dicta that deemed liquidation possibly could be protested under certain circumstances. See Norsk
Hydro, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 1178; Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1357 at 1362. The Federal Circuit stated in
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This means that an importer is not entitled to a refund in the overpay-
ment situation, but it also means that deemed liquidation is a defense,
even without a protest, in an enforcement action brought by the govern-
ment to collect additional duties owed in the underpayment situation.2 89
Second, a sub-set of the above-mentioned situation occurs when
Customs believes that deemed liquidation has occurred and issues a liq-
uidation notice to that effect. For example, in Cemex, S.A. v. United
States, 290 the DOC failed to publish notice of the final duty liability in the
Federal Register and also failed to send effective liquidation instructions
to Customs.291 Hence, the six-month time period for deemed liquidation
never started to run. 29 2 Nevertheless, about three years later, erroneously
believing that deemed liquidation had occurred, Customs posted public
notice to that effect.29 3 The Federal Circuit held that deemed liquidation
had not occurred but that Customs' liquidation notice to that effect had
become conclusive and final because the importer had failed to protest
the liquidation decision.294 The Cemex case is an example of a situation
in which the DOC's and Customs' failures to act in a diligent manner
may have serious implications for interested parties.
Third, deemed liquidation may occur because Customs erroneously
liquidated an entry as deemed liquidated contrary to an agency-imposed
suspension of liquidation. In that situation, courts have found that Cus-
toms' erroneous liquidation becomes conclusive and final unless the im-
porter protests the decision.295 Note, however, that in that situation, an
entry is not deemed liquidated by operation of law, but rather, Customs'
decision to consider it deemed liquidated becomes final and conclusive
on the parties.
Cemex that deemed liquidation can be protested. See Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 ("If a deemed
liquidation or any liquidation is adverse to an importer, it has its protest remedied under 19 U.S.C. §
1514 and access to judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)."). However, its statement appears to
have been limited to the facts of the case which involved Customs' decision to recognize entries as
deemed liquidated even though they were not. Id. at 1361-62 (distinguishing the facts in Cemex
from both Fujitsu and Int'l Trading). In Norsk Hydro, the CIT did not discuss the issue further but
indicated that, under certain, limited circumstances, there might be an administrative remedy avail-
able to importers under 19 U.S.C. Section 1520(c)(1) to undo deemed liquidation once it had oc-
curred. NorskHydro, 350 F. Supp. 2d. at 1178-79.
289. See, e.g., Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1558.
290. 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh 'g granted, No. 04-1058 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004).
291. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1314.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1317.
294. Id. at 1325.
295. See, e.g., id. at 1324-26; Juice Farms 68 F.3d at 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[A]II liquida-
tions, whether legal or not, are subject to the timely protest requirement."). In fact, any liquidation
occurring during an agency-ordered suspension of liquidation must be protested or it becomes final
and conclusive on all parties. Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559; Allegheny Bradford Corp. v.
United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004). Courts have consistently rejected
the proposition that "where a Customs decision violated an existing agency order, the decision was
void and the party was able to bypass the requirements of the protest procedure." Allegheny Brad-
fordCorp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 (citing Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1557).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Finally, the CIT has distinguished cases such as Juice Farm and
Cherry Hill, involving erroneous liquidations contrary to prior adminis-
trative decisions, from cases involving erroneous liquidation contrary to
court-ordered injunctions against liquidation.296 A preliminary injunction
against liquidation issued by the CIT in an appeal of an agency determi-
nation remains in effect until the CIT decision becomes final which is at
the time of the expiration of the appeals process. 297 Customs' purported
liquidation contrary to a court-ordered suspension of liquidation has "no
legal effect" and need not be protested.298 This result follows from the
fact that administrative agencies have no "authority ...to determine
whether a court-ordered injunction of liquidation should be enforced.,
299
In such a situation, courts have held the government in contempt of
court.3 ° °
As illustrated above, there are many ways in which deemed liquida-
tion can effectively occur. Customs can make a liquidation decision,
except if subject to a court-ordered suspension of liquidation, final and
conclusive on an importer regardless of the accuracy of the decision.
Congress created the protest procedure in Section 1514 to protect im-
porters from erroneous Customs action. The right to protest granted by
Section 1514, however, is coupled with an obligation on behalf of the
importer to exercise that right in a timely manner. If not, a consequence
for failure to act occurs: Customs' decision becomes final and conclu-
sive on all parties. The burden imposed on importers to monitor liquida-
tion of their entries appears equitable on its face. However, when viewed
in light of the sometimes lengthy delays in the liquidation protest, equity
may favor a different result. The time period between the DOC's deter-
mination of final duty liability and Customs liquidation may be lengthy,
296. See, e.g., Allegheny Bradford Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. Courts issue such injunc-
tion during judicial review under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2). This provision allows CIT to enjoin
"some or all entries of merchandise covered by a determination of the... administering authority..
upon request by an interested party... " Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1382.
297. See PAM S.P.A. v. JCM, Ltd., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1367 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
298. Allegheny Bradford Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (citing LG Electronics, 991 F. Supp.
at 675; Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (citing LG Electronics, 991 F. Supp. at 675)). The CIT in
Allegheny Bradford Corp. went on to find that
Top Line is thus correct in arguing that the improper liquidations are void ab initio, and
that it is inappropriate to subject a legal nullity to reliquidation and other administrative
action before this Court may provide a remedy. "The proper means to enforce an order
of this Court against the Government is to seek relief in this Court; it is not to file a pro-
test with Customs."
Allegheny Bradford Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (quoting Yancheng Baolong Biochemical Prod-
ucts Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003)).
299. Allegheny Bradford Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. In Allegheny Bradford Corp., the
Government took the position that liquidation in violation of a court-ordered injunction was not yet
final under § 1514(b) and that the importer had to wait for the final court decision in the litigation.
Id. The CIT stated that "[t]his, of course, would allow the economic detriment of a liquidation and
exaction of funds to persist through the course of the litigation, thereby frustrating Congress' intent
to provide injunctive relief from liquidations pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §1516a(c)." Id.
300. See, e.g., Yancheng, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (holding the government in contempt of a
court-ordered preliminary injunction when it liquidated subject entries after the CIT entered judg-
ment in the case, as the injunction remained in effect pending the appeals process).
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sometimes several years.30  During this time, importers must spend
money monitoring their entries to assure that Customs does not impose
on them a final and conclusive erroneous liquidation decision. Thus,
importers must spend resources to assure that Customs diligently per-
forms its statutory duty. From this viewpoint, erroneous Customs deci-
sions should not become final and conclusive on importers, especially in
light of congressional intent in creating 19 U.S.C. Section 1504(d) to
provide finality and certainty for importer and others involved in Cus-
toms transactions.
A possible counter-argument is that Congress' concern with the
creation of finality and certainty for importers would still be served un-
der the current protest scheme because Customs decisions become final
and certain upon the expiration of the protest period. Arguably, Con-
gress was not necessarily concerned with the accuracy of Customs deci-
sions when enacting Sections 1504(d). Instead, Congress appeared
mainly concerned with the long-time periods during which importers
carried uncertain liabilities. 0 2 From this viewpoint, the finality aspect of
Section 1514 is of little concern because negative consequences will only
materialize if an importer fails to monitor its entries.
More troubling, however, is the fact that deemed liquidation cannot
be undone by protest once it has occurred.30 3 Regardless of how dili-
gently an importer monitors its entries, an importer has no available ad-
ministrative remedy to prevent deemed liquidation from occurring. Con-
gress enacted Section 1504(d) to protect importers against financial loss
304and uncertain liabilities caused by delays in the liquidation process.
Therefore, a revised liquidation scheme should allow importers access to
some form of administrative remedy to safeguard their interest in accu-
rate liquidation. Otherwise, importers have no protection against arbi-
trary agency action.30 5
301. See supra Parts II.A-B.
302. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32, cited in Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 n.5 (citing Dal-
Tile Corp. v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 394, 399 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993)). See also Int'l Trading,
281 F.3d at 1272; Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559.
303. See Wolff Shoe, 141 F.3d at 1122-23; Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1558-60; see Cust.
HQ 228929, supra note 11.
304. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32 (cited in Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 n.5 (citing Dal-
Tile Corp., 829 F. Supp at 399). See also Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1272; Cherry Hill Textiles, 112
F.3d at 1559.
305. Remedies available under 19 U.S.C. § 1520 do not appear to have any effect on deemed
liquidation. Under § 1520, an importer may request reliquidation to correct mistakes of fact, clerical
errors, or other inadvertences in Customs liquidation decisions within one year of liquidation. 19
U.S.C. §1520(c)(1)(2005); U.S. Customs Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ 230116 (Jan. 29, 2004),
available at HQ 230116 (Westlaw); Executone Info. Sys. v. United States, 96 F.3d 1383, 1386 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). In Norsk Hydro, the CIT raised the possibility that a Customs notice that a particular
entry has been deemed liquidation could be challenged under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c). Norsk Hydro,
350 F. Supp. 2d at 1178-79. The CIT stated that "Customs' failure to liquidated entries in accor-
dance with Commerce's instructions cannot be categorized as a mistake of fact or a clerical error
[but that] liquidation by operation of law may result from inadvertence." Id. at 1179. According to
the CIT, an importer may challenge such inadvertence under § 1520(c)(1). It is unclear what type of
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A newly-created administrative remedy could come in a number of
different forms. One possibility would be to allow Customs to undo
deemed liquidation and providing importers with an opportunity to pro-
test deemed liquidation. The problem with this approach is that the pro-
test remedy should only be available for importers who have diligently
participated in the liquidation protest. It should not be an avenue for an
importer asleep at the wheel to undo a negative consequence cause by the
importer's own failure to act. Another possibility would be to allow an
importer to file a request for expedited liquidation or some form of an-
ticipatory, administrative protest shortly before deemed liquidation oc-
curs. That way, Customs would be alerted of the pending deemed liqui-
dation and could take appropriate action. Under the latter approach, an
importer would have provided proof that it had diligently monitored its
entries.
B. An Administrative Remedy for Representatives of U.S. Industry
Antidumping proceedings are intended to protect U.S. industry from
unfairly traded imports.30 6 The antidumping duties are intended to level
the playing field by forcing an increase in the price of foreign, dumped
goods.30 7 To a certain extent, U.S. industry has a "right" to expect that
the protection it has been afforded under the statutes is implemented. If
deemed liquidation occurs in the case of underpayment, U.S. industry
has lost part of the protection it was entitled to because the foreign goods
were not subject to as high of a duty as they should have been.308 In ad-
dition, U.S. industry has a direct financial stake in the liquidation process
as long as the Byrd Amendment remains in effect because any antidump-
ing duties collected will be distributed to the affected U.S. industry.
309
Accordingly, U.S. industry has a vested interest in the correct liquidation
of entries subject to antidumping duties (at least in the underpayment
situation).
U.S industry plays a key role in antidumping investigations and ad-
ministrative reviews. 3  However, it has no influence over the liquidation
"inadvertences" would be challengeable under § 1520, especially in light of the consistent statements
by courts and Customs that deemed liquidation cannot be protested or undone once it has occurred.
306. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy Through International Legal
Minimalism: A Re-characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 1, 67 (2004) ("Both anti-dumping law and presidential constitutional and legal authority over
foreign commerce were increasingly deployed to protect domestic industries.").
307. See, e.g., Alan F. Holmer et al., Enacted and Rejected Amendments to the Antidumping
Law: In Implementation or Contravention of the Antidumping Agreement?, 29 INT'L L. 483, 507
(1995) ("The antidumping law is not intended as a revenue raiser for the government but as a reme-
dial provision to 'level the playing field."').
308. Conversely, if deemed liquidation occurs in the case of overpayment, U.S. industry has
received more protection than it was entitled to and also, currently, perhaps a direct benefit in the
form of Byrd Amendment disbursements.
309. See 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2005).
310. For example, U.S. industry almost always is the initiator of an antidumping investigation.
See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 26 (1995)
("Although the DOC may initiate an antidumping action, in almost every case an interested party
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phase of antidumping proceedings. Once the DOC has issued its final
determination of duty liability in an administrative review, the U.S. in-
dustry has no available administrative remedies to safeguard its interest
in accurate liquidation because U.S. industry does not have standing311 to
file a Customs protest of incorrect liquidation.1 2 Instead, standing to file
Customs protests under Section 1514 is reserved to, inter alia, import-
ers.
3 13
From the U.S. industry's standpoint, this lack of standing to protest
erroneous Customs decision may seem problematic as U.S. industry can-
not enforce the protection from unfair imports afforded to it under the
U.S. antidumping statutes. For that reason, U.S. industry potentially
should be allowed to protest the accuracy of the liquidation process as
well as deemed liquidation.
However, there are multiple, meritorious reasons not to allow repre-
sentatives of U.S. industry such an administrative remedy. First, the
deemed liquidation provision was created to protect importers and not
the U.S. industry.314 Second, U.S. industry has an incentive to bring an-
tidumping cases regardless of their objective merits because the anti-
dumping procedure is heavily biased in favor of U.S. industry. By bring-
ing a case, U.S. industry gains immediate, albeit temporary, protection
from foreign goods by imposition of temporary duties and by creating
uncertainty about supply in the market. Third, allowing U.S. industry to
intervene in the liquidation process would increase the workload of Cus-
toms by adding administrative cost to the liquidation process. Such in-
tervention might also lead to additional delays if Customs would be
forced to adjudicate an adversarial proceeding between importers and
U.S. industry. In addition, allowing such protest might inject an adver-
sarial aspect into the process, forcing both importers and representatives
of U.S. industry to incur substantial costs in legal representation during
the process. Of course, it is likely that importers would have legal repre-
sentation anyway as importers currently have access to limited adminis-
trative remedies during the process. Fourth, another reason to leave U.S.
industry out of the liquidation process is that its interests are represented
by the U.S. government. Finally, representatives of U.S. industry should
not be allowed to take part in the liquidation process because the infor-
mation involved in Customs transactions is confidential business infor-
mation. Giving U.S. industry access to this information would greatly
files a petition."). U.S. industry also works intimately with the DOC during investigations and
administrative reviews to safeguard its interests.
311. The word "standing" as used in this article refers to a particular party's ability to chal-
lenge agency action and is not intended to raise issues relating to the legal concept of standing.
312. Of course, U.S. industry has the ability to request that the CIT enforce decisions by the
DOC or prior court decisions. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1325.
313. 19 U.S.C. §1514(c)(2) (1994). See also Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1323 n.9; Cemex, 279 F.
Supp. 2d at 1362.
314. See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 4.
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harm the competitive position of importers and foreign manufacturers.
Indeed, during antidumping proceedings similar information, so called
business proprietary information, is protected by administrative protec-
tive orders and access to it is only given to the parties' counsel; U.S. in-
dustry does not have access to it even during antidumping proceed-
ings.315 While it is theoretically possible to institute an administrative
protective order system to protect information involved in the liquidation
process, it is not administratively wise. The costs associated therewith
would be high, both for Customs and the parties involved. For these
reasons, representatives of U.S. industry should not be allowed to par-
ticipate in the liquidation process.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The DOC and Customs' delays are the source of the problems in the
liquidation process. While courts work under the assumption that admin-
istrative agencies act diligently, it is safe to assume that the delays of the
past will continue in the future. Therefore, the governing statutes must
be amended to eliminate the negative effects of agency delay. First, the
statutes must be amended to provide deadlines within which the DOC
must publish notice of the final results of administrative reviews and
issue liquidation instructions to Customs. Such deadlines are common in
other U.S. trade and Customs law provisions and would provide the
DOC with an unambiguous directive to act. Second, the statutes must be
amended to provide consequences for the DOC's failure to meet these
deadlines. Negative consequences should apply only against the gov-
ernment because the government is the least-cost-avoider as the delays
are within its exclusive control. Third, the statutes must be amended to
provide an administrative remedy for importers to either prevent deemed
liquidation from occurring or to alleviate negative consequences once it
has occurred. Currently, there are no administrative remedies. In addi-
tion, the judicial remedies available are inadequate to safeguard the in-
terests of the involved parties.
Accurately predicting the possibility of a statutory reform is impos-
sible. Congress is a political entity and the success of any statutory
amendment will depend on the perceived benefits and costs to its politi-
cal constituencies. Traditionally, Congress has taken a pro-U.S. industry
stance in enacting U.S. trade laws. Most likely, the amendments sug-
gested in this article would be perceived to be in the main interest of im-
porters and foreign manufacturers. Therefore, it may be politically costly
for Congress to even propose amendments. It is possible that interna-
tional pressure to reform may assist Congress in gaining the necessary
momentum. The United States is currently part of the Doha Round of
315. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b)-(c) (2005); 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.304-06 (2005).
[Vol. 83:2
2005] ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 529
trade negotiations under the auspice of the WTO. 3 6  The suggested
amendments may form part of a larger reform package to implement the
results of those trade negotiations. However, Congress has shown little
ability to repeal the controversial Byrd Amendment despite international
pressure and a directive to do so from the WTO.31 7 In addition, the cur-
rent record trade deficit and growing dissatisfaction with the WTO in
Congress may indicate a current trend towards isolation and prejudice
against foreign imports. At the same time, members of Congress fre-
quently take positions which can be dismissed as political rhetoric in-
tended to satisfy a particular political constituency. In light of this, a
pro-import statutory amendment is politically challenging to achieve but
not impossible.
316. The WTO landed its latest round of trade negotiations in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.
The negotiations cover, among other things, trade in goods, services and issues specifically related to
agriculture.
317. See supra note 99.

THE DEVELOPING THEORY OF GOOD FAITH IN DIRECTOR
CONDUCT: ARE DELAWARE COURTS READY TO FORCE




In the modern corporate climate, defined by the aftermath of recent
corporate scandals, regulatory reforms, high-profile derivative suits and
settlements forcing directors to pay claims out-of-pocket, directors face
the real possibility of personal liability for their actions. Along with
intensified scrutiny of director conduct and calls for stronger corporate
governance, some commentators have criticized Delaware for failing to
require higher standards for corporate conduct under state law. Con-
trary to that assertion, the Delaware courts began a cautious exploration
of the notion of good faith and the potential expansion of directors 'fidu-
ciary obligations well before the collapses of Enron and WorldCom and
the subsequent intensified focus on corporate governance.
The doctrine of good faith has been underdeveloped in Delaware,
as a result of the established fiduciary duty framework and procedural
obstacles. Over ten years ago, the Delaware courts began to provide
increasingly specific guidance to plaintiffs to overcome the procedural
obstacles that prevented many fiduciary duty claims from surviving the
pleadings stage. As more of these claims reached trial on the merits, the
Delaware courts began a cautious exploration of the duty of good faith
as a theory for increasing standards of director conduct.
Most recently, the Chancery Court's 2005 decision, In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, defined good faith as an amorphous,
overarching requirement for director conduct, transcending the estab-
lished duties of loyalty and care. Although the Disney IV plaintiffs could
not establish that the directors acted in bad faith, under the Court's for-
mulation of good faith, directors 'failure to act in good faith can defeat
established procedural and statutory protections for their actions. As a
result, the Delaware courts are positioned to continue this development
of good faith as a substantive basis for imposing personal liability on
directors, thereby elevating standards of directors 'fiduciary obligations.
t Tara L. Dunn is an associate in the Corporate, Securities and Finance group of the Denver,
Colorado office of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P. The author thanks Professor Celia R. Taylor of the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law for her guidance and encouragement and Whitney
Holmes of Morrison & Foerster L.L.P. for his invaluable mentoring and thoughtful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
2005 is a risky time to be a corporate director. A cultural sea-
change in standards for organizational conduct, marked by increased
scrutiny of corporate directors' decisions and processes, is well under-
way. The current climate is defined by developments that force directors
to confront heightened scrutiny of their actions, including the very real
possibility of personal liability: Sarbanes-Oxley;1 new self-regulating
organization ("SRO") rules; 2 high-profile corporate cases against direc-
tors and officers; 3 and increasingly sophisticated institutional investor
plaintiffs with their recent efforts to make directors pay settlements out-
of-pocket.4 Even before the spectacular corporate scandals of recent
years, the Delaware courts were setting the stage to develop more re-
fined, higher standards of director conduct through their analysis of
"good faith." In the wake of those scandals, directors who fail to pay
attention to the developing guidance offered by the Delaware courts in
cases like In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation5 ("Disney IV")
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, 29, 118 U.S.C.).
2. "Self-regulating organizations" ("SROs") refers to the New York Stock Exchange, The
Nasdaq Stock Market, and the American Stock Exchange, which are the largest and most active
public stock trading markets subject to regulation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Each
of the SROs recently passed stricter listing requirements pertaining to the definition of and role of
independent directors. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual Section 303A
Corporate Governance Rules (November 3, 2004), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A final rules.pdf, The NASDAQ Stock Market Inc. Corporate
Governance, Rules 4200, 4200A, 4350, 4350A, 4351 and 4360 and Associated Interpretive Material
(April 15, 2004), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorporateGovemance.pdf, American
Stock Exchange Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") December 1, 2003, available at
http://www.amex.com/?href=/atamex/news/amCorGov.htm (providing link to SEC Release No. 34-
48863, approving rule changes to §§ 101, 110, 120, 121, 401,402, 610, and 1009 and adopting new
§§ 801-808 of the Amex Company Guide). The American Stock exchange has changed several
other rules, including changes to Director Independent [sic] Standards, Closed-End Audit Committee
Meeting Requirements, Disclosure of Independent Director Determinations and Technical Amend-
ments to Corporate Governance Requirements. See
http://www.amex.com/?href-/atamex/news/amCorGov.htm.
3. Joann S. Lublin et al., Directors are Getting the Jitters: Recent Settlements Tapping
Executive' Personal Assets Put Boardrooms on Edge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at B 1 (recent out-
of-pocket settlements by directors); Executives on Trial: Guilty, Not Guilty, Mistrial, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, July 13, 2005, at B 1 (on file with author) (discussing the status of various suits against
executives).
4. Michael Klausner et al., Outside Directors' Liability: Have WorldCom and Enron
Changed the Rules?, 71 STAN. LAW. 36 (Winter 2005), available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/lawyer/issues/71/klausner.html (discussing the recent push
by plaintiffs to force directors to pay portions of settlements out-of-pocket even when there is direc-
tors and officers insurance available).
5. No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 1875804 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) ("Disney Ir'). In accor-
dance with the Delaware Chancery Court's nomenclature of the decisions preceding Disney IV, the
cases in the Disney litigation are hereinafter referred to as: In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("Disney "); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)
("Brehm"); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("Disney I');
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138 (Del. Ch. Sept.
10, 2004) ("Disney 111"'); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL
1875804 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) ("Disney IV'). At the time this article went to press, the Delaware
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
may expect to see more scrutiny, and possibly personal liability, imposed
on them and the processes by which they govern corporate activity.
Against this backdrop of corporate scandals, legislative and regula-
tory reform, and increased scrutiny of corporate behavior, the Delaware
courts have been cautiously exploring the concept of good faith and di-
rectors' fiduciary obligations under state law in a two-part process.6
First, the state's courts have been offering specific directives to plaintiffs,
explaining how to overcome procedural obstacles in order to reach trial
on the merits.7 Second, the courts have engaged in an ongoing discourse
regarding the concept of good faith as a potential avenue for finding di-
rectors personally liable for certain egregious or outrageous behavior,
which might not otherwise be actionable under traditional fiduciary duty
doctrines. 8 This process has developed into guidance, effectively a pre-
scription by the Delaware courts, both for how directors should act in the
modem corporate environment and for how stockholders can success-
fully challenge directors who fail to satisfy the obligation to act in good
faith. Most recently, the Chancery Court's description of the obligation
of directors to act in good faith in its August 2005 Disney IV decision
suggests that Delaware's corporate law may ultimately develop to reflect
the ongoing sea-change in corporate governance by imposing personal
liability on corporate directors. 9
Interestingly, Delaware judges (both current and former) often sug-
gest that the state's courts occupy a somewhat passive role in bringing
these cases before them.10 The procedural teachings of the Delaware
courts and their evolving guidance on the obligation of good faith, how-
ever, suggest otherwise. 1 Still, some commentators assert that the
Supreme Court was scheduled to hear oral arguments in the appeal of Disney IV on January 25,
2006.
6. See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *36.
10. E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 Bus. LAW.
1447, 1449 (2004) ("Although as judges we appear on panels, give speeches and write articles, we
are like clams in the water when it comes to deciding cases. We must wait for a case to come to us.
.. "); id. at 1451; E. Norman Veasey, Some Current Corporate Governance Issues for Directors of
Delaware Corporations, Address at the National Association of Corporate Directors in Washington,
DC (Oct. 21, 2003), http://courts.state.de.us/Courts/Supreme%20Court/pdf/?NACD10_03wash.pdf
(same proposition); John Gapper, Capital Punishment, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at 16 (interviewing
the Hon. Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, "He admits that some of Delaware's recent rulings appear
tougher on managers than in the past, but says that merely reflects the cases that have come before
it"). More recently, however, E. Norman Veasey, retired Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme
Court, has begun to specifically identify the courts' role defining the procedure necessary for plain-
tiffs to reach trial on the merits. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened
in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2005) [hereinafter Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retro-
spective] ("The fact that judicial review by Delaware courts of director conduct has resulted in some
findings of wrongdoing is primarily a function of intensified judicial focus on process and improved
pleading by plaintiffs' lawyers.").
11. See infra Part 111.
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state's courts have failed to act (or act quickly enough) in response to
this new era. 12 Contrary to the charge that Delaware has somehow failed
to respond to this new environment, Delaware's courts were actually
crafting their guidance well before the collapses of Enron and World-
Com.' 3 These early efforts evidence the Delaware courts' proactive ap-
proach to developing more refined and higher standards for director con-
duct under state law.14  This proactive approach notwithstanding, Dela-
ware's most substantial exploration of the concept of good faith as a po-
tential avenue for finding directors personally liable for their actions has
unfolded in the modem corporate climate. Understandably, Delaware
cannot ignore this backdrop of increased focus on directors' processes
and institutional investor plaintiffs' recent efforts to make directors pay
settlements out-of-pocket. In fact, Delaware's current and former judici-
ary freely admits that the stark realities of the current corporate climate
must inform and play a part in the courts' exploration of standards for
directors' conduct under state law. 15  The mere fact that Delaware's
process continues to unfold in and may be informed by the modem cor-
porate climate, however, does not make Delaware's process merely "re-
active."'
16
While this article argues that the Delaware courts are providing
guidance to further develop fiduciary duty jurisprudence to refine stan-
12. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457-60 (2004) (noting
that Delaware "has been largely absent from the debate" [over how to respond to the post-Enron
governance reform movement], but also describing the state's development of good faith, calling it
as "the test of the commitment and good faith of Delaware's corporate law and lawmakers"); Sean J.
Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55
DUKE L. J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 3, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=728431) ("Post-Enron, the responsiveness (or
laxity) of the states, Delaware in particular, in matters of corporate governance was hotly con-
tested").
13. See discussion infra Part III and IV.
14. See discussion infra Part III and IV.
15. See Griffith, supra note 12, at 48-9 (citing William B. Chandler lII & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of
Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 1001 (2003)) ("State law policymakers -
including judges shaping the common law - will undoubtedly be responsive to this expression of
concern [the reforms of 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley, in particular] and may use it as an opportunity to
reflect more deeply on whether their own policies need adaptation to better protect stockholders"));
Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1496 ("[T]he evolution in business and
social expectations and norms of directorial conduct may affect outcomes in a common law system
like ours by impacting the interpretation and application of such concepts as 'good faith' and 'best
interests."').
16. See Griffith, supra note 12, at 8-9 ("My account of good faith as a rhetorical device
stresses, first and foremost, its contextual contingency. The duty of good faith emerged in an envi-
ronment of sturm und drang in corporate governance, when a series of scandals - including frauds
and failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, celebrity insider trading, and corruption in
the IPO market - drew American corporate governance into question and plunged previously settled
questions into heated debate"). While a significant part of Delaware's exploration of good faith has
taken place in the modem corporate climate, the author believes that the procedural guidance and
exploration of good faith in Delaware courts prior to the collapses of Enron and WorldCom evidence
an established interest in developing good faith as a tool to increase standards of corporate conduct.
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
dards of director conduct,1 7 it is important to be mindful of the critical
distinction between ideals of corporate governance and the legal re-
quirements for directors to discharge their fiduciary duties under Dela-
ware law. 18  As Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Chancery Court
explained in Disney IV,
Delaware law does not-indeed, the common law cannot-hold fiduci-
aries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of best
practices . . . . [T]he development of aspirational ideals, however
worthy as goals for human behavior, should not work to distort the
legal requirements by which human behavior is actually measured. 19
Notwithstanding this important distinction, guidance developing in
the good faith jurisprudence raises the possibility that Delaware may
hold corporate directors personally liable for their perceived failings and
demonstrates the nexus between these two notions of director conduct.
This article describes the development of Delaware's two-part pre-
scription to increase standards for director conduct by more fully devel-
oping the concept of directors' good faith: through decisions that pro-
vide specific instructions to help plaintiffs overcome procedural obsta-
cles and substantive explanations of what a breach of good faith might
look like. Part I of this article explores aspects of the current corporate
climate and the push for directors' out-of-pocket settlements against
which Delaware courts have developed recent portions of their guidance
regarding directors' obligations of good faith. Part II begins the explora-
tion of Delaware's corporate law, by describing its traditional formula-
tion of directors' fiduciary duties and the historical challenge of under-
standing good faith within this framework. Part III considers the proce-
dural obstacles that have historically prevented the duty of good faith
from being more fully developed and the process element of the Dela-
ware courts' guidance to plaintiffs on how to overcome these hurdles and
17. Martin Lipton, a partner in the firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, who is perhaps
one of the best-known counselors to boards of major corporations, has concluded that neither Disney
IV nor the modem corporate climate "create new criteria for director liability." Memorandum from
Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Key Issues for Directors (Aug. 29, 2005) (on file
with author). While it may be as Mr. Lipton suggests, that Disney IV represents a withdrawal from
the developing notion that good faith may be an independent basis for director liability, the author
believes that procedural and substantive guidance coming from the Delaware courts in their explora-
tion of good faith suggest that there is more to come.
18. Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at * 1.
19. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court has also highlighted this distinction. Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 255-56 (Del. 2000).
"This case is not about the failure of the directors to establish and carry out ideal corpo-
rate governance practices .... [T]he law of fiduciary duties and remedies for violations
of those duties are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal corporate governance prac-
tices. Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for boards of directors
that go beyond the minimal legal requirements of the corporation law are highly desir-
able, often tend to benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation and can usually help
directors avoid liability."
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have their fiduciary duty claims heard on the merits. Part IV examines
the substantive element of the Delaware courts' guidance on good faith:
recent decisions developing good faith as a basis for directors' personal
liability, culminating with Disney IV's suggestion that "good faith" is a
ubiquitous requirement for director conduct that transcends the specific
duties of loyalty and due care. Part V concludes by discussing the poten-
tial avenues for finding directors personally liable under Delaware's cur-
rent formulation of good faith.
I. THE CURRENT CORPORATE CULTURE
Both before and after the spectacular corporate scandals since 2001,
the Delaware courts' attempt to increase standards of director conduct
face an inherent constraint. Unlike frustrated investors and federal regu-
lators, Delaware courts must work within established precedent and the
doctrine of stare decisis. 20 The state's judges consider this deference one
the most salient features of the state's corporate law, creating its hall-
mark "stability and predictability.",2' As a result, although Delaware
developed the early aspects of its guidance before the Enron and World-
Com collapses, these factors have forced much of the substantive com-
ponent of Delaware's prescription to play out against the backdrop of
post-scandal public and regulatory pressure to improve corporate gov-
ernance. 22  Two important features of this climate are the increasing
presence of institutional investor plaintiffs and their quest to force direc-
tors to pay settlements out-of-pocket. Taken together, these forces have
greatly shaped the corporate governance climate and increased the likeli-
hood that directors will be held personally liable for their actions. While
Delaware's courts must follow legal principles developed through years
of jurisprudence to analyze standards of conduct and potential liability
for directors, the current climate exerts considerable influence over the
substantive formulation of Delaware's prescription. 3
A. The Increased Presence of Institutional Investor Plaintiffs
Since the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), 24 the typical lead plaintiff in federal securities and state cor-
porate law cases has dramatically changed. Under the PSLRA, a lead
20. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1409-10. Although disgruntled
investors who choose to file suit to address their grievances are also bound by legal precedent and
the effects of stare decisis, they have other avenues available to them, including selling their hold-
ings, exercising their voting power at annual meetings and pressuring lawmakers for reforms.
21. ld. at 1410.
22. See infra Parts III and IV.
23. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between ideals
of corporate governance and fiduciary duties); note 16 and accompanying text (considering com-
mentary by members of Delaware's judiciary on how the current corporate climate impacts the
development of state corporate law).
24. Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(3)(iii)(l)(bb) (2000); Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(1)(bb) (2000). [hereinafter,
collectively, the "PSLRA"]
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plaintiff in federal securities cases must have the "largest financial inter-
est in the relief sought. 2 5  As a result, institutional investors have re-
placed the winner of the "race to the courthouse" as the most-likely lead
plaintiff in federal securities litigation, and federal courts openly favor
institutional investors for this role.26 Because the PSLRA does not apply
to cases brought under state corporate law, the phenomenon Vice Chan-
cellor Leo Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court describes as the
"medal round of filing speed (also known as the lead counsel selection)
Olympics" still exists in Delaware courts.27  Nonetheless, institutional
investors have embraced their role in corporate governance reform and
have become frequent players in the Delaware courts as well. 28
The increased participation of sophisticated institutional investors
plaintiffs in these cases appears to have had a significant impact, evi-
denced by a study of federal securities cases brought since the PLSRA,
finding that cases brought by institutional investors result in higher set-
tlements. 29  Accordingly, institutional investors have become increas-
ingly attractive to the plaintiffs' bar.30 Today, both securities and corpo-
rate law class-action suits have extraordinarily high economic stakes, in
25. Id.
26. See Malasky v. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP, No. 04 Civ. 7447 (RJH) (et al.), 2004 WL
2980085, at *3.4, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2004), reconsidered in part by Malasky v.
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP, No. 04 Civ. 7447 (RJH) (et al.), 2005 WL 549548, slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 2005) (discussing the interplay between the PSLRA's requirement that the lead plaintiff
have the "largest financial interest" and FED. R. CIV. P. 23's requirement that the lead plaintiff "ade-
quately protect the interests of the class," and discussing court opinions interpreting the PSLRA to
favor institutional investors for lead-plaintiff status); Motion for Lead Plaintiff: Only Institutional
Investors Need Apply, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN (Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman
& Robbins LLP), Second Quarter, 2005 at 4, available at
http://www.lerachlaw.com/pdf/newsletters/2005_2ndQtrCorpGov.pdf ("The Court did a great
service to the class by recognizing the value of having a sophisticated fiduciary such as the Cement
Masons appointed to oversee this significant litigation") (quoting Lerach Coughlin Attorney David
Rosenfeld, representing lead-plaintiff in Malasky case).
27. In re Cox Communications, Inc., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005).
28. Institutional investors have embraced their role in shaping corporate practices, as evi-
denced by the principles or guidelines for corporate governance that many of them publish. See The
California Public Employees' Retirement System Corporate Governance Core Principles & Guide-
lines (updated Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.calpers-
governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-principles.pdf; The Council of Institu-
tional Investors Corporate Governance Policies (updated Apr. 2005),
http://www.cii.org/site-files/pdfs/policies/2005%20_aprilciipolicies.pdf.
29. Press Release, Cornerstone Research, Class Action Securities Fraud Settlements are
Higher When Institutional Investors are Lead Plaintiffs (May 10, 2004),
http://securities.stanford.edu/settlementsiREVIEW_1995-2003/2003_Settlements_Release.pdf.
30. Tamara Loomis, Milberg Weiss Stronger Than Ever Despite Reform Act, N.Y. L. J., Apr.
22, 2003, at 1, available at 4/22/03 NYLJ1 (Col. 4)(Westlaw). Firms specializing in class action
suits often have institutional investor-specific sections of their websites. See
http://www.milbergweiss.com/practice/practicedetail.aspx?pgid=796 (Milberg Weiss Bershad &
Schulman LLP); http://www.milbergweiss.com/practice/practicedetail.aspx?pgid=
796&ControllD-l1346 (Milberg Weiss's "Principles of Corporate Governance for Institutional
Investors"); http://www.lerachlaw.com/Icsr-cgi-bin/miltempl=inst-invest.html (Lerach Coughlin
Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP); http://www.blbglaw.com/htn1/portfolio monitoring.html
(Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP).
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both the relief sought and the legal fees arising from this litigation. 31
This "big business" aspect of class-action corporate cases, however, has
put the plaintiffs' bar under increased scrutiny about its true motivation.32
In a study published in 2004, Professors Elliott J. Weiss and Lawrence J.
White examined merger-related class actions filed in the Delaware
Chancery Court between 1999 and 2001, concluding that these cases
evidenced "the opportunistic filings, of a lawyer-driven process rather
than a true client-driven process. 33 One commentator has remarked that
the class-action model has turned clients into "tokens to be moved
around on a game board [by plaintiffs' counsel]. 34  Notwithstanding
these critiques of the plaintiffs' bar, the combination of increased partici-
pation by institutional investors and the increasing importance of their
role in corporate cases, coupled with the potential economic rewards for
the plaintiffs' bar, has had a substantial impact the current corporate
class-action litigation climate.
31. As an example of a recent, high-stakes corporate case, the Disney IV plaintiffs claimed
$263 million in damages. Disney CEO, Directors Dodge Liability Bullet for Paying Ovitz $140
Million, ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LIT. REP. Aug. 15, 2005, at 1.
32. Editorial, The Trial Lawyers Enron, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2005, at A12 (Discussing the
ever more outrageous" behavior of plaintiffs' attorneys, "Sham 'screenings' to round up asbestos
plaintiffs, forum shopping for friendly juries, 'coupon' settlements that enrich only lawyers and
frivolous lawsuits have all become staples of today's tort system. Yet they have received almost no
media, much less legal, scrutiny"). Recently, some of this criticism of the plaintiffs' bar has taken
on a new, legal shape, in the form of a federal criminal investigation of one of the nation's largest
class-action law firms. Federal investigators are probing the practices of Milberg Weiss Bershad &
Schulman for alleged fraud, conspiracy and kickbacks. John R. Wilke & Scot J. Paltrow, Prosecu-
tors Step Up Probe of Milberg Weiss Law Firm; Ex-Partners Given Immunity in Grand-Jury Inves-
tigation of Possible Illegal Payments, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at Al. The firm considers the
allegations "baseless," and contends that many of the cases in question occurred before the PSLRA,
before kickbacks to plaintiffs were illegal. John R. Wilke & Scot J. Paltrow, Ex-Broker to Aid
Milberg Inquiry; Cooperation Underscores Wide Probe of Recruitment of Class-Action Plaintiffs,
WALL ST. J., Jun. 28, 2005, at A2.
33. Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law
(Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1856 (2004) (finding that in chal-
lenged mergers, 77% were filed within one day of the merger announcement and that hourly fees
averaged $492 per hour in settlements without monetary recovery but averaged $1,800 per attorney
hour worked in settlements with a monetary recovery).
34. In A Class of His Own: How Melvyn Weiss, A Class Action Lawyer, Finds Crimes That
Pay, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/people/
PrinterFriendly.cfm?StoryID=939966 (quoting Walter Olson of the Manhattan Institute). Courts
have not turned a blind eye to the aggressive nature of the plaintiffs' bar, and have increased their
scrutiny of class-action firms in evaluating fee requests in settlement agreements in securities and
corporate cases. Recent fee requests have been rejected and reduced with increasing judicial criti-
cism, including the suggestion that the plaintiffs can be "mere figureheads" for their attorneys and
that to award the full fee in the case at hand would be to grant the plaintiffs' lawyers a "windfall." In
re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Securities Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236-37 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In
June 2005, Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine admonished plaintiffs' lawyers in a fee award reduction,
describing their complaint as a "hastily drafted throw-away," and explained plaintiffs' lawyers'
practice of filing a complaint on the public announcement of a merger, rather than based on an actual
merger agreement, in order to win the "lead counsel sweepstakes." In re Cox Communications, 849
A.2d at 608, 641.
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B. The Push for Out-of-Pocket Settlements
Importantly, institutional investors have wielded their increasing in-
fluence by seeking to hold corporate directors personally liable for cor-
porate failings, by forcing them to pay settlements out-of-pocket, despite
directors and officers insurance ("D & 0 insurance") policies that might
be available to cover such settlements. 35 Early in 2005, institutional in-
vestor lead plaintiffs settled with former Enron and WorldCom directors,
forcing them to pay portions of the settlements personally.36 As part of
the WorldCom settlement, eleven directors agreed to pay over $20 mil-
lion of the $55.25 million settlement out-of-pocket.3 7 New York State
Comptroller Alan Hevesi, Trustee of the New York State Common Re-
tirement Fund (the WorldCom lead-plaintiff), explained that the out-of-
pocket settlement represented over twenty percent of the directors' cu-
mulative net worth, excluding certain judgment-proof assets. 38 "The fact
that we have achieved [this] settlement . . . sends a strong message to
directors of every publicly traded company .... We will hold them per-
sonally liable if they allow management of the company on whose
boards they sit to commit fraud., 39 As further evidence of these funds'
quest to inflict personal liability on directors, some institutional investors
are offering higher contingency fees if their attorneys can obtain out-of-
pocket payments from corporate officials.4a
While WorldCom and Enron are extreme examples, they illustrate
the current climate in which Delaware courts have pursued their prescrip-
tion to increase standards of director conduct under the state's fiduciary
duty framework. Prominent Delaware corporate lawyer, A. Gilchrist
Sparks III commented on the disturbing trend of clients "wanting a
pound of flesh," and noted that high-profile settlements have "created the
perfect storm."'4
Taken together, the increased litigation activity of institutional in-
vestors and their interest in forcing directors to pay out-of-pocket for
corporate failures has created a corporate governance climate that in-
creases the likelihood that corporate directors could be personally liable
in certain circumstances. Although the Delaware courts embarked on
35. See Lublin, supra note 3; Klausner et. al, supra note 4, at 36-38.
36. See Lublin, supra note 3; Klausner et. al, supra note 4, at 36-38.
37. Press Release, Office of the New York State Comptroller, Hevesi Revives Historic Set-
tlement, Former WorldCom Directors to Pay from Own Pockets (Mar. 18, 2005),
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/mar05/031805.htm.
38. Press Release, Office of the New York State Comptroller, Hevesi Announces Historic
Settlement, Former WorldCom Directors to Pay from Own Pockets (Jan. 7, 2005),
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/j an05/010705.htm.
39. Id. See also Klausner, supra note 4 (discussing the increased potential for outside direc-
tors' liability after the Worldcom and Enron cases).
40. See Lublin, supra note 3.
41. Alison Carpenter, Lawyers Weigh In on Uncertainty About Director Liability, 20 CORP.
COUNS. WKLY. 161, 168 (May 25, 2005).
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their prescription before this post-scandal climate ensued, they cannot
divorce this process from the new era. 2 The open question in the wake
of Disney IV is whether the Delaware courts are backtracking,43 grasping
for a temporary solution that will not result in a permanent change to the
substantive law,44 or providing procedural and substantive guidelines to
stockholders interested in promoting heightened standards that reflect the
modem climate of pressure to improve corporate governance.
II. DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER DELAWARE LAW
Although the ideals for corporate governance have undergone a
substantial and public transformation since 2001, the Delaware courts'
movement to refine its fiduciary duty framework has taken place with
considerably less publicity. This is partly caused by the constraints of
precedent and stare decisis, which has prevented Delaware from making
a quick or unreasoned response.45 In addition, the courts are constrained
to address the facts of the cases that reach them, which necessarily makes
development of jurisprudence an incremental process.4 Consequently,
the state's courts have methodically worked within these constraints
while developing a prescription to hold directors to higher standards of
conduct. In order to fully appreciate the nature of these constraints and
the development of Delaware's guidance, this Part describes Delaware's
traditional fiduciary duties and the difficulty of understanding good faith
within this framework.
Under Delaware law, directors manage corporations for the benefit
of stockholders. 47  As a result, directors owe fiduciary duties to both the
stockholders and the corporation. 48 Under Delaware's traditional formu-
42. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1412. "The evolution of
fiduciary principles occurs not only because courts must decide only the cases before them, but also
because business norms and mores change over time. Thus, concepts like "good faith" may acquire
more defined content and doctrinal status over time as cases emerge addressing new business dy-
namics." Id. (internal citation omitted).
43. See Lipton, supra note 17.
44. See Griffith, supra note 12, at 56, 67-69 (arguing that good faith is merely a rhetorical,
reactive device employed by the Delaware courts to prevent further federalization of corporate law,
and that once pressures for heightened standards for director conduct subside, the Delaware courts
will return to a position of greater deference to corporate directors).
45. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; id. at 1413 (citing Paramount Comrnmc'ns
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 5 1(Del. 1994)).
46. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation ("Disney IV"), No. Civ. A., 15452, 2005
WL 1875804, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) ("It is thus both the province and special duty of this
Court to measure, in light of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, whether an individ-
ual who has accepted a position of responsibility over the assets of another has been unremittingly
faithful to his or her charge").
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(a) (2005). "The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." Id.
48. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 255, 270 (Del. 1939); Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, Inc., 115 A. 918,
922 (Del. Ch. 1922) ("Directors of a corporation are frequently spoken of as its trustees. Their acts
are scanned in the light of these principles which define the relationship existing between trustee and
cestui que trust.")
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lation, these fiduciary duties were the duty of care, which includes a duty
to monitor, and the duty of loyalty.49 Although the state's courts occa-
sionally mentioned the fiduciary duty of good faith, until recently, this
discussion has been relatively superficial. 50  As such, the duties of care
and loyalty have been the almost-exclusive historical standards for
measuring directors' conduct under Delaware law.
A. Delaware's Duty of Care
Under Delaware's fiduciary duty of care, directors must act in good
faith, with the care of an ordinarily prudent person, and in the best inter-
est of the corporation. 5' In the absence of a conflict of interest, directors'
actions fall under the duty of care.52 The duty of care measures direc-
tors' decision-making processes, requiring that directors be informed in
order to discharge this duty. 3 Only actions that are grossly negligent,
such as allowing a merger agreement to be amended without board au-
thorization and contrary to the directors' intent, will give rise to liability
for a breach of the duty of care.54 In a duty of care case, directors enjoy
the protection of the business judgment rule.5 5  The rule is not substan-
tive, but rather a presumption that directors act "on an informed basis, in
good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interest of the company. 56 Plaintiffs can overcome the presumption of
the business judgment rule by pleading facts with particularity that sug-
gest the directors were uninformed or their actions were "so far beyond
49. See Barkan v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (noting that in a
sale of control transaction, Delaware law requires that directors discharge their two "fundamental"
fiduciary duties, those of care and loyalty); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. Civ.A 9700, 2001 WL
115340, at *25 n. 63 (Del. Ch., February 7, 2001), vacated on other grounds, 787 A.2d 85 (Del.
2001) (discussing the "bedrock" duties of care and loyalty); In re Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (settlement opinion) (noting that a complaint alleging that
directors did not adequately monitor corporate activity, "charges the director defendants with breach
of their duty of attention or care").
50. See Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1062 (Del. 1996) (discussing good faith within the
duty of care); Emerald Partners, 2001 WL 115340, at *25 n.63. "Although corporate directors are
unquestionably obligated to act in good faith, doctrinally that obligation does not exist separate and
apart from the fiduciary duty of loyalty." Id. See also John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, 'Good
Faith' and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary
Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 119 (2004) (explaining Vice Chancellor Strine's suggestion that it is
a misunderstanding of Cede & Co v. Technicolor Inc. 's mention of a triad to consider good faith as a
separate duty) (citing Cede & Co v. Technicolor Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993)).
51. Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *32-33; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-69; DENNIS J.
BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS,
117-18 (5th ed. 1998) (citing 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §8.30(a) (3d ed. 1996)).
52. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 257 (Del. 2000) (considering defendant directors'
decisions under the duty of care because an earlier Chancery Court ruling found company directors
to be independent).
53. See id. at 259.
54. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 882-83 (Del. 1985); Kahn v. Roberts, No. C.A.
12324, 1995 WL 745056, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1995), aff'd, 679 A.2d 460 (Del. 1996).
55. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm,
746 A.2d 744.
56. Id.;DisneylV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *31.
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the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems inexplicable on any
ground other than bad faith., 57 Arguably, to overcome this presumption,
stockholders might simply allege that directors acted in bad faith. His-
torically, however, this was an almost impossible undertaking because
the Delaware courts' discussion of good faith was extremely limited,
lacking analysis of when it was necessary to meet this "duty" or what its
discharge required.5 8 This left stockholders with the burden of challeng-
ing the presumption of the business judgment rule without a clear stan-
dard for what one of its major components, good faith, required. Given
the lack of doctrinal clarity on good faith, application of the business
judgment rule became outcome-determinative, preventing most duty of
care cases from reaching trial on the merits.5 9
B. Delaware's Duty of Loyalty
In addition to their obligation to act with care, directors owe a duty
of loyalty to the corporation. A question of the duty of loyalty arises
when a director has a self-interest in a corporate transaction that is not
generally shared by the corporation's stockholders. 60  For example, a
director who owns stock in both the acquiring corporation and the target
in a merger transaction has a financial interest beyond that of the target's
stockholders. 6' To discharge their duty of loyalty, directors must exer-
cise "undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation," and must hold
the best interest of the corporation above any self-interest. 62 The busi-
ness judgment rule will not apply in a duty of loyalty case unless the
directors have expunged the conflict of interest by having a majority of
disinterested and independent directors or a majority of the stockholders
approve the transaction after full disclosure.63 If the business judgment
rule does not apply, directors must prove that the transaction was entirely
fair to the corporation. 64
57. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988).
58. See discussion infra Part IID.
59. Griffith, supra note 12, at 12 ("[T]he business judgment rule will be held to apply with the
typical effect that the board wins, the shareholder loses, and the court stays out of it.") (internal
citation omitted).
60. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
61. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 47, 65 (Del. Ch. 2000).
62. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
63. Oberly v. Kirby 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 protects
transactions between a corporation and an officer from being "per se voidable" if they are "approved
by a majority of the disinterested directors or a good faith vote of the stockholders." In re Cox
Communications, Inc., 879 A.2d 604, 614 (Del. Ch.2005). Once a majority of disinterested direc-
tors or a majority of the stockholders approve the transaction, the business judgment rule standard
applies to the transaction. Id. at 615 (citing Puma v. Marriott, Inc., 283 A.2d 693, 694 (Del. Ch.
1971)). See also J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 342 (2004) (discussing the limited power of the duty of
loyalty due to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144).
64. Kahn, 1995 WL 745056, at *6.
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C. The Practical Realities of the Business Judgment Rule
While both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care are well-
developed concepts in Delaware jurisprudence, the duty of care has long
been considered to be a "director-friendly" theory, because directors are
protected by the business judgment rule in these cases. 65 A core princi-
ple of Delaware corporate law, the business judgment rule exemplifies
the judiciary's extreme deference to directors' business decisions and
Delaware's value on the social utility of treating directors as experts in
evaluating corporate risk.66  Chancellor Chandler further described this
policy in Disney IV, citing Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc. :67
Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small
proportionate ownership interest in their corporations and little or no
incentive compensation. Thus, they enjoy (as residual owners) only a
very small proportion of any "upside" gains earned by the corpora-
tion on risky investment projects. If, however, corporate directors
were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a risky project on
the ground that the investment was too risky (foolishly risky! stu-
pidly risky! egregiously risky!-you supply the adverb), their liability
would be joint and several for the whole loss (with I suppose a right
of contribution). Given the scale of operation of modem public cor-
porations, this stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for
corporate directors threatens undesirable effects. Given this disjunc-
tion, only a very small probability of director liability based on "neg-
ligence", "inattention", "waste", etc. could induce a board to avoid
authorizing risky investment projects to any extent! Obviously, it is
in the shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to
directors from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to con-
clude that, as a practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in
good faith and meet minimalist proceduralist standards of attention,
they can face liability as a result of a business loss.
68
The rule's presumption is so strong that when it applies, attacks on direc-
tors' decision-making are rarely successful. 69 Further, because the rule
presumes directors have acted in good faith, the traditionally mechanical
application of the rule has precluded meaningful analysis of what good
65. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (noting that a claim based on the duty of care is "possibly the
most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment").
66. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66 (noting that directors' decisions will be "respected by
courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in
good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their
decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all material facts rea-
sonably available"); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d at 780.
67. 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
68. Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *31 n.408 (citing Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1053).
69. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (noting that a claim based on the duty of care is "possibly the
most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment"); see
Griffith, supra note 12, at 12. "The business judgment rule will be held to apply with the typical
effect that the board wins, the shareholder loses, and the court stays out of it." Id. (internal citation
omitted).
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faith entails. 70  As a result, only rarely do stockholder challenges to the
rule survive the pleadings stage, such as the Chancery Court's landmark
2003 decision, In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation
("Disney I/'). 71 Under this framework, it is logical that corporate boards
will take affirmative steps, such as having disinterested and independent
directors approve certain transactions, so their actions will be considered
under the duty of care and be protected by the business judgment rule.72
Thus, the substantive workings of the business judgment rule within
Delaware's fiduciary duty framework has created a judicial environment
that until recently has left the duty of good faith a rarely elucidated and
amorphous standard.73 This lack of clarity about good faith has been
further compounded by the confusion as to how good faith relates to the
established fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
D. Delaware's Traditionally Amorphous Good Faith
Although the Delaware courts frequently mention good faith within
discussions of the duties of care and loyalty, traditionally the courts have
not substantively defined the "duty" of good faith.74 Further clouding the
issue, good faith is not defined in the Delaware General Corporation Law
("DGCL").75 Case law demonstrates the courts' historical uncertainty as
to whether good faith is an independent duty, a component of the duty of
care, or a component of the duty of loyalty. This lack of doctrinal clarity
has prevented good faith from commanding a greater role in stockholder
suits.
Despite good faith's amorphous status under Delaware law, the
Chancery Court's early formulations of good faith suggested that direc-
tors' conduct that is "reckless and indifferent as to the rights of the
stockholders" may breach the duty of good faith.76 The mere description
70. See discussion supra Part II.C.
71. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003), see discussion infra Part III.A.2; see also Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004
WL 1949290 (Del. Ch., August 24, 2004).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (2005); see also supra note 59.
73. But see Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at * 1; see infra Parts IV, V.
74. See Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1062 (Del. 1996) (discussing good faith within the
duty of care); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. Civ.A. 9700, 2001 WL 115340 at *25 n.63 (Del. Ch.,
Feb. 7, 2001), vacated on other grounds, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001) ("Although corporate directors are
unquestionably obligated to act in good faith, doctrinally that obligation does not exist separate and
apart from the fiduciary duty of loyalty.") Notably, Disney IV called into question whether good
faith was even a "fiduciary duty" or just a generally applicable standard. "In the end, so long as the
role of good faith is understood, it makes no difference whether the words "fiduciary duty of" are
placed in front of "good faith," because acts not in good faith (regardless of whether they might fall
under the loyalty or care aspects of good faith) are in any event non-exculpable because they are
disloyal to the corporation." See Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *36 n.463 (citing DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 §102(b)(7) (2005)).
75. See Reed & Neiderman, supra note 50, at 119.
76. Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 47 A.2d 479, 489 (Del. Ch. 1946) (citing Karasik v. Pacific
Eastern Corp., 180 A. 604 (Del. Ch. 1935)) (holding, however, that directors' decision was not so
grossly inadequate to necessitate a finding of bad faith).
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of conduct that may evidence a lack of good faith suggests that it might
be a viable doctrine for stockholder claims, but an examination of case
law demonstrates the difficulty Delaware courts have had in determining
when to analyze good faith.
Although there has been some mention of Delaware's "triad" of fi-
duciary duties: the duties of care, loyalty and good faith, historically,
Delaware cases discussed good faith as part of an analysis of the duty of
care or the duty of loyalty.77 Beyond this general proposition, however,
there is little consistency. Some opinions suggest that good faith is a
component of the duty of care. According to the Chancery Court, a di-
rector's "good faith effort to be informed and exercise judgment" is a
core element of the duty of care.78 Similarly, in Disney 11, the Chancery
Court found plaintiffs' well-pleaded claim based on the duty of care to
fairly raise the question of whether Disney directors acted in good faith.79
In contrast, the Delaware courts have frequently discussed good
faith as part of directors' duty of loyalty. The Chancery Court noted that
good faith belongs under a duty of loyalty analysis, because "by defini-
tion, a director cannot simultaneously act in bad faith and loyally toward
the corporation and its stockholders. 8 ° Similarly, the Chancery Court
explained that the obligation to act in good faith "does not exist separate
and apart from the fiduciary duty of loyalty.' Irrespective of where the
Delaware courts believe good faith belongs, these historical mentions
have been just that-judicial notice that some "duty" of good faith exists,
without clear guidance as to what it requires or when it applies.82
These contradictions have left the duty of good faith without doc-
trinal clarity, undermining its potential power in shaping director con-
duct. Because until recently the state's courts had not yet given guidance
as to when an analysis of good faith is proper and what it entails, stock-
holders historically brought claims under the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty, thereby precluding substantive discussions of good faith. More
recently, before the decision in Disney IV, good faith has been more
prominently discussed, but where it fits in the existing descriptions of
77. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (citing Cede, 634 A.2d at 361); Cinerama,
Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995) (subsequent history omitted); Kahn v.
Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, G.P. Inc., Civ.A. No. 12489, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 22, at *4 (Del.
Ch., March 1, 1994) (citing Cede, 634 A.2d at 361).
78. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968.
79. Disney I1, 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
80. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) (citing In re ML/EQ Real Estate
P'ship Litig., C.A. No. 15741, 1999 WL 1271885 at *4 n.20 (Del. Ch., December 21, 1999)).
81. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. Civ.A. 9700, 2001 WL 115340, at *25 n.63 (Del. Ch. Feb.
7, 2001), vacated on other grounds, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001) (discussing good faith separately only
because the defendant directors raised a § 102(b)(7) waiver as an affirmative defense).
82. See David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary
Law: A Contractrarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 496-506 (2004) (discussing the tension
between the Delaware Supreme Court and Delaware Chancery Court on how to categorize good
faith).
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directors' fiduciary duties remained unclear. In a suit alleging that direc-
tors breached both the duties of care and loyalty, counsel described their
uncertainty as to how to challenge directors' good faith:
What could be confusing in the cases is that there's language-and I
don't believe it's subtle-as to whether the bad-faith claim is a subset
of the duty of loyalty or not .... Prior to the [Disney I] decision, the
cases lined up in saying "Bad faith is a subset of the duty of loyalty,
and here's the test." After the recent [Disney I] decision, we have a
bad-faith claim under a duty-of-care theory. I'm prepared on this
complaint to apply either standard.
83
Part of the recent confusion over good faith is the direct result of the
Delaware courts' ongoing attempt to refine standards for director con-
duct through an evolving doctrine of good faith.84
E. The Vital Importance of Good Faith
Although there is significant confusion as to what good faith re-
quires of directors or when it applies, it is both a presumption under the
business judgment rule85 and an ostensible prerequisite to several vitally
important statutory protections for directors under the DGCL. s6
Of primary importance is the widely-used exculpatory charter pro-
vision of Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL. 87 Under § 102(b)(7), stock-
holders may adopt an exculpatory charter provision in their certificate of
incorporation protecting directors against personal liability for breaches
of certain fiduciary duties, but not for breaches of the duty of loyalty or
"for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional mis-
conduct or a knowing violation of the law." 88  Claims alleging only a
83. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Services, Inc., v. Elkins, No.
Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290 at, *9 n.33 (Del. Ch., Aug. 24, 2004). In the Chancery
Court's 2003 Disney 11 decision, the court held that stockholders' claims attacking Disney directors'
business judgment created a reasonable doubt that the directors acted in good faith, which was
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). See discussion infra Part
IV.B.
84. See supra Parts II.D and Parts IV.A to IV.E.
85. See supra Part II.C.
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 102(b)(7), 141, 144, 145 (2005). See also E. Norman Veasey,
State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors,
28 J. CORP. L. 441, 443, 447 (2003) (noting that the duty of good faith arises under case law and
under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145).
87. DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2005).
88. Id. § 102(b)(7) provides in pertinent part for:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation
or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, pro-
vided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any
breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts
or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing vio-
lation of the law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit.
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breach of the duty of care are barred by § 102(b)(7). 89 Delaware courts
have been unwilling to infer bad faith into claims premised solely on the
duty of care. 90 According to the Delaware Supreme Court, it is not
enough to argue that duty of care claims are "inextricably intertwined
with loyalty and bad faith claims" in the face of a § 102(b)(7) charter
provision. 91 As a result, to challenge a § 102(b)(7) charter provision in
what would otherwise be a duty of care claim, plaintiffs must allege a
breach of good faith with well-pled facts.
92
Three other sections of the DCGL seemingly require good faith, al-
though there has been little, if any, judicial attention paid to the interplay
between these statutory protections and good faith.93 Under DGCL Sec-
tion 145, corporations may indemnify officers and directors for actions
taken in good faith.94 In the modem corporate climate, indemnification
is a vitally important concept for directors concerned with personal li-
ability. On its face, the statute excludes actions taken in bad faith, so a
director's breach of good faith would prohibit statutory indemnifica-
tion. 9'
In cases of interested director or officer transactions, under DGCL
Section 144(a), a majority of the disinterested directors can approve the
transaction and prevent it from being voidable, as long as they are fully
informed and they act in good faith.96 Importantly, if the requirements of
DGCL § 144(a) are met, the business judgment rule applies to the trans-
action.97
Finally, under DGCL Section 141(e), directors are fully protected in
relying on the corporation's officers, committees of the board, or experts,
if such reliance is made in good faith.98 In order to be protected under
this section, reliance on an expert requires that the expert be selected
89. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (citing Emerald Partners v.
Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999); Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270,
1288 (Del. 1994); Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061 (Del. 1996)).
90. See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1093-94.
91. Id. at 1093.
92. Although § 102(b)(7) must be raised as an affirmative defense, there is some question as
to what exactly directors must do to effectively raise it. In re Emerging Communications, No. Civ.A
16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *40 (Del. Ch. Jun. 4, 2004) (charging the director with the burden of
proving that '"[his] failure to withstand an entire fairness analysis is exclusively attributable to a
violation of the duty of care'); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1434 ("In
order to achieve exculpation in Malpiede, the directors were not required affirmatively to prove the
lack of a breach of loyalty.") Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1094 (holding that defendants only need raise §
102(b)(7) as an affirmative defense).
93. Disney IV's extensive discussion of good faith addressed some of these provisions. See
infra Part II.F. But see Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1443-44; Disney
IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *36.
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145 (2005).
95. Id.
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §144(a)(1) (2005).
97. In re Cox Commc'n, Inc. S'holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 615 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citing Puma
v. Marriott, Inc., 283 A.2d 693, 694 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(e) (2005).
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with reasonable care and the director must reasonably believe the matter
is within the expert's competence. 99
Given the plain language of these statutory protections, an under-
standing of good faith is imperative. If stockholders could successfully
assert a claim based on good faith, the business judgment rule and these
statutory provisions would not apply to protect directors' actions. Until
recently, however, the confusion over whether the duty of good faith is a
component of the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, or a stand-alone duty
has prevented stockholders from making a successful challenge to these
statutory protections. In light of the historically amorphous status of
good faith, it is logical that stockholders have not been more vigorous in
basing their claims on bad faith, leaving cases to be ultimately decided
under the duty of care or duty of loyalty.
The limited reach of good faith and the rigidity of the traditional fi-
duciary duty doctrines have not gone unnoticed by the Delaware judici-
ary. Perhaps out of frustration with the limited reach of good faith or the
outcome-determinative nature of the traditionally mechanical application
of the business judgment rule, the Delaware courts have undertaken the
exploration of good faith in an attempt to increase standards of director
conduct.' 00 Refining the substantive doctrine of good faith to ultimately
increase standards for directors' actions and processes, however, would
be impossible without actionable good faith claims reaching trial on the
merits. Accordingly, the first component of Delaware's guidance has
been procedural. In order to bring fiduciary duty cases that allow for an
exploration of good faith before them, the state's courts have been offer-
ing plaintiffs specific instructions on how to overcome procedural obsta-
cles at the pleadings stage and have their claims heard on the merits.
III. PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES To DEVELOPING GOOD FAITH AND THE
DELAWARE COURTS' EFFORTS TO MAKE THEM SURMOUNTABLE
Good faith's traditionally underdeveloped status can be directly
traced to two procedural obstacles: (1) the demand requirement, a Chan-
cery Court Rule requiring aggrieved stockholders to first address their
complaint to the corporation, and (2) the impact of DGCL § 102(b)(7).' '
Together, these obstacles often defeat fiduciary duty cases before they
reached trial on the merits.102 As a result, there has been little opportu-
99. Id.
100. See infra Part IV.
101. DEL. R. CH. CT. 23.1 ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2005).
102. See Sale, supra note 12, at 459-60 (discussing the pre-suit demand requirement and Sec-
tion 102(b)(7) as "barrier[s] to litigation over fiduciary duty breaches"); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking
Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 650 (2004) (discussing
Delaware's procedural barriers which allow directors to "avoid litigating on the substantive merits of
the shareholders' claims") (citing JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS, 429 (2d
ed. 2003)).
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nity for the state's courts to conduct a more thorough analysis of the sub-
stantive workings of good faith.
The first component of the Delaware courts' guidance to increase
standards for director conduct directly addresses these procedural obsta-
cles. Through ongoing and increasingly specific instruction, the courts
of Delaware have been detailing how plaintiffs can overcome these pro-
cedural obstacles and reach trial on the merits.'0 3 In so doing, the courts
have brought fiduciary duty suits before them that may allow Delaware
to increase standards for director conduct by way of a refined (or de-
fined) conceptualization of the requirement that directors act in good
faith. '04
A. Delaware's Procedural Obstacles
1. The Demand Requirement
Under Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1 ("Rule 23.1"), stock-
holders in a derivative action must allege with particularity their efforts
to make demand on a corporation's directors seeking resolution of their
complaint, or alternately, explain why demand would be futile. 10 5 Under
the standard established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v.
Lewis,'06 a plaintiff may establish demand futility by alleging facts which
suggest that the directors were not "disinterested and independent" or
that the transaction was not "the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment."'
10 7
From a policy standpoint, Delaware's demand requirement serves
an important gate-keeping function by preventing "costly, baseless suits"
while allowing factually-based claims that might benefit the corporation
to continue. 0 8  Establishing demand futility is critical for legitimate
claims to move forward, because if a derivative plaintiff instead chooses
to make demand on the corporation, the directors have the power to dis-
miss the suit. 109 Therefore, in order to litigate on the merits, plaintiffs
must successfully challenge either the directors' independence (the "first
prong of Aronson") or the directors' business judgment (the "second
prong of Aronson").110 In application, the demand requirement imposes
103. See infra Part III.B.
104. See infra Part IV.
105. DEL. R. CH. CT. 23.1.
106. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000).
107. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814-15.
108. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254-55 (citing Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216-17 (Del.
1996)).
109. See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (holding that once a plaintiff
makes demand on the corporation, the board has the power to dismiss the suit and such decision by
the board is protected by the business judgment rule).
110. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
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an almost insurmountable procedural hurdle in derivative suits."' In
order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 23. 1, plaintiffs must ei-
ther establish that the directors were not sufficiently independent (the
concept of independence is currently another moving target in Delaware
jurisprudence, further adding to this challenge), 12 or rebut the presump-
tion of the business judgment rule. 1 3 Given the relative safety of review
under the duty of care because of the application of the business judg-
ment rule," 4 boards have an incentive to use the statutory protections of
DGCL § 144(a) to avoid a challenge on independence grounds, and in-
stead, have their actions protected under the rule." 5 Because of the tradi-
tionally hazy notion of good faith is a component of the business judg-
ment rule formula, establishing demand futility under the second prong
of Aronson has been a significant hurdle."l
6
2. DGCL Section 102(b)(7)
In addition to the demand requirement, DGCL § 102(b)(7) operates
as an affirmative defense against personal financial liability for claims
alleging a duty of care violation. 1 7 As previously noted, a § 102(b)(7)
exculpatory charter provision bars claims based exclusively on the duty
of care, but does not bar director liability for claims based on the breach
of the duty of loyalty or actions not in good faith. 1 8 Therefore, to over-
come a § 102(b)(7) charter provision by way of challenging a director's
good faith, pleadings must allege a loyalty violation or "bad faith, inten-
tional misconduct, [or] knowing violation of the law." ' 19 Unsurprisingly,
the traditionally amorphous status of good faith and the business judg-
ment rule's strong presumption gives directors a high likelihood of suc-
cess under § 102(b)(7).120 Recent decisions suggest some confusion as to
what the directors' burden is when raising § 102(b)(7) as an affirmative
defense. Although the Chancery Court has suggested that directors must
prove that their actions fall under the duty of care when raising §
102(b)(7) as an affirmative defense, the Delaware Supreme Court has
only required directors to raise the existence of the charter provision in
111. See supra note 102.
112. See In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., No. Civ.A 53 1-N, 2005 WL 1076069,
at *10 n. 48 (Del. Ch., Apr. 29, 2005) (discussing the evolving jurisprudence on philanthropic rela-
tionships and director independence) (citing In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del.
Ch. 2003); In re The Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692 (Del.
Ch., Mar. 27, 2002); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985)). The Delaware Supreme Court
has not yet settled this issue. See also Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at
1470-72 (discussing the development of "independence" in the Delaware courts between 1992 and
2004).
113. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
114. See supra Part II.C.
115. See supra Part I1.E.
116. See supra Part II.C
117. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del. 2001).
118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2005).
119. In re Baxter Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1270 (Del. Ch. 1995).
120. See Sale, supra note 12, at 459 (calling § 102(b)(7) a "barrier to litigation").
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order to meet this burden. 121 Despite this tension, in practice, § 102(b)(7)
has "created an immediate dismissal right for duty of care claims."'
122
Both the demand requirement and § 102(b)(7) function as signifi-
cant procedural barriers to litigation on the merits for fiduciary duty
cases. 23 In turn, this has prevented meaningful analysis of both the sub-
stantive requirement of good faith and how good faith meshes or inter-
acts with other duties and obligations, which has limited the potential for
courts and stockholders to hold directors to higher standards of conduct
under Delaware law.
B. Part I of Delaware's Guidance: An Ongoing Tutorial on Procedural
Requirements
A review of cases and commentary suggests that the Delaware
courts have become increasingly frustrated with the limiting nature of the
established duty of care and duty of loyalty tests and the procedural ob-
stacles that defeat many stockholder suits. 12 4 In response, the Delaware
courts have offered guidance in the form of increasingly specific com-
mentary to help plaintiffs overcome these procedural obstacles. By clari-
fying procedural standards through commentary in decisions that are
decided against plaintiffs or on unrelated grounds, the courts have cre-
ated the opportunity to hear claims that implicate good faith, ultimately
allowing Delaware to increase standards for director conduct through an
expanded notion of good faith. 25  Although Delaware's judges have
downplayed the courts' role in bringing good faith cases before the
courts, their ongoing instructions to plaintiffs appear to be the very impe-
tus behind the factually-specific claims that have provided the courts
with the opportunity to continue exploring good faith.1
26
Delaware's procedural instruction addresses two concepts: the im-
portance of pleading with particularity and the use of Section 220 of the
DGCL to gain access to the corporation's books and records in order to
obtain the information necessary to plead with sufficient particularity.
Through these cases, the judiciary has provided ongoing guidance, de-
121. See In re Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *40 (charging the director
with the burden of proving that his "failure to withstand an entire fairness analysis is exclusively
attributable to a violation of the duty of care"); Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *35 (citing In re
Emerging Communications for the proposition that directors asserting a § 102(b)(7) exculpatory
charter provision bear the burden of proving they are entitled to its protections); but cf Malpiede,
780 A.2d at 1094 (holding that defendants only need raise § 102(b)(7) as an affirmative defense); see
also Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1434 ("In order to achieve exculpa-
tion in Malpiede, the directors were not required affirmatively to prove the lack of a breach of loy-
alty.")
122. See Griffith, supra note 12, at 15.
123. See Sale, supra note 12, at 459-60.
124. See supra Part II; see infra Part IV.
125. See Disney H1, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); Integrated Health Services, 2004 WL
1949290; see also infra Part IV.
126. See Disney II, 825 A.2d 275; Integrated Health Services, 2004 WL 1949290; see also
supra note 10.
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tailing the procedural requirements necessary for claims alleging director
misconduct to survive the pleadings stage. Ultimately, this process has
opened the door for the Delaware to increase standards of director con-
duct through the courts' cautious exploration of good faith.1
27
1. Delaware is Particular About 'Particularity'
Traditionally, the demand requirement and DGCL § 102(b)(7) have
prevented Delaware courts from hearing good faith claims on the mer-
its. 128  Remarkably, however, cases such as Disney J,l29 and Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Services, Inc., v.
Elkins,130 have alleged breaches of good faith with well-pleaded facts and
survived motions to dismiss. The success of these complaints appears to
be the direct result of the courts' increasingly specific instruction as to
the level of particularity required to reach trial on the merits.
To satisfy Rule 23.1 as interpreted by Aronson, a complaint must
plead facts with particularity that if taken as true, raise doubt about the
directors' independence or the directors' business judgment.' 31 Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, allegations must be factual, not conclusory,
a standard exceeding the "short and plain statement" of notice pleading
called for by Chancery Court Rule 8(a).132  Derivative plaintiffs fre-
quently fail to meet this standard, due in part to the "race to the court-
house" to win lead-plaintiff status.1 33  Frustrated by inadequate com-
plaints based on insufficient (or almost non-existent) investigations,
Delaware's judges have repeatedly admonished plaintiffs for not plead-
ing with sufficient particularity. 34 Contrary to the claim that Delaware
has somehow failed to respond to the new corporate climate, 35 much of
the courts' ongoing critique of these defective complaints has occurred
since 1993, years before the post-Enron and WorldCom environment and
127. See infra Part IV.
128. See Sale, supra note 12, at 459-61 (discussing the pre-suit demand requirement and Sec-
tion 102(b)(7) as "barriers to litigation over fiduciary duty breaches"); Jones, supra note 102, at 650
(discussing Delaware's procedural barriers which allow directors to "avoid litigating on the substan-
tive merits of the shareholders' claims") (citing JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
CORPORATIONS, 429 (2d ed. 2003))
129. Disney 11, 825 A.2d 275.
130. No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290 (Del. Ch., Aug. 24, 2004).
131. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 744.
132. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254-55 n.19, 21; Saito v. McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132-NC, 2004
WL 3029876, at *7 n.67 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2004); In re Baxter Int'l. Inc. S'holders Litig., 654 A.2d
1268, 1270 (Del. Ch. 1995).
133. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 n.10 (Del. 1993) ("Perhaps the problem arises in
some cases out of an unseemly race to the court house, chiefly generated by the 'first to file' custom
seemingly permitting the winner of the race to be named lead counsel.").
134. Id.; see also infra note 138 (quoting opinions criticizing incomplete, defective com-
plaints).
135. See INTRODUCTION, supra.
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the public call for improved corporate governance.' 36 In its 1993 opin-
ion, Rales v. Blasband, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the re-
quirements of Rule 23.1 by rejecting the suggestion that a plaintiff
should have to demonstrate a "reasonable probability of success," ex-
plaining that the rule requires only an "allegation of particularized
facts.'
137
Since Rales, the Delaware courts have continued to chastise counsel
for making "conclusory allegations" in underdeveloped complaints that
do not meet the demand requirement or that cannot overcome a §
102(b)(7) charter provision. 38  In 2003, the Delaware Chancery Court
expounded on the problems presented by these defective complaints:
If the facts to support reasonable doubt could have been ascertained
through more careful pre-litigation investigation, the failure to dis-
cover and plead those facts still results in a waste of resources of the
litigants and the Court and, in addition, ties the hands of this Court to
protect the interests of shareholders where the board is unable or
unwilling to do so. This results in the dismissal of what may other-
wise may have been meritous claims, fails to provide relief to the
company's shareholders, and further erodes public confidence in the
legal protections afforded to investors. 1
a. Delaware's Focus on Particularity: Pre-2001 Cases
Before the today's post-Enron and WorldCom corporate climate,
the Delaware courts issued several opinions explaining the factual par-
ticularity necessary to survive the pleadings stage. In 2000, the Chan-
cery Court dismissed a plaintiffs claims for failure to establish demand
futility in White v. Panic. 14  In so doing, Vice Chancellor Lamb ex-plained:
136. Rales, 634 A.2d at 935 n.10 (describing the "race to the courthouse" and the "plethora of
superficial complaints that could not be sustained" that have resulted from this practice).
137. Id. at 934.
138. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249 ("The Complaint, consisting of 88 pages and 285 paragraphs, is a
pastiche of prolix invective. It is permeated with conclusory allegations of the pleader and quotations
from the media, mostly of an editorial nature (even including a cartoon)."); White v. Panic, 793
A.2d 356, 367 (Del. Ch. 2000), af'd, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001) (criticizing complaint as "replete
with highly moralistic, conclusory charges of misconduct"); Ash v. McCall, No. Civ.A 17132, 2000
WL 1370341, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000) ("Although the complaint is generously laden with
conclusory allegations that 'the facts described herein constitute breaches of directors' duties of
good faith, care and loyalty,' plaintiffs decline to connect the facts of the complaint with specific
claims of wrongdoing."); Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d
961 (Del. Ch. 2003), aifd, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004); Saito v. McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132-NC, 2004
WL 3029876, at *8 (Del.Ch. Dec. 20, 2004) (describing the pleadings as "conclusory and prolix
averments," and further critiquing the pleadings, "lacking facts to support these legal conclusions,
plaintiffs simply insert the names of certain defendants into the relevant legal standard.").
139. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living, 833 A.2d at 982 [hereinafter Beam I] (emphasis
added).
140. 793 A.2d 356 (Del. Ch. 2000), aft'd, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001).
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[T]he only reference to [the directors'] independence [the first prong
of Aronson] in the brief appears in a footnote .... From this, I con-
clude that plaintiff has chosen not to rely on any allegation of lack of
directorial independence in resisting this motion .... [With respect to
the second prong of Aronson], the complaint supplies little actual in-
formation about either the context underlying the challenged deci-
sions or the process followed by the Director Defendants in reaching
them. Instead, the complaint is replete with highly moralistic, con-
clusory charges of misconduct .... My review of the totality of the
Director Defendants' conduct, as gleaned from the complaint and the
magazine article on which it is based, leads to the conclusion that the
complaint does not satisfy the second prong of the Aronson test and,
thus, that demand is not excused. 141
Later that same year, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its Brehm v.
Eisner142 decision, allowing plaintiffs in the Disney litigation to amend
their initial complaint. 143 In describing the factual particularity require-
ment, the court harshly criticized the Brehm complaint for its generality,
describing it as "a pastiche of prolix invective," full of "conclusory alle-
gations," which were "editorial [in] nature" and served "no purpose other
than to complicate the work of [the] reviewing courts."' 44 Rather than
merely providing a general critique of the defective nature of the plain-
tiffs' complaint, the Delaware Supreme Court detailed a laundry list of
specific facts the plaintiffs' amended complaint might allege in order to
survive a motion to dismiss. 145  For example, the plaintiffs needed to
allege "particularized facts (not conclusions)" that directly attacked the
directors' business judgment, such as allegations that:
(a) the directors did not in fact rely on the expert; (b) their reliance
was not in good faith; (c) they did not reasonably believe that the ex-
pert's advice was within the expert's professional competence; (d)
the expert was not selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of
the corporation, and the faulty selection process was attributable to
the directors; (e) the subject matter ... was material and reasonably
available [and] was so obvious that the board's failure to consider it
was grossly negligent regardless of the expert's advice or lack of ad-
vice; or (f) that the decision of the [b]oard was so unconscionable as
to constitute waste or fraud.
146
141. White, 793 A.2d at 366 n.29, 367-68.
142. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 244.
143. Id. at 267. In the first chapter of the Disney litigation, plaintiffs brought claims alleging
that the directors breached their duties of loyalty, care and good faith. In re The Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 351 (Del. Ch. 1998) [hereinafter "Disney "]. The plaintiffs failed
to establish demand futility under either prong of Aronson and their claims were dismissed. Id. at
379-80. Their appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court was heard as Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.
144. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
145. Id. at 262.
146. Id.
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Despite the fact that the Brehm complaint did not meet the stringent par-
ticularity requirement to establish demand futility under Aronson, the
Delaware Supreme Court expressed concern that the case was potentially
"very troubling... on the merits."'' 47 Citing the "unusual nature" of the
case and "the interests of justice," the court allowed the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint. 48  Armed with the Supreme Court's specific
instruction for meeting the particularity requirement, the plaintiffs
amended the complaint and in 2003 returned to the Chancery Court in
Disney II, where they established demand futility under the second prong
of Aronson. 
149
Later in 2000, the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed plaintiffs'
claims in Ash v. McCall, 50 for failure to meet the particularity require-
ment necessary to establish demand futility.' 5' Chancellor Chandler ex-
plained, "The shorthand shibboleth of 'dominated and controlled direc-
tors' is insufficient .... [P]laintiffs have not alleged a single fact in sup-
port of their domination theory and, as Delaware courts have repeatedly
observed, such assumptions will not be made in the context of pre-suit
demand."'
52
b. Delaware's Focus on Particularity: Post-2001 Cases
Against the current backdrop of the post-Enron and WorldCom cli-
mate and calls for increased scrutiny of directors' actions, the Delaware
courts have continued to instruct plaintiffs on how to avoid pre-trial dis-
missal so legitimate suits can reach trial on the merits. Several recent
cases highlight the courts' attempt to illustrate the types of factual allega-
tions that will satisfy the particularity requirement. In 2001, in Telxon
Corporation v. Bogomolny,153 the plaintiffs alleged that the board's
committees did not keep minutes of their meetings, including a meeting
of the compensation committee where directors agreed to let the chair-
man acquire ten percent of a corporate subsidiary. 54  The Chancery
Court denied defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on the
147. Id. at 249.
148. Id. at 267.
149. Disney I1, 825 A.2d at 289-90.
150. No. Civ.A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000).
151. Ash, 2000 WL 1370341, at*1.
152. Id. at *7 (internal citation omitted). The plaintiffs oversight claims were dismissed
without prejudice and plaintiffs were permitted to replead their claims. Id. at *16. Based on the
factually particular repleaded complaint, plaintiffs established demand futility and survived a motion
to dismiss. Saito v. McCall, No Civ.A 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2004). See also infra Part III.B.1 .b.
153. 792 A.2d 964 (Del. Ch. 2001 Ch. 2001), reargument denied, Telxon v. Cribb, No. CIV.A.
17706, 2001 WL 1641236 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2001). The Chancery Court's Telxon decision was
issued on Oct. 29 and revised on Nov. 1. Telxon, 792 A.2d at 964. Enron's public decline began in
part with its Oct. 16 announcement of a quarterly loss and its Oct. 17 announcement that it would
decrease its stated assets by over $1 billion. See C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J.
ACCT., April 15, 2002, at 41.
154. Texlon, 792 A.2d at 975.
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plaintiffs' "well-pleaded allegations" that overcame the "usual presump-
tion" of the business judgment rule, creating a reasonable doubt that the
directors acted in good faith.155 Similarly, in 2002, in California Public
Employees' Retirement System v. Coulter156 ("CalPERS"), the Chancery
Court held that a factually specific claim alleging that directors acted in
bad faith by blindly relying on an expert's overvaluation of an acquisi-
tion target owned by the CEO was sufficiently particular to establish
demand futility and survive a motion to dismiss. 157 Likewise, the Chan-
cery Court's 2004 Integrated Health Services decision held that some of
the plaintiffs' factually-particular claims that company directors ap-
proved certain executive compensation transactions without any informa-
tion or deliberation met Delaware's particularity requirement, by plead-
ing facts alleging that directors "consciously and intentionally disre-
garded their responsibilities.' 58 More recently, the Chancery Court de-
nied a motion to dismiss in the 2004 case of Saito v. McCall. 59 Alleging
a failure of oversight (a subset of the duty of care), plaintiffs met the
particularity requirement of Rule 23.1 under the second prong of
Aronson, by pleading factually particular allegations that defendant di-
rectors knew or should have known about accounting irregularities at a
merger target yet failed to take action or disclose the problems.
60
The Delaware courts have also used decisions dismissing claims as
part of their tutorial about factual particularity. In 2004, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a stockholder suit in Beam v.
Stewart 6' ("Beam I') for failure to establish demand futility. 162 While
the complaint alleged that company directors were interested and not
independent, it did not provide the factual particularity required. 63 The
Delaware Supreme Court criticized the complaint for failing to give any
examples of directors' actions or their relationships with company CEO,
Stewart, that would meet the particularity requirements of Rule 23.1 and
satisfy the first prong of Aronson. 64 In its earlier disposition of the case,
the Chancery Court explicitly described specific facts that could have
met the particularity requirement. 65 Chancellor Chandler counseled:
I would be remiss, though, if I failed to point out that with a bit more
detail about the 'relationships,' 'friendships,' and 'inter-connections'
among Stewart and the other defendants or with some additional ar-
guments as to why there may be a reasonable doubt of the directors'
155. Id. at 973-75.
156. No. Civ.A. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343 (Del. Ch., Dec. 18, 2002).
157. CalPERS, 2002 WL 31888343, at *12-14.
158. Integrated Health Services, 2004 WL 1949290, at *10, 12.
159. No. Civ.A. 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,2004).
160. Saito, 2004 WL 3029876, at *7.
161. 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004) [hereinafter Beam II].
162. Beam I1, 845 A.2d at 1044.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1047.
165. Beam 1, 833 A.2d at 984.
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incentives when evaluating demand with respect to Count I, there
may have been a reasonable doubt as to one or all of the outside di-
rectors disinterest, independence, or ability to consider and respond
to demand free from improper extraneous influences. Nevertheless,
on this pleading, no such doubt is raised. 1
66
Not surprisingly, when the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, it too ex-
plained that the plaintiffs claim failed to make allegations about the
"closeness or nature of the friendship" in question, or specific factual
allegations as to why the defendant directors could not objectively con-
sider pre-suit demand.1
67
Most recently, in 2005, the Chancery Court again reiterated the
critical requirement of factually particularized pleading and dismissed
plaintiffs' complaint in In re J.P. Morgan Chase Co., Shareholders Liti-
gation. 68 The complaint alleged that directors breached their fiduciary
duties in a merger transaction and that demand was futile under both
prongs of Aronson.'69 Despite the plethora of recent cases describing the
factual particularity required, the pleadings failed to provide details al-
leging that the directors were not disinterested and independent and
merely asserted that the directors could not act independently, without
any detail as to how the directors specifically might have been influ-
enced. 70 Further, the complaint failed to include particularized allega-
tions challenging the directors' honesty, good faith, or to assert that that
the directors were not informed. 71
These cases illustrate the Delaware courts' attempt to help stock-
holders survive the pleadings stage, by explaining the factual particular-
ity necessary to overcome a motion to dismiss based on Rule 23.1 or
DGCL § 102(b)(7). While the Delaware courts have been painfully di-
rect about the particularity required for stockholder claims to reach trial
on the merits, plaintiffs' sole opportunity to meet this burden is at the
pleadings stage. 172 Notwithstanding that Brehm and Ash allowed plain-
tiffs to amend their complaints, these are the exception rather than the
rule. 173  After Brehm, then-Vice Chancellor Steele denied a plaintiffs
request to replead explaining, "I do not share plaintiffs counsel's belief
that [Brehm] suggests that trial judges should treat every complaint like a
166. Id. at 984.
167. Beam 11, 845 A.2d at 1047.
168. No. Civ.A. 53 1-N, 2005 WL 1076069, at * 12 (Del. Ch., Apr. 29, 2005).
169. J.P. Morgan Chase, 2005 WL 1076069, at *4-5.
170. Id at *10-11.
171. Id. at*12.
172. See generally Criden v. Steinberg, No. 17082, 2000 WL 354390, at *2 (Del. Ch., Mar. 23,
2000) (then-Vice Chancellor Steele (now Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court) erased any
doubt on this point, "I have neither the authority nor the predilection to entertain a practice where I,
as a trial judge, develop my own theories of possible recovery for plaintiffs or hear them for the first
time from plaintiffs at oral argument, and then allow them to replead until some viable claim hits the
wall and sticks.")
173. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 248; Ash, 2000 WL 1370341, at * 1.
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Phoenix ever ready to spring to life from its ashes upon learning of its
imminent demise."'
174
2. Utilizing DGCL Section 220's "Tools at Hand"
On its face, the requirement that plaintiffs plead with factual par-
ticularity before they can engage in discovery may seem inequitable.'75
Arguably, without access to information, stockholders cannot plead with
the requisite particularity necessary to reach trial on the merits. The
DGCL, however, provides a statutory method for obtaining this informa-
tion. Under Section 220 (hereinafter "DGCL § 220" or "§ 220"), a
stockholder asserting proper purpose and making a "specific and discrete
identification" of the particular records sought may inspect the corpora-
tion's books and records. 176 As part of the procedural element of Dela-
ware's prescription, the state's courts have made a concerted push over
the past decade to encourage stockholder plaintiffs to utilize this tool.
77
In 2003, the Delaware General Assembly broadened the reach of §
220 by extending inspection rights to beneficial owners and allowing
inspection of a corporation's subsidiaries' records in certain cases.'
78
This amendment evidences the legislature's shared interest in helping
stockholders obtain the necessary information to draft complete com-
plaints and have their legitimate claims heard on the merits.
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, § 220 generally has not
enjoyed widespread use and "[t]he result has been a plethora of superfi-
cial complaints that could not be sustained.' 79 Contemporaneously with
the courts' clarification of the particularity required at the pleadings
stage, the Delaware courts have been increasingly blunt in their recom-
mendation that stockholders utilize this tool.
a. Delaware's Push for Plaintiffs to Utilize §220: Pre-2001
Cases
Even before the corporate scandals that so dramatically impacted
the corporate climate, the Delaware courts were issuing guidance to
stockholders on how to meet the particularity requirement and have their
legitimate claims heard on the merits. In 1993, in Rales, the Delaware
174. Criden, 2000 WL 354390, at *4. Vice Chancellor Steele became Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court on May 26, 2004.
175. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 n.10 (Del. 1993).
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2005).
177. See Beam 11, 833 A.2d at 981-82 n.66 and accompanying text. See also Stephen A. Radin,
The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation: Section 220 Demands, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
1595 (2005), J. Travis Laster & K. Tyler O'Connell, Improving the "Tools at Hand": Recent Dela-
ware Books and Records Decisions, INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR, Jan.
2005, at 9. William M. Lafferty & Alan J. Stone, Recent Developments in Shareholder/Director
Inspection Cases: A Resurgence in the Use of Section 220 of the Delaware Corporation Law,
CORPORATION, June 2, 1997, § 2, at 1.
178. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220.
179. Rales, 634 A.2d at 935 n.l0.
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Supreme Court pointed to § 220 as a means for gaining the information
necessary to plead with sufficient factual particularity.1 80 The Delaware
courts have repeatedly encouraged stockholder plaintiffs to utilize this
tool through "suggestions, encouragement and downright admoni-
tions." 181 For example, in 2000, in White, the Chancery Court dismissed
plaintiffs' claims for failure to establish demand futility. 182 In a section
of that opinion focusing on § 220, Vice Chancellor Lamb explained that
what was missing from the complaint, details of the directors' actions,
could have been uncovered using § 220.183
Later in 2000, the Delaware Supreme Court admonished the (Dis-
ney) plaintiffs in Brehm for failing to use § 220 as one of the "tools at
hand" to uncover the detailed facts necessary to develop an actionable
claim. 184 After the court's reprimand, the plaintiffs made a § 220 books
and records request, amended their complaint and ultimately established
demand futility.' 85 In considering the plaintiffs amended and factually-
specific complaint in Disney II, the Chancery Court noted it was a "per-
fect illustration of the benefit [of using § 220]. ' '186 Chancellor Chandler
tempered his praise, however, describing the wasted time and expense
because the plaintiffs failed to make a § 220 request at the outset and
instead filed suit based on an incomplete complaint. 87 In another opin-
ion addressing § 220 in 2000, Ash, Chancellor Chandler dismissed an
oversight claim without prejudice, for failure to establish demand futil-
ity. 188  In so doing, he specifically referenced the Delaware Supreme
Court's repeated instruction that plaintiffs utilize § 220 as one of their
"tools at hand" to develop factually particular complaints and suggested
that the plaintiffs take advantage of § 220 in developing their amended
complaint. 89
180. Id.; see also id. at 931 n.4.
181. See Beam 1, 833 A.2d at 981, 982 n.65-67 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiffs
failure to make a books and records request under § 220 and citing to numerous Delaware Supreme
Court and Chancery Court opinions criticizing stockholders for lackluster investigations which
prevented the development of viable complaints, noting "[i]t is troubling to this Court that, notwith-
standing repeated suggestions, encouragement, and downright admonitions over the years both by
this Court and the Delaware Supreme Court, litigants continue to bring derivative complaints plead-
ing demand futility on the basis of precious little investigation beyond perusal of the morning news-
papers.") (internal citations omitted).
182. White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 371 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff'd, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001).
183. White, 793 A.2d at 364-65.
184. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 266-67.
185. Disney I, 825 A.2d at 279, 289-90.
186. Id. at 279 n.5.
187. Id.
188. Ash, 2000 WL 1370341, at *16.
189. Id. at * 15 n.56; see id. at * 16 (explaining, "Using the tools at hand, plaintiffs may seek to
develop additional particularized facts in order to allege properly an oversight claim that will meet
the demand futility standard").
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b. Delaware's Push for Plaintiffs to Utilize § 220: Post-2001
Cases
In the current corporate climate, the Delaware courts continue to
discuss the importance of § 220. In CalPERS,'90 while denying the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, the court explained that the plaintiffs util-
ized § 220, providing them with detailed facts necessary to meet the par-
ticularity requirement to establish demand futility.' 91
In light of this ongoing discourse on the importance of § 220, the
Delaware courts seem increasingly exasperated with plaintiffs who rush
to file suit, failing to take advantage of this tool. In its 2003 decision,
Guttman v. Huang,192 the Chancery Court expressed frustration with
plaintiffs' conclusory claim made without the benefit of facts that could
have been uncovered with a § 220 books and records request.1 93 In
granting the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to establish de-
mand futility, Vice Chancellor Strine expressed disbelief that the plain-
tiffs did not avail themselves of § 220, noting, "the plaintiffs have unsur-
prisingly submitted . . . [a] complaint that lacks particularized
facts . . . [w]hen the case most cries out for the pleading of real
facts . . . the complaint is at its most cursory."' 194 Similarly, in dismiss-
ing claims for failure to establish demand futility in Beam II the Dela-
ware Supreme Court criticized the plaintiff for electing not to make a
books and records request noting, "had Beam first brought a Section 220
action... she might have uncovered facts that would have created a rea-
sonable doubt."' 95 Specifically, the court explained, a § 220 request
might have uncovered "cronyism" in the nominating process, facts sug-
gesting that Stewart "unduly controlled the nominating process," or other
specific facts supporting the allegation that Stewart dominated the
board. 9 6 While he declined to speculate as to whether a claim based on
such investigation would have been successful, then-Chief Justice
Veasey remarked, "the point is that it was within the plaintiffs power to
explore these matters and she elected not to make the effort.' 97 More
recently, in its 2005 decision, In re J.P. Morgan Chase Co. Shareholder
Litigation, the Chancery Court dismissed a claim for failure to establish
demand futility. "In this case, the court is once again confronted with a
situation in which the plaintiffs attempt to plead demand futility, but
have not sought access to the books and records of the corporation under
§ 220 .... Despite the frequent admonitions of the Delaware Supreme
190. No.Civ.A. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343 (Del. Ch., Dec. 18, 2002).
191. CaIPERS, 2002 WL 31888343, at *4, 12-14.
192. 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).
193. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 492.
194. id. at 493-94.
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Court and the Court of Chancery, the plaintiffs did not pursue this rem-
edy," Vice Chancellor Lamb explained.
19 8
Although stockholders challenging directors' discharge of their fi-
duciary duties face the inherent procedural obstacles of the demand re-
quirement and § 102(b)(7), the Delaware courts have provided substan-
tial instruction to help plaintiffs overcome these obstacles. By detailing
how stockholders can reach trial on the merits for fiduciary duty claims
including those alleging breaches of good faith, the courts have posi-
tioned themselves to hear cases that will allow them to explore the con-
cept of good faith and thus increase standards of director conduct
through this good faith jurisprudence.
IV. PART II: DELAWARE'S DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD FAITH: FROM
AMORPHOUS TO UBIQUITOUS
Like the guidance on the procedural requirements offered by the
Delaware courts, the courts' cautious exploration of good faith also be-
gan before the collapses of Enron and WorldCom and the modem corpo-
rate climate that followed. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of the
substantive exploration of good faith has played out against the backdrop
of the current corporate climate and the increased focus on director con-
duct. This new era, particularly the increased pressures exerted by insti-
tutional investors seeking to hold directors personally liable, cannot be
ignored by Delaware courts as they decide cases that will ultimately de-
fine what directors' good faith requires. 199
This doctrinal development of good faith has been shaped by the
Delaware courts' deep respect for precedent, stare decisis and the stabil-
200ity and predictability that strict adherence to these principles creates.
Under these constraints, the state's courts have approached the second
part of Delaware's prescription and the refinement of good faith with
caution. Downplaying assertions that Delaware law has undergone a
substantial shift by its increased focus on good faith, E. Norman Veasey,
former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, describes changes
to standards of director conduct under state law as "evolving expecta-
tions.' '20' Importantly, he also has identified what he considers "an im-
portant genre of Delaware decision making .... an opinion that raises
questions or teaches without imposing liability [that] may provide guid-
ance to the corporate world to conform to best practices without the
downside of actually imposing personal liability. '20 2 This description
198. J.P. Morgan, 2005 WL 1076069, at *7-8.
199. See supra notes 15, 42, and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
201. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1436; Veasey, Counseling
Directors in the New Corporate Culture, supra note 10, at 1451 ;Veasey, State-Federal Tension in
Corporate Governance and the Professional Responsibility of Advisors, supra note 86, at 444.
202. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1406.
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describes an important aspect of Delaware's exploration of good faith:
the judiciary's value on "encourag[ing] the quest for best practices of due
care, loyalty, good faith, and independence, mixed with a good dose of
constructive skepticism and a demand for total understanding before
taking action. 2 °3
This Part traces the exploration of good faith in the Delaware
courts, beginning in 1996 with the Chancery Court opinion, In re Care-
mark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.204  Over the past nine
years, the Delaware courts have continued to cautiously explore the con-
cept of good faith as a potential standard for director liability. The most
recent chapter of this process, Disney IV, announced good faith as a
ubiquitous requirement for director conduct that transcends the specific
duties of loyalty and due care.
A. Directors' Good Faith Duty to Establish Monitoring Systems. In Re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation
20 5
In the context of a traditional duty of care analysis, directors must
make a good faith attempt to monitor corporate activity. Until recently,
the level of monitoring necessary to establish good faith and satisfy the
fiduciary duty of care was quite low. For over thirty years, under Gra-
ham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company,0 6 directors were not
required to establish or maintain systems to "ferret out wrongdoing" ab-
sent cause for suspicion.20 7 Under Allis-Chalmers, unless directors had
knowledge of a problem, there was no need to have investigatory sys-
tems in place. 20 8 Allis-Chalmers ostensibly provided directors with an
incentive to take an ostrich-like approach to corporate operations, be-
cause action was required only if directors had knowledge of suspicious
circumstances.20 9
In 1996, however, the Delaware Chancery Court announced a new,
heightened monitoring requirement in In re Caremark International Inc.
Derivative Litigation.21 In so doing, the court expressly acknowledged
the requirement that directors must act in good faith in order to discharge
their duty of care.21' Under Caremark, directors have an affirmative
obligation to assure that adequate internal systems exist such that the
board will receive appropriate information in a timely manner.' 12 Failure
to do so, evidenced by a "sustained or systematic failure of the board to
203. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1506.
204. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (settlement opinion).
205. Id.
206. 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
207. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 130.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 698 A.2d 959.
211. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968.
212. Id. at 969-70.
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exercise oversight" will establish a lack of good faith sufficient to find
directors liable for a breach of the duty of care.213 The court justified this
heightened monitoring standard as beneficial both to stockholders and to
directors, because it "makes board service by qualified persons more
likely, while continuing to act as a stimulus to good faith performance of
duty by such directors. 214
While Caremark places a greater burden on directors by requiring
them to act in good faith to evaluate corporate monitoring systems in
order to satisfy their duty of care, it does not destroy the general protec-
tions of the business judgment rule.2 15 The Chancery Court specifically
noted that even if the fact finder "believes a decision substantively
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or
'irrational,' [such belief] provides no ground for director liability, so long
as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or
,216employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests." De-
spite allegations that Caremark directors failed to adequately monitor
company employees and failed to prevent ongoing violations of federal
regulations, the court found that the directors demonstrated the good
faith necessary to discharge their duty of care by relying on experts who
opined that the company's practices "while contestable, were lawful."
2 1 7
The Delaware Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to ac-
cept or reject the Chancery Court's Caremark reasoning. Nonetheless, in
2003 then-Chief Justice Veasey remarked, "my personal view is that the
expectations of directors . . . progressed in the thirty-plus years from
Allis-Chalmers to Caremark.', 218 Both Caremark and former Chief Jus-
tice Veasey's comments suggest that Delaware courts consider acting in
good faith a necessary component to directors' discharge of their duty of
care. Ultimately, requiring directors to act in good faith in the corporate
monitoring context imposes significant affirmative obligations on corpo-
rate boards, thus elevating the fiduciary standard directors must meet.
Although Caremark considered good faith as a component of directors'
duty of care, its announcement of this elevated process standard serves as
the Chancery Court's first step defining the concept of good faith.
213. Id. at 971 (holding that directors discharged their duty of care because the corporation's
information systems "represented a good faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts").
214. Id. at 971.
215. See id. at 967.
216. Id. at 967.
217. Id. at 971-72.
218. Veasey, supra note 86, at 446.
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B. Allegations of Directors'Lack of Good Faith Sufficient to Establish
Demand Futility and Overcome a Section 102(b)(7) Charter Provi-
sion: In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation
219
In 2000, the Delaware Supreme Court rescued the Disney plaintiffs'
case in Brehm, by allowing them to replead in the Chancery Court.220
Although the original complaint was not factually-specific enough to
establish demand futility, the allegations, as understood by the court,
alleged waste, which could evidence that the board's decision was not
made in good faith.22 1 After making a books and records request, the
222plaintiffs amended their complaint and returned to court. In 2003 the
Chancery Court issued its In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative
Litigation ("Disney IF') opinion, holding that the amended complaint's
well-pled allegations attacking directors' business judgment created a
reasonable doubt that the directors acted in good faith and established
demand futility under the second prong of Aronson.223 Furthermore, the
plaintiffs factually particular complaint also survived a motion to dis-
miss based on Disney's § 102(b)(7) charter provision.224
Disney II arose out of the allegedly unilateral decision by Disney's
CEO, Michael Eisner, to hire his long time friend, Michael Ovitz, as
Disney's president. 225  Company stockholders challenged the Disney
board's process, whereby company directors allegedly approved Ovitz's
employment contract without knowing its material terms or consulting an
226expert. 6 In all, they claimed, Disney paid Ovitz in excess of $140 mil-lion dollars for just over one year of work.22 7
According to the complaint, rather than reviewing a draft of Ovitz's
employment agreement, the board's compensation committee relied on a
summary and left the final negotiations up to Eisner, Ovitz's close friend
of twenty-five years.228 After the compensation committee approved
Ovitz's hiring, the full board met.229 According to the complaint, Disney
directors authorized hiring Ovitz without receiving a summary of his
salary or severance terms, without the advice of an expert and without
asking questions. 230 Allegedly, the board left Eisner to set the final terms
of the contract, which they claimed ultimately varied substantially from
219. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
220. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000).
221. See id. at 263.
222. Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289-90.
223. Id. at 289-90.
224. Id. at 290.
225. Id. at 279.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 278-79.
228. Id. at 287.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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the summary provided to compensation committee.23' Ultimately Ovitz
left Disney under the contract's non-fault termination clause ("NFT"), a
departure allegedly brokered by Eisner without input from the board.232
As to Ovitz's $38 million NFT payment, a compensation expert com-
mented, "the contract was most valuable to Ovitz the sooner he left Dis-
ney. 233
Although the Chancery Court acknowledged extreme hesitation to
"second-guess the business judgment" of directors under the duty of
care, 234 the court held that the facts alleged in the complaint suggested
not just gross negligence, but that directors "consciously and intention-
ally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a 'we don't care about
the risks' attitude concerning a material corporate decision," which
would fall outside the protections of the business judgment rule.235 By
alleging that company directors engaged in decision-making without
material facts, without the use of an expert and left the determination of
material terms up to Eisner, the plaintiffs created a reasonable doubt as to
the directors' good faith.236 As a result, the directors could not assert
Disney's § 102(b)(7) exculpatory charter provision as an affirmative
defense and the case proceeded to discovery.237
While Disney II garnered significant attention, former Chief Justice
Veasey insists that the business judgment rule is alive and well, implying
that absent well-pled allegations that raise a reasonable doubt as to direc-
tors' good faith or other breach of duty such as those alleged in Disney
11, the state's courts will continue to defer to the decision-making of di-
238rectors. These remarks foreshadowed the Chancery Court's opinion
distinguishing between director conduct that is protected by the business
judgment rule and that which may evidence a "conscious and intentional
disregard" sufficient to establish director liability in Official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins.
239
C. The Crucial Distinction Between Nondeliberation and Not Enough
Deliberation: Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Inte-
grated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins
240
Just fifteen months after Disney II, the Chancery Court again ad-
dressed good faith in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Inte-
231. Id.
232. Id. at 288.
233. Id. at 283.
234. Id. at 278.
235. Id. at 289.
236. Id. at 290.
237. Id.
238. Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, supra note 10, at 1454.
239. See No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
240. Id.
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grated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins.2 4 1 Integrated Health Services held
that while directors' complete lack of deliberation may support a charge
of bad faith, as long as directors engage in some form of deliberation, the
court will not review directors' processes.242 The Integrated Health Ser-
vices complaint claimed that the company's CEO, Elkins, and company
directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving certain executive
compensation transactions without the use of an expert, without informa-
tion, with little deliberation, and in some instances, only deliberating
after a decision had been made.243 In considering the defendant direc-
tors' motions to dismiss based on IHS's § 102(b)(7) exculpatory charter
provision, the court acknowledged the parties' confusion as to whether
claims alleging that directors acted in bad faith implicated the duty of
care or the duty of loyalty.2" While the court did not resolve this ques-
tion, it quoted Disney 1I's "conscious and intentional disregard" language
on bad faith, explaining that Disney II could be construed to implicate
both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.245
While all of the Integrated Health Services claims were extremely
factually specific, only those alleging that directors acted without any
information or deliberation survived the defendants' motion to dis-
miss. 24 6 Specifically, the court denied motions to dismiss on claims that
the members of the compensation committee approved certain transac-
tions without deliberation, investigation, or consultation with an expert;
that they acted without knowledge of the compensation committee's de-
cision-making process; and that they added a forgiveness term to a loan
to IHS's CEO without considering of reasons the committee had denied
to do so just five months earlier.247 These claims alleged directors'
"knowing and deliberate indifference to [their] duties to act 'faithfully
and with appropriate care,"' and if true, would not satisfy the directors'
duty of good faith.248
The Chancery Court distinguished these claims from other transac-
tions whereby compensation committee retained a compensation expert,
had brief discussions, or granted stock options leaving the number of
options and price to be determined "at a later date., 249 In refusing to
evaluate the reasonableness of the length of time the directors discussed
241. Id.
242. Integrated Health Services, 2004 WL 1949290, at * 14.
243. Id. at * 1.
244. Id. at *4-9.
245. Id. at *9 n.36 (noting that the Disney H1 claim that Eisner breached his duty of good faith
negotiations with Disney after he became its fiduciary falls under the duty of loyalty). "One may
alternatively conceptualize the holding in [Disney 11] as a duty of care claim that is so egregious-
that it essentially alleges the Board abdicated its responsibility to make any business decision-that
it falls within the second exception to the general exculpating power of § 102(b)(7)." Id. at n.37.
246. Id. at *12, 14-15.
247. Id.
248. Id. at *15.
249. Id. at *13-14.
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certain transactions or the reasonableness of directors' use of a compen-
sation expert suggested by Elkins, the court held that, "as long as the
Board engaged in action that can lead the Court to conclude it did not act
in knowing and deliberate indifference to its fiduciary duties, the inquiry
of this nature ends., 250 These claims, suggesting that IHS directors en-
gaged in some form of deliberative yet abbreviated process, were insuffi-
251cient to challenge directors' good faith. In transactions where direc-
tors appeared to exercise "some business judgment," the court refused to
evaluate directors' processes.252 Vice Chancellor Noble explained, "alle-
gations of nondeliberation are different from allegations of not enough
deliberation., 25 3 The Chancery Court's willingness to apply the business
judgment rule to transactions whereby directors engaged some delibera-
tion suggests that Delaware's evolving concept of good faith will not
result in liability for directors who engage in some deliberative process
evidencing that they engaged in some business judgment.254
D. Directors' Expertise and Acting in Good Faith: In re Emerging Com-
munications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
255
In 2004, the Chancery Court evidenced good faith's continued
amorphous status by holding two directors liable for a breach of the duty
of loyalty "and/or" the duty of good faith on the merits in In re Emerging
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.56 In finding directors
liable for breach of their fiduciary duties in a going-private transaction,
the Chancery Court acknowledged that the Delaware Supreme Court has
not yet clarified the relationship between the fiduciary duties of loyalty
and good faith. 257 According to Justice Jacobs, 258 even if the only direc-
tors subject to review under the duty of loyalty were those directors with
a personal interest in the transaction, the non-interested directors would
still be liable for a breach of the duty of good faith for "consciously dis-
regarding his duty to the minority stockholders. ' 259  In either case,
Emerging Communications' § 102(b)(7) charter provision would not
protect the directors from personal liability.
2 60
One director's liability arose from the court's finding that he acted
solely to further the interests of the company's CEO.26' Importantly, the
250. Id. at *14.
251. See id. at *13-14.
252. Id. at *14.
253. Id. at *12 n.58 (noting that the Disney lYs analysis turned on "total lack of deliberation,"
and that "even a short conversation may change the outcome") (emphasis added).
254. See id.
255. No. Civ.A 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch., June 4, 2004).
256. Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1505745, at *39.
257. Id. at *39 n.184.
258. Justice Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme Court authored the In re Emerging Communica-
tions opinion while sitting by designation as Vice Chancellor as per Delaware statute. See id.
259. Id. at *39 n. 184.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *39.
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Chancery Court held the second director, Salvatore Muoio, liable in part
because he possessed specialized expertise from his position as principal
and general partner in an investment advising firm.262 Specifically, the
court found that Muoio's unique and "specialized financial expertise,"
meant that he knew or should have suspected that the proposed merger
price was unfair, yet he failed to call this to the attention of the other
directors and voted to approve the transaction.263 Although the Delaware
Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to determine whether exper-
tise subjects directors to higher standards of conduct to discharge their
fiduciary duties, this aspect of the decision has generated concern that
directors possessing specific expertise will be held to higher standards
under Delaware law.264 Notably, former Chief Justice Veasey asserts
that Muoio's particular expertise was not dispositive on the question of
whether he breached his duty of loyalty or good faith to the corpora-
tion.265 Rather, because Muoio possessed special expertise, this raised a
question of his good faith reliance on the CEO hired-expert's opinion on
the fairness of the merger price. 266 This distinction, however subtle, sug-
gests that the fiduciary standards applied to directors with particular ex-
pertise will not differ from those applied to non-expert directors. Veasey
explained:
It would be a perversity of corporate governance goals, in my view,
for the Delaware courts to announce a general rule that a director
with special expertise is more exposed to liability than other directors
solely because of her status as an expert. Rather, the facts and proce-
dural posture should be key. When purporting to rely on another ex-
pert in a transaction where a director knows that the expert's opinion
is questionable, the director could be at greater risk of liability than
other directors. This is not because of the director's status as an ex-
pert. It is simply that a director with such expertise cannot rely in
good faith on another expert's particular opinions under section
14 1(e).267
This interpretation of Emerging Communications is consistent with the
notion that Delaware courts prefer to teach by announcing concepts that
generally (although not in this case) allow directors to alter their conduct
without increasing the risk of increased liability.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *39-40.
264. See David H. Cook, The Emergence of Delaware's Good Faith Fiduciary Duty: In re
Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 91, 110 (2004); Kenneth
Heineman et al., Recent Developments in Corporate Counsel Law, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J.
311, 327 (2005); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1445.
265. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1445-47.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1446.
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E. Emerald Partners v. Berlin 268: The Delaware Supreme Court Ac-
knowledges Disney II's Formulation of Good Faith
Until Disney IV, the Chancery Court's Disney 11 opinion provided
the best developed exploration of good faith in the Delaware courts.
Nonetheless, Disney I was a Chancery Court opinion, and the Delaware
Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the evolving concept of good
faith. 2 69 In Emerald Partners v. Berlin,270 however, while upholding a
merger transaction as entirely fair (a duty of loyalty issue), the Delaware
Supreme Court noted concern over the directors' good faith.27 The fact
that directors did not exclude an interested director from their decision-
making process and allowed him unfettered access to their valuation ex-
pert evidenced "process flaws" that raised "serious questions" of the di-
rectors' good faith and a "'we don't care about the risks' attitude. 272
Ultimately Emerald Partners affirmed for the defendant directors
based on an expert financial advisor's determination that the merger
price was fair, suggesting (somewhat surprisingly) that a successful
showing of entire fairness overcomes a potential breach of good faith.
The Delaware Supreme Court's mention of good faith in Emerald Part-
ners suggests that given the right case, the court is poised to conduct a
more thorough analysis of the meaning of good faith.
F. Good Faith as a Ubiquitous Requirement: Disney IV
27 3
In 2005, Chancellor Chandler issued the much-anticipated Chancery
Court opinion in In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation ("Dis-
ney IV").274 In a determining that defendant directors were not liable for
a breach of the duty of care or for acting in bad faith, Disney IV offers
important insights about the Chancery Court's view of the position of
good faith under Delaware law. Importantly, Chancellor Chandler tem-
porarily settled the debate about whether good faith is a subset of either
due care or loyalty, or a freestanding obligation, by announcing good
faith as a ubiquitous requirement for director conduct:
Fundamentally, the duties traditionally analyzed as belonging to cor-
porate fiduciaries, loyalty and care, are but constituent elements of
the overarching concepts of allegiance, devotion and faithfulness that
must guide the conduct of every fiduciary. The good faith required
of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care and
loyalty, in the narrow sense that I have discussed them above, but all
268. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 295, 2003 WL 23019210 (Del. Dec. 23, 2003).
269. Disney 11, 825 A.2d 275.
270. Emerald Partners, 2003 WL 23019210.
271. Id. at *1.
272. Id.
273. No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 1875804 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
274. Id.
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actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders.
275
In an opinion vacillating between reasoned discussion of how direc-
tors discharged their fiduciary duties and scathing commentary as to how
their processes fell far short of aspirational ideals, Disney IV provides an
important tutorial on the interplay between the modem corporate climate
and legal standards for director conduct under Delaware law. "Times
may change, but fiduciary duties do not," Chancellor Chandler opined,
reasoning, "[t]he development of aspirational ideals, however worthy as
goals for human behavior, should not work to distort the legal require-
ments by which human behavior is actually measured.,
276
Noting the inherent difficulty in defining good faith, Chancellor
Chandler described good faith as acting "at all times with an honesty of
purpose and in the best interest[]" of the corporation.277 Under this for-
mulation, failures to act in good faith include affirmative acts, such as
"intentionally act[ing for] a purpose other than that of advancing the best
interests of the corporation," acting with the intent to "violate applicable
positive law" (such as Sarbanes-Oxley or SRO rules),278 or failures to
act, by intentionally and consciously disregarding a duty when under a
known duty to act. 279 Importantly, the opinion expressly noted that these
were but three potential formulations of conduct not in good faith, and
were not the exclusive standards under which a director's good faith
could be measured.28 ° Citing the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
White v. Panic, Disney IV also explained that an act constituting waste
could not be deemed to be taken in good faith.28'
In formulating good faith as an overarching requirement for director
conduct, Chancellor Chandler explained that good faith's independent
significance is to remind directors that failure to act in good faith can
result in personal liability.282 Accordingly, the understanding that good
faith is an independent basis for imposing personal liability on directors
frees good faith from the confines of Delaware's fiduciary duty frame-
work that the state's courts have grappled with over the years:
In the end, so long as the role of good faith is understood, it makes no
difference whether the words "fiduciary duty of' are placed in front
275. Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *36.
276. Id. at * 1. Chancellor Chandler suggested that some of this difficulty in defining "good
faith" rather than "bad faith" could be due to business judgment rule's presumption that directors act
in good faith. Id. at *35.
277. Id. at *36.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id. ("There may be other examples of bad faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these
three are the most salient.").
281. Id. at *32 (citing White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553-55 (Del. 2001)).
282. See id. at *35 n.453 (citing In re Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *38).
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of "good faith," because acts not in good faith (regardless of whether
they might fall under the loyalty or care aspects of good faith) are in
any event non-exculpable [under DGCL § 102(b)(7)] because they
are disloyal to the corporation. 283
In addition to fleshing out the concept of good faith, Disney IV
clarified the relationship between good faith and the business judgment
rule.284 The threshold for determining if the rule applies is not the pre-
sumption that directors acted in good faith but is whether directors acted
on an informed basis.285 Further, citing Justice Jacob's opinion in In re
Emerging Communications, Chancellor Chandler reiterated that the ap-
plication of the business judgment rule and the determination as to
whether directors can be exculpated for a breach of duty are to be made
for each individual director, rather than making a determination at the
level of the board as a whole.286
Based on this formulation of good faith and 9,360 pages of tran-
scripts taken in the thirty-seven day trial, Chancellor Chandler deter-
mined that each defendant director had met their fiduciary duties to Dis-
ney.287 Much of this analysis rested on the court's factual findings that
differed significantly from the allegations plaintiffs made throughout the
litigation.288
With respect to Eisner, Chancellor Chandler found that contrary to
plaintiffs' allegations that Eisner acted unilaterally in hiring Ovitz, Eisner
minimally involved some members of the compensation committee, who
performed independent analyses of the financial terms of the draft em-
ployment agreement and engaged a compensation expert, Graef Crystal,
with whom they analyzed the financial terms of the draft of the Ovitz
Employment Agreement ("OEA").2 89 Importantly, Chancellor Chandler
found that Ovitz's employment was not a "done deal" before the com-
pensation committee and full board approved the terms of his employ-
ment with the company.
290
Despite the finding that Eisner only minimally involved the com-
pensation committee in the negotiations with and hiring of Ovitz, Eis-
ner's "usurping" of the board's role did not violate the law.29' While
Eisner's actions were not the basis for liability, he failed in many ways to
"comport with how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to
283. Id. at *36 n.463.
284. Id. at *31.
285. Id. at *31 n.407 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 899 (Del. 1985)).
286. Id. at *31 (citing In re Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *38).
287. Id. at * 1; see id. at *37-51.
288. See id. at *3-30; see also discussion supra Part IV.B.
289. Id. at *42-43.
290. Id. at *8-10.
291. Id. at *41.
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act., 292  Chancellor Chandler determined, however, that Eisner dis-
charged his fiduciary duties because he was the most informed member
of the board and he subjectively believed that he was acting in the best
interests of Disney.293
Similarly, allegations that Eisner agreed to help Ovitz obtain a ter-
mination ("NFT"), allowing him to collect $38 million upon his depar-
ture, were unsupported.294 Not only did Eisner have the power to termi-
nate Ovitz under Disney's governing instruments, but Eisner consulted
Disney general counsel Sandy Litvack for a determination as to whether
Ovitz could be terminated for cause. 295 Litvack was adequately informed
and Chancellor Chandler agreed with Litvack's conclusion that Disney
was bound by the terms of the NTF and Ovitz could not be terminated
for cause (thereby avoiding payment under the NFT), so there was no
waste.296 On these facts, Eisner was not liable for a breach of good faith,
but the court cautioned that this situation presented a prime example of
when personal liability premised on a breach of good faith might apply:
It is precisely in this context - an imperial CEO or controlling share-
holder with a supine or passive board - that the concept of good faith
may prove highly meaningful. The fiduciary duties of care and loy-
alty, as traditionally defined, may not be aggressive enough to protect
shareholder interests when the board is well advised, is not legally
beholden to the management or a controlling shareholder and when
the board does not suffer from other disabling conflicts of interest,
such as a patently self-dealing transaction. Good faith may serve to
fill this gap and ensure that the persons entrusted by shareholders to
govern Delaware corporations do so with an honesty of purpose and
with an understanding of whose interests they are there to protect.
297
With respect to the other members of Disney's compensation com-
mittee and their role in hiring Ovitz, Chancellor Chandler found that they
too, were adequately informed and acted in good faith.298 In challenging
the compensation committee's actions, plaintiffs' arguments mirrored
those made about TransUnion's directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom:299 that
members of Disney's compensation committee acted without enough
deliberation and without sufficient documentation in making their deci-
292. Id.
293. Id. at *39-41. Chancellor Chandler's criticisms of Eisner were abundant. "Despite all of
the legitimate criticisms that may be leveled at Eisner, especially at having enthroned himself as the
omnipotent and infallible monarch of his personal Magic Kingdom, I nonetheless conclude, after
carefully considering and weighing all the evidence, that Eisner's actions were taken in good faith."
Id. at *41.
294. Id. at *50-51.
295. Id. at *48-51, 20.
296. Id. at *50.
297. Id. at *40 n.487.
298. Id. at *4247.
299. 488 A.2d 858, 874-75 (Del. 1985).
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sion to approve the hiring of Ovitz. 300 The Chancery Court distinguished
the actions of Disney's compensation committee members from the
TransUnion directors on several grounds. 30 1 Primarily, the nature and
magnitude of the transactions were fundamentally different: TransUnion
directors were given no reason and just one day's notice of a meeting
called to approve a merger to sell the company, compared to the Disney
compensation committee's decision to hire an executive for compensa-
tion that was "not economically material to the [c]ompany. ''30 2 Further,
unlike the TransUnion directors, members of the compensation commit-
tee knew of the proposal to hire Ovitz in advance and had some details of
the OEA prior to the meeting.30 3 At the committee meeting, the Disney
compensation committee worked from a term sheet and heard a presenta-
tion summarizing the analyses of both compensation expert Crystal and
two members of the compensation committee, contrasted with TransUn-
ion directors who approved a merger without any documentation about
the merger agreement and in reliance on a misleading presentation by
management. 304 Although Crystal did not present his report to Disney's
compensation committee personally, the committee reasonably believed
the analysis was within his competence, particularly because he had
evaluated executive compensation for Disney before, and they believed
Crystal had been selected with reasonable care. 30 5 Based on these rea-
sonable beliefs, the compensation committee was entitled to rely on
Crystal's opinions under DGCL § 141(e). 306 Finally, members of Dis-
ney's compensation committee knew that the overall response to hiring
Ovitz was positive, as opposed to the TransUnion directors who ap-
proved the merger knowing that senior management opposed it.30 7 Not-
withstanding the conclusion that members of Disney's compensation
committee were informed and acted in good faith, Chancellor Chandler
counseled directors as to better practices that would help the court de-
termine that their actions were legally defensible, "[i]t would have been
extremely helpful to the Court if the minutes had indicated in any fashion
that the discussion relating to the OEA was longer and more substantial
than the discussion relating to the myriad of other issues brought before
the compensation committee that morning. 30 8  As for the remaining
members of the board and their approval of the OEA, under the compen-
sation committee's charter, the board had no duty to review and approve
300. Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *44.
301. Id.
302. Id. at *44, 46. Chancellor Chandler detailed specific facts about Disney's 1996 revenues
($19 billion) and operating revenues (over $3 billion) used to determine that the OEA was not eco-
nomically material to the company. Id. at *44 n.533.
303. Id. at *45.
304. Id.
305. Id. at *46.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at *45 n.539.
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the OEA. 30 9 They were informed and acted in good faith in what they
believed were the best interests of the company.
310
Finally, the members of Disney's board at the time of Ovitz's ter-
mination were absolved from liability because they had no duty in con-
nection with Ovitz's termination.3 1 Under Disney's governing instru-
ments, either Eisner or the board could remove inferior officers, so the
board had no duty to act when Eisner terminated Ovitz. 312 Further, the
board had no independent duty to approve the payment of the NFT, be-
cause it was a term of the OEA that had been properly approved by the
compensation committee prior to Disney's decision to hire Ovitz.
31 3
By characterizing good faith as a ubiquitous requirement for direc-
tor conduct, the Chancery Court has increased the likelihood that corpo-
rate directors could be personally liable for their actions or failures to act
in good faith. Notably, the court has announced this formulation of good
faith while avoiding a decision to hold directors liable. Disney IV is an
excellent example of what former Chief Justice Veasey described as a
"genre of Delaware opinion" that teaches without imposing liability.314
In Disney IV, Chancellor Chandler reiterated the importance of opinions
as a means of providing specific guidance to directors to encourage bet-
ter director processes and higher standards for director conduct:
Are there many aspects of Ovitz's hiring that reflect the absence of
ideal corporate governance? Certainly, and I hope that this case will
serve to inform stockholders, directors and officers of how the Com-
pany's fiduciaries underperformed. As I stated earlier, however, the
standards used to measure the conduct of fiduciaries under Delaware
law are not the same standards used in determining good corporate
315
governance.
V. ARE DELAWARE COURTS READY TO FORCE DIRECTORS OUT-OF-
POCKET FOR ACTIONS NOT IN GOOD FAITH?
Today's modem corporate climate, marked by scandals, legislative
and regulatory reform, and increased scrutiny of directors' processes,
presents a challenge to corporate directors. In the face of mounting pres-
sure to conform to aspirational ideals of corporate conduct and the in-
creasing interest of institutional investors to force directors to pay out-of-
pocket for corporate failures, directors must consider the possibility that
they could be held personally liable for their actions.
309. Id. at *47.
310. Id.
311. Id. at *49.
312. id.
313. Id.
314. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at * 1406.
315. Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *47.
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Well before the onset of this new climate, the Delaware courts be-
gan cautiously exploring the notion of good faith as a standard for direc-
tor conduct. Through an ongoing, proactive tutorial to stockholders on
how to overcome procedural obstacles in the state's courts and have le-
gitimate claims heard on the merits, Delaware's courts have been setting
the stage for cases to come before them that allow them to explore and
refine the concept of good faith. Over the past nine years, the courts
have engaged in an ongoing discourse as to what directors' obligation to
act in good faith requires and whether directors will be personally liable
for failing to conform to this evolving standard. The most recent chapter
in Delaware's exploration, Disney IV, offers detailed guidance to corpo-
rate directors on the Chancery Court's formulation of good faith as a
ubiquitous requirement for director conduct that transcends the duties of
loyalty and due care. Importantly, even though Disney IV did not result
in personal liability for defendant directors, it provides guidance to all
corporate directors on how meet their legal obligation to act in good faith
and how to comport with the higher standards of corporate conduct envi-
sioned by aspirational ideals.
Under Disney IV, affirmative acts such as intentionally acting with a
purpose other than in the best interests of the corporation or by violating
applicable positive law, such as Sarbanes-Oxley or SRO rules, or failures
to act evidencing an intentional and conscious disregard of a duty to act,
will evidence a conduct undertaken in bad faith.316 Meeting the obliga-
tion to act in good faith is crucial for directors to enjoy Delaware's pro-
cedural and statutory protections and avoid potential personal liability
under state law. First, a failure to act in good faith will allow a plaintiff
to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule and establish
demand futility under the second prong of Aronson.317 Second, a failure
to act in good faith will prevent directors from utilizing several statutory
protections. Directors who fail to act in good faith in reliance on corpo-
rate records, executives, committees of the board or experts will not be
protected in their actions under DGCL § 141(e).3" 8 Approval of inter-
ested-director transactions not made in good faith will also be unpro-
tected under DGCL § 144(a).319 Further, failing to act in good faith will
prevent statutory indemnification under DGCL § 145.320 Most impor-
tantly, a failure to act in good faith is not exculpable under DGCL §
316. Id. at *35.
317. Id. at *32-33; see also supra Part II.A. 1.
318. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2005); Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *46; In re
Emerging Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *39-40
(Del. Ch. June 4, 2004); see supra notes 262-67 and accompanying text; see also Veasey & Di
Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1443.
319. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra
note 10, at 1443.
320. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, Retrospective, supra
note 10, at 1443.
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102(b)(7).3 21 Even without these protections, however, a director still
might avoid personal liability for a failure to act in good faith if the cor-
poration carries director's and officer's ("D &O") insurance.322 Under
public policy, willful conduct cannot be insured under a D & 0 policy;
but often directors can still be covered under D & 0 insurance when
statutory indemnification is unavailable.323 Assuming that there is ade-
quate coverage for any monetary judgment or settlement and the direc-
tor's failure to act in good faith is not willful; directors acting in bad faith
may be able to escape personal liability under the corporation's D & 0
policy.324 This assumption, however, ignores one of the salient features
of the modem corporate climate: the increased interest of institutional
investors in forcing directors to pay out-of-pocket for corporate fail-
ures.3 2 5 Arguably, any amount of insurance will be irrelevant to a sophis-
ticated plaintiff who wants to "inflict [a] significant [amount of] financial
pain" on corporate directors.326
Ultimately, how the Delaware Supreme Court will respond to the
Chancery Court's Disney IV formulation on good faith remains to be
seen. Until an appeal of Disney IV or another case with the requisite
factual and procedural posture necessary to allow the Delaware Supreme
Court to consider directors' good faith, corporate directors must under-
stand the formulation of good faith as the overarching, ubiquitous obliga-
tion described in Disney IV as Delaware's most current guidance on the
standards of conduct necessary to discharge their obligations and avoid
personal liability.
321. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804, at *36 n.463.
322. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary
Duty Through LegalLiability, 42 Hous. L. REV. 393,412-15 (2005).
323. Id. at 413
324. Seeid. at412-15
325. See supra INTRODUCTION.




UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: How SHOULD CONGRESS PLAY
THE BALL?
INTRODUCTION
"Like the proverbial road to hell, the path to the Guidelines was
paved with good intentions."' These good intentions, however, could not
stop the Supreme Court from finding that the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines ("Guidelines") 2 were unconstitutional in certain applications in light
of the Sixth Amendment . In United States v. Booker,4 the Supreme
Court held that the federal judicial practice of using facts the jury did not
consider to increase the statutory maximum sentence of an offender was
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.5 The Court held that "any
fact (other than prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sen-
tence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a
plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.",
6
The Court first whispered the concept of this inevitable holding in
Jones v. United States7 in 1999.8 In Jones, the Supreme Court hinted at
the unconstitutionality of judicial fact-finding under the Sixth Amend-
ment.9 In the federal system, a judge may determine a fact by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and impose a sentence higher than the prescribed
1. Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 354 (2005) (citing Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Cri-
tique of Federal Sentencing, POL'Y ANALYSIS, Nov. 1, 2002, at 3,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa458.pdf).
2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2005), http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf The
Guidelines were created to provide judges with "fair and consistent sentencing ranges to consult at
sentencing." Id. at 2. They are based on two main criteria: the seriousness of the crime charged and
the defendant's criminal history. Id. There are forty-three levels for crimes and six categories for
criminal history. Id. These two factors intersect on a table, which contains a range of time in which
the judge can sentence the offender. Id. The top of each range exceeds the bottom by six months or
25%, whichever is greater. Id.
3. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005); The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
5. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 755-56.
6. Id. at 756.
7. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
8. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
9. Id.
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sentencing range.10 The Supreme Court fully addressed whether this
practice was constitutional in Apprendi v. New Jersey" in 2000, but the
decision only applied to the constitutionality of a state statute. 12  The
Court applied the holding of Apprendi to state statutory maximums in
Ring v. Arizona; 3 and in 2004, the Court applied the same reasoning to
Washington's sentencing guidelines.' 4 Until January of 2005, the ques-
tion was still unanswered as to whether the Apprendi holding applied to
the Guidelines. 5
By 2005, the Booker Court's constitutionality holding (the "Stevens
majority") 16 was not much of a shock. The shock came when a different
majority (the "Breyer majority") 7 of the Court revealed their remedy to
this application of the Sixth Amendment.' 8 The Breyer majority held
that, in line with Congress' supposed intent, it had to sever and excise
provisions of the Guidelines in order to keep the Guidelines constitu-
tional; thus the Breyer majority made the Guidelines advisory. 9 The
remedy was "a remarkable act of judicial jujitsu.',
20
The Breyer majority's decision has left Congress with an advisory
guideline system. 2 1 Although this remedy was astounding and unex-
pected,22 it offers Congress a chance to analyze the system in its current
state and determine what course of action to take.23 Accordingly, Part I
of this Comment explains the history and case law that led up to Booker.
Part II outlines the two majority opinions of Booker and the multiple
dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the situation of the post-Booker
sentencing system. This Part explains why the current advisory system is
not Congress' best option and why Congress should change it. Part III
also describes the three realistic options for Congress: (1) a Booker-ized
Guideline system that would allow juries to determine sentencing factors
needed to increase the sentence above the Guideline range; (2) a complex
10. See Frank 0. Bowman, 111, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Struc-
tural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1315, 1326 (2005).
11. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (finding "other than the fact of prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
12. Id. at 468-69.
13. 536 U.S. 584, 589 (1999).
14. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004).
15. See David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely and
Booker, 50 VILL. L. REv. 163, 171 (2005).
16. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
17. Id at 756.
18. Id; See Steven G. Kalar et al., A Booker Advisory: Into the Breyer Patch, CHAMPION,
Mar. 2005, at 8, 10.
19. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764; See also, Kalar, supra note 18, at 11.
20. Kalar, supra note 18, at 11 ((quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Breyer Review: The Court's Fancy
Footwork, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2005, at 10, 10) quoting Prof Frank 0. Bowman's assessment of
the Breyer Majority).
21. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757.
22. Kalar, supra note 18, at 10.
23. See Gardina, supra note 1, at 388-89.
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charge system that turns all possible sentencing factors into elements of
the crime; or (3) a simple charge system where each crime has one sen-
tence and the judge could use mitigating factors to individualize a sen-
tence. 24 Finally, this Comment will compare Congress' options and ex-
plain why a bifurcated jury system is the best option.
I. BACKGROUND
Two decades ago, the United States experienced a major sentencing
reform.25 Rising crime rates, lack of evidence of prisoner rehabilitation,
and extensive sentencing disparity were the major factors that induced
this reform.26 The Guidelines were fully in place for about sixteen
27years. In the last six years, however, beginning with Jones v. United
States,28 the Supreme Court began to question the constitutionality of
judicial fact-finding used to increase a defendant's maximum punish-
ment.29 A majority/minority split that persisted throughout the subse-
quent cases originated from Jones.30 The four pre-Booker cases discuss-
ing the issue establish strong precedent for the Stevens majority's hold-
ing in Booker,3 1 but none of the parties or amici suggested the Breyer
majority's remedy.32
A. Sentencing Reform
Critics in the legal community have been debating for decades over
ways to eliminate disparate sentencing in the federal system.33 Prior to
1984, the Federal Government used a system of indeterminate sentenc-
ing.34 In the indeterminate sentencing system, statutes specified penalties
for each crime, but judges had discretion to decide the true length of the
sentence. 35  To complement judicial discretion, Congress used parole
boards to evaluate each offender and determine the length of each of-
fender's sentence.36 Once the parole board released an offender, a parole
24. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554-58.
25. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM iv (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_yearstudy full.pdf
(hereinafter Fifteen Years).
26. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1322-23.
27. Fifteen Years, supra note 25, at iv.
28. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
29. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
30. In Jones, the majority consisted of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg
while the minority consisted of Justices Breyer, O'Connor, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id.
at 229.
31. Susan R. Klein, Shifting Powers in the Federal Courts: The Return of Federal Judicial
Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 714 (2005).
32. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 771 (2005).
33. See Yellen, supra note 15, at 165-66.
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officer would supervise him or her.37 Congress based this system upon
the theory of rehabilitation.38 If prison could rehabilitate an offender, his
or her risk of recidivism would decrease. 39 Sentence disparity was, how-
ever, too common.4 ° Offenders that committed the same crime and had
similar criminal histories received widely different sentences and served
different amounts of their sentences.4 In one extreme example, a sen-
tencing judge would ask the convicted offender how many people were
in the courtroom that day.42 After the offender had counted, the judge
would sentence the offender to the same number of years as there were
people in the courtroom.43 This type of arbitrary sentencing angered the
public and many members of the legal community.44
As crime and recidivism rates were stagnant or increasing, and sen-
tence disparity was rampant, the theory of rehabilitation fell out of fa-
vor.45 In the 1980's, Congress began to consider a mandatory guideline
system based on determinate sentencing.46 In 1984, Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act ("Act")47 that created the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission ("Commission").48 Congress gave the Commission the
task of creating a mandatory sentencing guideline, which all federal
judges would follow. 49 Congress gave the Commission three goals: (1)
to "assure the meeting of purposes of sentencing as set forth" in the
Act; 50 (2) to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defen-
dants with similar records;" and (3) to "reflect to the extent practicable,
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the crimi-
37. Id.
38. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1321. Rehabilitation aims to reform the criminal into a law-
abiding citizen through different programs like drug and alcohol rehabilitation, and G.E.D. classes.
See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Pur-
pose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1313, 1316-19 (2000). "This model held that,
through ... personal renewal spurred by counseling, drug treatment, job training and the like, crimi-
nal deviance could be treated like any other disorder." Bowman, supra note 10, at 1321.
39. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.
40. Id at 365.
41. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2544 (2004).
42. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 394
(2005).
43. Id.
44. See Id. at 394-95.
45. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1322.
46. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-67.
47. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2005).
48. Peter B. Krupp, The Return of Judicial Discretion: Federal Sentencing Under "Advisory"
Guidelines After United States v. Booker, 49 B. B.J. 18, 18 (2005); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
28 U.S.C. § 991 (2005).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 991; See also Yellen, supra note 15, at 167.
50. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2005)). The four purposes of the
Act were: (1) "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense;" (2) "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;" (3) "to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;" and (4) "to provide the defendants with
needed... correctional treatment." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2005)).
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nal justice process.",5' Although the Act eliminated much of sentencing
disparity, it certainly did not meet all of the specified goals. 52 The Act
greatly diminished the number of offenders sentenced to probation and
doubled the average time an offender spent incarcerated. 53  Therefore,
the Commission did not achieve its purpose of "just punishment. 54  In
addition, recidivism rates have not dropped,55 and federal prisons do not
emphasize correctional treatment.56 Nonetheless, Congress kept the
Act.57 In 1999, however, the issue of whether a specific aspect of the
Guidelines was constitutional in light of the Sixth Amendment sur-
faced.58
B. Background Cases
1. Jones v. United States
In Jones, the Court faced the issue of whether to construe a federal
carjacking statute59 as three separate crimes or as one crime with three
maximum penalties.60 Based on facts the jury found beyond a reasonable
61doubt, the defendant's maximum possible sentence was fifteen years.
In spite of this, the presentence report62 recommended a twenty-five-year
sentence due to "serious bodily injury" of one victim. 63 The major point
of distinction in Jones was whether a sentencing factor and an element of
51. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2005)).
52. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1326-28.
53. Yellen, supra note 15, at 183.
54. See Bowman, supra note 10, at 1328-29.
55. PATRICK A. LANGDON & DAVID J. LEVIN, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994,
NCJ 193427 1, 1 (June 2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf ("Among nearly
300,000 prisoners released in 15 States in 1994, 67.5% were rearrested within 3 years. A study of
1983 releases estimated 62.5%.").
56. See Steven Belenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment Into the Criminal
Justice Process, 63 ALB. L. REV. 833, 855-56 (2000).
57. See Hon. John S. Martin, Jr., The Role of the Departure Power in Reducing Injustice and
Unwarranted Disparity Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 259, 268 (2000).
58. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
59. The statute states:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that
has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the per-
son or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so,
shall - (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if
serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title, including any conduct that,
if the conduct occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, would violate section 2241 or 2242 of this title) results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and (3) if death results, be fined under this ti-
tle or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998).
60. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
61. Id. at 230-31.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (2005) ("A United States probation officer shall make a presentence
investigation of a defendant that is required pursuant to the provisions of Rule 32(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and shall, before the imposition of sentence, report the results of the
investigation to the court.").
63. Jones, 526 U.S. at 231.
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a crime were two different names for the same thing, or distinct from
each other.64
The majority decided that if it were to construe the statute as one
crime, the defendant's sentence could have raised Sixth Amendment
issues of whether a jury should determine all facts that increase the
maximum penalty for an offender. 65 "The point is simply that diminish-
ment of the jury's significance by removing control over facts determin-
ing a statutory sentencing range would resonate with the claims of earlier
controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet set-
tled., 66 Therefore, the majority construed the statute as three separate
offenses in order to avoid the Sixth Amendment issue.6 7
The minority strongly disagreed in Jones.68  Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that there was a
definite difference between an element of a crime and a sentencing fac-
tor.69 The minority thought that there was no need to even mention con-
stitutionality in the holding.7° Justice Kennedy's dissent aptly predicted
that this holding would "cause disruption and uncertainty in the sentenc-
ing system[] .. '..,,7' The Court avoided the constitutional issue first
raised in Jones and instead left it for future resolution.
2. Apprendi v. New Jersey72
Like the defendant in Jones, the defendant in Apprendi faced an
elongated sentence based on a judge's determination.73 In Apprendi, the
petitioner pled guilty to multiple counts involving firearms. 74 After ac-
cepting the guilty plea, the judge concluded that the crime was "moti-
vated by racial bias., 75 This finding increased the petitioner's sentence
for that specific count from a possible five to ten years, to exactly twelve
years.76 The petitioner appealed the sentence77 and the Court had an op-
portunity to answer the question foreshadowed by Jones.78 The Court
held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that in-
creases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed... maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt., 79 The
64. Id. at 232.
65. Id. at 251-52.
66. Id. at 248.
67. Id. at 251-52.
68. Id. at 255 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 254.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 271.
72. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
74. Id. at 469-70.
75. Id. at 471.
76. Id. at 471.
77. Id. at 471.
78. Id. at 476.
79. Id. at 490.
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Court also cleared up doubt by reiterating that a sentencing factor and an
element of a crime are no different; only a legislative choice places an
aspect of the crime or offender in one category or the other. 80
The Court was also split 5-4 in this opinion.8' Justice O'Connor
called the majority opinion "meaningless formalism." 82 Justice Breyer
questioned how the Court could expect a defendant to prove his inno-
cence while at the same time disproving any factor that would lead to a
sentencing increase.83 This type of defense would lead to statements
such as, "I did not sell drugs, but I sold no more than 500 grams. 84
Congress' only probable solution would be bifurcated jury processes in
which one stage would determine if the accused had committed a crime
and the other stage would determine the veracity of facts that would in-
crease or decrease the offender's sentence.85 Justice Breyer also pointed
out that in some cases, there are just too many factors to submit them all
86to the jury. Apprendi left just as many questions unanswered as Jones
as to how far the holding would apply in other situations. The main
question was how and if this holding would affect state and federal sen-
tencing guidelines.87
3. Ring v. Arizona
88
Before addressing the true concerns that arose from the Apprendi
and Jones holdings, the Court addressed the constitutionality of judicial
fact-finding of an aggravating factor that is necessary for the imposition
of the death penalty under the Sixth Amendment. 89 Although the jury
convicted the defendant of a crime that fell within the statutory range of
"death or life imprisonment," and the imposition of the death penalty did
not exceed the statutory maximum, the Arizona murder statute required a
court to find aggravating factors before imposing the death penalty. 90
Because an aggravating factor is still a fact found by the judge that is the
"functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Court held
that a jury must decide the fact-finding necessary to put the defendant to
death.9' This holding was a sidestep that reaffinmed the reasoning the
Court would use to arrive at the holding of Booker.
This case was slightly different from the others in this line of rea-
soning because of the Justices who joined the majority. Justice Kennedy
80. Id. at 476.
81. Id. at 468.
82. Id. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




87. Id. at 544.
88. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
89. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
90. Id. at 603-04.
91. Id. at 609.
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joined the majority, stating in his concurrence that although Apprendi
was wrongly decided, it was now law.92 Even a cautious extension of
Apprendi would result in the majority's holding.93 Justice Breyer also
concurred, but because he believed that "jury sentencing in capital cases
is mandated by the Eighth Amendment." 94 Justice O'Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, however, maintained in their dissent that the holding
in Apprendi was a "serious mistake.
95
4. Blakely v. Washington
96
Blakely was the final step in a series of cases that led to the inevita-
ble holding of Booker. The defendant in Blakely pled guilty to second-
degree kidnapping, which required a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three
months under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act.97  However, the
Washington guidelines allowed a judge to impose a higher sentence if he
or she found "substantial and compelling reasons justifying an excep-
tional sentence. 9 8 The judge found that the defendant had acted with
"deliberate cruelty" and sentenced the defendant to ninety months.99
In the appeal, the State contended that Apprendi did not apply be-
cause ten years was the statutory maximum for all class B felonies. 00
The Court, however, made clear that the term "statutory maximum" in
Apprendi referred to the maximum sentence "a judge may impose solely
on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the de-
fendant."'' 1  In the defendant's case, the judge could only impose a
higher sentence if he found aggravating factors, not elements of the
crime. 102 In finding such aggravating factors without a jury, the judge
violated the holding from Apprendi. 
103
The Court made sure to express that the "Federal Guidelines are not
before us, and we express no opinion on them."'' 4 This statement did not
keep Justice O'Connor from speculating on the effect of Blakely on the
Guidelines. 1 5  Justice O'Connor noted that Washington's sentencing
scheme was almost identical to the Guidelines and she predicted that
"what I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sen-
92. Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
96. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
97. The Washington state sentencing guidelines were very similar to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
98. Id. at 2535.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2537.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2538.
104. Id. at 2538 n.4.
105. Id. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judg-
ments are in jeopardy."' 10 6  The majority's holding caused the lower
courts to split into many factions, all with a different opinion on how or
why Blakely applied to the Guidelines. 0 7  Thus, the Supreme Court
granted the Solicitor General's request for expedited review of Booker
and heard arguments for Booker the first day of the term.'08
II. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER10 9
Booker is the culmination of six years of arguments and specula-
tions about the constitutionality of sentencing above the Guidelines
range, based on judicial fact-finding. Justice O'Connor first made note
of the possibility in Apprendi v. New Jersey" 0 and continued to show
concern over how an unconstitutional ruling would affect the Guide-
lines."' The Justices in Booker all stayed on their respective sides for
the constitutionality issue: Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Stevens in the majority, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Breyer in the minority. 112 In that respect, the
Stevens majority holding was not a surprise, as it followed the law set
forth in Apprendi and Blakely. 13  The surprise came from the Breyer
majority, composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg." 4  The Breyer majority produced
complex holdings and left Congress to pick up the pieces. 15
A. Facts
116
The government charged Booker with possession with intent to dis-
tribute at least fifty grams of cocaine base. 17  The jury found Booker
guilty of possessing fifty grams of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. §
106. Id. at 2550.
107. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved?
A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 217, 226-27 (2004)
[hereinafter Train Wreck].
108. Yellen, supra note 15, at 171; Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 219 n.2.
109. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
110. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
111. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
113. Klein, supra note 3 1, at 714.
114. Kalar, supra note 18, at 10.
115. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
116. The case of United States v. Booker also encompassed another defendant in the opposite
position of Booker: Fanfan. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747. The United States charged Fanfan with
conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine. Id.
The maximum sentence for this crime was seventy-five months under the Guidelines. Id. After the
trial, the judge held a sentencing hearing and found by a preponderance of the evidence that Fanfan
had possessed 2.5 kilograms of cocaine and 261.6 grams of crack. Id. In addition, the judge found
that Fanfan had been an organizer or supervisor in the criminal activity. Id. This finding increased
Fanfan's possible sentence to 188 to 235 months, tripling Fanfan's possible sentence. Id. However,
in Fanfan's case, the judge relied on Blakely and determined that he could not increase Fanfan's
maximum penalty but would rely on the jury's guilty verdict to sentence Fanfan. Id.
117. Id. at 746. Cocaine base is also known as crack. Id.
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841 (a)(1).118 This particular statute provided a minimum sentence of ten
years and a maximum sentence of life." 9 Based upon Booker's criminal
history and the jury conviction, the Guidelines mandated a sentence of
210 to 262 months. 20 Yet, after the jury trial, the judge found by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Booker had actually possessed 566
grams of cocaine base, and was guilty of obstructing justice. 12' This
finding increased Booker's possible sentence to a minimum of 360





The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Booker's sentence
conflicted with the holdings of Apprendi and Blakely. 125 The court relied
on the holding that "the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."' 26 The court
therefore remanded the case with instructions for the judge to sentence
Booker within the sentencing range or hold a separate sentencing hearing
using a jury. 127 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari for the




The Stevens majority asked whether the "the imposition of an en-
hanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on
the sentencing judge's determination of a fact.., that was not found by
the jury or admitted by the defendant" violated the Sixth Amendment.
30
Based on prior case history and the fact that the Guidelines were manda-
118. id. at 746; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ("Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally.., to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance").





124. In Fanfan's case, the Government filed for appeal in the First Circuit and filed a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id. at 747. The Court granted the writ and the Supreme Court held
that Fanfan's sentence had not violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 769. The Government, how-
ever, could still seek re-sentencing within the guideline range. Id. The Court, therefore, vacated the
holding and remanded the District Court case. Id. Although Booker actually encompasses two
separate cases, the reasoning the court applied pertains to both situations. Id. at 746.
125. Id. at 746.
126. Id. at 746-47.
127. Id. at 747.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 769.
130. Id. at 747.
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tory and binding on all judges, the Stevens majority found that "the
Guidelines [had] the force and effect of laws."'
31
The Government outlined three arguments detailing why Blakely
should not apply to the Guidelines.' 32 The Stevens majority, however,
found these unpersuasive. 33 First, there was no constitutional signifi-
cance between guidelines a commission created and those the legislature
wrote. 134  Second, the pre-Blakely cases that were inconsistent with
Blakely did not apply in this instance because those cases either were
pre-Guidelines or did not deal with the issue of an increased maximum
sentence due to facts a judge determined. 135 Third, the application of
Blakely to the Guidelines would not unconstitutionally grant legislative
power to the Sentencing Commission.' 36 After refuting the Govern-
ment's arguments, the Stevens majority reaffirmed its holding in Ap-
prendi that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary
to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt."'' The Stevens
majority's constitutional holding left a wound in the Guidelines. If a
judge could not determine facts that led to an increase in the maximum
sentence, how could Congress adapt the Guidelines to comply with this
holding?
2. The Breyer Majority
The Breyer majority did not decide a separate issue but chose a
remedy for the Stevens majority's holding. 138 The remedy, however, was
shocking. 139 The Breyer majority began by listing two options: (1) to
engraft the Booker jury right into the Guidelines or (2) to render the
Guidelines advisory, and therefore not subject to the holding in
Booker. 40 Although the expectation was for the Court to Booker-ize the
Guidelines, the Breyer majority chose the latter remedy.
14
In an eloquent attempt to explain the Breyer majority's reasoning,
the Court argued that an advisory system was in line with Congressional
intent and that a bifurcated jury system had too many problems. 42 First,
the Breyer majority asserted that Congress would prefer an advisory sys-
131. Id. at 750.
132. Id. at 752.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 753-54.
136. Id. at 754-55; See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
137. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
138. Id. at 756.
139. Kalar, supra note 18, at 10.
140. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757.
141. Id.; Kalar, supra note 18, at 10.
142. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759-64.
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tem to a bifurcated jury system.143 The Breyer majority deciphered Con-
gress' intent by looking at the meaning of words like "court" in the Sen-
tencing Reform Act.' 44 In determining that "the court" meant, "judge
without a jury," the Breyer majority reasoned that taking that sentencing
power away from the judge would deny Congress' intended plan.
45
Second, the Breyer majority explained that Congress' basic goal was to
diminish sentencing disparity and to base punishment on real conduct.
146
Taking sentencing factors out of the judge's determination would un-
dermine the basic aim of the statute of ensuring less sentencing dispar-
ity; 147 although, the Breyer majority never explained how an advisory
system would keep sentencing disparity from arising as a problem again.
Third, the Breyer majority explained that if the Court was to apply
the "grafting" remedy, the system would become too complex. 48 As
brought up in the Apprendi dissent, the Breyer majority asked how the
courts could expect a defendant to prove innocence at the same time as
disproving sentencing factors.149 Fourth, the Breyer majority stated that
plea-bargaining would become worse in a system with the Sixth
Amendment engrafted.150  The skill of counsel and the policies of the
prosecutor would win out over the real conduct of the defendant. 51 The
prosecutor could choose which sentencing factors to use and which to
leave out of the process. 5 2 Again, the majority failed to address the fact
that these issues already came up in the Guidelines. Fifth and finally, the
Breyer majority stated that Congress would not have enacted a system in
which it was easier to adjust the sentence downward than upward.
53
Overall, none of the Breyer majority's reasons were wholly convincing.
In order to render the Guidelines advisory, the Breyer majority ex-
cised certain provisions of the Guidelines. 15 4 The Guidelines could retain
any provision that was constitutionally valid, could function independ-
ently, and was consistent with statutory objectives. 55 The Breyer major-
ity excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) 156 and § 3742(e) 157 as the provisions




147. Id. at 760.
148. Id. at 761.
149. Id. at 761-62.
150. Id. at 762.
151. Id. at 763.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 764.
155. Id.
156. The statute states:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described. In determining whether a cir-
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did not meet these criteria. 158 Section 3553(b)(1) was the provision that
made the Guidelines mandatory, and without that section, the Guidelines
no longer fell under the holdings of Apprendi and Blakely.15 9  Section
3742(e) had set forth the standard of review for Guidelines sentences.
160
Without § 3742(e), the Breyer majority found that there was an implied
standard of review of "unreasonable[ness].,, 161 The Breyer majority then
affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision in Booker's case. 62  The Govern-
ment could re-sentence Booker under this holding.
63
D. Dissents
1. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens refuted the arguments the Breyer majority put forth
in their opinion.' 64 Justice Stevens stated that neither the Government,
nor the respondents, nor numerous amici suggested the Breyer majority's
remedy applied. 165  He went further to say that the Breyer majority's
remedy was an exercise of legislative, not judicial power. 1
66
Justice Stevens explained how his chosen remedy of "Booker-izing"
the Guidelines would only affect a very small number of cases.167 First,
only 55% of cases involve sentencing enhancements and only a small
percentage of those cases would involve Sixth Amendment issues.
68
cumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sen-
tencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Com-
mission.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2005)
157. The statute states:
Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence -
(1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect applica-
tion of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and (A)
the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons required by section
3553(c); (B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor
that - (i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or (ii) is not au-
thorized under section 3553(b); or (iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or (C) the
sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range, having
regard for the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in section
3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated
by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or (4) was imposed for
an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreason-
able.
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2005)
158. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 765.
162. Id. at 769 (The Court vacated Fanfan's sentence).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens was joined in part by Justices
Souter and Scalia).
165. Id. at 771.
166. Id. at 772.
167. Id. at 774-76.
168. ld. at 773.
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These numbers would also shrink due to defendants who waive their
right to a jury trial and defendants who plead guilty to all facts. 169 Justice
Stevens had faith that the government would handle correctly the minor-
ity of defendants whose sentences involve Sixth Amendment issues. 70
Justice Stevens then went on to refute the Breyer majority's reason-
ing for rejecting the minority's remedy. 171 Justice Stevens' main idea
was that while the minority's remedy would, without a doubt, affect
some cases; the Breyer majority's remedy would affect every case.
172
Congress' main purpose was to have a mandatory guideline system, so
how could the Court ever think Congress would prefer an advisory sys-
tem to a mandatory system? 173 Congress rejected many other types of
systems, including advisory systems, and so its intent was clear that to
remove disparity, Congress wanted to remove judicial discretion. 74 The
Breyer majority's remedy removed the uniformity that the Breyer major-
ity said was Congress' intent. 75 In addition, the Breyer majority's hold-
ing positioned the sentencing system in a pre-reform state without the
mitigating benefit of parole.1
76
2. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, like Justice Stevens, dissented from the Breyer ma-
jority's remedy. 177 According to Justice Scalia, the Breyer majority had
placed the federal courts in the position the courts were in before the
Guidelines, but with a different standard of review. 78 On this subject,
Justice Scalia asked, "[W]hen the Court has severed that standard of re-
view... does it make any sense to look for some congressional 'impli-
cation' of a different standard of review in the remnants of the statute
that the Court has left standing? Only in Wonderland."'' 79 Under this
"reasonableness" standard of review, Justice Scalia feared either that the
appellate courts would find all sentences reasonable or that the appellate
courts would simply follow the Guidelines. 80  Either way, sentences
would undoubtedly become disparate.' 81 In the end, the Breyer major-
ity's remedy was ironic because "[i]n order to rescue from nullification a
169. Id. at 774.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 779-82.
172. Id. at 789.
173. Id. at 785-86.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 787.
176. Id. at 788.
177. Id. at 789 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 791.
179. Id. at 793.




statutory scheme designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing, [the
Court] discards the provisions that eliminate discretionary sentencing.'
' 82
3. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer dissented from the Stevens majority holding that the
Sixth Amendment forbids a sentencing judge to determine sentencing
factors without a jury.18 3 Traditionally, federal law has allowed judges to
determine sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence.
184
Aside from finding the Stevens majority's history analysis unpersuasive,
Justice Breyer brought up two other reasons against this holding.
185
First, Justice Breyer distinguished between statutes and administrative
guidelines.18 6 The Guidelines only guide, they do not create a new set of
sentences so much as they reflect and organize pre-Guidelines sen-
tences. 8 7  Second, Justice Breyer asserted that the Guidelines do not
impose absolute constraints on federal judges.188 The Guidelines permit
a judge to depart from the Guidelines based on facts that constitute ele-
ments of the crime. 189  Overall, Justice Breyer found Apprendi and
Blakely distinguishable from Booker.'9"
III. ANALYSIS
The Breyer majority's holding in United States v. Booker 91 has left
Congress with advisory Guidelines; but, if Congress wishes to change
the sentencing system back to a mandatory one, it is forced to comply
with the Stevens majority's Sixth Amendment holding. 192 Congress must
decide whether to leave the system in its current state, or to change the
system. 193 No matter the course Congress chooses, this outcome leaves
the federal system with a wonderful opportunity to evaluate all options
and choose the best route.
Congress' best option would be to abandon the current sentencing
system because the advisory Guidelines are not in line with Congres-
182. Id. at 790. Justice Thomas also dissented from the Breyer majority's holding. Id. at 795
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas criticized Justice Breyer's severability analysis. Id. Jus-
tice Thomas explained that normally in a severability decision, the action is only invalidated for the
application of the litigant. Id. In this case, severability analysis can apply, but the statute is not
facially invalid, only invalid as to Booker's application. Id at 798-99.
183. Id. at 802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. These same four justices had consistently dissented
in Apprendi, Blakely and the similar line of cases).
184. Id. at 803.
185. Id. at 804-07.
186. Id. at 805.
187. Id. at 806.
188. Id. at 806-07.
189. Id. at 807.
190. Id.
191. 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005).
192. Katie M. McVoy, Note, "What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come To Pass": Blakely,
Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1613, 1621 (2005).
193. Kalar, supra note 18, at 18.
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sional intent and the review standard of "reasonable" is not sufficient.1 94
If Congress chooses to change the sentencing system, there are three
realistic alternatives: (1) a Booker-ized form of the Guidelines using bi-
furcated juries; (2) a mandatory guideline system that avoids the use of
bifurcated juries by using a complex charge system; or (3) a simple
charge system where each crime has one sentence and the judge can use
mitigating factors to individualize a sentence. 195 Although the current
system seems to work and judicial discretion is presently stable, there is
no guarantee that judicial discretion will remain constant in the future.'
96
For this reason and many more, it is clear that a bifurcated jury system
will best serve Congress' original goals for the Guidelines while also
maintaining their constitutionality.
A. The Guidelines Post-Booker
As the Guidelines are now, post-Booker, Congress has yet to truly
see how an advisory system will pan out. Some federal judges are em-
bracing their expanded discretion while others are doing their best to
stick to the Guidelines. 197 United States v. Ranum198 and United States v.
Wilson'99 are examples of how different courts have used their new dis-
cretionary powers. In Ranum, the judge decided that the Guidelines are
now just one of a number of sentencing factors to consider.200 Pre-
Booker, the defendant in Ranum would have received a sentence of
thirty-seven to forty-five months, but instead the judge sentenced him for
one year, based on many mitigating factors. 20 1 On the other hand, in
Wilson, the judge considered the Guidelines as presumptive unless there
are unusual reasons to sentence outside of them.20 2
Further evidence of how judges are treating an advisory system
comes from the Commission itself and its studies.20 3 In June and August
of 2005, the Commission released data of the percentage of offenders
sentenced within the Guidelines after the Booker ruling.20 4 In June 2005,
judges had sentenced 61.7% of all offenders in the federal system within
194. See infra, Part 11I.B.
195. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2554-58 (2004).
196. See Ben Trachtenberg, Note, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison Admissions, 38 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 479, 508 (2005) (describing the North Carolina system in which judicial discre-
tion slowly increased in an advisory system).
197. Kalar, supra note 18, at 12, 14.
198. 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
199. 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005).
200. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
201. Id. at 989.
202. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
203. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT
(2005), http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_060605Extract.pdf [hereinafter June CODING
PROJECT] (data extracted as of June 6, 2005); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL
POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT (2005), http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker 080805.pdf
[hereinafter July CODING PROJECT] (cases extracted as of July 12, 2005).
204. June CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1; July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1.
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the Guidelines; and in August of 2005, judges had sentenced 61.3% of all
offenders within the Guidelines.2 °5 The percentage of offenders sen-
tenced within the Guidelines only differed by 5-10% when compared to
the fiscal years of 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.206 These numbers show
that the majority of judges may continue to sentence offenders within the
Guidelines, but six months of data cannot be conclusive.20 7 The decrease
in judges sentencing within the Guidelines could continue until the sys-
tem resembles sentencing before the 1984 reform.208 Most likely, as
soon as Congress sees a definite indication of a return to judicial discre-
tion, it will impose a new system or changes to the current system.
2 9
B. The Current Sentencing System
The easiest route for Congress is to keep the advisory Guidelines
system. There is nothing inherently wrong with an advisory system;
however, Congress has concerns with judicial discretion. 2 0  As said
above, the advisory system has shown a steady adherence to the Guide-
lines for the first six months post-Booker, but it is hard to estimate how
long that adherence will last.211 In addition, although the nationwide
percentage of adherence to the Guidelines has only decreased about eight
percent, some districts have substantially decreased adherence to the
Guidelines.21 2 For instance, the adherence to the Guidelines in the First
and Second Circuits has decreased by fifteen percent.21 3 Looking at the
history of federal sentencing and state systems that have advisory guide-
lines, there is a good chance that these trends will continue in the federal
system.2 14
Aside from the chance of decline in Guidelines adherence, the advi-
sory system is not in line with Congressional intent.215 "Congress' basic
goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the sentencing system in
the direction of increased uniformity. 216 To achieve this goal, Congress
passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which directed a mandatory sentenc-
ing system.217 If Congress had believed it could increase sentence uni-
formity through an advisory system, it would not have rejected models
205. June CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1; July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1.
206. June CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 5; July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 7
(in 2000, 64.5% were sentenced within the Guidelines; in 2001, 64%; in 2002, 65%; and in 2003,
69.4%).
207. See Trachtenberg, supra note 196, at 508.
208. Id.
209. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761.
210. Id. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. See June CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1; July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203,
at 1.
212. July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 7.
213. id. at 7-8.
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761.
216. Id. at 761; see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) and § 994(f).
217. Yellen, supra note 15, at 167.
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for advisory guidelines systems in the past. 21 8  Therefore, if Congress
makes a change to the current sentencing system in the future, it would
most likely choose a mandatory system over an advisory one.219
In addition, the system has an insufficient appellate review standard
of "unreasonable[ness]," which leaves too much room for discretion.22 °
Although 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) 22' mandates that the court explain its rea-
soning for a sentence, some judges may submit vague explanations.222
Justice Scalia notes in his dissent to Booker that the requirement for
courts to evaluate each sentence individually for reasonableness could
lead to two different reactions from appellate courts.223 The courts could
"seek refuge in the familiar and continue . . . the 'appellate sentencing
practice during the last two decades.,, 224 Alternatively, the courts may
approve almost any sentence within the statutory range, as long as the
district judge complied with the formalities.225 Justice Scalia predicts a
"discordant symphony" of standards ranging from court to court.
226
Overall, the reasonableness standard is not sufficient for fair and compe-
tent appellate review.
Furthermore, in general, advisory guideline sentencing systems
have specific problems. First, appellate review standards under advisory
guidelines are usually more nebulous. 7 Second, judges are less likely to
follow a complicated sentencing scheme if they do not have to.228 Fi-
nally, an advisory system weakens a defendant's plea bargaining power
when they have no certainty that the judge will give a specific sentence
to a plea of a certain crime.229 Thus, because the current system is not in
line with Congressional intent, has an insufficient review standard, and
has general sentencing problems, Congress should change the advisory
Guidelines.
218. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 783-84.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 794.
221. The statute states:
Presentence procedure for an order of notice. Prior to imposing an order of notice pursu-
ant to section 3555, the court shall give notice to the defendant and the Government that
it is considering imposing such an order. Upon motion of the defendant or the Govern-
ment, or on its own motion, the court shall - (1) permit the defendant and the Govern-
ment to submit affidavits and written memoranda addressing matters relevant to the im-
position of such an order; (2) afford counsel an opportunity in open court to address
orally the appropriateness of the imposition of such an order; and (3) include in its state-
ment of reasons pursuant to subsection (c) specific reasons underlying its determinations
regarding the nature of such an order.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(d) (2005)
222. Kalar, supra note 18, at 16.




227. See McVoy, supra note 192, at 1629.





Congress is left with a plethora of options ranging from leaving the
system as is to completely wiping the slate clean and starting fresh. Ac-
cording to the statistics mentioned above, Congress most likely has time
to delay before instituting any changes. 3° In fact, a group of United
States Attorneys and retired federal judge John S. Martin lobbied Con-
gress in March 2005 to ask Congress to "wait and see" before enacting
any new legislation. With this time, Congress should study the differ-
ent options before it.
Any realistic alternative for Congress will have certain aspects: the
new system must conform to the Booker holding,232 and it must have
appellate review. 33 If a system is not Booker compliant, then the Court
would immediately hold the system unconstitutional.234 The appeal stan-
dard is important for many reasons. First, district court judges sentence
offenders with the knowledge that the appellate court can review the
sentence to keep judicial discretion in check.235 When review is rare, as
in North Carolina, sentencing disparity will slowly increase, because
judicial discretion is unchecked.236 Second, "the opportunity for appel-
late review is important to the fairness of the judicial process and may do
much to preserve the legitimacy of that process in the eyes of liti-
gants. ,2 7 Congress, however, has the job to legislate and enact an appel-
late review statute; appellate review should not emerge from case law.238
One alternative to the current system is to adopt the remedy that the
Court rejected: to "Booker-ize" the existing Guidelines.2 39  In the
Booker-ized system, the jury does all fact-findings in cases where Booker
would apply, and the judge decides the appropriate sentence within the
Guidelines.2 40 This system would have bifurcated jury trials.24' After a
trial on the charges had occurred, the jury would decide any fact beyond
a reasonable doubt that would raise the sentence.242 Congress could de-
cide whether this right would be waivable; but because a defendant can
waive a normal jury trial, it would seem most likely that a defendant
230. See supra Part III.A.
231. Jack King, NACDL Leadership, Former U.S. Attorneys, Judge, Warn Congress on Perils
of Hasty Federal Sentencing 'Reform,' CHAMPION, Apr. 2005, at 6, 6.
232. McVoy, supra note 192, at 1621.
233. Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 247.
234. See McVoy, supra note 192, at 1621.
235. See Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 247 (discussing appellate review under an advisory
system).
236. Trachtenberg, supra note 196, at 508.
237. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment
Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53, 89 (1984).
238. Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 247. This Comment does not discuss how appellate
review will differ under each option due to a lack of substantive material on the topic.
239. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757; Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554.
240. Gardina, supra note 1, at 389.
241. Id. at 390.
242. Id. at 390-91.
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could also waive this jury right.24 3 Though this would increase the bur-
den on the federal system, it would only affect a small number of tri-
als.24
Kansas currently uses a system that is most like the one proposed
for the federal system: the jury determines whether a fact is proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt, but the judge still decides what sentence to
impose.245 This system keeps the amount of bifurcated jury trials low
because the judge decides pre-trial what facts to introduce at trial, and
what facts to introduce during sentencing.246 Kansas also uses the same
jury for trial and sentencing.247 Most importantly, Kansas' bifurcated
jury trial system has been effective without serious monetary issues.248
There are, however, issues with a bifurcated jury system for sen-
tencing. First, the rules of evidence preclude the jury from hearing cer-
tain issues during the trial, although a judge uses those factors when sen-
249tencing. Congress may have to enact new rules of evidence to deter-
mine what the court should allow a jury to hear in each phase of the
trial.25° Second, Congress or the Commission would have to work out
basic jury issues such as hung juries for the sentencing phase.2 ' Third,
some critics say a bifurcated jury system will increase prosecutorial
252power. A plea of "not guilty" would force a defendant to take the
chance on what the jury will decide for two trials if he or she does not
bargain with the prosecutor.253 Yet, no matter what system is in place,
254there is an argument that it will increase prosecutorial power.
As a second option, Congress could reinstate the Guidelines as
mandatory; but instead of using bifurcated juries, all crimes would have a
complex system of elements to encompass all facts that would increase
the sentence of the offender.255 In this type of system, each crime would
have a multitude of elements such as: injury to the victim, type of
weapon used in the crime, and any drugs involved.256 This system would
only require a single jury; but necessitates that the jury return special
verdicts every time, which could make the process much more confus-
ing.257 In addition, the complex charge system would force a defendant
243. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 774, 776.
245. McVoy, supra note 192, at 1637.
246. Id. at 1637-38.
247. Id. at 1638.
248. Id. at 1641.
249. Id. at 1639-40.
250. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556.
251. See McVoy, supra note 192, at 1640.
252. Id. at 1639.
253. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
254. McVoy, supra note 192, at 1639.
255. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
256. Id. at 2554-5.
257. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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to make claims of innocence, while also proving a lesser crime.25 8 For
example, the defendant would have to argue, "I did not sell drugs, and if
I did, I did not sell more than 500 grams.5
2 59
In this type of system, there would be no aggravating or mitigating
factors, only elements of the crime.260 Although there are many factors
for each crime, these factors cannot encompass everything because no
two criminals or crimes are exactly alike. 26 1 As an example, two men
rob a convince store, both steal $500 and both use a gun in the rob-
bery.2 62 Assuming both men have similar criminal histories, there is no
guarantee that both men are equally culpable.2 63 One man may rob the
store to sustain his cocaine habit while the other man stole because his
family would otherwise starve.26 4
A third option is a simple charge system where the judge would
sentence an offender to the maximum statutory sentence. 265 The judge
would then apply a multitude of mitigating factors to decrease the sen-
tence appropriately. 266 This simple charge system would not require a
267 wol lo icein 268 thbifurcated jury, and would allow judicial discretion. In addition, the
legislature would not have to rewrite most criminal statutes, as they al-
ready contain maximum sentences.269
Nevertheless, a simple charge system is also only an evasion of the
Booker holding.270 Furthermore, the system reverses the ordinary bur-
dens of proof in criminal cases; 27' the defendant would have the burden
to prove any mitigating factors.272 Furthermore, a fixed sentence for a
crime could increase prosecutorial power because the prosecutor could
273manipulate the charge. Another problem with this system would be
that if defendants could not prove many mitigating factors, the system
274may have too much uniformity and not enough individualization.
258. Id. at 557-58.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 555-56.




265. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2558 (Breyer, J. dissenting); Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 262-
63.
266. Yellen, supra note 15, at 177.
267. See id. (stating that the fact-finding could be performed by a judge).
268. See id.
269. See Jason Amala & Jason Laurine, Comment, An Exceptional Case: How Washington
Should Amend Its Procedure for Imposing an Exceptional Sentence in Response to Blakely v. Wash-
ington, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (2005).
270. See Yellen, supra note 15, at 175-77 (discussing different "evasion" sentencing system
options for Congress).
271. Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 263.
272. Yellen, supra note 15, at 177.
273. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
274. Id.
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D. Proposal
From the proposed options, there is no choice without flaws or dif-
ficult decisions. When evaluated closely, however, Congress will hope-
fully see that one choice is the better option. The remedy Congress
should adopt is a Booker-ized form of the Guidelines using a system of
jury fact-finding and judicial sentencing. There are three main reasons
for this choice: (1) the degree of complexity, (2) prosecutorial power,
275and (3) judicial discretion. After assessment, the bifurcated jury sys-
tem would be the most effective choice.
1. Degree of Complexity
Both the bifurcated jury system and the complex charge system are
intricate sentencing schemes.276 Both systems require the jury to under-
stand and make decisions on many more factors than any past system.277
According to Justice Breyer, there are just too many factors to submit
them all to the jury.278 The bifurcated jury system also comes with addi-
tional complexities such as second indictments and new federal rules of
evidence. 279 However, the bifurcated jury system would also come with
an option for the defendant to waive his or her right to a bifurcated
jury.
2 8 0
The court would also only use the bifurcated jury system in a small
amount of trials.281 To begin with, over 95% of federal criminal prosecu-
tions are plea-bargained.28 2 This means that a jury would use either sys-
tem in only 3 to 5% of all federal criminal prosecutions. 283 Only half of
those federal criminal prosecutions, however, have sentencing enhance-
ments. 284 While the court would only use the bifurcated jury for sentenc-
ing enhancements,28 5 the court would use the complex charge system for
every case.286
275. Id. at 2554-58.
276. Id. at 2554, 2558.
277. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
278. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557.
279. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
280. Id. at 2541.
281. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 20 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/Fig-c.PDF (chart showing
that since 2000, over 95% of charges result in a plea bargain); however, just because the jury is not
dealing with a complex charge system does not mean that the prosecutor and the judge would have
to use the system every time.
284. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 772 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
285. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how a jury fact-finding re-
quirement would only apply to a minority of cases).
286. See generally, Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-
mises Upon Which they Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 10 (1988) (discussing the basic system and
how "courts" use this system).
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The complex charge system has other, unique complexities, The
legislature would have difficulty writing the criminal statutes because
each charge has multiple elements to determine and define.287 As stated
above, this system would also require defendants to prove innocence at
the same time as disproving other criminal elements.288
The simple charge system is a somewhat less complex system.
Criminal statutes already contain maximum sentences, but Congress
would have difficulty creating the list of permissible mitigating fac-
tors.289 As Justice O'Connor has noted, the difference between a mitigat-
ing and aggravating factor is usually "in the eye of the beholder., 290 In
addition, the court would use this type of sentencing system in every
prosecution unless the prosecutor accepted the truth of the mitigating
factor without a hearing. 291 Overall, the simple charge system is less
complex, but the bifurcated jury system affects the least number of cases.
2. Prosecutorial Power
In the bifurcated jury system, prosecutorial power is most likely to
292decrease. A prosecutor who faces a longer, bifurcated jury trial could
offer a desirable plea bargain to the defendant.293 Defendants may not
trust a jury determination and instead choose to plea bargain,294 but the
threat of a bifurcated trial should at least even the playing field.
The amount of prosecutorial power in a complex charge system is
harder to determine. The prosecutor would control the charge by deter-
mining which of many elements to indict.295 The prosecutor could then
engage in "charge bargaining." 296 In addition, the prosecutor may have
to decide which elements to charge the defendant with before discover-
ing or evaluating all the evidence.297 On the other hand, if the prosecutor
charges the defendant with many elements and the defendant does not
plead guilty, the prosecutor may face a long, drawn out trial.298 Each
element a prosecutor must prove only extends the length of the trial and
287. Id. at 558-59.
288. Id. at 557.
289. See Amala & Laurine, supra note 269, at 1127.
290. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 542-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
291. See Amala & Laurine, supra note 269, at 1138.
292. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2557 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
293. Id. at 2556.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2555.
296. Id.; Joy Anne Boyd, Comment, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of Justice's
Plea Bargain Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor's Power Under the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 595 (2004) (describing "charge bargaining" as a form of plea
bargaining in which the prosecutor would agree to drop certain charges if the defendant agrees to
plea guilty to other charges).
297. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
298. Id. at 2542 (majority opinion).
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increases the likelihood that a prosecutor will offer a better plea bar-
gain. 99
In a simple charge system, the prosecutor would also have the
power to "charge bargain., 30 0 Because each charge carries a maximum
penalty, the crime a prosecutor charges a defendant with could greatly
affect the sentence. 30 1 In addition, because this system reverses the bur-
den of proof, the prosecutor does not have to prove anything except that
the crime itself was committed.30 2 The Court in Booker also notes that
any options such as these are only available because of the heavy reli-
ance in our system on plea-bargaining.30 3 Therefore, the bifurcated jury
system shows the most promise in decreasing prosecutorial power.
3. Discretion
In terms of judicial discretion, the bifurcated jury system and the
complex charge system come out almost evenly. After the jury deter-
mines which facts are true beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge will still
have discretion to sentence the offender within the Guidelines.30 4 In the
case of the bifurcated jury system, however, the judge would also have
the decision to increase the sentence above the Guidelines, although the
Guidelines would never require a judge to do so.
30
5
In the simple charge system, the judge may have too much discre-
tion. The judge has the option to apply any appropriate mitigating fac-
tors and would have the option to decrease the sentence. 30 6 Unless the
Commission was to give specific decreases in the sentence for each find-
ing of mitigation, it would allow the judge a great deal of discretion to
determine how much to decrease the sentence.30 7 In addition, a simple
charge system has no framework for appellate review.30 8 Thus, a bifur-
cated jury system or complex charge system would allow the appropriate
amount of judicial discretion.
Therefore, after a full evaluation of the three options, Congress
should choose the bifurcated jury system. The system is complex, but
not so much that it is not worth the trade-off of fairness to defendants. In
Blakely, the Court states that
The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, be-
fore depriving a man of [ten] more years than his liberty, the State
299. Id.
300. Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
301. Id.
302. Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 263.
303. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
304. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
305. McVoy, supra note 192, at 1638.
306. Amala & Laurine, supra note 269, at 1129.




should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation
to 'the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors,'
rather than a lone employee of the State.
309
In addition, prosecutorial power and judicial discretion are more stable in
the bifurcated jury system. 310 Although this system is not perfect, it is
the most fair system that is in accord with Congressional intent and com-
plies with Booker.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Booker,311 the Stevens majority succeeded in up-
holding a basic constitutional right for criminal defendants: courts should
not increase a defendant's sentence unless a jury of his or her peers finds
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all facts.3 12  The
Breyer majority, however, instead of allowing criminal defendants to
benefit from this constitutional right, found a loophole: an advisory sen-
tencing system. Although the Breyer majority did an eloquent job of
attempting to convince everyone that an advisory system fits best with
Congressional intent and is better than a Booker-ized system, in reality,
the holding only evaded providing defendants with their constitutional
right to a jury trial on all facts.
Nonetheless, "[t]he ball now lies in Congress' court."'3 13 Whether
Congress wanted the opportunity or not, it now has the job of deciding
how to play the ball served by the Supreme Court. When Congress
evaluates the options, it should not only look at issues like the degree of
complexity, prosecutorial power, judicial discretion, and many more; it
should also not lose focus of the constitutional right Booker upheld for
defendants. Although a bifurcated jury system is not a perfect sentencing
system, it is more fair to the defendant and staves off a concern than that
has existed almost as long as the United States: that the "jury right could
be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion. '3 14
Amanda Farnsworth*
309. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752 (citing Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004)).
310. See supra, Part III.D.2-3.
311. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
312. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
313. ld. at 768.
314. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
thank Mary Ellen Rayment and Professor Kamin for their generous assistance and insight in the
creation of this Comment.
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COLORADO SUPREME COURT STATISTICAL SURVEY
This article modestly begins what will hopefully become a Denver
University Law Review tradition. Below is the statistical analysis of the
Colorado Supreme Court from when the seven justices first starting serv-
ing together (April 24, 2000) through June 2005. The analysis does not
endeavor to include all the Court's opinions. Rather, the presentation
focuses on four subjects: insurance law, suppression orders, water law,
and takings.
Chief Justice Mullarkey has been serving on the Court since 1987.
Justice Kourlis was appointed in 1995,1 Justice Hobbs in 1996, Justices
Martinez and Bender in 1997, Justice Rice in 1998, and Justice Coats in
2000.2
Some commentators have noted and analyzed the supposed results
of having six of the seven justices appointed under Governor Romer.3
This article seeks only to present two statistical results in four categories.
First, a summary of the number of cases reversed or affirmed in each
category. Second, the voting alliances of each justice in each category.
I. THE PROCESS
A. Cases Reversed or Affirmed
The charts show the number and percent of cases affirmed or re-
versed in each category. Note that "reversed" includes cases reversed in
part.
B. Justices in Agreement
The percentage of agreement is calculated by dividing the number
of opinions on which the two justices joined by the total number of opin-
ions in which both justices participated in the category. Agreement
amongst two justices counted only once per case. For example, if Justice
Bender and Justice Martinez were to join to concur in part and dissent in
part, they would only be counted as having agreed once.
1. As this article went to press, Justice Kourlis announced her resignation effective January
10, 2006. Howard Pankratz, Kourlis Stepping Down From Colo. High Court, DENV. POST, Dec. 6,
2005, at Al.
2. For more biographical information, see http://www.courts.state.co.us/
supct/supctjustices.htm, last visited (Nov. 14, 2005).
3. Adam D. Feldman, Romer Party Plus One: Managing Public Law in Colorado, 2000-
2004, 68 ALB. L. REV. 445 (2005).
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II. CASES REVERSED OR AFFIRMED
A. Insurance Law











The Court ruled on twenty-five water law cases.6
4. Smith v. Farmers Ins. Exch. & Mid-Century Ins. Co., 9 P.3d 335 (Colo. 2000); Welch v.
George, 19 P.3d 675 (Colo. 2000); Clementi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 223 (Colo.
2001); City of Arvada v. Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency, 19 P.3d 10 (Colo. 2001);
Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Progressive Mountain Ins. Co., 27 P.3d 343 (Colo. 2001); DeHerrera
v. Sentry Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001); Avemco Ins. Co. v. N. Colo. Air Charter, lnc, 38 P.3d
555 (Colo. 2002); Hill v. Dewitt, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 888 (Colo. 2002) consolidated with Fasi v.
Becker, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 848 (Colo. 2002); Giampapa v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230
(Colo. 2003); Hawes v. Colo. Div. of Ins., 65 P.3d 1008 (Colo. 2003); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Kastner, 77 P.3d 1256 (Colo. 2003); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brekke, 105 P.3d 177
(Colo. 2004) consolidated with State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shaffer (Colo. 2004); Am. Fam.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 102 P.3d 333 (Colo. 2004); Goodson v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 89 P.3d 409
(Colo. 2004); Cotter Corp. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2004 Colo. LEXIS 477 (Colo.
2004); Thompson v. Md. Cas. Co., 84 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2004); Steiner v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 85 P.3d
135 (Colo. 2004); Friedland v. Travelers Indem. Co., 105 P.3d 639 (Colo. 2005); Cary v. United of
Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288 (Colo. 2005); Coors v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 112 P.3d 59
(Colo. 2005).
5. People v. Randolph, 4 P.3d 477 (Colo. 2000); People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774 (Colo.
2000); People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300 (Colo. 2000); People v. Ramos, 13 P.3d 295 (Colo. 2000);
People v. King, 16 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2001) consolidated with People v. Gulick (Colo. 2001); People
v. Brazzel, 18 P.3d 1285 (Colo. 2001); People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986 (Colo. 2001); People v.
Koverman, 38 P.3d 85 (Colo. 2002); People v. Heilman, 52 P.3d 224 (Colo. 2002); People v. Man-
gum, 48 P.3d 568 (Colo. 2002); People v. Syrie, 101 P.3d 219 (Colo. 2004); People v. Howard, 92
P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004); People v. Ramos, 86 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2004); People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421
(Colo. 2004); People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060 (Colo. 2004); People v. Kirk, 103 P.3d 918 Colo. 2005).
6. Bd. County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homewoners' Assoc., 14 P.3d 325 (Colo. 2000);
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consolidated Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799 (Colo. 2001);
Empire Lodge Homeowners' Assoc. v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139 (Colo. 2001); Mount Emmons Mining
Co. v. Town of Crested Butte, 40 P.3d 1255 (Colo. 2002); City of Thornton v. City and County of
Denver, 44 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2002); SL Group, LLC v. Go West Indus., Inc., 42 P.3d 637 (Colo.
2002); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 45 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2002);
Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241 (Colo. 2002); State Eng'r.
v. Bradley, 53 P.3d 1165 (Colo. 2002); Double RL Co. v. Telluray Ranch Props., 54 P.3d 908 (Colo.
2002); West Elk Ranch v. United States, 65 P.3d 479 (Colo. 2002); Groundwater Appropriators of
South Platte River Basin, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 73 P.3d 22 (Colo. 2003); Colo. Ground Water
Comm'n v. North Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62 (Colo. 2003); East Twin





The Court ruled on eight cases dealing with regulatory takings, emi-




III. JUSTICES IN AGREEMENT
The following graphs represent voting alignments for each justice in






Takings: - - - - - -
Lakes Ditches & Water Works, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs., 76 P.3d 918 (Colo. 2003); Moyer
v. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n, 78 P.3d 313 (Colo. 2003); United States v. Colo. State Eng'r
101 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2004); Black Hawk v. City of Central, 97 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004); Wyse Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate Invest. LLC, 92 P.3d 918 (Colo. 2004); Fort Morgan Reservoir &
Irrigation Co. v. Groundwater Appropriators of the S. Platte River Basin, Inc., 85 P.3d 536 (Colo.
2004); City of Golden v. Simpson, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 64 (Colo. 2004); City of Aurora v. Simpson,
105 P.3d 595 (Colo. 2005); Colo. Conservation Water Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conser-
vancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2005); East Ridge of Fort Collins v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation
Co., 109 P.3d 969 (Colo. 2005); East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation Dist. V. Rangeview
Metro. Dist., 109 P.3d 154 (Colo. 2005); Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Farmers Reservoir & Irriga-
tion Co., 115 P.3d 638 (Colo. 2005).
7. Pub. Highway Auth. v. The 455 Co. 88 Co. 3 P.3d 18 (Colo. 2000); Fowler Irrevocable
Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 2001 Colo. LEXIS 106 (Colo. 2001); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v.
Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377 (Colo. 2001); Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 38 P.3d 59 (Colo. 2001); Jagow v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo.
2002); Dep't of Transp. v. Stapleton, 97 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2004); E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Re-
venig, 91 P.3d 1038 (Colo. 2004); Arvada Urban Renewal Auth. V. Columbine Prof. Plaza Assoc.,
Inc., 85 P.3d 1066 (Colo. 2004).
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PEOPLE V. HARLAN: THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT
TAKES A STEP TOWARD ELIMINATING RELIGIOUS
INFLUENCE ON JURIES
"An eye for an eye will only make the whole world blind."'
-Mahatma Gandhi
INTRODUCTION
Gandhi's familiar quote is a powerful response to the ancient
maxim "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.",2 Death penalty opponents
often cite Gandhi's quote to suggest that the death penalty is flawed and
should be abolished.3 Gandhi's quote reminds people that while Ameri-
can society allows the death sentence in murder cases, it does not do so
blindly. A death sentence is not part of a simple equation as "an eye for
an eye" suggests. Justice requires the courts to employ a rigorous, struc-
tured and exhaustive process before deciding whether a citizen must die
for the crime he or she committed.
The court placed Robert Harlan's life in the hands of the jury.4 The
court admonished the jury to follow a strict process.5 They were to listen
to the evidence, follow the court's legal instructions, apply a four-step
process, and not vote for the death penalty automatically. 6 A trial court
found that the jury had not followed the court's strict legal instructions.7
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court found that because jurors
brought Bibles into the jury deliberation room, and discussed biblical
passages such as "eye for an eye," the court could no longer trust that
neither "pride or prejudice" influenced the jury's verdict.8  Robert
1. See Gandhi Statue dedication Ceremony at Hermann Park (Oct. 2, 2004),
http://www.indianembassy.org/amb/ambgandhi-houston_04.htm.
2. The idea of an "eye for an eye" can be found in the Bible in Leviticus 24:20. It has been
traced, however, to other ancient sources, most notably the Code of Hammurabi. See CODE OF
HAMMURABI § 196 (Robert Francis Harper ed. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2d. ed. 1904) (about
1750 B.C.).
3. See, e.g., The Oklahoma Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty,
http://www.ocadp.org/speakers.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
4. See People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2000).
5. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 629-30.
6. Id. at 620.
7. Id. at 619-20 ("The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable possibility that use of
the Bible in the jury room to demonstrate a requirement of the death penalty for the crime of murder
would have influenced a typical juror to reject a life sentence for Harlan.").
8. See id. at 633 (referring to COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(b)(2005) which requires the
Colorado Supreme Court to overturn death penalty conviction is the sentence was imposed due to
pride of prejudice).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Harlan's sentence was overturned and he was re-sentenced to life without
the possibility for parole. 9
The circumstances in People v. Harlan were not unique. Advocates
on both sides of the issue frequently cite biblical passages and religious
arguments.1l However, challenges to sentences allegedly tainted by re-
ligion "often face formidable state evidentiary hurdles and rarely result in
mistrials or reversals."" Harlan is unique because it is a rare example
where a court has concluded that there was a sufficient likelihood that
religion could have had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the jury's
deliberation. 12
The court's decision sparked a harsh reaction from conservative and
religious groups. Colorado Governor, Bill Owens, reacted by stating,
"[t]oday's decision is demeaning to people of faith and prevents justice
from being served .... 13 The decision inspired one commentator to
write, "[i]n sum, the anti-religious principle of Harlan categorically con-
demns a juror whose morality is informed by religion. God is dead, at
least in the chambers of the Colorado Supreme Court."' 4 The court's
decision was understandably controversial; however, to claim that the
decision was anti-religious is a mischaracterization. The decision in
Harlan only prohibits the physical presence of the Bible in the jury de-
liberation room.' 5
In Part I, this article will discuss the facts of Harlan and how the
Colorado Supreme Court came to its decision. In addition, it will discuss
the Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals' decisions in Arnett v.
Jackson'6 and United States v. Bakker' 7 respectively. In Part II, the arti-
cle will compare Arnett and Bakker to Harlan and discuss emerging
standards courts have applied when analyzing religious influences in
sentencing decisions. The article will then consider whether the Colo-
rado Supreme Court was correct to assert that we live in a religious soci-
ety that could be prejudiced by the presence of the Bible. Next, the arti-
cle will discuss the court's narrow holding in light of the arguments
made in Justice Rice's dissent. Part III will analyze the trial court's deci-
sion to impeach the jury's verdict, and dismiss the protection afforded by
9. Id. at 617.
10. Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin on Heaven's Door: Rethinking the Role of
Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REv., 1090, 1092 (2001).
11. Id. at 1121.
12. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 619-20.
13. Court: Jurors Erred by Consulting Bible in Death Penalty Case, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Apr. 19, 2005, at 16, available at 4/19/05 CHRSTNCTY 16 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Jurors Erred].
14. Bruce Fein, Purging Religious Influence, WASH. TIMES, April 19, 2005, at A14. The
author makes the argument that the spoken word is more powerful than the written word. See id.
15. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 632.
16. 393 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2004).
17. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Rule 606(b). 18 Finally, in Part IV, this article will predict how the court
would have ruled if the verdict had been challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds.
In conclusion, this article will suggest ways courts and lawmakers
could modify the conditions of jury deliberation and jury instructions in
an effort to ensure defendants receive sentences free from prejudice. The
Colorado Supreme Court and other courts across the country attempt to
strike a balance between respecting religious views and limiting religious
influence in the courtroom. 19 Courts are asking, "How much religion
should we tolerate?" The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Harlan
20
has taken a step towards answering that question: no Bibles in the jury
deliberation room.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Colorado Supreme Court's Decision in People v. Harlan
21
In 1995, a jury convicted Robert Eliot Harlan of raping and murder-
ing Rhonda Maloney and of shooting Jaquie Creazzo He shot Jaquie
Creazzo as she attempted to rescue Rhonda Maloney; the injury Jacquie
Creazzo suffered left her paralyzed for life.2 3 Then, he seized Maloney
and savagely beat, raped, and killed her.24 The jury sentenced Robert
Harlan to death, and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the verdict.
25
Subsequently, Harlan brought a motion to vacate his death sentence
due to jury misconduct.26 Harlan alleged that jurors brought Bibles into
the jury room during deliberations and the Bibles presented them to
"demonstrate... authoritative passage[s] commanding imposition of the
death penalty. 27 The trial judge frequently warned the jury to ignore
any and all extraneous information, 28 and told the jury that they were to
consider the evidence brought forward by the trial and "nothing else
whatsoever., 29 The court instructed the jury that Colorado law requires
that they follow the instructions and guidelines the court had given.
30
Specifically, the court told the jury that their verdict could not be "the
18. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 625.
19. See cases cited supra notes 16-17.
20. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 616.
21. 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2000).
22. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 618.
23. Id. at 618.





29. Id. The court also warned the jury not to discuss the case with anyone, not to watch any-
thing on television about the case, and to have someone scan the newspaper before they did to make
sure they did not see anything that concerned the criminal justice system. See id.
30. See id.
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result of passion, prejudice or other irrational or arbitrary emotional re-
sponse."3'
In an instruction that the dissent would later rely upon in its opinion,
the court directed the jury that their decision to impose a death sentence
would require them to "apply [their] reasoned judgment in deciding
whether the situation calls for life imprisonment or the imposition of the
death penalty., 32 The jury would "still make a further individual moral
assessment of whether [they have] been convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the death penalty ... is appropriate. 33  Finally, the jury
"should attempt to arrive at a reasoned judgment as to whether [they]
have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating fac-
tors do no outweigh the aggravating factor or factors. 34
Three months after the jury sentenced Harlan to death, a defense
counsel investigator interviewed five members of the jury. 35 The jurors
revealed the physical presence and discussion of the Bible during the
death penalty deliberations,36 which prompted Harlan to file a motion to
vacate the sentence.37 His motion alleged juror misconduct, and the trial
court granted an evidentiary hearing.38
According to facts brought forward at the hearing, the jury deliber-
ated late into Friday evening, but did not reach a verdict.39 That night,
several jurors read passages from the Bible in their hotel rooms and
searched for passages that related to the death penalty and the jury's role
in sentencing the defendant.40 One juror, Ms. Eaton-Ochoa, took notes
on two particular Bible passages.41  The first passage was Leviticus
24:20-21, "fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, as he has
caused disfigurement of a man, so shall it be done to him. And whoever
kills an animal shall restore it, but whoever kills a man shall be put to
death."A2 The second passage was Romans 13:1, "let every soul be sub-
ject to the governing authorities for there is no authority except from God
and the authorities that exist are appointed by God."A3 The trial court
31. Id.





37. Seeid. at 619.
38. See id. at 620.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 622.
42. Id. The court noted:
[T]hese quotations are taken from the record, in which counsel read from juror Yantis-
Cumming's Bible, a New Scofield Study Version, [which] is the Bible that Eaton-Ochoa
used on Friday night and from which she took her notes and may have been one of the
Bibles present in the jury room.




concluded that these passages and the presence of the Bible in the jury
room could have caused jury members to vote for the death penalty.44
Therefore, the trial court reversed the jury's death sentence.45
On appeal, Rule 606(b) limited the Colorado Supreme Court's in-
quiry into whether the biblical passages could have prejudiced the jury.4
Rule 606(b) precludes an inquiry into a jury verdict with the exception of
inquiries into the improper introduction of extraneous evidence.47 The
court drew from Colorado Rule 606(b) case law and compiled a list of
permissible factors to consider in such an inquiry4 8
The Colorado Supreme Court considered evidence permissible un-
der the compiled list and concluded, "[they] can no longer say that the
death penalty verdict was not influenced by passion, prejudice, or some
other arbitrary factor."49 The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's order to vacate the death sentence and imposed a life sentence
without the possibility of parole.50
Justice Rice authored a dissent in which Justice Kourlis joined.5t
Justice Rice argued that the only issue was whether the presence of the
Bible caused Harlan's sentence to be prejudiced.5 2  She stressed that
there was no misconduct because the court did not instruct the jury
against bringing Bibles into the deliberation. 3 Furthermore, she argued
that defense counsel encouraged the jury to discuss the Bible because he
44. See id. at 634.
45. See id. at 623.
46. See id. at 626 ("We must ... determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are sup-
ported by evidence admissible under COLO. R. EvID. 606(b).") Rule 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jurors' attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit
or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be pre-
cluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
COLO. R. EvID. 606(b)
47. See id. (discussing the exception to COLO. R. EVID. 606(b)'s prohibition against impeach-
ing a verdict with testimony from jurors).
48. See id. The court stated:
Each of these factors is appropriate for inquiry... (1) how the extraneous information re-
lates to critical issues in the case; (2) how authoritative is the source consulted; (3)
whether a juror initiated the search for the extraneous information; (4) whether the infor-
mation obtained by one juror was brought to the attention of another juror; (5) whether
the information was presented before the jury reached a unanimous verdict; and (6)




50. See id. at 633.
51. See id. at 634-39.
52. See id. at 636.
53. See id. at 635.
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asked jurors about the concept of "eye for an eye" during voir dire,54 and
discussed Harlan's habit of reading the Bible during the closing argu-
ment.55 She also argued that the court effectively instructed the jurors to
consider the Bible when it asked them to apply their "reasoned judg-
ment," and make an "individual moral assessment., 56 Furthermore she
argued, the majority was unreasonable in assuming that the Bible preju-
diced the jury and the majority opinion "exhibits a complete lack of faith
in the jury system.,57 The Colorado Supreme Court's decision is in stark
contrast to a recent decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
which that court held that a Judge did not act inappropriately when she
cited the Bible as the basis for her sentencing decision.
58
B. The Sixth Circuit Court's Decision in Arnett v. Jackson
59
In Arnett, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to overrule an
Ohio Supreme Court decision holding that a trial court judge's recitation
of the Bible during her sentencing decision did not violate the peti-
tioner's due process rights.60 The Sixth Circuit overruled the district
court's determination that the trial judge violated the petitioner's due
process rights when she impermissibly referenced the Bible during the
petitioner's sentencing hearing.6' The petitioner, James Arnett, entered
guilty pleas on ten counts of rape and one count of pandering obscenity
involving a minor.62 The victim of Amett's sexual abuse was the daugh-
ter of his live-in girlfriend.63 During the sentencing hearing, the Judge
referenced the Bible as an explanation for the defendant's sentence.
64
The trial judge's monologue, which served as the basis for the peti-
tioner's due process claim, reads in pertinent part:
Trial Court: And in looking at the final part of my struggle
with you, I finally answered my question late at night when I
turned to one additional source to help me. And basically,
looking at Rachel on one hand, looking at the photographs of
you happily as a child, and looking at the photographs of
downloading that came from your computer, I agree they're
very sad photographs, they're pure filth, it just tells me how ill
you are.
54. Id. at 635 n.3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 637.
57. Id. at 638.
58. See generally Amett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681 (2004).
59. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 681.
60. See id. at 683.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 682-83.
63. Id. at 683.
64. Id at 684.
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Trial Court: And that passage where I had the opportunity to
look is Matthew 18:5, 6. 'And whoso shall receive one such
little child in my name, receiveth me. But, whoso shall offend
one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for
him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were
drowned in the depth of the sea.'
65
Arnett appealed the trial court's decision and the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals vacated the sentence, "concluding that his due process rights were
violated by virtue of the trial court 'factoring in religion' when imposing
its sentence. 66 The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously concluded, "the
judge's Biblical reference did not violate Arnett's right to due process
because it was not the 'basis' of the sentencing determination, but rather
'one of several reasons' or an 'additional source' relied upon by the trial
court. 6 7 Arnett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in district court
alleging that the Ohio Supreme Court incorrectly applied Supreme Court
precedent on the issue of whether the court can rely on religious passages
in a sentencing decision.68 A ett's habeas petition also alleged that the
trial court violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment;
however, the United States magistrate judge held that the Establishment
Clause claim was procedurally invalid because the defendant raised it for
the first time in the Ohio Supreme Court. 69 The magistrate judge found
that the trial court's reliance on the Bible as a "final source of authority"
constituted an impermissible factor for sentencing, and granted Arnett's
70habeas petition on the finding of a denial of due process.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although the United
States Supreme Court has held that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process,7' the Court has not decided the narrow issue
of whether citing a religious text during a sentencing hearing violates a
defendant's due process rights.72 The Court of Appeals held that the
magistrate judge should not have granted the petition because the Su-
preme Court had not decided the exact issue at hand.73 Furthermore, the
Sixth Circuit held that the trial judge's reliance on the Bible was proper
because "the principle embedded in the referenced Biblical passage (of
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting State v. Amett, 724 N.E.2d 793, 803 (Ohio 2000)).
68. Id. at 684-85.
69. See id. at 685 n.2.
70. Id.
71. See In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
72. See Arnett, 393 F.3d at 686 ("[T]he Supreme Court has never specifically decided whether
a defendant's right to due process is violated if a religious text or commentary is cited during a
sentencing hearing and/or considered by a trial court in reaching a sentencing determination.").
73. See id. at 686.
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not harming young children) is fully consistent with Ohio's sentencing
consideration to the same effect."
74
The dissent argued that the Bible played a significant role in Ar-
nett's sentence. 75 The dissent agreed with the district court's determina-
tion that the trial judge looked to the Bible as her "final source of author-
ity, '76 but it reasoned that the trial judge would not have employed the
Bible to answer her dilemma unless it "carries special significance as a
source of moral authority. 77 The dissent believed the trial judge ac-
corded the biblical passages read at Arnett's sentencing hearing "consti-
tutionally significant weight. 78  Therefore, the trial judge violated
Arnett's rights to due process. 79 The dissent stated that the trial judge's
motivation was identical to that of the sentencing judge in United States
v. Bakker.80 In that case, the Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant's sen-
tence because the sentencing judge's "personal religious principles" were
the basis for the sentencing decision.
81
C. The Fourth Circuit Court's Decision in United States. v. Bakker
82
In United States v. Bakker, James 0. Bakker, a well-known televan-
gelist, appealed his fraud and conspiracy convictions to the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.83 Bakker challenged his sentence by claiming that
the trial judge's "personal religious beliefs" impermissibly affected the
84sentence. During sentencing, the trial judge stated that Bakker "had no
thought whatever about his victims and those of us who do have a relig-
ion are ridiculed as being saps from money-grubbing preachers or
priests. 85  Bakker argued that the judge's comments constituted an
abuse of discretion and a violation of Bakker's due process rights be-
86cause the judge factored personal religious beliefs into the sentence.
The government argued that the judge was not speaking for himself but
for society as a whole and was well within his discretion.87
74. Id. at 686-87. The "Ohio Sentencing considerations" referred to by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals are enumerated in the OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(b)(1) (2005). Inter alia, the
Code requires the sentencing judge to consider whether: "(1) The physical or mental injury suffered
by the victim of the offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physi-
cal or mental condition or age of the victim;" and whether "(6) The offender's relationship with the
victim facilitated the offense." Id.
75. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 689 (Clay, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 690.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 692.
79. Id. at 692.
80. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991).
81. Bakker, 925 F.2d at 741.
82. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991).
83. Id. at 731.
84. Id.





The Circuit Court recognized that it was appropriate for a sentenc-
ing court to consider the social impact of the crimes the defendant alleg-
edly committed and the opportunity to vindicate those crimes for the
community. 88 And, "to a considerable extent a sentencing judge is the
embodiment of public condemnation and social outrage. 89 In dicta, the
court recognized that while the Constitution does not require a person to
surrender her religious beliefs if they are appointed to judicial office,
"[c]ourts ... cannot sanction sentencing procedures that create the per-
ception of the bench as a pulpit from which judges announce their per-
sonal sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish defendants for of-
fending it."90 The court held that the trial judge's comments had ex-
ceeded his discretion and the court vacated Bakker's sentence and re-
manded his case for re-sentencing.9'
II. ANALYSIS
In People v. Harlan,92 the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that
the Bible might have prejudiced the death sentence the jury handed
down. 93 In doing so, the court avoided following the dubious "vaguely
in-line" standard espoused in Arnett v. Jackson9 4 and argued for in Jus-
tice Rice's dissent.95 The standards utilized in Arnett and United States
v. Bakker96 reveal standards courts have applied to sentences allegedly
tainted by religious influence. Furthermore, the circuit court cases reveal
the standards the Colorado Supreme Court may apply if it were review-
ing a sentence decided by a judge. The Harlan decision correctly as-
serted that the Bible has a prejudicial effect on jurors because of the pro-
found role religion plays in the average American life.97 The majority's
narrow holding took a big step towards limiting religious influence in
jury deliberations. However, in reality it only prohibits the presence of
the Bible in the jury deliberation room.98
A. A Questionable Standard
The Sixth Circuit majority opinion in Arnett attempted to establish
the following standard: courts will tolerate biblical passages if they are
"vaguely in-line" with state law.99 Justice Rice employed the same logic
88. Id. (citing United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1990)).
89. Id. (citing United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1982)).
90. id.
91. Id. at 741.
92. 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005).
93. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 634.
94. 393 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2005).
95. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 634-39.
96. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cit. 1991).
97. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 633.
98. See id.
99. See Arnett, 393 F.3d at 686-87. The majority agues that the biblical quote cited by the
judge was "fully consistent with Ohio's sentencing consideration," codified at OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.12(b)(1) (West 2005). Id. at 687.
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in the Harlan dissent.'00 She argued the reading and discussion by the
jury of Romans 13:1, "[e]veryone must submit himself to the governing
authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has estab-
lished," could not have been prejudicial to the jury because the passage
merely "instructs individuals to follow the laws of Colorado."10 1 The
majority opinion in Harlan found Justice Rice's arguments unpersua-
sive 102 and correctly chose not to follow the Sixth Circuit's standard be-
cause it would force judges to take part in biblical interpretation.
The "standard" suggests that judges may allow the incorporation of
biblical passages in sentencing decisions if they can find an interpretation
of the biblical passage that resembles state law. For example, the Sixth
Circuit found that Matthew 18:5, which calls for the punishment of child
molesters by hanging a millstone around their necks and having them
thrown in the sea, 10 3 "wholly consistent" with Ohio sentencing guide-
lines.'°4 Ohio law instructs the sentencing court to consider "[t]he physi-
cal or mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense due to the con-
duct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical or mental
condition or age of the victim. '' 1°5 Matthew 18:5 is only consistent with
Ohio law in that it considers abuse to young children, and is even vague
on that point. Does "offending," mean molesting? Does it mean raping?
Alternatively, does it simply mean being rude to? Matthew 18:5 suggests
that someone who commits the sexual assault of a child should be put to
death by drowning. 1°6 The Ohio sentencing statue does not permit the
court to consider capital punishment, and more importantly the Eight
Amendment and the Supreme Court case law interpreting the amendment
clearly state that the death penalty is inappropriate for any crime less
than murder. 10 7 The biblical quote cited by the trial judge in Arnett was
not consistent with state law and had no place in the trial judge's deci-
sion. The jury's discussion of Romans 13:1 in Harlan is unacceptable
for the same reason: because our laws do not require a submission to
authority, and our authority does not require the death penalty.
10 8
Justice Rice argued that Romans 13:1 should be tolerated because
"the well-accepted interpretation of [the] passage is that individuals are
100. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 637 (Rice, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. See generally id. at 618-34 (explanatory parenthentical needed - so might be able to
reduce the pinpoint cite once he writes this).
103. See Arnett, 393 F.3d at 684 (quoting Matthew 18:5, 6).
104. See id.
105. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(B)(1) (West 2002).
106. Mathew 18:5 (King James).
107. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (holding that the death penalty was a grossly disproportionate punishment for the crime of
rape of an adult woman).
108. See Romans 13:1 (King James).
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to obey the laws of their nation."'0 9 Justice Rice reasoned that the bibli-
cal passage was not prejudicial because its effect would only lead a juror
to follow the laws of Colorado, which require a four-step process to sen-
tence a defendant to death." 0 The principles behind the Constitution are
not in line with Justice Rice's interpretation of Romans 13:1. The First
Amendment encourages people to question government officials, protest
against inequality and impeach politicians if need be."1 Furthermore,
Justice Rice's argument in favor of Romans 13:1 was flawed because the
biblical passage, like most biblical passages, is esoteric. Romans 13:1
does much more than just encourage jurors to follow the law; it suggests
that jurors have a divine obligation to apply the laws of state, and an ob-
ligation to vote in favor of the death penalty.
Justice Rice's dissent also revealed another reason why the
"vaguely in-line standard" is dangerous to our court system. Her dissent
serves as an example of how judges would participate in biblical inter-
pretation.1 12 Judge Clay's dissent in Arnett warned that "[u]nder this
approach, the judgments of trial courts could begin to resemble the fat-
was of religious clerics, and the opinions of appellate courts echo the
proclamations of the Sanhedrin."' 
13
Justice Rice began her discussion of Romans 13:1 by stating: "the
plain meaning and well-accepted interpretation of this passage is that...
,, 4 Indeed Justice Rice is interpreting the Bible. She chose to employ a
majority interpretation of the Bible, which presumes there are minority
interpretations that she chose not to follow. She also states that her un-
derstanding of the passage was the "plain meaning" of the passage. This
suggests that she applied the canons of construction common to statutory
or contract interpretation to discern the intent of the author. 1 5 Religion
does not have the force of law and judges do not have a duty to interpret
it. Courts should abandon the standard established by the Sixth Circuit
in Arnett and followed in Justice Rice's dissent in Harlan. The Colorado
Supreme Court correctly decided against employing the "vaguely in-
line" standard in its decision.
B. A Different Standard
In Bakker, the Fourth Circuit did not employ the "vaguely in-line
standard" espoused by the Sixth Circuit." 6 Instead, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the defendant's sentence because the trial court believed the trial
109. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 637.
110. See id. at 630.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
112. See Arnett, 393 F.3d at 691.
113. Id.
114. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 637.
115. See, e.g., Richard A. Lord, Rules of Interpretation, in § 32:3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
(4th ed. 2005) ("The plain meaning of language will be given to the words of a contract.").
116. See Bakker, 925 F.2d at 741.
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judge's "personal religious principles" played a decisive role in the
court's sentencing determination." 7 The Fourth Circuit's approach is
preferable to the "vaguely in-line" standard because it objectively con-
siders whether religion has prejudiced a sentence.' 8 The Colorado Su-
preme Court would likely have applied the Bakker standard if a judge
had decided Harlan's sentence. Other reviewing courts should utilize
the Bakker standard when a judge's "personal religious principles" taint
their sentencing decisions." 9
The Fourth Circuit based its decision on the following statement by
the trial judge, "those of us that do have a religion are ridiculed as being
saps."'12 The Sixth Circuit distinguished Bakker from Arnett, and incor-
rectly applied the "personal religiosity" standard by arguing that the trial
judge in Arnett "made no reference whatsoever to her own religious be-
liefs in sentencing Arnett."' 2' The Sixth Circuit made this claim despite
the trial judge's statement that she had been struggling to find an answer
and found that answer in the Bible. 22 Why would the trial judge look for
an answer in the Bible unless the Bible was an integral part of her "per-
sonal religious principles?" By using a quote from the Bible to make a
decision on the length of a defendant's sentence, the trial judge's per-
sonal religiosity became a factor in the sentence.
Although Bakker and Arnett read together do not form a single-
workable standard, one thing is evident: courts may be more willing to
vacate a sentence if a trial judge explicitly references her religiosity dur-
ing the sentencing hearing. If the Colorado Supreme Court chooses to
review a judge-made sentence allegedly prejudiced by religion, the jus-
tices likely would consider whether the judge's personal religiosity
played a role in the sentence, and whether the judge's comments express
that prejudice.
The court in Harlan could not use the standard set forth in Bakker
because Rule 606(b) restricts courts from considering whether the Bible
and the biblical quotes discussed actually swayed the jury's decision.
123
Instead, the court could only inquire into "whether there is a reasonable
possibility that ... extraneous information influence[d] the verdict to the
detriment of the defendant ....
117. See id.
118. See id. at 740.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 687.
122. See id. at 683.
123. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 625 ("The court may not take into account testimony regarding
the jury's deliberations, a juror's mental processes leading to his or her decision, or whether the
extraneous information actually swayed any of the particular jurors' votes."); see also discussion
infra Part II.
124. Harlan, 109 P.3dat 625 (citing Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Colo. 1987)).
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C. Was There a Reasonable Possibility That the Jury Was Prejudiced?
Justice Rice's dissent stated, "there is no reasonable possibility that
a typical jury would be prejudiced by exposure to the biblical passages at
issue here."'' 25 The majority disputed this conclusion and stated, "there is
a reasonable possibility that the extraneous biblical texts influenced the
verdict to Harlan's detriment."'' 26 The majority reasoned that Americans
live "[in] a community where Holy Scripture has factual and legal import
for many citizens."1 27 The majority's decision rested on an unconfirmed
premise. It is only reasonable to assume that the Bible could have preju-
diced Harlan's sentence if the United States is a highly religious society.
Furthermore, the premise is correct only if the members of our highly
religious society, the jurors, believe the Bible to be the Word of God.
According to a recent Gallup poll roughly six in ten American
adults say that religion is "very important" in their lives, 2 8 twenty-eight
percent of adults nationwide go to church at least once a week,129 and
ninety percent of adults nationwide believe in God while only four per-
cent do not.130 The same poll, reported in May 2004, observed that fifty
percent of adults nationwide are Protestant, twenty-three percent of
adults nationwide are Catholic, and nine percent of adults nationwide say
they are Christian but have no specific church.13  When asked specifi-
cally about the Bible, forty-two percent of adults nationwide said that
they believe "[t]he Bible is the actual Word of God,', 132 and thirty-seven
percent of adults nationwide believe that "[t]he Bible is the Word of God
but not everything in it should be taken literally."'' 33  Although only
forty-two percent of adults nationwide say they believe the Bible is the
Word of God, sixty percent believe "[t]he story of Noah and the ark in
which it rained for 40 days and nights, the entire world was flooded, and
only Noah, his family and the animals on their ark survived," is literally
true. 134 Moreover, sixty-one percent of Americans believe "[t]he crea-
tion story in which the world was created in six days," is literally true,
and sixty-four percent of Americans believe "[t]he story about Moses
125. Id. at 633.
126. Id. at 637.
127. Id at 633.
128. Dr. Richard Land, How religion defines America, BBC News, UK Edition (Feb. 25,
2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/programmes/wtwtgod/3518221.stm. The BBC article contrasts the
importance of religion in the United States to that of Canada and the United Kingdom where only 28
percent and 17 percent of those polled described religion as "very important" in their lives. Id.
129. The Gallup Poll, May 2-4, 2004, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Virginia Commonwealth University Life Sciences Survey, Sept. 3-26, 2003,
http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm.
133. Id.
134. ABC News PrimeTime Poll, Feb. 6-10, 2004, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm.
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parting the Red Sea so the Jews could escape from Egypt" is also liter-
ally true. 
135
Furthermore, Cornell University Law Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson
agrees with the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling, specifically that it
recognizes the effect of the Bible in a religiously based society. She
stated, "[t]he majority is correct in saying that in a heavily religious cul-
ture, to recite the Bible to someone could have a prejudicial effect on the
sentencing."'' 36  The above poll numbers support Professor Johnson's
statement. If ninety percent of Americans believe in God, twenty-eight
percent of Americans attend church once a week, and roughly six in ten
American adults say that religion is "very important in their lives," it is
fair for Professor Johnson and the Colorado Supreme Court to character-
ize the United States culture as "heavily religious."
Furthermore, the poll numbers also support Professor Johnson's as-
sertion, and the court's holding, that the Bible "could have [had] a preju-
dicial effect on the sentencing."' 37 In the court's opinion, "The written
word persuasively conveys the authentic ring of reliable authority .. .
,,138 The court further notes, "Some jurors may view biblical texts like
the Leviticus passage at issue here as a factual representation of God's
will.' 39 The poll cited above states that forty-two percent of adults na-
tionwide believe the Bible is the actual word of God.140 Mathematically,
out of a jury of twelve citizens it is fair to assume that five believe the
Bible is the Word of God. It is also fair to assume that if an individual
believes the Bible is the Word of God that they believe people should
obey the Bible as well as passages directing capital punishment for the
crime of murder.
Moreover, the poll numbers say that sixty percent of Americans be-
lieve the story of Noah's Ark.141 Noah's Ark is a particularly interesting
Bible story because of what some might consider its impossible qualities
- a story in which a flood extinguished all life, and the world was re-
populated only with the pairs of animals on Noah's Ark. Widely ac-
cepted scientific truths refute the biblical account. Nonetheless, a sig-
nificant majority of Americans believe the story to be true - literally
true. 142 While it is only fair to assume - based on the polling numbers -
that five of twelve jurors believe the Bible is the Word of God, it is fair
to say that seven of those jurors believe the story of Noah's Ark. If the
135. Id.
136. David L. Hudson Jr., Making Biblical References at Trial May Be Grounds for Reversal,
A.B.A. J., July 2005 at 14, 14 (quoting Prof. Johnson).
137. Id.
138. Harlan, 109 P.3d, at 632.
139. Id.
140. Virginia Commonwealth University Life Sciences Survey, supra note 132.
141. ABC News Prime Time Poll, supra note 134.
142. ABC News Prime Time Poll, supra note 134.
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American population is willing to believe, what some might consider, an
impossible story such as Noah's Ark, it follows that they would be even
more willing to believe biblical passages such as "eye for an eye, life for
a life.', 143 The story of Noah's Ark might seem far-fetched to some, but
"eye for an eye" seems logical and requires a less significant suspension
of the average American's disbelief. The above statistics reveal the pro-
pensity of biblical passages to prejudice an average juror.
The Bible can also have a profound effect on jurors who are not
highly religious or non-religious. There is no doubt that the Bible plays
an important role in civil ceremonies. For example, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court swears the President of the United States into office
with his hand over the Bible; and, witnesses offering testimony in court
have traditionally sworn to tell the truth on the Bible. Interestingly, Pro-
fessor Kevin O'Neil suggests that the Bible is just as prejudicial as any
other learned text and courts should keep it out of the jury deliberation
room for the same reason.144 The hearsay exception for learned treatises
allows "[a]n expert witness [to] refer to a passage in a treatise, but that
treatise is not allowed inside the jury room for fear that jurors will roam
at large through its pages, drawing unguided and possibly erroneous con-
clusions."' 145  Professor O'Neil suggests that allowing the Bible in the
jury deliberation room could cause a similar problem.146 Jurors might
roam through the Bible, find, and apply standards different from those
given in the jury instructions.
147
D. Harlan's Narrow Holding
The Harlan majority held that the jury did not follow the instruc-
tions given to them before the deliberation.
148 Justice Rice disagreed. 149
She argued that the court's instructions actually "directed the jurors to
consider their moral and religious precepts, as well as their general
knowledge, when making a reasoned judgment about whether or not to
impose the death penalty."'150 She argued that the following jury instruc-
tions called for the jury to consider biblical quotations: "[y]ou must still
all make a further individual moral assessment of whether you've been
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty instead of
life in prison is the appropriate punishment; "' and "[t]his consideration
143. See supra note 42.
144. See Hudson, supra note 136, at 14.
145. Id. (quoting Prof. O'Neil).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 629 ("Because the trial court's admonitions were thorough and
sufficient to instruct a capital sentencing jury, and because the written biblical materials used in the
jury room were neither admitted into evidence nor permitted by court instruction, their use in this
case was improper.").
149. See id. at 634-39 (Rice, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 637.
151. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
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involves a process in which you must apply your reasoned judgment in
deciding whether the situation calls for life imprisonment or the imposi-
tion of the death penalty."'
52
Justice Rice argued that these instructions called for the jury to con-
sider their moral and religious precepts, which for many who believe that
the Bible is the Word of God, calls for the consideration of biblical pas-
sages. 53  The majority essentially agreed with Justice Rice, stating,
"[w]e do not hold that an individual juror may not rely on and discuss
with the other jurors during deliberation his or her religious upbringing,
education, and beliefs in making the extremely difficult 'reasoned judg-
ment' and 'moral decision."",154 The majority opinion recognized that the
jury instructions given might encourage jurors to consider and discuss
their own religious thoughts during jury deliberation.155  The majority
opinion only held that it was "improper for a juror to bring the Bible into
the jury room,"'' 56 and that the actual physical presence of the Bible has a
powerful prejudicial effect on jurors. 1
57
The majority's narrow holding indicates that the court was looking
to draw a line. It was trying to determine how much to tolerate in a death
sentence deliberation. The court was torn between the competing inter-
ests of providing a fair trial for Harlan and respecting the backgrounds
and beliefs of the jury.158 The Colorado Supreme Court essentially held
that it would tolerate any presence of religion in the jury deliberation
room except for the presence of a Bible. 159 The court may have desired
to draw the line even further towards restricting religious influence;
however, it was bound by Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b).
III. COLORADO RULE OF EVIDENCE 606(B)
16 1
Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) is identical to the Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b), which "incorporates the long-established policy of pro-
tecting the secrecy of jury deliberations. ' 61 The purpose of Rule 606(b)
is to "encourag[e] the finality of jury verdicts," to "conserve[e] judicial
resources by foreclosing lengthy adversary hearings on marginal claims
of misconduct," and to "preserv[e] the dignity of the court."'162 Further-
more, the protections of 606(b) encourage open discussion in the jury
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 637 (Rice, J., dissenting).






160. See supra note 46 for text of COLO. R. EVID. 606(b).
161. Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is
the Broad Exclusionary Principal ofRule 606(b) Justified? 66 N.C. L. REv. 509, 509 (1988).




room, reduce juror harassment by those angry about the verdict, and
"prevent[] minority jurors from agreeing to the verdict only to challenge
it at a later time."'163 The operation of 606(b) raises a conflict "between
the need for confidentiality of deliberation and verdict finality, and the
requirement that the case be decided solely on the evidence presented to
a fair and impartial jury."'164 The Colorado Supreme Court properly ap-
plied Rule 606(b) in People v. Harlan165 according to its precedent; how-
ever, the threat of extraneous information prejudicing jury decisions re-
mains. The Colorado Supreme Court should consider the arguments
made by proponents of amending Rule 606(b) 166 and should amend the
rule to allow the observation of jury conduct and to ensure defendants
receive sentences free from religious prejudice.
A. The Colorado Precedent: Wiser v. People'
67 and People v. Wadle' 68
Two Colorado cases have formed the standard by which Colorado
courts determine whether jury misconduct has tainted a verdict. Wiser
and Wadle established a two-part inquiry: "first, a court makes a deter-
mination that extraneous information was improperly before the jury;
and second, based on an objective 'typical juror' standard, makes a de-
termination whether use of that extraneous information posed the reason-
able possibility of prejudice to the defendant."' 69 In Harlan, the court
found that the facts met the two-part test and impeached the verdict.
7 °
In Wiser, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that it was improper
for a juror to consider a dictionary definition of the word "burglary," the
crime with which the defendant was charged. 17' The court cited other
cases in which juries had consulted dictionaries and held that "[j]urors
are required to follow only the law as it is given in the court's instruc-
tions; they are bound, therefore, to accept the court's definitions of legal
concepts .. ,,172
163. See Crump, supra note 161, at 512.
164. James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and Beyond, 65
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 389, 394 (1991).
165. 109 P.3d 616, 633 (Colo. 2005).
166. See, e.g., Gregory M. Ashley, Theology in the Jury Room: Religious Discussion as "Ex-
traneous Material" in the Course of Capital Punishment Deliberations, 55 VAND. L. REV. 127
(2002) (arguing that both federal and state courts should amend their interpretations of Rule 606(b)
to address the effect of religious discussion in capital punishment deliberations); Comments of Fed-
eral Magistrate Judges Association Rules Committee on Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REv. 2 (proposing amend-
ment to 606(b) that would clarify whether juror statement can be admitted to prove a disparity be-
tween the verdict intended and the final verdict).
167. 732 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1987).
168. 97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004).
169, Harlan, 109 P.3d at 624.
170. Id. at 629-31.
171. Wiser, 732 P.2dat 1141.
172. Id. (citing Alvarez v. People, 653 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1982)).
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In Wadle, the court affirmed the Colorado Court of Appeals finding
that information retrieved from the Internet and subsequently shared with
the jury was "improper" and "extraneous."' 173 The jury had previously
sent a note to the trial judge requesting a copy of the Physician's Desk
Reference, looking for information on the anti-depressant drug Paxil.
174
The court informed the jury that "supplying reference materials of any
kind to a jury was prohibited, and it referred the jury back to its instruc-
tions." 175 Although the court had admonished the jury against the con-
sideration of extraneous information, it extended its ruling by holding
that extraneous information is improper "whether or not ... [it was] the
result of deliberate juror misconduct.',
176
In Harlan, the majority stated, "our cases are clear that extraneous
information is improper for juror consideration whether or not the court
specifically warned against its use."'17 7 The court noted that this rule
applies whether the improper evidence is factual as in Wadle, or if the
evidence is legal as in Wiser.178 Therefore, the presence, and the subse-
quent discussion, of the Bible in the jury deliberation room in Harlan
were clearly "extraneous." The Bible provides alternative opinions about
when to inflict the death penalty - just as the dictionary offered an alter-
native definition for "burglary" in Wiser. And, although the court did not
expressly forbid the presence of the Bible, as the court held in Wadle, the
court can find information "extraneous" whether the court forbids it or
not. 179
The Colorado Supreme Court combined factors considered in Wiser
and Wadle and compiled a list to determine whether improper introduc-
tion of the extraneous information created a reasonable possibility that
the jury's verdict was influenced to the detriment of the defendant.'
80
The factors are: (1) how the extraneous information relates to critical
issues in the case; (2) how authoritative is the source consulted; (3)
whether a juror initiated the search for the extraneous information; (4)
whether the information obtained by one juror was brought to the atten-
tion of another juror; (5) whether the information was presented before
the jury reached a unanimous verdict; and (6) whether the information
would be likely to influence a typical juror to the detriment of the defen-
dant.'
8 '
173. Wadle, 97 P.3d at 933.
174. See id. at 934.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 935.
177. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 625.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 626. The court disclaims that this is.not a formal test or an exhaustive list, but are
"useful" and "persuasive." Id.
181. Id. (citing Wadle, 97 P.3d at 935; Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1142).
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The court applied the facts of the jury's deliberation to the factors
above and reasoned "we do not have confidence that the death penalty
here was not influenced by extraneous information.' ' 82 Justice Rice's
dissent attacked the majority's list of factors appropriate for inquiry un-
der 606(b) and exhorted, "neither Wiser nor Wadle support this kind of
categorical approach when undertaking an analysis of extraneous infor-
mation."' 83 She argued that, "the sole inquiry upon which each case fo-
cuses is whether there is a reasonable possibility that exposure to extra-
neous information prejudiced the jury."' 84 Justice Rice's argument was
without substance because the majority's list of factors was simply a
break down of her "sole inquiry." Justice Rice was simply arguing for a
less probative investigation into the conduct of the jury. The majority's
list of factors provides courts with a useful outline to focus their "extra-
neous information" inquiry.
B. The Loophole in 606(b)
The Colorado Supreme Court's holding in Harlan prohibits the
presence of the Bible in jury deliberations, 185 but it does not prohibit the
discussion of religion during deliberations. 186 The court actually expects
that jurors will discuss religion.' 87 The court's justification for prohibit-
ing the actual text of the Bible and not other manifestations of religion,
such as recitation of biblical passages, was that "the written word persua-
sively conveys the authentic ring of reliable authority in a way the recol-
lected spoken word does not."'
' 88
The court's distinction is imperfect. Charismatic reverends, or even
a well-schooled churchgoer could be as prejudicial as a Bible, and possi-
bly even more so. A religious orator would be able to recite passages
from memory, and his or her interpretations would carry with it the au-
thority of a "Man of God." Moreover, some believe group prayer during
jury deliberations is common, 189 and since no one but the jurors ever
learns that group prayer has occurred, it is fair to assume that "the in-
stances that find their way into judicial opinions represent only the tip of
the iceberg."' 190 The power of prayer could be just as, or more, prejudi-
cial than the physical presence of a Bible; however, Rule 606(b) forbids
courts from impeaching the Bible recitation and group prayer.' 91 The
rule precludes jurors from testifying as to any occurrences in the jury
182. Id.at 634.
183. Id. at 636 n.8.
184. Id. (citing Wadle, 97 P.3d at 935; Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1142).
185. Id. at 632.
186. Id.
187. Id. ("We expect jurors to bring their backgrounds and beliefs to bear on their deliberations
but to give ultimate consideration only to the facts admitted and the law as instructed.").
188. Id.
189. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1125.
190. Id.
191. COLO. R. EVID. 606(b).
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room, or to anything that affected the jurors mind during deliberation. 92
While the policy considerations behind Rule 606(b) are important, open-
ing jury deliberations up to further scrutiny may be the only way to en-
sure defendants receive sentences free from prejudice.
The Colorado Supreme Court has left a loophole in which religion
can still prejudice juries. Even if the ruling in Harlan prohibits Bibles in
the future, religion can still prejudice juries in the form of Bible recita-
tion from memory, group prayer and pre-prepared notes. Justice would
best be served if the court could guarantee that every sentence decided by
a jury is free from prejudice.
The court could regulate this conduct if the court recorded and re-
viewed jury deliberations. Opponents of this practice may claim that
recording jury deliberation compromises the policy goals of Rule 606(b).
The authors of Rule 606(b) designed the rule to encourage the finality of
jury verdicts 193 and reviewing recorded jury deliberations would under-
mine this goal. Furthermore, the authors designed the rule to "conserve
judicial resources by foreclosing lengthy adversary hearings on marginal
claims of misconduct," to "preserve the dignity of the court," to encour-
age "free and frank discussions inside the jury room," to reduce juror
harassment, and to "prevent minority jurors from agreeing to the verdict
only to challenge it at a later time"'194 Concern over the effect recordings
may have on the efficacy of the jury is valid; however, the court could
take steps to mitigate the negative effects.
The court could withhold the recordings from the public so that
those angry about the jury decision could not single out jurors for ridi-
cule. Judges could simply call a mistrial if they found prejudicial infor-
mation, which would forego lengthy hearings. Jurors would receive a
warning in their instructions that the court will record their deliberation,
only the judge will view the recording, and that they are encouraged to
have a free and frank discussion. Ultimately, the policy considerations
behind Rule 606(b) are less important than the need for a jury sentence
free from prejudice - especially a death sentence. The court should re-
view jury conduct consistently and objectively to ensure that we are not
executing people because a jury was swayed by a Bible passage or a
prayer session.
Recording deliberations raises many difficult issues. Courts and
judges may not have the time or resources to review all jury deliberation
recordings, but it is not necessary to review all jury deliberations. The
court need only review the deliberations where there is a suspicion of
192. Id.
193. Crump, supra note 161, at 512.
194. Id. (describing the policy considerations underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
which is the federal equivalent of Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b)); Harlan, 109 P.3d at 624
(citing Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316, 322 (Colo. 2002)).
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misconduct. Finally, legislatures and courts might find recordings too
intrusive in every case, but they should at least record death penalty de-
liberations. Death penalty jury deliberations are unique. The result of
jury misconduct is irreversible once the sentence is carried out. Death
penalty juries should be held to a higher standard by recording their de-
liberations to ensure they sentence the defendant free from prejudice.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.'' 95 The Supreme Court has applied the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment to prohibit prayer in public
school, 196 to prohibit the decoration of public buildings with religious
symbols, 197 and to limit the delegation of governmental authority to reli-
gious organizations.198 The Court should also apply the First Amend-
ment to limit the influence of religion in the courtroom and the jury de-
liberation room. Religion plays a "prominent role"1 99 in capital cases
during peremptory challenges, closing arguments and jury delibera-
tions.2°° Despite its frequent presence, questions as to its propriety "have
almost always been framed and answered with little or no attention to"
the First Amendment. 20' Harlan was no exception; he did not allege an
Establishment Clause violation. 202 Interestingly, Arnett did claim an
Establishment Clause violation; 20 3 however, the trial court denied it for
procedural reasons.2 °4 The court did not deny Arnett's claim for substan-
tive reasons. This suggests that attorneys are considering the effective-
ness of Establishment Clause claims in cases where religion has influ-
enced a sentence. The defense could have attacked Harlan's sentence on
Establishment Clause grounds and this Part predicts the outcome of a
hypothetical Establishment Clause claim, if Harlan's counsel had raised
the issue.205
First, Harlan must successfully argue that the act of sentencing a de-
fendant is state action.2 °6 On one hand, it can be argued that jurors are
195. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
196. See generally Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding school led
prayer at football game unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds).
197. See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that while
Creche violated Establishment Clause, menorah next to Christmas tree did not).
198. See generally Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(invalidating a separate school district created for a religious group).
199. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1092.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See generally People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2000).
203. See infra Part I.B.
204. See Arnett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681, 685 (2004).
205. 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2000).
206. See Terrence T. Egland, Prejudiced by the Presence of God: Keeping Religious Material
Out of Death Penalty Deliberations, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 337, 358 (2004).
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not state actors because they are private citizens and the state has no con-
trol over their decisions.2 °7 On the other, "they should be seen as state
actors when serving as jurors because they are acting pursuant to a dele-
gation of authority from the state. 20 8 The state pays jurors for their time
and the Supreme Court has referred to them as "a government body.' '2°9
Some argue that, "it is only a natural extension of current law governing
the actions of court actors to find the jury to be similarly bound as judges
and prosecutors., 210 If the court were to decide jurors are state actors,
the court system might face serious and unperceived ramifications. An
immeasurable variety of private actions "might be constrained and chal-
lenged.",211 We must deal with the ramifications. Otherwise, we allow
the hollow fiction, that jurors are acting independently of the state, to
dilute our justice system. The state summons jurors, subjects them to
penalties, instructs them, and has them serve a function of the State.
They are state actors and must follow the rules applied to the state.
If Harlan successfully argued that jurors were state actors, the next
step would have been to argue that the presence of the Bible in the jury
deliberations failed the three-pronged Lemon v. Kurtzman test. 2 12 Under
the Lemon test, religious texts used in jury deliberations will be found
unconstitutional if the texts' presence: (1) has no secular purpose; (2) has
a principal primary effect that either advances or inhibits religion; or (3)
fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion. 213  While
the Lemon test has come under attack by members of the Court,2 14 and its
future role is "uncertain, '' 15 it is still followed by lower courts. 216 The
more recent Establishment Clause precedent only finds a violation of the
Establishment Clause if "the government establishes a church, coerces
religious participation, or favors some religions over others. 217
The jury's conduct in Harlan would fail all three prongs of the
Lemon test. First, the presence of the Bible during jury deliberation has
no secular purpose. The Bible's presence and the discussion of biblical
passages only tainted the secular procedure with religious standards and
prejudices. The presence of the Bible also would violate the second
prong, also known as the "effect" prong. If the Colorado Supreme Court
207. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1108.
208. Id.
209. See id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1991)).
210. Egland, supra note 206, at 144 ("Jurors are protected by common law immunity from
prosecution, just as judges and prosecutors are, and should be held to the same standard.").
211. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 513 (2002).
212. See id at 1158 (discussing the holding of the court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971)).
213. Id. at 1159.




217. Id. at 1154 (discussing the holding in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)).
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allowed jurors to bring Bibles into the jury deliberation room, and to
discuss the Bible during the deliberation, it would effectively promote
religion over non-religion and Christianity over religions that do not con-
sider the Bible holy. It would send a signal to jurors and the public that
religion has a place in the criminal justice system. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that the Establishment Clause "precludes [the]
government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that re-
ligion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."'2 18 If the
Colorado Supreme Court had ruled that the discussion of Leviticus
24:20-21 and Romans 13:1 was permissible during Harlan's death pen-
alty jury deliberations, it would have conveyed a message that those par-
ticular religious principles are preferred. Finally, the presence of the
Bible during Harlan's sentencing deliberation would have impermissibly
entangled the government with religion. Allowing jurors to bring Bibles
into jury deliberations would have set a precedent that our civil justice
system sentences defendants subject to the religious views of jurors.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in flux, and many Supreme
Court Justices prefer other tests.219 The "endorsement" test, formulated
by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly,220 asks whether the govern-
ment action "endorses" religion.221 Under the more recent and less strict
Mitchell v. Helms222 test, an Establishment Clause violation is found if
the presence or function of religion amounts to "coercion." 223 The Court
ruled that prayers during football games were impermissibly coercive in
Sante Fe Independent School District v. Doe.224 Justice Stevens argued
that the practice "threatens the imposition of coercion upon those stu-
dents not desiring to participate in a religious exercise. 225 Courts should
apply the same standard in cases such as Harlan where jurors bring reli-
gious texts into jury deliberations. The presence of the Bible may coerce
Jurors into believing that they are obligated to vote a certain way. The
effect is possibly even more coercive than in Santa Fe Independent
School District, where the court recognized that students could feel co-
erced by mass prayer.226 In that scenario, at least some level of anonym-
218. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (quoting Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
219. CHEMERINSKYsupra note 211, at 1159.
220. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
221. See Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 694 ("Every government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.").
222. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
223. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870.
224. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). The Court noted:
The Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this difficult choice
upon these students for it is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require
one of its citizens to forfeit his of her rights and benefits as the price of resisting confor-
mance to state-sponsored religious practice.
Id. at 312.
225. Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312.
226. See generally id.(discussing that adolescents are susceptible to pressure regarding social
convention).
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ity protected the students. The prayer may have compelled them to join
in but they were not individually encouraged to participate. In the case
of religious influence in jury deliberation rooms, some jurors may be
insisting that others obey the Bible and demand full participation in
group prayer. There is at least as much coercion in the scenario exempli-
fied in Harlan as the Court found in Sante Fe Independent School Dis-
trict because a jury is more personal.
Trial attorneys also introduce religious influence into trials.227
Ironically, in Harlan, the defense counsel that made the motion to vacate
Harlan's death sentence due to jury misconduct for bringing a Bible into
the jury deliberation room, was the same defense counsel that invoked
the Bible in closing argument.228 In closing argument, Harlan's defense
counsel referenced the Bible several times by telling the story of Abra-
ham and Isaac and mentioned Harlan's habit of reading the Bible.229
Furthermore, the defense counsel asked a juror about the biblical quote,
"eye for an eye ' '23° possibly provoking the very discussion the defense
counsel would later claim was misconduct on the level of requiring a
231new sentence. It is common for both the defense counsel and the
prosecution to invoke religion during closing arguments - "the Bible is a
favorite source for both sides. 232 The frequent presence and injection of
religion in trials raises the same question asked earlier: how much relig-
ion will the court tolerate?
Joe Freeman Britt, a notable trial attorney,233 believes that there is a
place for religion in the courtroom.23 4 He states that, "'[b]iblical refer-
ences [are] considered great works of literature .... They can be used
with caution, just as any quotation of a great work, to make a particular
point. ' ' '235 Religious tolerance in the courtroom receives varied treat-
ment from state to state.236 For example, North Carolina and Georgia
courts are not as concerned as other states with the invocation of religion
237during closing arguments. In North Carolina, the court will tolerate
the religious arguments by prosecutors as long as they do not argue "the
state law or its officers were divinely inspired., 238 Georgia does not al-
low prosecutors to suggest that religious authority mandates the death
227. See, e.g., Harlan, 109 P.3d at 635 n.3 (Rice, J., dissenting); Simson & Garvey, supra note
10, at 1110.
228. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 619, 635 n.3.
229. See id. at 635 n.3.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1110.
233. See Hudson, supra note 136, at 14 ("[O]nce called 'the deadliest prosecutor' by the Guin-
ness Book of World Records for his success in capital cases ... .
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1111.
237. Id.
238. Id. (quoting State v. Sidden, 491 S.E.2d 225, 231 (N.C. 1997)).
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penalty.23 9 Pennsylvania, on the other hand, "has adopted a rule that
'reliance in any manner upon the Bible or any other religious writing in
support of the imposition of a penalty of death is reversible error per se
and may subject violators to disciplinary action.,'
2 40
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court may find an establish-
ment violation where it finds an "endorsement of religion., 241 Further-
more, it has been suggested that prosecutors and public defenders are
state actors because they are employees of the state.242 If prosecutors and
public defenders make arguments that utilize biblical passages, the State
sends a message of endorsing religion. Prosecutors would in essence be
arguing that the defendant ought to go to jail, or be executed, according
to the Word of God. Allowing prosecutors to make religiously based
arguments would not only send a clear statement that our government
"endorses" and "prefers" religion over non-religion, but would erode the
wall between church and state.
Private Defense attorneys also may violate the Establishment
Clause when they invoke religion at closing argument.2 43 It is more dif-
ficult to make the argument the private defense attorneys are state actors
because they are not employees or agents of the state. However, they are
still working within the system, and the court is a state actor.244 There-
fore, if a court allows defense counsel to make, or denies objections to,
religiously based arguments, courts would in essence align themselves
with the arguments at least, "in the sense of affirming that arguments of
that type are valid and have a place in [the] courtroom., 24 5 By allowing
private defense attorneys to make religiously based arguments and by
affirming their place in the courtroom, judges, as state actors, are endors-
ing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.246
CONCLUSION
Religion is not dead in the chambers of the Colorado Supreme
Court,247 and its decision is not demeaning to people of faith.248 The
court's decision is sensitive to the individual beliefs of jurors and only
prohibits the physical presence of the Bible in the jury deliberation
room.249 As the law stands, jurors are free to discuss their own religios-
ity and personal beliefs.250 The court has simply recognized the need to
239. Id. (citing Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217, 222 (Ga. 2000)).
240. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991)).
241. See discussion supra Part IV.





247. Contra Fein, supra note 14, at A14.
248. Contra Jurors Erred, supra note 13.
249. See People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 633 (Colo. 2005).
250. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 632.
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provide defendants sentencing decisions free from religious influence;
however, much more can be done to reach that end.
The court should provide jury instruction that clearly forbid Bibles
during jury deliberations. The instructions should also include a prohibi-
tion against group prayer, recitation of biblical passages and religiously
based arguments in favor or opposed to the death penalty. Jury instruc-
tion may not be enough, however, and death penalty sentences free from
prejudice should be a higher priority than upholding the policy consid-
erations behind Rule 606(b). Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court
should amend Rule 606(b) so that courts can record and review jury de-
liberations, while doing everything possible to protect jurors from public
scrutiny.
Finally, allowing religion to play a role in our court system erodes
the wall between church and state. Judges, attorneys, and jurors are all
state actors in the court system and if their actions suggest an endorse-
ment of religion they are in violation of the Establishment Clause.251
Before asking if God is alive in the chambers of American courts, let us
be sure that Justice is. Justice demands that defendants receive sentences
free from religious influence.
Cory Spiller*
251. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1113.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., University
of Arizona, December 2001. The author would like to thank Patrick Rogers for his comments and
patience. The author would also like to thank his parents for their unwavering love and support.
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STRETCHING LIABILITY Too FAR: COLORADO'S FELONY
MURDER STATUTE IN LIGHT OF A UMAN
INTRODUCTION
Felony murder is a widely debated theory of accomplice liability.'
Generally, felony murder liability is triggered if a death results during the
commission of a specifically enumerated felony.2 Some jurisdictions
have expanded the scope of liability to include the immediate flight from
the felony.3 Most recently the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that
even arrest does not automatically terminate the immediate flight stage of
felony murder as a matter of law, and even worse, a co-felon can still be
held liable for a death occurring after her own arrest.
4
In Auman v. People5 the Colorado Supreme Court stretched Colo-
rado's felony murder statute beyond a reasonable scope. Auman was the
first person in the state of Colorado to be convicted of murder while in
official police custody.6 The Colorado Supreme Court dodged the issue
of immediate flight in this case and remanded it on a technicality. The
court refused to define the limitations of immediate flight, and stated that
arrest, as a matter of law, does not cut off liability for felony murder.8
The felony murder rule should not be extended beyond the purpose
it was designed to serve, namely, to deter felons from causing a homicide
during the commission of the crime. Holding Auman liable for the death
of Officer VanderJagt was not a rational function that the felony murder
doctrine was designed to serve. 9 The Auman case sparked national con-
troversy over the degree of culpability an individual should have while in
police custody.'0 The mass amount of public outcry after the trial illus-
trates how the Colorado Supreme Court has gone too far.
This Comment criticizes the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling on
the issue of arrest not terminating immediate flight as a matter of law.
1. Lindsay Fortado, A Tale of Murder, and Who Pays the Price Case Triggers Debate Over
Felony Murder Rule, NAT'L L. J., June 21,2004, col. 1, at 6.
2. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 515 (3d ed. 2001)
("Under most modem murder statutes, a death that results from the commission of an enumerated
felony (usually a dangerous felony, such as arson, rape, robbery, or burglary) constitutes first-degree
murder for which the maximum penalty is death or life imprisonment."); See also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-102 (2004).
3. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 2005).
4. Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 650 (Colo. 2005).
5. 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).
6. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650; Diane Carman, Auman Case Hangs from a Split Hair, DENVER
POST, Sept. 14, 2004, at BO.
7. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
8. Id
9. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516 (explaining that the deterrence rationale
does not, in fact, deter accidental killings during felonies).
10. Fortado, supra note 1, at 6.
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The shooting of Officer VanderJagt was outside the scope of immediate
flight, and an already in custody Auman should not have paid the price
for the shooter's actions." Part I addresses the facts that led the court to
its holding in Auman. Part II addresses the majority opinion and Chief
Justice Mullarkey's dissent. Part III summarizes the issues of causation
and the justifications for felony murder statutes in general. Part IV ex-
amines felony murder liability from other jurisdictions across the United
States, highlighting the trend to either eliminate or limit the scope of
liability. Part V describes the current Colorado felony murder statute and
traces the emergence of immediate flight. Part VI criticizes the court's
ruling as an overly broad interpretation of Colorado's felony murder
statute. This Part also offers a possible limitation to felony murder liabil-
ity in specific instances.
I. FACTS OF AUMAN V. PEOPLE'
2
On November 12, 1997, Lisl Auman and four others broke the pad-
lock on Auman's ex-boyfriend's apartment door and entered without his
permission.' 3 The group consisted of Auman's friend Demetria Soriano,
Soriano's boyfriend Dion Gerze, and Gerze's friends: Mattaeus Jaehnig
and Stephen Duprey.14 Auman asked the group to assist her in gathering
her belongings from Shawn Cheever's apartment. 15  The group took
Auman's items and some of Cheever's personal property, loading them
into two cars. 16 Auman then proceeded from Cheever's apartment with
Jaehnig in a stolen Trans-Am. 17  The police pursued them into what
turned into a high-speed chase. 18 At one point during the chase, Auman
held the steering wheel, while Jaehnig fired a weapon at an officer's
car.' 9  Auman and Jaehnig eventually stopped at Jaehnig's apartment
complex, and the two of them ran into an alcove.20
After hiding in the alcove for an extended period of time, Auman
turned herself over to the police and was placed in the back of a police
car.21 While Auman was in police custody, the officers questioned her
about Jaehnig's whereabouts and whether he was armed.22 She did not
11. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
12. 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).






19. Id. at 653. Lisl Auman has stated, "I surrendered as soon as I could. I did not think I
could have done anything to Mattaeus Jaehnig that could have changed the warpath he was on. He
was in another world." Jeff Kass, I Feel for Her, and I Feel for Her Little Girl, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
Mar. 18, 2001, at 38A (interview with Lisl Auman, in Canon City Women's Prison).
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answer the questioning.23 She had been in police custody for approxi-
mately five minutes when Officer VanderJagt, while continuing his
search for Jaehnig, looked around a comer and was fatally shot by
Jaehnig.24 Jaehnig then shot and killed himself with the officer's gun.
25
Jaehnig was high on methamphetamines at the time of the crimes.26
Moreover, he had a lengthy rap sheet consisting of an array of violent
crimes and was a dedicated white supremacist.
27
Although Auman was in police custody at the time of the shooting,
the jury convicted her of second-degree burglary and first-degree felony
murder.28 She received a life sentence for the death of Officer Vander-
Jagt.29 Auman appealed her conviction to the Colorado Court of Appeals
raising the issue that arrest, as a matter of law, terminates the immediate
flight stage for felony murder.30 The Court of Appeals affirmed both the
convictions of burglary and felony murder.3' Auman then appealed to the
Colorado Supreme Court.32 The Colorado Supreme Court initially
granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly
concluded that arrest does not terminate liability for felony murder as a
matter of law. 33 However, after initial briefing and arguments, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court asked for additional materials, including supplemen-
tal briefs and arguments, on the issue of whether the Court of Appeals
had properly instructed the jury on the elements of felony murder.34
II. A UMAN V. PEOPLE35
The Colorado Supreme Court held that when a co-felon is arrested,
that action alone does not automatically terminate liability for felony
murder as a matter of law.36 Moreover, liability is not cut off for the
arrested co-felon when a co-participant, still in flight from the predicate
felony, commits a murder.37 The court stated that arrest, in other circum-
23. Id. There is some dispute about what exactly Auman said after being placed in police
custody. See Lisl.com, http://www.lisl.com/facts.htm (listing disputed facts).
24. Auman, 109 P.3d at 653.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 654.
27. See Lisl.com, Matthaeus Reinhart Jaehring Rap Sheet, http://www.lisl.com/jaehrap.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
28. Auman, 109 P.3d at 654-55.
29. Id. The prosecution decided not to charge the others involved with felony murder. All
five accomplices went to the apartment that day. Only Auman was charged with felony murder.
The District Attorney reviewed filing felony murder charges against the others, but did not file since
he believed the prosecution would not meet the burden of proof on all the elements. Soriano, Gerze,
and Duprey pled guilty to burglary. Duprey received four years in prison. Gerze and Soriano both
received two years probation. Jeff Kass, Cop Killing Case Brought Wide Range of Penalties; State's
High Court Eyes Controversial Auman Sentence, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 15, 2004, at 33A.
30. Auman, 109 P.3d at 654.
31. People v. Auman, 67 P.3d 741 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002), rev"d, 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).
32. Auman, 109 P.3d at 647.
33. Id. at 655.
34. Id.
35. 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).
36. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
37. ld
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stances, might terminate liability, but strictly as a matter of law, it does
not.38 Auman, who had been in police custody for five minutes at the
time her co-participant shot and killed a police officer, was sentenced to
life in prison for the death of the officer.39 Auman is no longer serving a
life sentence in prison because the Colorado Supreme Court reversed her
conviction on a faulty jury instruction for burglary.40 However, the
Colorado Supreme Court decision was not unanimous.4' Chief Justice
Mullarkey agreed with the majority's opinion up to the point where they
determined that the erroneous jury instruction rose to the level of re-
versible error.4 2 Chief Justice Mullarkey would not have reversed
Auman's conviction.43
A. Majority Opinion
In addressing Auman's arrest, the court determined that arrest does
not automatically terminate immediate flight for purposes of felony mur-
der liability when another participant is still in flight from the crime.
44
The court then concluded that the issue of whether a co-felon is still in
the stages of immediate flight is a question for the jury.45 The court fur-
ther stated that the concept of immediate flight is "broad" and, that as a
matter of law, "felony murder does not terminate where death occurs
during continuous flight from the predicate felony, nor does it terminate
where intervening events interrupt flight."'46  The Colorado Supreme
Court did not find that arrest terminates liability as a matter of law be-
cause they did not want to take that issue away from the jury. The issue
of whether arrest terminates immediate flight is not included in the fel-
ony murder statute; therefore, the jury must look at the unique facts of
every case to make that determination.47
The jury must decide whether: (1) there is a "temporal connection
between the predicate felony, flight and death" thereby making it "im-
mediate" and (2) whether the death occurring after a defendant's arrest is
still "in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight."" The jury
instruction submitted told the jury that they could find Auman liable for
felony murder, if they found "beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer
38. Id. at 656. The court mentioned two instances where arrest might terminate liability: (1)
when the defendant was acting alone and is subsequently placed under arrest; (2) when all co-
participants of the underlying crime have been arrested. Id.
39. Id. at 653.
40. Id. at 671. After the Supreme Court remanded the case Auman accepted a plea bargain,
pled guilty to burglary and accessory to first-degree murder, and was sentenced to 20 years in a
community corrections facility. Jim Kirksey, Auman Bid Gets Widow Backing, DENVER POST, Aug.
17, 2005, at B-01.
41. Auman, 109 P.3d at 671-76 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 671.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 650.
45. Id. at 659.
46. Id. at 657.
47. Id. at 659.
48. Id.
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VanderJagt's death was caused by anyone 'in the course of or in the fur-
therance of burglary, or in the immediate flight therefrom."'' 49 Auman
argued that this instruction was erroneous since it did not require the jury
to find both a temporal and a causal connection between the immediate
flight and the death.50 The court agreed that the instruction was worded
incorrectly but concluded that it was not a reversible error.5
Auman submitted a supplemental instruction for the jury that de-
fined the limitations of immediate flight, but the trial court refused to
submit it to the jury.52 This instruction stated that immediate flight
means that:
no intervening event has broken the continuity of the underlying
crime; a person is not in the immediate fight from a burglary if an en-
tirely new episode of events has begun; nor is a person in immediate
flight if she has reached a point of temporary safety or is subject to
complete custody at the time the death is caused.
53
For a defendant to be allowed an intervening cause instruction there
has to be three conditions that are met: (1) "a defendant must introduce
competent evidence to show that the ultimate harm would not have oc-
curred in the absence of the claimed intervening cause;" (2) "a claimed
intervening cause must be one that the defendant could not foresee;" and
(3) "such a cause must be one in which the defendant does not partici-
pate., 54 Auman argued that Jaehnig was running from the police because
the car was stolen and he was high on methamphetamines. 55 The court
concluded that since Auman produced no evidence to demonstrate that
Jaehnig's actions were an intervening cause, she was not entitled to the
instruction.56
In addressing Auman's affirmative defense to felony murder, the
court turned to the elements in the Colorado felony murder statute that
require that the defendant "not only had nothing to do with the killing
itself, but was unarmed and had no reason to believe that any of his con-
federates were armed or intended to engage in any conduct dangerous to
life.",57 Moreover, if the defendant believes that a co-felon might be
armed or might commit an act that would be dangerous, the defendant
may relieve herself of liability if she were to immediately disengage her-
self from the felony or the flight therefrom. 58 The court concluded that
Auman did not meet the requirements for the affirmative defense since
49. Id. at 660.
50. Id.
51. Id.




56. Id. at 662-63.
57. Id. at 657.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(2) (2005).
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she had knowledge that her co-participant was armed and dangerous, and
she did nothing to disengage herself from the flight.59 However, Auman
did voluntarily relinquish herself over to police custody thereby, argua-
bly, "disengaging" herself from the underlying felony.60 The affirmative
defense does not require a co-participant to warn policemen of other
dangers.6' It only requires that she disengage herself from the flight if
there are reasonable grounds for her to believe that a co-participant might
engage in actions that could lead to a death or serious injury.62 If Auman
had warned police of Jaehnig's whereabouts, she might have qualified
for the affirmative defense. 63 Waving her Fifth Amendment right to si-
lence in order to aid the police officers would have helped Auman's de-
fense;64 however, Auman had an absolute right not to say a word.65 Nev-
ertheless, the court determined that since she did not speak to police
upon arrest, she did not qualify for the affirmative defense instruction.66
The jury convicted Auman of second degree burglary, which was
then used as the predicate crime for felony murder.67 The court consid-
ered whether the erroneous jury instruction on the predicate crime of
burglary constituted plain error thereby necessitating reversal of the de-
fendant's conviction.68 Burglary is a specific intent crime that required
Auman to knowingly break into the dwelling with the intent to commit a
crime inside. 69 However, on appeal Auman claimed that the jury instruc-
tion omitted an essential element of the crime of theft. 70 The instruction
submitted did not include the mental state of "knowingly" with the ele-
ment "without authorization" in the elements of burglary. 71 Auman pled
guilty to the charge of criminal trespassing, but insisted that she did not
plan to steal Cheever's property upon initial entry into the room, thereby
not committing a burglary.72 Because of the faulty instruction, the jury
could have convicted Auman of burglary without having to conclude that
59. Auman, 109 P.3d at 657.




63. § 18-3-102(2); Auman, 109 P.3d at 654.
64. See Auman, 109 P.3d at 654.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Judge John Webb wisely noted this issue and asked that if "[t]he
officer was already dead, as was Jaehnig, so what difference did it make . .. what she said to the
police officers?" Karen Abbott, Judges Ask ifAuman Still Fleeing When Cop Was Shot; Question
Critical in Appeal of Murder Conviction in Death of Officer Shot by Her Accomplice, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, May 1, 2002, at 5A (quoting a question asked by Judge John Webb during oral arguments
before the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Auman, 67 P.3d 741 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002)).
66. Auman, 109 P.3d at 654.
67. Jd. at 663 n.18.
68. Id. at 660.
69. Id. at 664. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-203(1) (2005) ("A person commits second de-
gree burglary, if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains
unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit
therein a crime against another person or property.").
70. Auman, 109 P.3d at 663-64; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-401 (2005) (elements of theft).
71. Auman, 109 P.3d at 663-64.
72. Id.
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she intended to commit theft upon unlawfully entering Cheever's resi-
dence.73
Auman did not object to this instruction at trial, thereby not preserv-
ing the objection for appeal.74 The court reviewed for plain error,75 look-
ing at whether the omission of the word "knowingly" affected a substan-
tial right that damaged the fairness of Auman's trial.76 The court relied
on a prior opinion concluding that a similar jury instruction was reversi-
ble error since the instruction "allowed a guilty verdict to be returned
without a determination that [the] defendant was aware of his lack of
authority. 77  The court also weighed the amount of evidence against
Auman. 78 If there was an overwhelming amount of evidence of her guilt,
the evidence against her would have cured the instructional error.79
However, because the issue of Auman's intent was contested at trial,
there was not overwhelming evidence against her sufficient to cure the
error.80 Because the instruction omitted an essential element of the crime
of burglary, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that Auman was
deprived of a "full and fair jury consideration" of her defense. 81 There-
fore, the court reversed the conviction based on this instructional error,
since it was reasonable that a jury could have been misled by the instruc-
tion and convicted her without regard to her intent upon entering.
To summarize, the majority opinion held, as a matter of law, that ar-
rest does not automatically terminate immediate flight when another co-
felon is still in the stage of immediate flight.83 The court did not reverse
on the arrest issue; instead, it dodged the issue by reversing only on the
burglary instruction.84
B. Chief Justice Mullarkey's Dissent
Chief Justice Mullarkey disagreed with the majority opinion be-
cause Auman did not object to the jury instruction on burglary at trial,
thereby not preserving the objection for review on appeal. 85 Chief Jus-
tice Mullarkey agreed that the erroneous instruction could only be re-
viewed if it affected substantial rights and was considered plain error.86
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted the following defi-
nition of plain error: "plain error is 'fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lack-
ing in its elements that justice cannot have been done' United States v. Coppola, 486 F.2d 882, 884
(10th Cir. 1973) (quoting United States v. Summerour, 279 F. Supp. 407,410 (E.D.Mich. 1968)).
76. Auman, 109 P.3d at 665.
77. Id. at 664 (citing People v. Bomman, 953 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997)).
78. Id. at 669.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 650.
82. Id. at 671.
83. ld. at 651.
84. Id. at 671.
85. Id. (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id.
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However, Chief Justice Mullarkey argued that the erroneous jury instruc-
tion on the predicate crime of burglary did not rise to the level of plain
error, and therefore the conviction should have been upheld.87
Chief Justice Mullarkey stated that all the instructions must be
looked at as a whole, not as separate entities. 88 In doing so, the Chief
Justice did not agree that the erroneous instruction had a direct effect on
the outcome of the case. 89 In her opinion, the phrase "by deception" in-
cluded in the instruction implied that the defendant acted "knowingly."
90
In view of the fact that the phrase included "by deception," there was, in
effect, no error in the instruction. 91 She further contended that it was a
possibility that the burglary instruction could have misled a juror, but
that the error did not contribute to the burglary conviction.92 Looking at
all the evidence as a whole in light of the instructions and the verdicts,
Chief Justice Mullarkey believed that the jury understood the elements of
each instruction, and therefore, rejected Auman's defense when it con-
victed her of second-degree burglary.
93
III. HISTORY
The history of felony murder is quite convoluted. Some scholars
declare that the United States inherited the doctrine from the common
law in England,94 while others believe it was created by our own system
of statutes and judicial interpretation. 95  Overall, "[t]he existence and
scope of the felony-murder doctrine have perplexed generations of law
students, commentators and jurists in the United States and England...
,,96 Regardless of whether the United States inherited this doctrine, or
created it within the judicial and legislative processes, felony murder is a
troubling doctrine. 97 On its face, felony murder is a theory of accomplice
liability that operates as a way to punish those individuals who partici-
pate in enumerated crimes that involve inherent danger and risk of
death.98 These felonies include "arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
certain forms of sexual assault and sexual assault on a child, and the
crime of escape." 99 Felony murder holds individuals liable for commit-
ting felonies that result in a death. In Colorado, deaths occurring during
either the commission of the predicate felony or during the immediate
87. Id.






94. See Fortado, supra note 1, at 6 (contending that the felony murder rule was not inherited
from England).
95. Id.
96. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Mich. 1980).
97. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1442-48 (1994).
98. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
99. Id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2005).
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flight trigger liability under the felony murder doctrine.' 00 Liability will
attach even if the defendant did not possess the intent to kill and even if
the defendant did not do the actual killing. 01 The theory of felony mur-
der is based on transferred intent between crimes. 102 Therefore the intent
to kill "is imputed from the participant's intent to commit the predicate
felony."' 1 3 The theory of transferred intent, as used in the felony murder
doctrine, allows for the judicial system to manipulate the boundaries and
limitations of the rule.
A. Felony Murder Causation
One of the primary arguments against the felony murder rule in
general is that it ignores proximate cause, 10 4 thereby making one "re-
sponsible for consequences that are unforeseen or unlikely in the ex-
treme."'' 0 5 Early versions of the felony murder doctrine were in tune with
the requirements of proximate cause. 1° 6 As the doctrine developed over
time, the original rationale of the death being within the foreseeable
scope of the felony, has been slowly evaporating.10 7 Moreover, case law,
such as Auman, stretches the doctrine beyond the reasonable foreseeabil-
ity that the proximate cause element demands.1
0 8
The theory of proximate cause in felony murder cases has been jus-
tified simply as "when a felon's attempt to commit a forcible felony sets
in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his
contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held respon-
sible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence re-
sults from the initial criminal act."'1 9 This premise is sound: the law
should hold individuals responsible for their own actions and the fore-
100. Id.
101. Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 655 (Colo. 2005).
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Whitman v. People, 420 P.2d 416,418 (Colo. 1966)).
104. Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 763, 774-75 (1999) ("The felony murder doctrine is simply indifferent to these principles of
causation.").
105. Jeff Kass, Lawyers Debate Centuries-Old Legal Concept, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, March 18,
2001, at 38A (quoting William Pizzi, University of Colorado Law Professor).
106. See generally, DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 522-26 (discussing different approaches to
felony murder causation).
107. See Gerber, supra note 104, at 774 ("The felony murder doctrine is simply indifferent to
these principles of causation"); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2005)
Arizona expanded felony murder to include more than the standard inherently dangerous felonies.
See id. The statute states that it is first-degree murder if one is "[a]cting either alone or with one or
more other persons the person commits or attempts to commit sexual conduct with a minor...
sexual assault ... molestation of a child ... terrorism ... marijuana offenses ... dangerous drug
offenses ... narcotics offenses ... kidnapping ... burglary ... arson ... robbery ... escape ...
child abuse... unlawful flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle... and in the course of and
in furtherance of the offense or immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person
causes the death of any person." Id.
108. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 525; see also Lynne H. Rambo, An Unconstitutional Fiction:
The Felony-Murder Rule as Applied to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671, 691-92 (1986)
(discussing expansion of felony murder to suppliers of drugs as ignoring proximate causation).
109. People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 976 (111. 1997).
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seeable results.l° Some attorneys believe that the statute is well within a
reasonable scope of liability and that "you are guilty for the logical con-
sequences of your actions.""' However, modem statutes, like Colo-
rado's, 1 2 have taken this theory and stretched it too far. Felony murder
historically only applied to the commission of the felony and any deaths
that occurred therein. 13 Furthermore, a causal connection between the
underlying felony and the death must be proved. 1 4 Now, juries in Colo-
rado may hold defendants responsible for actions that were committed by
another after the defendant was physically incapable of preventing the
death from occurring because they were in police custody.
115
Holding a felon responsible for actions of another co-felon commit-
ted after she is in custody is arguably beyond the scope of proximate
cause. 116 The basic theory of proximate cause in the field of criminal law
was simply stated as the "natural and probable consequences of [the de-
fendant's] acts." ' 1 7 Furthermore, the death cannot have been a "result of
an independent intervening cause in which the accused does not partici-
pate, and which he could not foresee." ' 1 8 It was not foreseeable, and
therefore not a proximate cause, that when Lisl Auman went to her ex-
boyfriend's home to retrieve her belongings that Officer VanderJagt
would be killed. The Colorado Supreme Court refused to reverse the
trial courts ruling disallowing the jury to take into consideration interven-
ing causes that cut off the chain of causation." 9 Arrest, logically, should
cut the chain of events for purposes of felony murder liability. 20 This
ruling stretched the felony murder doctrine beyond its original rationale
of foreseeability.121
B. Justifications for Felony Murder Rule
The felony murder rule, since its first codified appearance, 122 has
transformed into a doctrine that, in some instances, lacks justification and
purpose. The Model Penal Code attempted to eliminate felony murder
liability. 23  However, this model was not widely adopted and many
110. Hamrick v. People, 624 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Colo. 1981) (stating that people should be held
responsible for the natural and probable consequences of their acts).
111. Fortado, supra note 1, at 6.
112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(l)(b).
113. Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REv. 59,
199-207 (2004); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
114. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 523.
115. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
116. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 523 (explaining justification for proximate cause in felony
murder).
117. Hamrick, 624 P.2d at 1324; see also People v. Rostad, 669 P.2d 126, 128 (Colo. 1983).
118. Hamrick, 624 P.2d at 1323.
119. Auman, 109 P.3d at 662-63.
120. Collier v. State, 261 S.E.2d 364, 372 (Ga. 1979) (overruled on other grounds).
121. See Binder, supra note 113, at 204 (stating that proximate cause requires forseeability);
see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 523.
122. 1827 Ill. Laws ch. 124-65.
123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 introductory n., at 2 (1962) ("The final innovation of Section
210.2 is its departure from the traditional rule of felony murder. Section 210.2(1)(b) establishes a
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states still continue to utilize felony murder for prosecution., 24 There are
two primary justifications for the endurance of the felony murder rule.'
25
First, it is meant as a means of deterring accidental deaths during the
commission of felonies. 126 Second, society continues to uphold the doc-
trine because it reaffirms the sanctity of human life. 127 These two policy
reasons for the continuance of felony murder liability are touted for their
justifications, but upon closer examination of the doctrine, felony murder
liability has been expanded beyond any rational reason for its original
invention.
1. Deterrence
The most commonly cited reason underlying the purpose of the fel-
ony murder doctrine is that it acts "to deter felons from killing negli-
gently or accidentally by holding [defendants] strictly responsible for the
killings they commit.' ' 128 If individuals are held liable for any death that
occurs during the commission of a felony, the deterrence theory asserts
that the felon will proceed with the felony in a more careful manner that
will be less likely to result in a death. 129  This reasoning is illogical:
"Quite simply, how does one deter an unintended act?"' 130  The deter-
rence theory is a crude attempt to justify the broadening of the felony
murder doctrine. The felony murder doctrine "does not punish an actor
for the social harm caused by her intentional conduct. Instead, it looks
beyond the intentional conduct to punish the social harm caused by an
unintended, perhaps unforeseeable result - and it does so with the sever-
est possible penalties available under law."' 3 1  Moreover, even though
the statistical data is hard to find and usually unreliable, homicides dur-
ing the commission of felonies are not very common. 132 One source cites
that "only one-half of one percent of all robberies end up in a homi-
presumption that the requisite recklessness and indifference to the value of human life exist when a
homicide is committed during the course of certain enumerated felonies. This presumption has the
effect of abandoning the strict liability aspects of the traditional felony-murder doctrine but at the
same time recognizing the probative significance of the concurrence of homicide and violent fel-
ony.").
124. Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 399,400-01 (2000) ("It is commonly said that almost every state in
the country has retained some form of the felony murder rule and so repudiated the Model Penal
Code's proposed reform.").
125. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516-18.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.2 cmt. 6, at 37-8 (1962); Gerber, supra note 104, at 779-82; Tomkovicz, supra note 97, at 1448-
58.
129. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516.
130. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitu-
tional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 451 (1985).
131. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 1, Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005), available at http://www.nacdl.org
(follow "Amicus Briefs" hyperlink; then follow "Auman v. State" hyperlink).
132. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517.
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cide."' 133 This begs the question: what exactly does the felony murder
doctrine deter?
The deterrence theory of felony murder is illogical when viewed in
light of the current structure of the Colorado felony murder statute. If the
felony murder doctrine is used as a means to deter felons from causing a
death, its purpose failed in the Auman case.' 34  In People v. Washing-
ton,' 35 the California Supreme Court stated that "The purpose of the fel-
ony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally
by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit .... This
purpose is not served by punishing them for killings committed by their
victims.' ' 136 Similarly, the purpose of the felony murder doctrine is not
served by punishing a co-participant who voluntarily surrendered before
the killing occurred. If arrest did not prevent Auman from being held
liable for Jaehnig's murderous actions, it is wholly unsound that the ap-
plication of the felony murder doctrine in this case was for deterrence
reasons.' 37 Norm Mueller of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers stated that the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of
the felony murder statute was "not just a stunningly bad interpretation of
the felony murder law, it's awful public policy.' 38  This type of broad
interpretation, instead of deterring accidental death, could have the oppo-
site effect and place police officers at risk since there will not be an in-
centive to surrender when fleeing from a felony.' 39  This would more
likely deter surrender and not deter homicides. 40  When felony murder
liability is stretched so far that even arrest does not terminate it, the de-
terrence theory of felony murder appears to be a fallacy.
2. Reaffirms Sanctity of Human Life
One of the reasons for the enduring felony murder rule is that the
doctrine "reaffirms the sanctity of human life.' 4 1 The rule reflects soci-
ety's view that the crime of homicide that occurs during a felony de-
serves a harsher punishment than for a felony that does not result in a
death.' 42 However, what makes felony murder distinct from other first-
133. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799-800 nn.23-4
(1982) (reporting the data)).
134. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516-17; Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
135. 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965).
136. Washington, 402 P.2d at 133 (citations omitted).
137. See People v. Williams, 406 P.2d 647, 650 (Cal. 1965) (stating that deterrence purpose of
felony murder doctrine was not served when the doctrine was used with a non-inherently dangerous
crime); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516-17.




141. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517-18; State v. La Grand, 734 P.2d 563, 572 (Ariz. 1987)
("The felony murder rule, designed as it is to protect human life, represents sounds public policy, is
reasonably related to the end sought to be accomplished, and is not constitutionally impermissible.").
142. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517.
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degree murder is that the death is accidental or negligent.1 43 Since the
death is accidental, the felon should not pay for the crime with the same
degree of punishment as a vicious murderer.44 This use of the rule is not
reasonable, and furthermore, is not in the interests of justice, to punish a
criminal who did not have the mens rea to commit a premeditated murder
with punishments reserved for first-degree murderers. 145 Moreover, an
individual who did not actually pull the trigger on the gun, and who was
physically incapable of committing the murder, or preventing it, should
not be forced to serve the time for another's actions. 146 This in no way
"reaffirms the sanctity of human life.' ' 147 The justification for reaffirm-
ing society's ideal of the sanctity of life is merely a guise for allowing a
punishment that does not fit the crime. 148 Furthermore, when the doc-
trine is stretched to include an individual such as Auman, who has volun-
tarily turned herself over to police custody, the justification no longer is
logical.' 49 The Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the doctrine
has expanded the felony murder rule beyond its original premise.
IV. FELONY MURDER ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
A. Other States' Felony Murder Statutes
Throughout the years, each jurisdiction struggled to define and cod-
ify felony murder. In the past century there was a trend, in some juris-
dictions, to limit felony murder, either by scope or by punishment.
50
The first felony murder statute emerged in Illinois in 1827.151 At
this point in time, felony murder was used to only hold liable those per-
sons who engaged in felonies that resulted in a death.' 52  The death,
though unintentional, still needed to be reasonably foreseeable. 53 Since
the codification of this felony murder rule, the doctrine has been ex-





146. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517 ("Even if a felony that results in a death should be
punished more severely than one that does not result in a homicide, it hardly follows that a felon
who accidentally takes a life should be subject to the severe penalties, including death or life impris-
onment, reserved for murderers."); but see Auman, 109 P.3d at 650 (holding, as a matter of law, that
Auman's arrest did not terminate felony murder liabilty).
147. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517-18.
148. See Tomkovicz, supra note 97, at 1457 (describing the justifications for felony murder as
a delusion).
149. See generally id.
150. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 519 ("Many courts have engrafted limitations on the
felony-murder rule .... ); Roth & Sundby, supra note 130, at 446-47.
151. I11. Rev. Code, Crim. Code, 22, 24, 28 (1827).
152. See Binder, supra note 113, at 65 ("Beginning in the 1820s, many American legislatures
passed true felony murder statutes, imposing murder liability for all killings in the attempt of certain
felonies.").
153. Id. at 121 (statutes during this time period used language such as "naturally" and "prob-
able consequences" to include an element of foreseeability).
154. See Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 650 (Colo. 2005); see DRESSLER, supra note 2, at
519.
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For instance, Michigan requires an accomplice to have intent to kill
and therefore, entirely abolished the common law felony murder rule
through case law. 155 Similarly, Hawaii and Kentucky have abolished
their felony murder statutes. 56 Ohio eliminated the felony murder stat-
ute and changed it to involuntary manslaughter.1 57 Minnesota and Wis-
consin have likewise reduced the degree of felony murder and the pun-
ishment that couples it.' 58  Moreover, the state supreme court in New
Mexico determined that there must be a mens rea requirement for felony
murder.' 59 Other states have reduced the punishment that accompanies
felony murder. Alaska, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah
all have reduced felony murder to second degree murder instead of first
degree murder.' 60  Other states have added an affirmative defense.'61
Furthermore, England, the source of American common law, abolished
its felony murder rule in 1957.162
However, even these attempts to reduce the harshness of the felony
murder doctrine have met criticism because "they do not resolve [the
rule's] essential illogic.' ' 163 Even with legislation reducing the scope and
punishments that accompany felony murder convictions, this rule contin-
ues to be stretched beyond reason. 164
B. Other States'Felony Murder Case Law
Other states have looked at the issue of arrest in the context of fel-
ony murder liability. For instance, a Georgia case deliberately stated that
"[t]he underlying felony can.., terminate for the purpose of the felony-
murder rule if the perpetrator is arrested."'' 65 Likewise, in Coleman v.
155. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 335 (Mich. 1980) ("Today we simply declare that the
offense popularly known as felony murder, which, properly understood, has nothing to do with
malice and is not a species of common-law murder, shall no longer exist in Michigan, if indeed it
ever did."); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
156. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 (2004) (First-degree murder statute does not include felony
murder); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (LexisNexis 2004) (same); see also DRESSLER, supra note
2, at 515 n.110.
157. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01, 2903.04 (LexisNexis 2005).
158. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 315 (Minnesota reduced felony murder to a third degree offense);
WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (2005) (Wisconsin reduced felony murder to class B felony that includes no
more than a twenty year prison sentence).
159. State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (N.M. 1991); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at
515 n.l10.
160. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 315 (discussing other jurisdictions handling of felony murder
statutes); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30. l(A)(2)(a) (2005);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(b) (2005) ("A criminal
homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was en-
gaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
202(l)(d) (2005).
161. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 2005).
162. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § I (Eng.); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at
515.
163. Roth & Sundby, supra note 130, at 447 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at
36(1962)).
164. See, e.g., Auman, 109 P.3d at 650; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(2) (Lex-
isNexis 2005).
165. Collier v. State, 261 S.E.2d 364, 372 (Ga. 1979) (overruled on other grounds).
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United States,166 the issue on review was whether there was "such an
'arrest' of the appellant as to break the essential link between the robbery
and the killing."'' 67 If a determination could be made that the arrest did
break the essential link between the felony and the death, arrest would
have terminated the immediate flight stage and cut off felony murder
liability.
168
In People v. Irby,169 a New York court was faced with a question of
whether the temporary police custody of the defendant terminated the
underlying felony.' 70 At the trial court, the jury was not instructed on the
issue of arrest. The New York Court of Appeals determined that Irby
was entitled to have a proper trial where the jury would be instructed on
the significance of her police custody or arrest. 171 The court further de-
termined that it was error for the appellate division to deem the issue of
arrest irrelevant.
172
A California court reversed a defendant's conviction for first-degree
murder when he and a co-participant robbed a store and the owner of the
store shot and killed the co-participant. 173 The court concluded that hold-
ing the defendant liable for his co-participant's death was an absurd use
of the felony murder doctrine. 74  Furthermore, this court likened the
result with that of a robber being held responsible for a co-participant's
actions when he himself was already under arrest and in police custody at
the time the accomplice was killed.
75
The California case is analogous to the situation in the Auman
1 76
Though Auman's accomplice was not the one killed, it parallels the
situation. 77 The California court condemned this exact application of
the felony murder doctrine that Colorado applied in Auman.178  The
Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a co-participant will still be
found responsible for acts committed by other participants, even while in
police custody. This is a legally absurd use of the felony murder doc-
trine.
Yet, in deciding Auman, the court refused to conclude that as a mat-
ter of law arrest should terminate liability.179 The court decided to leave
166. 295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
167. Coleman, 295 F.2d at 561.
168. Id. at 560-61.
169. 47 N.Y.2d 894 (N.Y. 1979).
170. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d at 895.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 135 (Cal. 1965).
174. Washington, 402 P.2d at 134.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also Auman, 109 P.3d at 653.
177. Id.
178. Washington, 402 P.2d at 134.
179. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
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the issue to the jury and remanded the case.180  Unfortunately, because
the court dodged the issue at hand, the law in Colorado now stands that
arrest as a matter of law does not terminate the immediate flight stage of
felony murder. 181 In fact, because the court refused to discuss the issue
of terminating immediate flight, the stage of immediate flight in felony
murder could possibly be endless. 82 The court needed to define the limi-
tation and scope of the immediate flight stage of felony murder. 83 Ar-
rest is so significant to an individual's culpability concerning felony
murder that in Colorado arrest should terminate immediate flight in fel-
ony murder as a matter of law.
V. BACKGROUND
The scope of felony murder can, and has, been stretched to cover
those felons who are not even in the course of committing the felony but
are in the flight therefrom. 84 Colorado amended its felony murder stat-
ute in 1971 to include the phrase "immediate flight therefrom."' 85 This
concept has been codified into the current Colorado statute186 and was
derived both from New York's penal law and Colorado cases decided
before the revision of the code. 187 Currently, Colorado has one of the
most stringent felony murder statutes in the United States.'
88
A. Overview of Colorado's Felony Murder Statute
Colorado's felony murder statute has been deemed one of the harsh-
est felony murder statutes in the country.189  In the state of Colorado,
felony murder is classified as first-degree murder, 190 which carries with it
the equally harsh sentence of life imprisonment without parole. "9! In
1971, Colorado's General Assembly modeled the Colorado felony mur-
der statute on New York's penal law. 192  New York added the words
"immediate flight therefrom" to "clarify that felony-murder liability does
not terminate upon the completion of the predicate felony."' 93 The for-
180. Id. at 671.
181. Id. at 650.
182. See generally Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, What Constitutes Termination of Felony for
Purposes of Felony-Murder Rule, 58 A.L.R. 3D 851 (2004).
183. Id. § 9.
184. Id.
185. Act of June 2, 1971, ch. 121, sec. 1, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 388, 418; COLO. REV. STAT. §
40-3-102(l)(b) (1971).
186. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2005).
187. § 40-3-102(l)(b); see also Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 657-58 (Colo. 2005).
188. § 18-3-102(1)(b).
189. See Auman, 109 P.3d at 650 (ruling in case expanded liability by stating that even arrest
will not automatically terminate immediate flight from felony). For less harsh felony murder stat-
utes, see supra Part IV.
190. § 18-3-102(l)(b).
191. § 18-3-102(3) ("Murder in the first degree is a class 1 felony."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1.3-401(V)(A) (2005) (requiring a minimum sentence of life imprisonment, a maximum sentence of
death coupled with no mandatory period of parole for class I felonies).
192. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (Consol. 2004).
193. Auman, 109 P.3d at 658 (reciting reasons for including "immediate flight therefrom"
language within revision of felony murder statute); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-102(l)(b) (1971).
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mer Colorado felony murder statute did not include the words "immedi-
ate flight therefrom,"'' 94 but the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted this
statute to encompass immediate flight within felony murder liability.' 95
Within Colorado case law, the expansion of felony murder liability en-
compassing immediate flight first began to emerge. 1
96
1. Colorado - Emergence of Immediate Flight in Felony Murder
Liability
Colorado's previous felony murder statute stated that murder com-
mitted in the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of a specific fel-
ony would be considered first-degree murder. 197  The statute did not
specify any limitations on when and where perpetration of a crime termi-
nates. Without a statute that clarified and defined immediate flight from
an underlying felony, Colorado courts were free to set limitations of li-
ability or to expand upon it.198
Before the phrase "immediate flight therefrom" was codified in
Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted this phrase to be
within the scope of felony murder liability. For instance, in Bizup v.
People,199 the defendant robbed a taxi-cab driver and shot and killed him
later in the evening.200 The defendant was convicted of first-degree mur-
der, although he contended that the murder occurred after the robbery
had ended. 20 ' The court affirmed his first-degree murder conviction and
held that "[t]he robbery and the killing which followed were all part of
the same transaction. They were so closely connected in point of time,
place, and continuity of action as to be one continuous transaction.,
20 2
The court, in this case, demonstrated how actions committed after the
initial felony could still be considered part of the crime for purposes of
felony murder liability.20 3
Furthermore, in People v. McCrary,2°4 the court affirmed the defen-
dant's felony murder conviction based on the fact that he and the co-
felon were still in the immediate flight from the felony.20 5 The defendant
and the co-felon had robbed a doughnut shop and kidnapped an em-
194. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-3(1) (1963) (amended 1971) (current version at § 18-3-
102(l)(b)).
195. See Bizup v. People, 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962); Auman, 109 P.3d at 657.
196. See Bizup, 317 P.2d at 788; People v. McCrary, 549 P.2d 1320, 1331 (Colo. 1976).
197. § 40-2-3(1) ("All murder... which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpe-
trate any arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, or burglary... shall be deemed murder of the first degree..
198. § 40-3-102(l)(b).
199. 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962).
200. Bizup, 371 P.2d at 787.
201. Id. at 788.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 549 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1976).
205. McCrary, 549 P.2d at 1332.
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ployee.2 °6 In this case, the felons, after kidnapping their victim, stopped
at a bar for approximately twenty to thirty minutes to have a drink.20 7
They left the bar and eventually stopped again down the road.20 8 The
defendant's co-participant murdered the employee while the defendant
had stepped out of the car.20 9 Even though the felony murder statute in
force at the time did not mention immediate flight as an element of fel-
ony murder, the court interpreted the statute to cover flight from a fel-
ony.21 ° In this case the court concluded that immediate flight had not
terminated even though the felons had left the scene of the crime, entered
a new location and found a place of temporary safety.211 This case dem-
onstrates the court's ability to broaden the scope of felony murder and
the ease with which the court could expand upon liability.212
When these cases were decided, Colorado's previous felony murder
statute was still in effect.2 13 This prior statute did not specifically state
that immediate flight could trigger felony murder liability. 21 4 However,
the court determined that "escape from the scene of the underlying fel-
ony is part of the res gestae of a crime so that a murder committed to
facilitate the flight can be felony murder., 215 The court interpreted the
statute to include immediate flight from the predicate crime because the
actions of the defendant were "one continuous integrated attempt to suc-
cessfilly complete his crime and escape detention., 21 6 The Colorado
General Assembly would later take these decisions and codify them into
what is presently the felony murder statute in Colorado.2t 7
Colorado modeled its felony murder statute after a similar New
York statute.21 8 Prior to 1965, New York's statute only covered a killing
that occurred during the commission of a felony. 219 However, New York
included the phrases "in the furtherance of' and "immediate flight there-
from" in the statute to reinforce the fact that liability does not end when
the underlying crime is completed. 220 After New York added the "im-
mediate flight" language to the statute, Colorado followed suit in 1971.221
The present felony murder statute in Colorado states in part that:




210. Id. at 1331-32.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-3(1) (1963).
214. See McCrary, 549 P.2d at 1331 n.13; § 40-2-3(1).
215. McCrary, 549 P.2d at 1331. Res Gestae is defined as "the events at issue, or other events
contemporaneous with them." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (8th ed. 2004).
216. McCrary, 549 P.2d at 1332 (quoting Bizup, 371 P.2d at 788).
217. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2005).
218. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25; see also Auman, 109 P.3d at 658.
219. People v. Donovan, 385 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389 (App. Div. 1976).
220. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25; see Auman, 109 P.3d at 658.
221. See supra, note 185.
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A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if...
[a]cting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits
or attempts to commit... burglary... and, in the course of or in fur-
therance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to
commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other
than one of the participants, is caused by anyone.222
Colorado courts have now interpreted this statute to include actions
in furtherance of the immediate flight and have stated that even arrest of
a co-felon does not automatically terminate immediate flight as a matter
of law. 223 The Colorado felony murder rule has now transformed into a
rule that disregards individual intent and foreseeability, ignoring other
states' attack on the doctrine.224
VI. ANALYSIS
Upon granting certiorari, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the law was unsettled on the issue of immediate flight and
when liability terminates. 225 The court had the opportunity to define the
limitations of immediate flight but did not step up to the task. Instead,
the court expanded liability for felony murder by stating that, as a matter
of law, arrest does not automatically terminate immediate flight when a
co-felon still remains in flight.226
The Auman case sparked a national controversy over the degree of
Lisl Auman's culpability.227 Proponents of the Colorado Supreme
Court's ruling in Auman hold strong that Officer VanderJagt was killed
because Auman set into action the course of events that led to the chase
of an enraged skinhead with a death wish.228 Others believe that the un-
derlying events that Auman was involved in terminated once she was
placed in police custody.
229
The outcome of the Auman case is troubling for defendants and de-
fense counsel alike.23° Critics of the expansion of felony murder liability
hold firm that Colorado should place a well-defined limitation on the
scope of immediate flight.231 The most shocking aspect of the Colorado
Supreme Court's ruling was how far the court was willing to stretch the
222. § 18-3-102(1)(b).
223. Auman, 109 P.3d at 651.
224. See supra Part V.A.
225. Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 655 (Colo. 2005).
226. Auman, 109 P.3d at 651.
227. Fortado, supra note 1, at 6.
228. Id.; Diane Carman, Auman Case Complicated But Crucial, DENVER POST, Jan. 21, 2004,
at BO1.
229. Karen Abbott & Jeff Kass, Auman 's Life Term Argued in High Court; "Harsh Result"
Divisive After Officer's 1997 Slaying, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 16, 2004, at 6A. Justice Gregory
Hobbs stated that "This is a harsh result ... She gets life imprisonment. She didn't commit the
murder. She's not committing the burglary, and she's no longer in flight at the time this occurred."
Id. (quoting oral arguments in Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005)).
230. Carman, supra note 228.
231. Reggie Rivers, Felony Murder Law Too Inflexible, DENVER POST, April 1, 2005, at B7.
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boundaries of felony murder liability.232 The ruling on immediate flight
is illogical and could lead to prosecution of participants, like Auman,
who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, and who volun-
tarily surrender themselves over to police custody.23 3
Critics of the felony murder doctrine believe that the rule is being
stretched too far under the guise of "deterring" felonies. 23 4  When the
rule is stretched beyond its reasonable limits, legally unsound results will
follow that are out of line with the general purpose of the felony murder
doctrine.235 The felony murder rule "should not be extended beyond any
rational function that it is designed to serve. 23 6 Was holding Auman
liable for the death of Officer VanderJagt a rational function that the fel-
ony murder rule was designed to serve? The amount of attention this
case has gathered demonstrates that the Colorado Supreme Court has
stretched felony murder liability too far.237
A. Broadening the Scope of Felony Murder
Examining the purpose behind felony murder, it becomes clear that
Colorado has lost all sight of the original intent of the rule - namely to
deter accidental and unintentional deaths.238 In addition, felony murder
is based on the notion that there is a reasonably foreseeable possibility
that a death could occur during some element of the underlying felony.
2 39
But when arrest does not cause the chain to be broken in the immediate
flight element, the purpose behind the felony murder doctrine disap-
pears.240 Liability should be cut off when it no longer is foreseeable that
a death might result in an underlying felony. Liability, also, should be
terminated, as a matter of law, upon arrest.
The Auman court dissected Colorado's felony murder statute to jus-
tify the ruling on immediate flight.24' The Colorado felony murder stat-
ute states that a defendant acting "either alone or with one or more per-
sons" is subject to felony murder liability, even during the "immediate
flight therefrom., 242  The court interpreted this language to indicate that
either a sole participant's liability during immediate flight might be ter-
232. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
233. See Rivers, supra note 23 1, at B7.
234. See supra Part III.B. I (discussing deterrence theory of felony murder).
235. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (discussing absurd results of
felony murder doctrine).
236. Id.
237. See Fortado, supra note 1, at 6; Carman, supra note 228 (quoting Norm Mueller of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers calling the ruling "dangerous"); Abbott & Kass,
supra note 229; Rivers, supra note 231 ("By mandating a life sentence for anyone convicted of this
crime, the legislature has created the potential for situations like Auman's, where she's not totally
innocent, but her punishment is unjust because it's too severe for her role in the crime.").
238. See supra Part 111.B.1; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2005).
239. See supra Part III.A (discussing proximate cause in felony murder).
240. See supra Part III (examining the purposes and justifications of felony murder doctrine).
241. Auman, 109 P.3d at 656-57.
242. § 18-3-102(l)(b).
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minated by arrest, or that all the participants must be in custody for arrest
to terminate the immediate flight stage.243 However, the Colorado Su-
preme Court gave no authority for this reading of the statute. The felony
murder statute does not clarify whether all of the participants, some or
just one of them must be in police custody for immediate flight to termi-
nate. 244 Therefore, it is plausible that there is another logical reading of
the statute. The arrest of only one participant should not preclude a find-
ing that the immediate flight stage has been terminated for that one indi-
vidual.245 The court relied on the fact that the General Assembly did not
specifically write this particular instance into the statute, and therefore,
concluded that the non-existence of any wording to indicate that the ar-
rest of only one participant could terminate the immediate flight stage
was not unintentional.246
The notion that people should be held responsible for the natural
and probable consequences of their acts is at the center of criminal law
jurisprudence.247 In the State of Colorado, felony murder has been ap-
plied and upheld in cases where a killing occurred because of the natural
248and probable consequences of the defendant's actions. Auman is not
one of these cases. There is a fine line to be drawn between "but for"
causation, that the jury used to hold Auman liable, and the point where
liability terminates.249 Using the overly simple "but for" causation test in
all felony murder cases, every slight action of every person involved
could result in numerous people being held liable for first-degree murder.
"But for" causation does not leave room for intervening causes or un-
foreseeable results.25°
The Colorado Supreme Court, in People v. Calvaresi,251 defined the
standard of intervening causes in death cases:
To warrant a conviction for homicide, the death must be the natural
and probable consequence of the unlawful act, and not the result of
an independent intervening cause in which the accused does not par-
ticipate, and which he could not foresee. If it appears that the act of
the accused was not the proximate cause of the death for which he is
243. Auman, 109 P.3d at 656.
244. § 18-3-102(l)(b).
245. See Barbre, supra note 182 (noting that the issue of arrest terminating liability for felony
murder purposes has been raised with varying degrees of success.) Most existing case law on this
topic "can be read as supporting the view that under certain circumstances arrest could terminate the
underlying felony." Id.
246. Auman, 109 P.3d at 656-57 (citing Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc., 929 P.2d 1332,
1339 (Colo. 1997)).
247. See Hamrick v. People, 624 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Colo. 1981).
248. See id,
249. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 523 ("The but-for causal connection is often
easy to satisfy.").
250. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner, supra note 131, at 15 ("The broad 'but for' theory of felony murder causation
argued by the prosecution in Ms. Auman's case does not increase the deterrence value of the felony
murder rule enough to justify the increased harshness of its results.").
251. 534 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1975).
20051
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
being prosecuted, but that another cause intervened, with which he
was in no way connected, and but for which death would not have
occurred, such supervening cause is a defense to the charge of homi-
cide.
252
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that Auman did not qualify for
an instruction on intervening cause since both she and Jaehnig were still
running from the burglary.253 However, the court could have issued an
instruction to the jury regarding arrest being a sufficient intervening
cause.254 The Auman court did conclude that arrest is an issue for the
jury;255 therefore, the Auman case warranted a jury instruction on the
issue of intervening causes since there was an issue of arrest as a super-
vening cause.
The court held that as a matter of law an arrest of a co-felon does
not terminate liability while another participant is still in the immediate
flight stage of the predicate crime.256 This rule may bring about legally
absurd results in the justice system. In most burglaries, there is a rea-
sonably foreseeable possibility that a death could ensue. 7 However, in
the Auman case, it was an unforeseeable result that Jaehnig would kill
the officer once Auman was already placed in police custody. 8 In gen-
eral terms, holding a co-participant liable for the death of an officer after
being taken into police custody and having no further control over the
actions of the co-participant, is a legally unsound result.
B. A Solution: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime
The felony murder doctrine has been slated as an "ancient rule" that
has been "created apart from any constitutional considerations and has
been bombarded by intense criticism and constitutional attack., 259 One
attack on felony murder is that the punishment does not fit the crime in
some circumstances. 6 ° In Auman, the punishment was excessive in rela-
tion to the crime that was committed. She did not actually pull the trig-
ger, but was charged, in essence, as if she had.26' She was sentenced
252. Id. at 319 (quoting 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 200,
at 448 (12th ed. 1957)).
253. Auman, 109 P.3d at 663.
254. See Calvaresi, 534 P.2d at 319.
255. Auman, 109 P.3d at 651.
256. Id. at 650.
257. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515 (noting that burglary is an inherently dan-
gerous felony); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 37 (1962) ("For the vast majority of
cases it is probably true that homicide occurring during the commission or attempted commission of
a felony is murder independent of the felony-murder rule.").
258. Auman, 109 P.3d at 653.
259. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1171 (N.J. 1994).
260. See Roth & Sundby supra note 130, at 446; Donald Baier, Note, Arizona Felony Murder:
Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 701, 703 (1994) ("[F]elony murder rule, al-
though popular with prosecutors, is under attack from academics and legislators who wish to limit its
harshness in extreme cases.").
261. See supra note 191 (Felony murder is a class I felony and carries with it a minimum
sentence of life in prison with no mandatory period of parole).
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with life imprisonment without parole - a sentence that should be re-
served for those who commit first-degree murder.262
Felony murder "turns on fortuitous events that do not distinguish
the intention or moral culpability of the defendants. 263 One scholar even
declares that "neither state legislatures nor the courts have sought to
bring the felony-murder rule into line with well-accepted criteria of indi-
vidual accountability and proportionate punishment.
' 264
The common punishment for felony murder is either the death pen-
alty (under specific circumstances) or life sentence without parole.265
For a non-triggerman to be punished with a life sentence without parole
is equally excessive and disproportionate when taken in perspective with
the seriousness of the underlying felony.266 If Auman, for instance, had
only been convicted of burglary without felony murder attaching, she
would not have been sentenced to a life sentence without parole.267 She
did not pull the trigger and kill the officer, but she was sentenced with
the punishment as if she did.268
In Enmund v. Florida,269 the United States Supreme Court stated
that "[i]t is fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be pun-
ished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.'
' 270
This ruling should likewise extend to the excessive punishment of life
without parole in specific cases where the harm was caused unintention-
ally.271 After the Court's holding in Enmund, the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding in Auman seems unjust and excessive.272 The punish
ment should fit the crime.
In Auman, the Colorado Supreme Court ignored the development in
other jurisdictions of limiting felony murder liability.2 73  Other states
have placed well-defined limitations on felony murder, and some have
abolished this theory altogether based on the "widespread trend, both in
the Model Penal Code and in other states, to abolish or narrow a rule
262. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517 ("it hardly follows that a felon who accidentally takes
a life should be subject to the severe penalties, including death or life imprisonment, reserved for
murderers.").
263. Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); see also People v.
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 328 (Mich. 1980).
264. George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 413, 418 (1981).
265. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-90 (1982) (concluding that death penalty for a
non-triggerman charged with felony murder violated Eighth Amendment).
266. See id. at 797.
267. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-202(2) (2005) (naming burglary as a class 3 felony, bringing
with it a minimum of four years and maximum of twelve years imprisonment).
268. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650 (affinming conviction of felony murder).
269. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).




273. See supra Part IV; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 30 (1962) ("[I]t is the
submission of the Model Code that the felony-murder doctrine should be abandoned as an independ-
ent basis for establishing the criminality of homicide.").
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universally viewed as unprincipled. 274  The Colorado felony murder
statute's definition of "immediate flight" needs to be clarified and have
limitations set.
One suggestion for eliminating the vastly unsound results that could
appear in future cases based on the Auman ruling, is that the statute, in
general, could carry with it a less harsh punishment: one that fits the
crime. In a criminal trial the jurors are not advised of the effect of the
conviction. 275  The jury does not know what the sentencing or penalty
will be. 276 For instance, an average juror would not know that convicting
a defendant of felony murder carries with it a mandatory life sentence
without parole.277 In fact, juror Linda Chin regretted convicting Auman,
and stated that "[w]hat happened to Lisl [Auman] is wrong, absolutely
wrong. This is one of those rare issues that is so clearly unjust that it
leaves no room for doubt or argument., 278  To eliminate future unjust
results, the Colorado statute should be reformed. Other jurisdictions
have both first-degree and second-degree felony murder statutes.279
Colorado only has first-degree requiring a mandatory life sentence if
convicted. 280  There is no steadfast rule mandating that it be first-degree
murder; 281 that determination is left solely to the legislatures and those in
charge of sentencing.282
There are various degrees of mens rea within the crime of homi-
cide. 28 3 This division of culpability is divided by the intent the individual
274. Judge Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 135, 147 (2001); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 30 (1962) ("The effect of the Model Penal Code, there-
fore, is to abandon felony murder as a separate basis for establishing liability for homicide .....
275. One pattern jury instruction states that:
The question of possible punishment of the defendant is of no concern to the jury and
should not, in any sense, enter into or influence your deliberations. The duty of imposing
sentence rests exclusively upon the court. Your function is to weigh the evidence in the
case and to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
solely upon the basis of such evidence. Under your oath as jurors, you cannot allow a
consideration of the punishment which may be imposed upon the defendant, if he is con-
victed, to influence your verdict, in any way, or, in any sense, enter into your delibera-
tions.
1 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS -CRIMINAL § 9.01(Matthew Bender 2005).
276. Id.
277. See supra note 191 (sentencing for class I felonies).
278. Free List! Press Conference and Rally, at 7,
http://www.lisl.con/documents/free lislpress-transcpt.pdf (transcript of Linda Chin's statement, as
read by Kathy Sparks, at a May 14, 2001 rally for List Auman on the steps of the Colorado State
Capitol building).
279. See supra Part IV; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 41-42 (1962).
280. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2004); see also supra note 191 (sentencing for class
I felonies).
281. See supra Part IV (noting that each individual jurisdiction can define scope of felony
murder statute).
282. See id.
283. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 115-42 (stating that mens rea includes inten-
tionally, knowingly, willfully, negligent or reckless); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210, introduc-
tory n., at 1 (1962) (stating that the Model Penal Code has abandoned the degree structure of crimi-
nal law and instead "classifies all criminal homicides into the three basic categories of murder,
manslaughter, and negligent homicide.").
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had upon committing the crime.284 For example, if one accidentally
causes the death of another in an automobile collision, it is usually
deemed as a reckless act, specifically vehicular homicide.285 However,
for felony murder, there is no actual intent for the homicide, only the
intent for the underlying felony.286 This needs to be taken into considera-
tion in sentencing felony murder defendants.
Jurisdictions across the United States have dealt with felony murder
sentencing in different capacities.287 Following the trend that "[l]esser
culpability yields lesser liability, ' 288 some states have divided felony
murder itself into degrees. 289 For instance, New York has second-degree
felony murder.290  The sentencing for second-degree is not as harsh as
that for first-degree, thereby providing a more reasonable sentence for
those individuals who did not have the requisite culpability to commit
first-degree murder.291  Other jurisdictions have eliminated the felony
murder rule completely. 292 When Hawaii abolished the felony murder
statute, it inserted the following commentary into its statutes:
Even in its limited formulation the felony-murder rule is still objec-
tionable. It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, negligent,
or reckless homicide into murder simply because, without more, the
killing was in furtherance of a criminal objective of some defined
class. Engaging in certain penally-prohibited behavior may, of
course, evidence a recklessness sufficient to establish manslaughter,
or a practical certainty or intent, with respect to causing death, suffi-
cient to establish murder, but such a finding is an independent deter-
mination which must rest on the facts of each case. In recognition of
the trend toward, and the substantial body of criticism supporting, the
abolition of the felony-murder rule, and because of the extremely
questionable results which the rule has worked in other jurisdictions,
the Code has eliminated from our law the felony-murder rule.
2 93
If the Colorado Supreme Court is unwilling to pull the reigns in on
felony murder liability, it is up to the legislature to provide a more rea-
sonable and fitting approach to felony murder.2 94 The felony murder rule
is not being used for its original purpose.295 In Colorado, the addition of
284. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 115-42.
285. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-106 (2005).
286. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
287. See supra Part IV; see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
288. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 36 (1962).
289. See supra Part IV.
290. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 2005).
291. See supra Part IV.
292. " See id.
293. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Mich 1980) (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-
701, commentary). Aaron gives an extensive overview of the history of felony murder in England
and the United States in support of Michigan abolishing the felony murder doctrine. Id. at 307-27.
294. See Rivers, supra note 231, at B7 (calling for the legislature to review felony murder
statute and define a level of intent and to define when flight terminates).
295. See supra Part III.
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the affirmative defense was the legislature's attempt to reform the felony
murder doctrine to allow for an accomplice to be excluded from liabil-
ity.2 96 If this is the extent of reform that the legislature is willing to par-
ticipate in, it is up to the courts to bring felony murder into accord with
other jurisdictions and countries around the world.297
CONCLUSION
In Auman v. People,298 the Colorado Supreme Court expanded li-
ability and held that an arrest, as a matter of law, does not terminate li-
ability for purposes of felony murder when a co-felon is still in the im-
mediate flight stage. 299 The court increased liability for felony murder,
ignoring the elements of proximate cause, such as foreseeability and in-
tention, and refused to acknowledge an intervening cause. 300 Results such
as Auman, are illogical and legally unsound when viewed in light of the
history and justifications of the felony murder doctrine. 30 1  The felony
murder rule should not be extended beyond the purpose for which it was
designed to serve.30 2 Holding Auman liable for the death of Officer Van-
derJagt was an illogical extension of the felony murder rule.30 3 Further
abuse of the doctrine can be avoided if the Colorado felony murder stat-
ute is solidified in regards to placing a well-defined limitation on the
immediate flight stage.
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296. See Fletcher, supra note 264, at 420.
297. See id.; see supra Part IV; see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 321-
40 (1978) (discussing French, German and Soviet homicide laws).
298. 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).
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302. See id.
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